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ABSTRACT 
TRADE UNIONS AND INCOMES POLICIES: 
BRITISH UNIONS AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT IN THE 1970s --~~ .-....~ ..... - - - -
This is an investigation of the trade union role in the Social Contract 
incomes policies in Britain during the 1970s. In the context of the general 
political economy of the period, the study looks at the development in the 
early 1970s of an accord between the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the 
Labour Party known as the Social Contract, examines the trade union 
participation in the series of voluntary incomes policies that followed the 
election of the Labour Government in 1974, and charts the development or 
opposition to such participation oulminating in the collapse of the policy 
in the winter of 1978-1979 and the subsequent defeat of the Labour 
Government in the 1979 general election. More specifically, the study 
focuses on the experience of six individual unions within the context of TUC 
policy-making: the articulations between their approaches to incomes policy 
and their collective bargaining policies, the anatomy of their responses and 
policies towards the various phases of the Social Contract, the mobilization 
of consent and/or opposition to TUe and Government policy in each union, and 
the limits placed on relative union leadership discretion to participate in 
TUe policy-making by the political and industrial processes and 
organizational structure of each union. 
The research has involved a variety of sources and methods. First, 
there has been an attempt to draw on and link the diverse areas of the 
industrial relations literature which are concerned with the relationship 
between trade Unions and incomes policies. These include the separate 
literatures on incomes policy, on the link between trade unions and the 
Labour Party and Labour governments, on trade union government and the 
soc1010gy of trade union organizations, and on the debate over 'corporatist' 
types of arrangements between trade unions and the state. Secondly, the 
research has involved the use of a wide range of primary and secondary trade 
union and political documentary sources on this period of history through 
the 1970s. Finally, the detailed case studies of the six sample unions have 
involved both primary documentary materials and extensive interviewing. 
Thus, the materials collected for the study constitute a unique source on 
different approaches to the 1970s pay policies, on their industrial impact 
and the political processes that they engendered within individual unions, 
and on the broader relations between British trade unions and the state 
during this period. 
The theoretical contribution of the study is primarily exploratory in 
nature. It identifies the constraints to which national union leaderships 
are· subject when they engage or attempt to engage in macro-economic and 
political exchanges with the state. Such constraints are explored in an 
eXamination of the upwards and downwards mediations that occur within trade 
unions as illustrated by the variations within and between trade unions in 
the mobilization of consent and opposition to the Social Contract incomes 
policies. This analysis informs debates about the limits and/or viability 
of other corporatist or 'Social Contract' types of arrangements. It also 
investigates the organizational implications of voluntary incomes policies 
and compares the internal political processes and industrial practices of 
British trade unions: at the level of t~e TUC as a whole, within individual 
affiliates and, in partiCUlar, in the articulations between TUC and 
individual union policy-making and bargaining behaviour. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
This is a study .of the trade union role in the Social Contract 
incomes policies in Britain in the 1970s. It specifically focuses on 
the interrelations between the policy-making.of the Trades Union 
Congress (TUC) and six of its major affiliates. It is argued that 
an understanding of voluntary incomes policies must be grounded in 
the analysis of internal union policy-making which determines the 
relative discretion available to national trade union leaders to 
engage in macro-economic and political exchanges with the state. This 
introductory chapter attempts to establish the basis of such an 
approach and outlines the research design. The chapter ~s divided 
into three main parts. The first explores the research problem. The 
second examines the research strategy detailing the settings of the 
research, the research process and various methodological 
considerations. Finally, the third part outlines the organization of 
the results. 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM 
The relationship between trade unions and incomes policies has 
emerged as possibly th~ pre-eminent industrial relations 'problem' 
for state policy makers in the United Kingdom since the Second World 
1 
War. This study is about that relationship- Why has 'incomes policy 
been such a problem in Britain? The response is two-fold. First, 
because of chronic economic problems, policy-makers have repeatedly 
attempted to implement policies designed to restrain wages and reduce 
levels of price inflation. Secondly, however, these policies have 
demonstrated a marked propensity to breakdown. The demise of these 
policies has frequently been attributed either to an outright trade 
. 
union hostility to,their implementation or to a withdrawal of the 
cooperat.ion that had previously been forthco~g._. 
The incomes policy experience in Britain, therefore, might be 
understood in the light of both the structure and performance of the 
economy and the relative willingness of trade unions either to 
cooperate or acquiesce in such policies. This study focuses on this 
latter dimension of the British incomes policy experience. This 
section will attempt briefly to place both in perspective. It first 
looks at the possible range of state intervention in the labour 
market and locates the British experience in the context of the range 
of comparable international experience. It then outlines the 
essential elements of the Britisb experience, particularly the 
problematic nature of the trade union role therein. Finally, drawing 
on the relevant literature, it attempts to identify key questions tor 
theoretical and empirical investigation. 
State Intervention in the Labour Market 
Incomes poliCies shOUld be understood as a form of state 
intervention in the labour market. The state is invariably present 
in the labour market (for a theoretical and empirical account of the 
role of the state in the labour market, particularly the capitalistic 
2 
labour market, see Hyman, 1975; Crouch, 1977; Strinati, 1979; Giles, 
1985). This presence assumes a variety of forms, but it.can be argued 
that the state affects both the form of labour market interactions 
and their outcomes. Firstly, it affects the form and character of 
labour market interactions: through leg~l regulation of individual 
"and collective employment relations; through the promotion or 
legislation of schemes such as industria.l democracy, 'concerted 
action' .. and quality of working life; and through exhortlve or 
advisory bodies such as voluntary conciliation services, agencies to 
promote workplace reform and bodies inte·nded to influence the 
direction of public opinion on labour market issues. Secondly, state 
agencies or governments also intervene directly or indirectly to 
establish the range of acceptable labour market outcomes, 
particularly the nominal and/or real price at which labour power is 
exchanged in the labour market. The general framework of state 
economic policy such as relative levels of demand and fiscal policy, 
of course, affects the pattern of labour market outcomes. More 
direct intervention includes the definition of minimum terms· and 
conditions for labour market exchanges. In periods of inoessant 
inflationary pressures and increased international competition, 
governments have also sought to influence directly and indirectly the 
real price or the rate of increase in the price of labour market 
exchanges. Such intervention is generally called incomes or wages or 
pay policy. 
Incomes policies have been a oentral component of state 
economic policy in a variety of advanced capitalist nations since the 
second World War (see, i.e., Shonfield, 1965). Such polioies have 
3 
occasionally been designed for their 
veritable supplement to fiscal policy. 
redistributive effect - a 
More typically, they have 
been concerned with reducing the level of nominal wage increases, 
sometimes to effect reductions in real wages and sometimes to 
maintain real wage increases at a level equivalent to or less than 
the rate of productivity growth. However, the rationale,.design and 
institutional arrangements of such poli~ies have been highly 
differeptiated both by country and over time (see, i.e., Braun, 1975; 
Flanagan et al., 1983; von Beyme, 1980: 256-285). The state might, 
for instance, define in law permissible liI:lits--on wage increases' as-
in the' case of statutory wage controls. Alternatively, state 
agencies or government departments might seek to encourage a range of 
outcomes through recommended norms or voluntary guidelines. However, 
exhortation and advice have been generally ineffective without the 
support of other political or industrial influence. Thus, policies 
direoted at achieving specified labour market outcomes on a voluntary 
or consensual basis typically operate through direct political 
mediations with representative organizations of employees or 
employers which, in turn, influence the behaviour of their 
constituent members. Incomes policies have generally assumed some 
varia tion of these two forms: either directly administered by the 
state or voluntarily by representative labour market organizations. 
Governments have frequently attempted to influence labour market 
behaviour through political mediations with particular employers, 
unions and industrial sectors. The case of their own employees in 
the public sector has often proved irresistible as an instrument or 
example of wider policy objectives, especially in more recent years 
of publio expenditure restraint. A wage policy targeted on a 
4 
particular sector, employer or union is sometimes practicable without 
the support of a broader tripartite or bipartite agreement if the 
state can exert a particularly strong influence on that sector or 
rely on the cooperation of the employer or the union. fbwever, 
equality of sacrifice appears'to be an important normative dimension 
for voluntary partiCipation in a wage policies (see, i.e~, Barbara 
Wootton, 1955: 161-190). Moreover, incomes policies are often 
targeted at a broader range of labour market exchanges. 'Iherefore, 
central union confederations and employers' organizations, either 
through - tripartite or bipartite arrangements, -a!"e a more typical-
vehicle for voluntary agreements on wage restraint. 
The problem with such agreements, however, even Where they are 
obtainable, is the degree to which such representative organizations 
are capable of translating policy support into actual industrial 
practice. Where central trade union and employer organizations enjoy 
a high degree of power and authority over affiliated organizations, 
largely a by-product of both bargaining structure (see Clegg, 1976b) 
and the absence of competing confederations organized on the basis of 
political affiliation, the move from centralized policy-making to 
industrial practice has been more clearly articulated and less 
problema tic. Where prevailing institutional arrangements do 'not 
correspond to this pattern, as in the case of British bargaining 
structure, such forms of administered state intervention in the 
labour market have proved less durable. Before exploring the British 
experience of incomes policies in greater detail, the next section 
first places it in the context of international experience. 
5 
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International Patterns 
At the risk of oversimplifying complex national patterns, the 
experience of incomes policies in advanced capitalist nations in the 
post-war period might be divided into three broad groups. First, 
there are a number of economies which have operated some form of 
incomes policy on a more or less continuous basis over most of the 
post-war period. Secondly, there are those countries which have 
adopted incomes policies on a temporary or exceptional basis, but 
otherwise either relied on other forms of m:u;'ket intervention or 
adopted a.laisser-faire approach to labour marke~~u~cmes. Finally,_ 
there are countries which for a variety of institutional and 
political reasons have usually avoided recourse to a formal incomes 
policy as a central component of their anti-inflation strategies but 
have, instead, exercised some other form of 1nf'luence on nominal or 
real wage increases and their relative distribution. Of course, many 
states have altered the direction of their policies over the post-war 
period or simultaneously explored more than one ~f the above options. 
A number of Western European countries with relatively 
centralized bargaining arrangements, a single or dominant trade union 
," 
confederation, a predominant central employers' organization, and 
fairly elaborate consultative systems, often accompanied by a 
dominant sooial democratic political party, have generally succeeded 
in the almost continuous operation of some form of wage guidelines. 
In Austria and Norway, for example, this has been accompliShed 
through a formal tripartite system and direct state intervention in· 
wage bargaining. In Sweden, there was bipartite cooperation between 
the central union and employer organizations which sustained the 
former's commitment to an egalitarian ~wages solidarity' policy. In 
6 
recent years, however, the stability of this arrangement has been 
undermined by the increasing influence of other trade union 
confederations, the problem ot public sector pay relativities and 
some decentralization in the structure of bargaining. In Germany, 
there has been a mixture of more informal em.ploye~ cooperation and 
tripartite consultation or 'concertation' over the general" direction 
ot economic policy; although there have been few attempts at direct 
government intervention and the central union organization, the OOB, 
has retained a consistent opposition to formal incomes policies. 
These countries have been judged ~s fairly successful in the 
implementation ot more or less permanent pay policies .(see, i.e., 
Anderson and Turner, 1980: 33-34; Clegg, 1976b; on the case of 
Sweden, see Korpi and Shalev, 1979). The experience of 'guided wage 
policy' in the Netherlands resembled the pattern demonstrated by the 
examples of 'permanent' policies listed above, but the apparent 
consensus broke down in the 1960s (see Flanagan et al., 1983: 83-
154). Notably, both employer and trade union representation in 
Holland were divided among competing organizations and these 
divisions, in the face of increasing external and internal economic. 
pressures, seemed to be an important factor in the subsequent 
inability to generate much consensus on wage questions. 
A second group of countries has periodically opted to implement 
either voluntary or statutory wage policies tor a limited time 
period. In canada and the United States, for example, unions and 
employers have often been less than enthusiastic in their response to 
such policies. The highly fragmented nature of both the collective 
barga1ning system and of employer and union organizations and the 
7 
legal compulsion characteristic of their collective bargaining 
relations have meant that the tight or hard phases of these policies 
have tended to be administered through complex, bureaucratic 
intervention rather than through any voluntary self-administration 
by employers and union organizations. These policies were generally 
intended to tackle immediate inflationary problems through the 
adjustment of wage expectations rather than to resolve the permanent 
problems of pattern bargaining, relativities and differentials. In 
-contrast with the- previous group, these countries possessed 
relatively fragmented bargaining arrangements a.nd . less developed 
systems of conSUltation. 
A third type of incomes policy experience consists of those 
countries which have developed alternative, often administrative, 
systems to the use of formal wage guidelines, however informally 
administered. Australia and New Zealand, for instance, have systems 
of compulsory arbitration which play a significant role in the 
determination of money wage increases and can be used as a vehicle 
for anti-inflation policy (see Clegg, 1976b: 113). Governments in 
France and Italy, on the other hand, have found it difficult. to 
sustain any political consensus on wage issues~ Like the second 
group of countries mentioned above, they have occasionally opted for 
temporary wage freezes but they have also explored depoliticlzed t 
administrative solutions to distributional problems. In France, 
price guidelines have generally been the central component of anti-
inflation policy but many wage differentials follow from the 
regulation of minimum wage levels (see Flanagan et al., 1983; Clegg, 
1976b: 114). '!he Italian system has seen the development of an 
automatic wage indexation system, the scala mobile, i~'many of its 
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national level negotiations (see, i.e., Lange et al.,. 1982). 
British policy-makers have perhaps aspired to emulate the 
experience of the first group of countries, but the actual policy 
experience has more closely reflected the temporary or exceptional 
character of the second group. Certainly the British experience 
constrasts markedly with the success of the first .group -1n 
establishing more or less permanent wage policies or coordinated 
bargaining in the post-war period. It is, therefore, more ~ike the 
. 
second group's mixed experience with temporary polieies~ However, it 
differs --from this -latter group becCl;use for.cuch of the post~--
period it has had virtually a permanent succession of temporary 
policies. Economic pressures for the implementation of pay po~cies 
have been almost constant, but the poliCies have repeatedly broken 
down in the face of union hostility and the related industrial' 
pressures arising from an increasingly decentralized system ot 
collective bargaining. This experience has given rise to the notion 
of an incomes policy 'problem' in Britain. 
The Incomes Policy Problem in BrltatB 
The post-war British economy has reflected i-ts imperial legacy 
as both a mercantile and industrial power importing raw material.s and 
exporting manufactured' goods and financial services, albeit on a 
scale of decreasing importance in the overall world economy. '!bus, 
, 
it has remained highly oriented to international trade. Like many 
other advanced capitalist economies, sharing an implicit or explicit 
'post-war settlement' with a relatively powerful labour movement, 
economic policy has, at least until the mid-1970s, generally been 
committed to the maintenance of high enough levels of demand to 
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achieve some approximation of' full employment. However, marked by 
comparatively slowe~ rates of' growth, higher rates of' price 
inflation, and lower levels of' productivity and investment than its 
principal competito~s in Western Europe and North America, the 
~itish economy has been subject to chronic balance of payments 
problems (see, i.e., Caves et al., 1968). Even under flexible 
exchange rates, the pound sterling has been highly vulnerable to 
periodic currency crises. This vulnerab1.l1ty has no doubt. been 
exacerbated by a banking and financial system_.s~ronglY oriented to 
servicing the international f'1nanc1ai system and hence committed to 
stabiUty in the value of sterling, preferrably at a high level (see 
Longstreth, 1979; Mllner, 1980; Minns, 1981). Thus, domestio 
economio policies have frequently had to be adjusted in the light of 
balance of' payments problems and external pressures on the value of 
the pound. Although ~he exploitation of North Sea oil resources in 
the 1980s has sligh~ly improved the balance of payments and~ for- a 
while, alleviated some of the pressure on the exchange rate, the 
continuing fluctuations in the value of the pound, problems with the 
international oompetitiveness of the manufacturing sector, the 
prospect that the oil revenues might diminish rapidly over the coming 
decades, and a continued underlying weak economio performance all 
suggest that domestic economic policy continues to display a 
particular vulnerability to external pressures (see, i.e., Caves and 
Krause, 1980) • Thus, in order to improve relative economio 
performance and international oompetitiveness, bolster foreign 
confidence, -and reduce the external pressures on the pound, British 
governments have almost continuously focused their policy efforts on 
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a reduotion in the level of inflation. This has led to the 
implementation of a variety of wage policies and prioe guidelines. 
The relative merits of inoomes polioy as a counter-inflationary 
device and a oredible instrument of eoonomio polioy have been the 
source of enduring controversy. Economists are divided ove~ both 
the utility and real impaot of suoh policies (see Davies, 1983). In 
line with what has generally been labelled the 'Keynesian approaon', 
. . 
many economists and politicians have argued that incomes policies 
. 
were necessarily a permanent feature of the pos~-war, fUll employment 
economy_ .. '!be problem, it l."aS argued, was that. ·f'u.ll employment. 
inevitably generated wage cost pressures. If governments wished, 
therefore, to pursue positive demand polioies to this end, without 
engendering recurring balance of payments and competitiveness 
problems, then money wage increases had to be kept below the level of 
price inflation and real wage increases in line with the rate of 
inorease in growth and productivity. Incomes policy, ~~erefore, was 
essential for the sucoessfUl operation of this social democratic 
eoonomic equation. Beveridge (1944) outlined this problem in his end 
ot war report on the implications of full employment and it has been 
1i • 
reiterated and re-emphasized by a wide variety of authors (see, i.e.,. 
Balogh, 1970b; Shonfield, 1965; also Chapte~ 2). Thus, even before 
the dramatic increase in the rate of inflation in most Western 
economies in the 1970s, Okun (1970: 130) suggested that the 'task of 
combining prosperity with price stability now stands as the major 
unresolved problem of aggregative eoonomic performance '.. In 
opposition to the advocates of pay policy, neo-classioal economists 
have argued against this type of state intervention in the labour 
market. They have maintained that the rate of inflation is derived 
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from increases in the money supply and attempts by governments to set 
norms for wage increases simply distort market forces (see, i.e., 
Brittan and Lilley, 1977). Even among the proponents of incomes 
policies, there are significant differences. Some have argued that· 
they can exert an important, albeit temporary, effect. Others have 
suggested that many of the temporary benefits are quickly lost as 
wages, prices and even the level of industrial conflict spiral 
upwards. after the relaxation or breakdown of the policy (see, i.e., 
. 
Henry and Qnerod, 1978; Davies, 1979). Therefore, many have argued 
that only a permanent or longer-term policy woul.d. be beneficial t"or 
economic performance. 
Whatever their theoretical or empirical merits, incomes 
policies have become a.permanent feature of state economic policy in 
Britain. This is because both short-term performance and longer-term 
structural factors have pushed economic policy-makers in that 
direction. Even when such policies did not result in tangible 
benefits, they were often reassuring to both politicians and the 
public (on "expressive' or symbolic as opposed to ~instrumental' 
political acts and their pertinence to wage and price deoisions, see 
Edelman and Flemming, 1965). These policies have dif'fered .in degree 
and detail, been both statutory and voluntary, and of longer and 
shorter duration (see Clegg, 1982; Panitch, 1976; Turner and 
Wilkinson, 1975; Towers, 1978). They have all, however, shared a 
common demise. Successive governments from the early 1950s to the 
late 1970s have met electoral defeat which was, at least in part, 
associated with the collapse of such policies: Attlee in 1951, 
Macmillan in 1964, Wilson in 1970, Heath in 1974 and callaghan in 
12 
1979. In each case, the withdrawal of union .cooperation or 
acquiescence in the implementation of the policy appeared to play an 
important role in its demise. Thus, British incomes policies have 
been characterized by a cycle of construction, disillusionment, 
breakdown and eventual reconstruction, though generally under· the 
auspices of a different govemment. 
British state intervention in the labour market has had to 
contend with the highly decentralized and fragmented character of 
wage bargaining; what' Flanders memorably describ.ed in his evidence to 
the-- Donovan Commission as "largely informal, larg;ly fragmented and -
largely autonomous' (Donovan, 1968: 18). Statutory norms, generall1 
administered centrally by a state agency, encountered myriad problems 
in such a diffuse bargaining system. Traditional wage differentials 
and relativities were disturbed by the quite uneven. impact of such 
policies. They also seemed unable to contain workplace wage drift 
(see Clegg, 1971). Statutory policies were, moreover, the object ot 
unremitting hostility from a trade union movement which seemed to 
place legal abstentionism or the absence or statutory intervention 
above all other priorities (see, i.e., TOC, 1966 and 1968b; also 
Dorfman, 1973; Crouch, 1977). Autonomy from' the general legal 
regulation of collective bargaining along with the notion of ~tree 
collective bargaining', often including the absence of even voluntary 
restraint, have togeth~r constituted one of the key ideological 
dimensions of British trade unionism. British employers have perhaps 
demonstrated les~ prinCipled objection to statutory policies. 
Indeed, they have sometimes lobbied for such policies. Otherwise, 
they have generally been willing to acquiesce in, if not support, 
both statutory and voluntary policies provided that the economic 
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circumstances merited it, that they appeared to work and that there 
was surricient allowance ror an adequate return on capital. lbwever, 
the British employers' organization, the Confederation of British 
Industry (CBI), dates only from the 1960s as a unified, central 
employers' confederation and its powers over its constituent members 
are extremely limited (see Clegg, 1979: 338-344). Its cooperation 
could not, therefore, necessarily guarantee the success of any policy 
of voluntary employe~ restraint, particularly in the face of union 
hostility to such a policy_ 
Thus, the cooperation of trade unions in a politically mediated, 
voluntary policy has often been a central objective of state policy -
if only because such policies were at least temporarily more 
acceptable to many British trade unionists and had 'expressive' or 
symbolic value for political leaders. Conservative governments bave 
been unsuccessful·in their attempts to gain trade union cooperation 
in voluntary incomes policies. They have, therefore, had to contend 
with all of the problems associated with direct statutory-
intervention. Labour governments have been much more successrul in 
securing a degree of trade union cooperation in voluntary, wage· 
restraint policies. This has no doubt been related to the high 
degree of loyalty that Labour governments could command from trade 
union leaders and activists (see Panitch, 1976). Voluntary policies 
have been relatively effective over the short-term with either trade 
union acqUiescence or support. However, they have collapsed more or 
less quickly when unions have withdrawn that support. Thus, the trade 
union role has been central to the cycle of incomes policy 
performance in Britain. 
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PoUtically mediated, voluntary incomes pol1cie~ depend in large 
part on the articulation between centralized policy-making and 
industrial practice. In the British case, this link has proved 
highly problematic. Although the central trade union organization, 
the ruc, was one of the first national trade union centres, its 
limited. powers over its affiliates reflects the historical. legacy of 
complex patterns of multi-unionism and the structure of industry in. 
Which these evolved (see Winchester, 1979; Clark et al., 1980; Ross 
Martin, 1980). Thi's, in turn, has created a certain political 
terrain in Which the TOC leadership operated· - intermediaries_ 
between decentralized union industrial practice and state attempts to 
influence the direction and character of that practice. 'Ibis has 
placed. a premium on political mediations particularly, as in the case 
of successive incomes policies, through the vehicle of the Labour 
Party. 
This definition of a political and industrial terrain on which 
TUC leaders operated must be understood in. .terms of the 
organization's historical development. There has long prevailed an 
ethos within the TOC that trade unions should participate f'Ul.].y in 
the economic and political life of the nation as an equal partner to 
capital and government. This vision of trade unionism as a partner. 
in government, rather than an alternative government, emerged 
predominant within the TUC in the post-World War One period When a 
Government, anxious of the political implications of industrial 
militancy, expressed its willingness to recognize the political 
legitimacy of official trade unionism (see Middlemas, 1979). During 
this same period, rising levels of unemployment rendered syndicalist 
notions of 'direct action' to alter state policies increasingly less 
" 
'. 
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-viable (see Allen, 1960: 301). This change in political emphasis was 
further consolidated in the aftermath of the 1926 General Strike and 
into the depression of the 1930s when revolutionary, trans fo rmative 
strategies ill-suited a much weakened trade union movement. It 
received a further impetus during the Second World War through the 
implementation of an elaborate system of consultation OJ:"\ the war-time 
economy and the elevation of a major trade union figure, the leader 
of the largest union, Ernest Bevin, to one ot'" the leading cabinet 
. 
posts in the all-party Government. 
The developments of' the Secca!! World War ~~re. seen by many 
trade union leaders as the concrete realization of What mlgnt be 
called a 'representational' strategy. The claim of national trade 
union leaders to represent trade unionists as industrial citizens in 
the poll tical sphere was a t last recognized. Trade unionism, thus, 
constitued a new and distinctive 'estate of the realm' from wilich 
there could be no return. This predominant mould of post-World War 
Two "consensus politics' was underpinned by a state commitment to 
relatively full employment and symbolized by continuin~ consultation 
with the TOC on a wide range of issues (see Beer, 1969; Pan1tcb .. 
1976; Urwin and Murray, 1982). Thus, it seemed, in keeping with the 
vision at Milne-Bailey (1934: 383) , head ot' the TOC Economic 
Department during the 1930s and an influential advocate of a 
representational strategy for the TUC, that trade unions were finally 
finding their place 1n the 'economic life and institutions of the 
community' • 
The problem for successive generations of TUC leadership in the 
post-war period has been how to marry this representative vision with 
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-the more diffuse realities of a fragmented and decentralized labour 
movement operating in an equally fragmented and decentralized system 
of bargaining and, seemingly, united only in its opposition to any 
form of state intervention that might encroach on the autonomy and 
independence of trade union organizations. Certainly numerous 
authors have ,identified the high priority' accorded to legaL 
abstentionism by British trade unions (see, i.e., Lewis, 1976; 
CUrrie, 1979). This priority, moreover, was vehemently reaffirmed in 
the hostility of the ToC to attempts by first the Wilson and then the 
'Heath· Governments to take a much more interventionist role in labour ' 
relations in the 1960s and early 1970s (see Chapters 2 and 3). In 
the TUC's written evidence to the Donovan Commission in the 19608, 
for instance, it was argued that the state should perform 
complementary rather than alternative functions to trade unions. 
Alternative functions were those that might 'detract from the 
independence of the trade union movement' and the misgivings about 
prices and incomes policies were linked to the fact that they orten 
involved such alternative functions (see TOC, 1968b: 140-142; alsO 
roc, 1966). However, it appeared that the increasing role ot" the 
state in the management of the post-war economy often made it 
difficult to distingUish between 'complementary' and 'alternative' 
functions. 
While according such a priority to legal abstentionism, 
particularly in the area of wage bargaining, the ruc has nonetheless 
been increasingly concerned to influence the direction of state 
economic policy. TOC leaders in the post-war period have indicated 
a qualified willingness to contemplate some fOrm! of voluntary wage 
planning as part of a broader economic package. One of the central 
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contradictions Of TUe policy practice, however, has been between 
leadership willingness to contemplate the role of wages in the 
overall process of economic planning and the reluctance of many of 
its key affiliates to surrender any autonomy over their bargaining 
authority. Tue leaders have, thus, opposed statutory wage policies 
but demonstrated a willingness to consider voluntary policies that 
did not .impinge on the autonomy of individual affiliates to' lend 
their -consent to such exercises. This has meant. that the externa1 
dynamics of incomes policies, in particular the relations between the 
Tue and governments, have constantly been subject to the. internal 
policy 'process of the TUe and, in turn, the policy processes and 
industrial practice of key affiliates; what might be called the 
internal dynamics of incomes policy. This study is centrally 
concerned with the interconnections between these internal and 
external dynamiCS of incomes policies. The next section focuses more 
specifically on key questions £or theoretical and empirical 
investigation. 
The External and Internal pynamics or Incomes Policy 
Panitch (1976: 3) has .aptly described voluntary incomes policy 
as an integrative exercise without peer. lbe potential for such an 
exercice, however, is clearly limited. It can be argued that in the 
British case these limit,s are primarily internally determined through 
the political and industrial processes of the partiCipating trade 
union organizations. Trade union policy-making on voluntary incomes 
policies seems to confirm such an interpretation. Policies are 
generally initiated at the level of the TUC General Councilor, more 
typically, within ita subcommittees or, indeed, among key union 
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leaders and TOe staff within those subcommittees. In the case of 
incomes policies, such policy developments are often in response to 
prior government policy initiatives. After detailed discussion of a 
particular policy initiative within the relevant subcommittee of the_ 
General Council, key TUC leaders will then attempt to forge a rough 
consensus at the level of the entire General Council which might 
subsequently be translated into affiliate practice. This is the 
critical link - wha t has so frequently highlighted the ascendaIlcy of 
centrifugal forces within the mc. Ironically, it!.s precisely the 
_ .. - -
enduring and problematic nature of decentralized trade union practice 
that, nonetheless, makes even the TUC's limited oentral powers an 
attractive vehicle for governments and other external agents to 
attempt to influence the direotion and character or trade union 
industrial practice. 
Certainly a number of authors have pointed to the cr-itical 
importance ot the internal cohesion and authority of the 
organizations involved in such macro-economic bargains. In 
particular, Corina (1967: 305) identified 'the toleranoe limits of 
union cohesion' as one of the prinCipal factor-s in the operation of 
the 1948-1951 voluntary policies •. In his important study of the 1964-
1970 Labour Government incomes policy exper-ience in Britain, Pan1tch 
(1976: 248) highlighted to What degree the Government had 'to fall 
back on the TUC's ability and willingness to control its members'. 
Thus, he pointed to the 'high degree of instability' character-istia 
of the quasl-corporatist project in which trade unions were to act as 
agenCies of social oontrol over their members (ibid.: 246). He 
attributed this to the contradiction between the integr-ative 
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-ideologies displayed by the Labour Party to its working class base. 
Yet, notwithstanding this contradiction, the greater degree ot 
stability exhibited by incomes policies in some other countries would 
seem to suggest that institutional arrangements such as bargaining 
, . 
and union structure are also an important factor'in 'the relative 
durability of wage policies. Certainly, a number of . the 'neo-
corporatist' theorists have highlighted the internal stresses placed 
on, union organizations participating in voluntary incomes policies 
and 'other corporatist types of arrangements (see Sabel, 1981; 
Panitch,--1981; Streeck, 1981 and 1982; Regin!.;- 1"982'; and Alexis,-
1983). ,Their work clearly pOints to the need for a more systematiC 
understanding of the reciprocal relations between internal union 
dynamics and tripartite or quasi-corporate arrangements. Pizzorno 
(1978a and b), in particular, has highlighted the need for a better 
understanding of exchange relationships between unions and the state 
and their implications for leadership-membership intra-organ1zational 
relations. Similarly, Lange et ale (1982: 218-2.19) have'argued t'or 
an 'actor-centred' analysis of trade unions as institutions loIbicl1 
might best be understood 'as systems of mediation and regularized 
exchange t in market and political arenas. 
'!hus, the relationship between trade union leaders and their--
members would seem to be central to an understanding of trade, uniOns-
macro-econom.1c and polit~cal roles. This is particularly true in the 
case of voluntary incomes policies when two often discrete areas ot 
trade union practice - policy-making and industrial practice - are 
necessarily brought into closer relation. A decision to participate 
in a voluntary incomes policy is generally made in union policy-
making channels. However, it is directly experienced in the realm of 
union industrial practice whioh, in many unions, concerns a quite 
separate channel of decision-making. !here are, however, rew 
sy~tematic attempts to explore the articulations between union 
industrial practice and union policy-making. MUoh of the literature 
on trade unions has been dominated by a concern with internal 
. 
democracy to the detriment of any understanding of actual policy and 
industrial behaviour - as if trade union organizations were 
exclusively conoerned, with the pursuit of democratic practice ratner 
than the organization of wage earners in specl.f.1.q. industrial 
settings .. 
An important exoeption to this prevailing tendency was the 
study by ArthUr Ross (1948). He suggested that a trade union was 'a 
political agency operating in an economic environment', .. a political 
instrumentality' (ibid.: 12 and 74). He argued, ~~ererore, that in 
order to understand union wage pollcy it was necessary to look at 
both internal and external pressures in the organization. "'lhese 
pressures emanate from the complex of political relationships 
surrounding the officials j relationships with the rank and filet with 
the employers, with other organizational levels of' the union" -with 
the rest of the labour movement, and with the government' (ibid.: 
48). Such an approach highlights the need to examine the diverse 
interests of different groups within the membership as well as 
, 
external to it and the nature of the political mechanisms by which 
those interests are expressed. 
More recently, Hyman (1975: 87-93) has argued that the 
specific organizational interest of trade unions lies in the 'dynamio 
between internal and external power relations. It can be ,argued that 
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this approach is espe.cially fruitful in the case of trade unions and 
incomes policies. In terms of voluntary incomes policies, for 
instance, governments, as external agents, are interested 1n trade 
unions as intermediary organizations because of their internal power, 
i.e., their abUity within· limits to influence the industrial 
behaviour of their members. Thus, the internal dynamics of union 
organizations assume a particular significance for any broader 
understanding of the experience of voluntary incomes policy. 'Ihi.s 
is especially true . since support for pay policies is generally 
decided in the policy sphere yet experience~ _in the bargaiDIng 
. 
sphere. Assent to voluntary incomes policy, therefore, entails a 
particular link or articulation between union bargaining and policy 
activities in which union structure and modes of organization become 
key mediating variables. In an organization such as the TUC with its 
highly autonomous constituent unions, the experience of incomes 
policy concerns patterns of articulations at two levels: first, 
between internal pollcy-making and indUstrial behaviour in individual. 
unions and, secondly, between individual affiliate polley-making and 
industrial behaviour and the larger process of TOC pollcy-making .. 
'lhese articulations must, of course, be located. in the broader 
political economy of the period as well as, in the case of individual 
unions, the specifio oontext of particular industries. 
In other words, there is a need to develop an understanding of 
British trade union strategy and behaviour which speoifioally takes 
account of the link between the internal and external dynamiCS of 
trade union organizations (see Hyman, 1983). It follows that the 
route to a clearer understanding of the trade union experience with 
incomes policy in Britain might lie in a more systematic acoount of 
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the link between internal union developments and thei~ exte~al 
eVironment. '!his would involve, on the one hand, an understanding of 
macro-level developments and, on the other, the internal dynamics of 
union strategy, policy-makin~, internal government, and iridustrlal 
praotice. In the British oase, these ~ela tions are further 
,complicated, by the relative autonomy of TUC affiliates. "'Iherefore, 
in order to comprehend the direction of ruC-state' relations on a 
" 
policy issue such as wage restraint, it i.s essential to focus on the 
internal dynamics of TUC' pol1cy-making, particularly the two-way 
articulations between the policy proaesses of key af'!'lliates and the 
ruc. 
It is puzzling, therefore, why there are few if any systematic 
studies of the particular organizational implications of 'incomes 
policy for unions in Britain. Indeed, there do not seem to be any 
extensive investigations of individual union policies towards. pay 
policy, yet alone the variations between them., ,Certainly, it. is 
.~. l-" 
clear that the internal dynamics of incomes policies have impinged on 
tlleir external dynamics and ~ versa. Equally, individual. unions 
do ,appear to take different ,policy positions. on the role o~ pay 
policies. Moreover, given the seemingly inevitable, albeit often 
highly differentiated, withdrawal of trade union consent for 
voluntary incomes policies, the processes and struoture of British 
union polioy-making would seem to be of singular importance for an 
understanding of their performance and breakdown. A number of 
studies have focused on that intermediary role played by the TUC, 
particularly in its interaotions with Labour governments, what might 
be called the external dimension or dynamiCS of incomes policies (see " 
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Panitch, 1976; Clark et al., 1980; Crouch, 1977; Minkin, 1974 and 
1978b; Tarling and Wilkinson, 1977; Dorfman, 1973). lbwever, the 
internal dynamics of this process have not been well served in the 
literature. A number of authors have pointed to the need to examine 
the internal authority and cohesion of union organizations under 
conditions of voluntary incomes policies, but there does ,not appear 
to have been any systematic attempt to do so. Nor has there been any 
attempt to explain the variations between· individual union. 
organizations on this'question • 
. -- This - section has argued that the -internal-poli.cy processes- of" -
the TUC and its affiliated unions are central to any understanding of 
the British experience of incomes policy. However, a number of 
questions remain either unanswered or unexplored. fbw, for instance, 
do individual unions determine their respective approaches to incomes 
policies? How might these be related to bargaining strategies and 
industrial practice, membership composition and organizational 
structure? In turn, by loIhat proce~s does the TUC determine its 
position on particular pay policies? How, for instance, is the 
discretion of individual union leaders to participate in TUC polley--
making limited by the political and industria~ processes and. 
organizational structure of particular unions,? once a policy of wage 
moderation is agreed at the level of the TUC General Council, how is 
this then translated into individual affiliate policy-making and 
industrial practioe, if at all'? How is consent for such a policy 
approach mobilized downwards within individual unions? Is individual 
union policy support or opposition translated into actual industrial 
practice? And sinoe suoh policies invariably seem to lead to a 
withdrawal of TUC polioy support, how is opposition to TUC and 
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Government policy mobilized within individual unions and articulated 
at the level of individual union and TUe policy-making? It 1s 
surprising that so many of these questions remain unanswered when 
incomes policy continues to figure so prominently on the ,national 
pOlitical agenda. In an attempt to shed some new light on the role 
of trade unions in incomes policies, this study focUSE;S on the, 
participation of British trade unions in the Social Contract 
voluntary incomes policies from 1914 to 1919. 
THE RESEARCH smATEXlY 
Since this study involves an exploration of both TOe-government 
negotiations over incomes policies and the policy-making and 
bargaining behaviour of selected TUC affiliates, the research was 
conducted at two levels. At a macrO-level, it focused on the period 
of voluntary incomes policies in Britain from 1974 to 1919 with 
particular attention to the dynamics of' trade union-state relations 
and ruC-Government relations during the construction, implementation 
and ultimate collapse of these policies. At a micra-level, 1t, 
investigated the experience of six TUC-affiliated unions within the 
context of these macro-level developments. In particular, ~~ 
considered the' policy positions of the selected unions looking at the 
actual impact of the pay policies, the articulations between 
individual union policy-making and bargaining behaViour, and, most 
importantly, the linkages between individual union policy-making and 
practice and rue policy-making. 
The study reflects a number of themes. It charts the process 
Whereby the policies were constructed, implemented and ultimately 
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collapsed. It particularly focuses on the process' of w'e policy-
making in the formulation of such policies. It also investigates the 
organizational consequences of the policies with particular emphasis 
on the upwards and downwards mediation of policy within individual 
unions affiliated to the ruC. Thus, it considers the particular 
constraints to wnich national trade union leaders are subject ~en 
they agree to moderate the bargaining behavi?ur of their members and 
suggest~ some' of the determinants of relative leadership discretion 
in this type of policy situation. This also ieads to some analysis 
of -the sources of support for and opposition to incomes policy within. 
various 'unions affiliated to the TUC. Finally, the research 
considers the viability of voluntary pay policies under different 
types of organizational and collective bargaining arrangements. 
The remainder of this chapter details the research settings and 
choice of sample, the research process and related methodological 
considerations, and the organization of the results. 
The Research Settings 
Since the study concerns both the experience of the Soc1a~ 
Contract incomes polioies in general and the specific pol.1cy 
processes and industrial practice of six unions affiliated to the 
TUC during this period, this section outlines each of" the research 
settings. 
'l'he Social Contract Incomes Policies. Some form of incomes 
policy was operative during most of the 1970s in Britain (see Table 
A.l, Appendix A). The period from 197~ to 1979 is specifically 
equated with what were called the 'Social Contract' incomes policies. 
A new Labour Government was elected in February 197~ 'pledged to 
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-implement a set of policies which had been negotiated over the 
previous two years b~tween representatives of the Labour P~t1 and 
the TOC. This set of policies and the privileged bipartite 
relationship between the TUC and the Labour Government which it 
represented came to be known 'as the Social Contract. The central 
aspect of this putative "contract t was a somelobat reluctant 
willingness on the part of trade union leaders to moderate the 
industrial behaviour of their organizations. in return for the 
. 
implementation of favourable social and industr~~ relations poliCies 
and~ a Government commitment to the pursuit of e.conom1.c growth. .. As the 
Labour Government pursued a number of' its Social Contract commitments 
through its first months in office, the ruc agreed that its 
affiliates would not seek to increase their real standard of' living 
over the 1974-1975 bargaining round. '!'his policy was known as . the 
"Social Contract Mark It. 
However, in the face of deteriorating economic circumstanaes, 
particularly a rapidly accelerating rate of price inflation and 
severe pressures on the value of the pound in the international 
currency markets, the Labour Government secured the agreement of the 
TOC to implement the first of a series of much tighter 1D.comes 
polioies from mid-1975. Given the Government's desire to maintain 
harmonious relations with the unions and the traditional antipathy or 
British unions to statutory incomes policies, these pay 'polioies were 
largely voluntary in design.. In order to maintain the Labour 
Government in office and sustain the principle of the Social 
Contraot, key trade union leaders were persuaded of the necessity of 
a more rigorous pay policy and played a key role in negotiating their 
design and delivering the support of, first, the TOC General Council 
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-and, then, affiliated unions. The "'tight' phases of the Social 
Contract incomes policies lasted three years and were generally 
acknowledged as being unusually effective. The TUC overtly supported 
Phases One and Two from 1975 to 1977. As opposition to the effects 
of these pOlioies grew within a number of unions and the balanoe 
between support and opposition altered, however, the TOC supported 
only some aspects of Phase Three in 1977-1"978, though it appeared 
largely· to acquiesce. in the implementation or the polley. 
When the Government sought to implement _a!.hase . Four polley 
ove~ the 1978-1979 pay round, however; the TOC moved to a position of' 
outright opposition. Phase Four ultimately collapsed under the 
strains of a period of industrial strife and a continuing erosion of 
the Government's ability to secure majority support in Parliament.' 
'!be attempts by the TUC and th'e Government to renew their special' 
relationship with the signing of the "'Concordat' in February 1979 
must be judged as unconvincing in the eyes octna electorate.. lhe 
Government was defeated in the general election two months later by 
a, Conservative Party pledged to the restriction or trade uniOn. power-
and the' reform. of industrial relations law. Thus, the 1974-1919 
period presented all of the key elements or the classio cycle or 
voluntary incomes policy in Britain: construction, disillusion and 
breakdown. !he experience of the Social Contract incomes policies by 
, 
British trade unions and the gradual withdrawal of ruc support for 
the polioies, therefore, raises all of the questions posed in the 
outline of the research problem and serves as the macrO-level focus 
of this study. 
Tbe Sample Unions. This study has, more particularly, 
concentrated on the experience of selected British unions during the 
1970s. It has investigated the anatomy of their different approaches 
to the various Phases of the Social Contract incomes poliCies, 
particularly the mobilization of consent and/or opposition witnin 
the unions to TOC and Government policy. These six unions -
hereafter referred to as the .. sample unions' - are the Amalgamated 
Union of Engineering Workers (Engineering- Section) or AUEW, the 
Association or Technical, Scientific and M:lnagerial. Staffs or AS'IMS, 
the Fire Brigades Union or FBU, the Genera~ and Municipal ' Workers t 
Union or GMWU, the National Union of 'Public Emplcyees or NUFE, and 
1 
the Transport and General Workers' Union or TGWU. 
The sample is stratified and the choice of the individual 
unions was based on several criteria. First, in order to explore some 
of the differences between union experiences under incomes pol1aias, 
it was intended that ~hey should reflect a diversity of 
organizational structures and membership coverage. Secondly, in. 
order to shed some light on the nature of the TOC policy-maklng 
process, it was preferable that they be relatively well integrated 
into that process. Thirdly, in order to identity key variations 
between the sample unions, it,' was necessary to include a variety ot' 
policy approaches to the different phases of the Social Contract 
incomes policies. Finally, given the sometimes sensitive nature of 
information required from each union organization, there had to be 
some degree of research access, at least, in each case. The choice 
of the sample unions in relation to each of these criteria is 
discussed below. 
Table 1.1 gives an overview of the organizational struoture and 
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membership ooverage of the sample unions. In terms of their broad 
membership ooverage, the sample unions might be classified as either 
general, semi-industrial or industrial types of unions. In the case 
pf the oomplex organizational development and hybrid permutations of 
British union organizations" however, such classifications oan 
obscure almost as much as they inform. ASiMS, the GMWU and TGWU might 
all be desoribed as general unions inasmuch as they organized among a 
wide variety of occupations in many diffe'rent sectors. Ibwever, 
, . 
ASTMS was a white-collar general union, whereas the GMlU and TGWU 
oonformed to the classic conception of the gene.'"al., union which 
organized primarily among the unskilled and semi-ski1led across most 
industries in both the public and private sectors. ''!he AUEW and NOPE 
might both be classed as semi-industrial unions inasmuch as they 
organized primarily in one industry or sector and among a variety of 
occupations or grades. Indeed, both union organizations have' 
traditionally aspired to organize their entire sector, the 
engineering industry in the oase of the AUEW and local.' authorl:tY and 
health service manual workers in the oase of }lUPE. lbwever, both 
Unions, in fact, operated in multi-union bargaining contexts with a, 
fairly high degree of oompetition for members. lhe AUEW'developed 
primarily as a craft organization and only later extended its ranks 
to the less skilled. lbe craft or 'seotion t· members oontinued to 
predominate in most deoision-making bodies within the union and the -
craft ethos was sufficiently strong that some still viewed it as a 
craft union. NUPE's pattern of growth had been sustained largely by 
its low-paid membership. Its polioy orientations have reflected this 
composition of membership. thus, in each case, their policy choioes 
tended to be coloured as much by their'respective skill,profiles as 
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TABLE 1.1 
SUHMARY PROFILE OF THE SIIMPLE UNIONS 
." 
llATURE OF MEMBERSHIP , 
. 
Job Territory Sectoral Coverage 
skilled & semi- mainly private, 
skilled manunl some public 
... ~ , " -
--
white-collar tech- mainly private, 
nical, aupcrvisory 
• 0' 
some public 
& clcricnl 
-
acmi-okilled 
mnnual public Ii 
, 
at • F 
- "" 
.,....... 
1 
U1\- & semi .. private. 
, 
okilled manual & public 
lln- & nand.- - , 
Qldlletl Tl1l1nual ., - o vulJ11C 
. 
. 
UIl- & fH!Ju.l- mainly private, 
, altilled mllnunl some public 
, J3ARGAINING POLICY 1 . 
• 
o STRUCTURE STRUCTURE 
tWo-tier, mainly o single 
decentralized c~nnnel 
I 
dunl o I I decentralized channel 
I 
. single 
centralized 
channel 
. 
. 
I 
r.cnt;1:'nl.izcd & dual , ,I 
I 
{Ieccntrali::ed channel I 
S\,,~\e. 
centralized channel 
central,ized & 
• 
dunl 
decentralized chnnnel 
their sectoral location. The remaining sample union, the FBU, was a 
good Ulustration of an industrial un10n. Its members are all in the 
fire service and the great majority are covered by a single national 
agreement. thus, the sample unions reflected a variety of 
organizational types, a range of industrial sectors, and various 
grades of workers from the unskilled to the highly skUle~ and white-
collar occupations. In this sense, they should serve as a reasonably 
representative sample of the impact of pay polieies. 
'!be bargaining' and polley structures of' the sample union.s . wUl 
be--considered in some detail in Chapter 4. !abler1.1 Ulustrates the. 
range within the six sample unions both in terms of centralization 
and decentralization and in the relative diVision between pol1ey-
making and bargaining. Unions such as the FEU and NOPE which 
operated exclusively in the public sector tended to be highly 
centralized in their bargaining arrangements. This centralization 
and their location in the public sector rendered them extremely 
vulnerable to the rigid implementation of ineomes polley norms., the 
. general manual unions such as the GMWU and TGWU included both 
centralized and decentralized bargaining arrangements. The TaW, 
however, has tended to place a much greater emphasis on 
decentralization. This was also the case with the AUEW, though its 
relative division between centralization and decentralization was . 
integral to the system of two-tier bargaining in the engineering 
industry. Finally, although the White-collar general union, ASTMS, 
engaged in some centralized bargaining arrangements, its coverage was 
largely decentralized with particular emphasis on the au~onomy of 
eaeh bargaining group. 
These differing bargaining arrangements tended to be reflected 
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in the policy structure of the sample unions. The key division was 
between single and dual-channel unions. Single-channel unions such 
, •• hJPE. 
as the Au~and the FEU generally discussed detailed barga1ntng 
policy and other policy matters in the same forum. . This is 
partioularly significant when considering the organizational 
implioations of voluntary incomes policies; support for incomes 
pOlicies was generally. decided in terms of general policy but 
implemeqted in bargaining policy channels. The other sample unions 
all had some form of dual channel syste:n, what Undy et al. (1981:- 20) 
have labelled as a 'bifurcated syste~t. !his·~ns that bargaining 
policy and other policy items were considered in separate polioy· 
forums. 
Another single-channel industrial union, the National Onion of 
Footwear, Leather and Allied Trades or NUFLAT, was orginally also 
inoluded in the sample .It was one of the rare examples of an 
industrial . union concentrated in the private sector with relatively 
centralized bargaining arrangements. After a pilot study, however, 
i~ was decided that there was a diminishing marginal return in a 
detaUed study of this organization. This was, in part, because the 
union operated in suoh a depressed sector of the economy that incOmes 
policy did not appear to have been the subject of muoh debate within 
the union. This was also possibly related to the fact that NUFLA! 
was not closely integrated into the TOC polioy-making process (see 
below). It was the only one of the potential sample unions whose 
leader was not a member of the TOC General Council during most of the 
period under investigation. This leads to· a seoond oriterion for the 
se1eotion of the sample unions. 
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In order to explore the articulations between individual union 
behaviour and TUC pollcy-making, the sample unions had also to be, 
to some degree at least, closely integrated into the process of TUC 
policy-making. Such integration might be gauged by both. relattve 
size and representation on the TUC General Council. Table 1.2 
indicates individually and cumulatively the size of the sample 
unions, their ranking and relative proportion of' roc membership in 
both 1972 and 1979. By 1979, five of the sample Unions were among the 
six largest in the TUC and the six sample unions represented 45J of 
alr- TUC"" membership_ Thus,' in te:-~ of size -al.ene, the sa:nple-
represented a significant proportion of TUC members and many or its 
largest affiliates. '!he internal policy-making of' these unions was, 
therefore, bound to have a significant impact on TUC decision-maldng. 
Moreover, General Council representation al.so ensured that each 
of the sample unions was directly integrated into TUC policy-maklng. 
All of the sample unions also had representatives on the TUC General. 
Council during the period under investigation. Table 1.3. shows this 
representation for the year 1975-1976. The six sample unions then -
accounted for just over a third of General Council members. In 
addition, the leaders of the three largest unions were among the six 
TUC representatives on the National Economic Development Council who 
were generally considered to constitute the inner circle of' TUC 
policy-making. 
The sample was, therefore, clearly biased towards large unions 
Which were closely integrated into TUC policy-making. It would 
certainly also be valuable.to study a range of unions whioh were not 
olosely integrated into TUe polioy-making, that had no representative 
on the General Council, for instance, and whose size was not so large 
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. AUEW(E) (2) 
ASTMS (8) 
FBU (44) 
GMWU (3) 
NUPE (5) 
TGWU (1) 
SAMPLE 
TOTAL: 
Tue (126) TOTAL: 
- ---- -~ - ~----
TABLE 1.2 
SAMPLE UNION SIZE AND RANKING 
WITHIN THE Tue, 1972 & 1979 
.. 1972 
SIZE % OF RANKING 
Tue 
t1EMBER-
SHIp· 
. 
1J145,,826 11.5% (2) 
280JOOO 2.8% (6) 
30JOOO .003% (50) 
848J481 8.5% (3) 
443/354 4,ll% (5) 
1., 746 J 554 17.5% (1) 
4J494,,215 115% 
. 
, 
10.,001/419 (109) 
-.,. 
---'.1,-
.' 
~ 
1979 .I ~ , 
SIZE % OF 
Tue 
MEMBER-
SHIP 
1J217J760 10.0% 
. 491.,000 4.0% 
30JOOO .0025% ' 
I 
! 967,,153 8.0% , 
I 691.,770 5.7% 
2/086J281· 17.1% 
5/ LI83 1 96LJ 45% 
12,,172,,508 
," ,~" 
TABLE 1.3 
SAMPLE UNION REPRESENTATION 
ON mE me GENERAL COUNCIL, 1975-1976 
TOTAL GENERAL COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP - 38 
SAMPLE UNION REPRESENTATION 
AUEW(E) 3 
ASlMS. 1 
FEU 
-
1 
GMWU 3 
NUPE 
-
1 
. 
'l'GWU 4 
TOTAL: 13 
SAMPLE UNION REPRESENTATION 'AS A PERCmlT OF 
GENERAL COUNCIL MEMBERSHIP - 34.2% 
as to carry any great significance in the overaLl determination or 
TUC polioy. Sinoe the objeot ot: this study, however, was to explore' 
e' 
the internal dynamics of voluntary incomes policY"~ particularly the 
relative. disoretion available to trade union leaders to engage in. 
agreements on wage restraint and the implioations of these internal. 
union dynamios for the direotion of TUC polioy, it was decided to 
, 
focus on some of the key actors in TUC policy-making. They were 
union leaders whose organizations were olosely integrated into TUC 
polioy-making and who 'represented quite distinot organizational 
polioy profiles on support for and opposition to inoomes polioies. 
This leads to a third criterion for the selection of the sample 
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unions. 
The sample also required a variety of organizational approaches 
to the idea of incomes policy and the various phases of the Social 
Contract incomes policies in particular. Table 1.4 indicates the 
position of the sample unions for each phase of the Social Contract 
incomes policies. Table 1.5 summarizes the overall pattern of 
observations in Table 1.4.' Tables 1.4 and 1.5 indicate that the 
sample included a variety of policy profiles bo~ on each phase and 
overall. '!he GMWU, for instance, was supportive of' the pay policies 
in -- all but one of the observations. In contrast., .asTMS opposed' 
almost all of the phases of the Social Contract incomes policies. 
The other sample unions displayed a more differentiated pattern 
moving from support to opposition or ~ versa depending on the 
particular phase. The FBU, for instance, supported the Phase Two 
policy but was the source of the most vehement challenge to Phase 
Three. The significance of such movements and the particular 
organizational profiles of the sample unions on pay policy will, of 
course, be the subject of detailed scrutiny in subsequent chapters. 
In- the choice of sample, it was simply important that the unions 
reflected a range of policy positions on incomes pollcy both 
historically and in relation to the 1970s policies. 
Finally, the choice of unions was also influenced by the 
possibility of research access. All of the sample unions granted 
some degree of access to their organizations and officials and 
activists in each were exceedingly generous with their time and 
resources. The actual research process will be elaborated in the 
next section. 
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TABLE 1.4 
SAMPLE UNmN POSITmNS ON PAY POLICY PHASES 1974-1979 
---------------- -~---~----------------------------------~---~~~~-~ I PAY POLlCY PHASE I SUPPORT I ACQUIESCENCE OPPOSITION I 
I-----~------~-----I-----------I------------------I-----~---~-~~I I Social Contraot I AUEW(E) I I AS'IMS I 
I Mark I I FBU I I I 
I Voluntary Restraint 1 GMWU. I I I 
I I NUPE I I I 
I I TGWU I I I 
--------~----------------------I-----~~-~-l----.-~~------J Pre- I GMWU I I AUEW(E) I 
TUC I TGWU I I A SIMS I -
I I I FBU I 
PHASE I I I I NUPE I 
Six . I-----~--~- -----~--~-I~~--- . (~----. --I Pounds I Post- GmU AUE.W(E) . I A SIMS I 
TUC TGWU FBU I I 
OOPS - I -I 
J I 
I I 
PHASE II AUEW(E) I AS~ I 
5% FBU I I 
GMWU I I 
NUPE I I 
TGWU I I 
I I 
I 1 
:pre- GMWU I AUEW(E) I 
TUC I AS1M3 I 
I FEU I 
I I NUPE I 
PHASE III ) I row I 
10% I------~-- -----------1------- ----1------------ -I Post- GmU I AUEW(E) J A SIMS I . 
TUC I TGWU I FBU I 
I I NUPE 1 
I I I 
I 1 1 
Original I I AUEW(E) I 
Policy 1 I ASTMS 1 
I I FBU I 
I I GMWU I ' 
PHASE IV I I NUPE I . 
5% I~-·------- -----------I------------------l------------~---I . I Proposed AUEW(E) I I FBU 
November ASTMS I I NUPE 
Modifioa-I GMWU . I I TGWU' 
tions I I I 
I I I 
Notes: ·The TGWU's position was ambivalent with some of its General 
Council representatives voting against and some abstaining. 
Sources: Interview data, press reports and internal union documents. 
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TABLE 1.5 
SUMMARY OF SIMPLE UNION POSITIONS 
ON PAY POLICY PHASES, 1974-1919 
(Calculated from Table 1.4) 
--~~~--~--~---~~-~~-----~-~~-------~~ r UNION SUPPORT I ACQUIESCENCE OPPOSITION I 
l---------~I~---~-------I------~---~----------I--- ---------....... 1 I GMWU I 1 I 0 I 1 I 
I I I I I 
I TGWU I 4 I 1 I 3 I 
I t I I I 
I AUEW(E) I 3 I 2 . I 3 I 
I I I I I 
I FBU I 2 I 1 . I 5 I 
( I ( I I 
I NUPE I 2 1 -1 - 1- 5 I 
I I 1 r 1 
I ASTMS I 1 I 0 ) 7 I 
I I I I I 
The choice of six unions, rather than four or ten, was 
ultimately somewhat arbitrary. The principal constraints against 
more cases were time, resources and the 'manageabll1ty' of the data .. 
Yet fewer unions would have limited the scope fo~ comparison and 
generalization as well as the ability to meet the sometimes 
conflicting criteria on which basis the sample unions were selected. 
In, retrospect, given the nature of the research design, even six. 
unions proved an extremely ambitious task. 'lhis leads to some· 
consideration of the research process and related methodological 
questions. 
The Research Process 
This study was undertaken without either detailed prior 
knowledge or direct experience of the period in question. Such a 
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disposition exoluded at least some of the possibility of an initial 
bias. However, it also meant that the researoh prooess had to 
oompensate for this laok of prior information. Thus, as was 
specified in the research deSign, the research effort proceeded 
simultaneousl~ on two fronts and with almost equal emphasis. 
At a maoro-level, there was a oontinuous attempt to retrace 
the origins of the Sooial Contraot and reoonstruct the detailed 
development of the various phases of' the 'Social Contraot inoomes 
po11oieS.-:' This was, done through referenoe to both primary and 
seoondary documentation with particular emphaais on th~ det.a.ils. ot' 
TUC polioy-making and the main interactions between the me and the 
Conservative and Labour Governments during this period. Mmy or 
these' events were, of oourse, of national significance and the 
subjeot of detailed reporting in the press as well as other secon~ 
literature. However, it was also possible to obtain oonsiderable 
primary dooumentation suoh as key polioy oommittee minutes, hitherto 
not extensivel~ available, and further supplement this with interview 
, 
data. 
The . micro-level research involved detaUed case studies or the 
six sample unions and seleoted data colleotion in a few other unions. 
The objective 1il eaoh oase study was to reoonstruct the policy-mak1ng 
process on inoomes polioy and establish its interrelations wi~ TOe 
polioy-maldng, to investigate. the impaot of the pay polioies and to 
, 
identify any important changes in the polloy approaoh of eaoh or· the 
sample unions. A number of relationships were of partioular 
interest. . At the leadership level of the individual union, it was 
essential to locate the linkages between the aotions of senior 
exeoutive offioers in their internal union roles, suoh as individual 
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union policy~ing and industrial behaviour, and their external 
union roles, particularly in terms of the TUe General CouncU.. It 
was also necessary to identifY the key decision~king levels within 
each union and explore the dynamics of these bodies. In all of the 
unions, this involved both the executive council and some form. of 
policy conference. Most unions were also divided into discrete 
industrial or geographical groupings. 
, . ~. ,-
, " 
To· the degree that resources 
permitted, there was an attempt to identifY some of the key dynamic~ 
. . 
at this level of disaggregation in union pol1cy-making and industrial 
behaviour, at least inasmuch as it tlirectly art"ec:ted either policy 
conference or executive approaches to the Social Contract incomes 
policies. Finally, there was some attempt to assess the industrial 
impact of the Social Contract incomes policies on particular groups 
of union members. '!he detailed case work required a range of 
research techniques. These included the collection and analysis of 
both primary and secondary documentary materials, a li.JJdted amount. of 
7 " 2 
observation, and extensive interviews. 
'!he documentary materials, 1ncluded, where they were ava1.l.able,. 
,J 
" general head office circulars,. research papers and relevant. policy 
, papers; executive co~ittee minutes (in four- of the six unions); 
- ·f'·""-
'pollcy conference proceedings and minutes; selected regional and, 
industrial committee and conference minutes or proceedings; union 
journals; press reports on each union; and various indices of 
earnings and bargaining da ta • 
A limited amount of direct observation techniques was also 
employed. It was possible to observe key actors 'in aotion' and the 
operation of the head offioe 1n each of the unions. Observation also 
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included attendance at a range of meetings of union decision-making 
bodies including a policy conference, the annual Trades Union 
Congress and Labour Party Conference on several occasions, several' 
regional union meetings and the conferences of a number of industrial: 
groups. 
The range of interviews is summarized in Table 1.6. In very 
approxima te terms, around two hundred and fifty interviews loJere 
conducted with two hundred and thirty different individuals. As' 
should be olear from Table 1.6, considerable ef~ort was made to cove~ 
key_._ ~f.ficials and activists at a variety of orgarj zat1onal levels .. 
Thus, the population for- the interviews was trade union officers and 
activists plus a few key infonnants on each union. A form of 
judgement sampling was used, but this was stratified by both 
or-ganization and hierarchy. For- instance, nineteen of a possible 
twenty-one senior exeoutive 'officers in the sample unions were 
interviewed. The interview sample was then stratified at different 
levels of the organization and for different industrial groupings 
with increasingly sparse coverage at lower levels of the 
o·rganization. '!here was a definite "'aotor bias' -in the choice or-
the lay interviews. The officer interviews were selected mor'e iIi-
terms of geographical and industrial coverage. '!he interviews were 
conducted over the course of eighteen months in 1979-1980 and 
throughout the United Kingdom. 
The interviews employed the unstructured, focused technique (see 
stacey, 1969: 75). A formal interview schedule was rejected because 
the sample was not random nor was comparable information necessarily 
being sought from each interviewee. Mlny of the interviewees were 
key partiCipants in events at a specific level within a union or they 
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TABLE 1.6 
StntW\Y PROFILE OF INTERVIEWS BY UNION AHD BY POSITION 
1 UNION I I I I I I I I I (POSITION I AUE.W 1 ASTMS 1 FBU 1 GMWU 1 NUPE 1 TGWU 1 OTHER I TOTALS 1 (WITHIN THE 1 I 1 1 1 I 1 I 1 
I UNION ( 1 I I ( I , . I 1 
I----~~~--.--I--~-I------~I------J-~~-I-~-I----~-I~~I---~----I 
ITOC General I 5(6) 1 2 ( . 1 1 2(4) I 1(2) I 5(10)1 1 I 11(26) I 
(Council Member 1 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 
1-----------------1------1-------1------1------1------1 ---t---~I~~---I ( I I 1 
I Senior .. , I , J , I I - I 
" 
'Executive " I 3(4) 4 I 4 1 1(2) I 3(5) I 4(10)1 4(6) I 23(35) I 
IOfficers •. 1 . 1 I I 1 I I , 
I(G.s., D.G.S. I 1 I I I 1 I , 
1& President) I 1 I I I I I , 
1 I J I. I -- - I - I I I .. . 
I National 1 2 4 1 3 I· 8(9) I 2. I 6 I 2 1 21(28) 1 
IOfficer (F .T.) I I I 1 .1 1 ( I 
1 1 I 1 1 I I I I 
I National I I , I I , t I 
I Executive , 5(6) 1 I 8 1 5 I 6 1 6 1 0 1 31(38) I 
1 Member 1 1 1 1 I I I I 
1 (Lay or F.T.) 1 1 I 1 1 I I I 
1 1 1 1 I 1 1 I 1 
IResearch & I I I I 1 I I I 
I Administrative I 3 2(3) 1 0 1 8(9) 1 2(4) ( 5 I 5 1 25(29) 1 
IStaff (F.T.) 1 I 1 , 1 1 I 1 
I I I 1 I ( 1 ( I (Regional, I ( 1 1 1 1 I t 
1 Officer 1 1 I I . 1 I I 
ICF. T.) 6 1 ( 2 111(18)1 1 ( 1 1 0 t 46(47) I 
I 1 1 I 1 1 I 1 
1 District 1 1 1 I 1 1 I 
1 Officer 6 0 1 0 1 1 I 0 I 10 1 4 t 21 I 
HF.T.) 1 1 ( I I 1 , 1 I 
I I 1 I I I I I 1 
IRegional & I 1 1 . 1 1 1 I t 
I Distriot I I 1 I , , I I 
ILay Aotivists 6 I 13 1 6 1 3(4) I 2 I 5 1 1 1 36(37) 1 
I ( I I I 1 I I I 
IRelated Experts 3 1 '0 I 0 1 0 1 1(2) I 1 I 10 I 15(16) I 
1 1 I I 1 I I I 1 
1 1 I I 1 I I I I 
I I I 1 1 1 1 , 1 
1 Totals 34(36)1 37(38») 23 143(48)123(28)144(SO)126(28)t230(251)1 
1 1 I I I I I I I I 
Notes: G.S.: general secretary D.G.S. : deputy general secretary 
F.T.: full-time official 
The number in brackets represents the number of interview sessions. 
Thus, 5(6) means that five people were interviewed in six 
different sessions. ' 
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provided information. on the impact or politics of the. Social Contract 
incomes policies in a particular industry or region. As Stacey 
(ibid.) has suggested, where experiences, reasons and motives are 
involved and Wlere depth of understanding is important, . informal. 
interview techniques are generally more appropriate. The duration of 
the interview ranged from half an hour to a rull day with. the median 
between one and one and a half hours. the methodological 
implications· of the research techniques will be discussed briefly 
below. 
Methodological Considerations 
This study possesses a number of clear methodological 
limitations. First, inasmuch as its concerns ~propositions of wide 
scope about major social institutions and processes', it is largely 
exploratory and will, at best, result only in the generation of" 
theories, not in their verification. Secondly, the scope of the 
research has been limited to developments in the unions' structure 
and hierarchy. In this sense, the focus is largely on the process of 
formal policy-making and the informal processes that come to bear on 
the policy-making process. The intriguing link between workplace and 
V 
union, . for instance, remains largely unexplored. SUch a link would 
require a different research design, yet it is clearly sign1ticant 
for any understanding of the impact and implementation of incomes 
policies (for a detailed workplace study of the impact of the Social 
Contract income.s policies, see Willman 1982). Similarly, apart from 
recourse to some previously untapped opinion poll data (see Appendix 
C), the attitude of individual trade unionists towards these pay 
poliCies remains a matter for conjecture. Finally, the.findings of 
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this study might conceivably be influenced by the degree of research 
access, the bias of the sample towards unions which were closely 
Integrated ,into ruc pol1cy-making, and the obvious "actor bias' of 
the interview data. 
. 
Against these limitations were a number of methodological 
safeguards. Following the well-trodden path of Glaser apd strauss 
(1968) and a wide variety of case study approaches in the industrial ~ 
relations literature (see, i.e., Batstone et al.~ 1977 ,and 1978), 
. ' 
this research has been "grOUnd~d' in a variety of research techniques 
with emphasis on a high degree of fl~x1bllit7-and maximllm collection-
of data. A wide range of documentary sources have been used in 
addition to the interview data. !he large number of interviews as 
well as access to confidential documentary sources has also 
facilitated cross-ohecking of key information. This recourse to a 
variety of research operations or "multiple triangulation' was used 
as a check on reliability, validity and other forms of researcher 
1:0\1. 
bias. However, the study inevitably had to contend with the problems 
·of data collection in highly charged political settings. This cannot. 
be an argument against such research, but it does necessitate carefUl. 
scholarship on the part of the author and vigilance on the part ot" 
the reader. 
Finally, the particular methodological interest of this study" 
resides in the unique opportunity for comparative organizational 
research. Different organizations are observed through time in the 
context of a common set of specific government policies on which they 
must take policy decisions on a number of different occasions. 
Moreover, these individual organizations are all linked in their 
common aftiliation to a larger polioy body, the Trad~Union COngress. tt,I 
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Ihus, while the individual affiliates are all formally autonomous, 
they are part of a larger organization which renders both their 
decision-making processes and the impact of their decisions 
interdependent. It is, therefore, possible to explore the upwards 
and downwards mediation of policy messages both within the individual 
union affiliates and between the individual affiliates and the TOC. 
Tracing the patterns of interconnections and. interactions is arguably 
useful for theory generation. This was, of' course p the logic of the 
research design and it appears to be unique. Such. an approach does 
-
not- seem to figure in the literature on. =rit:i sh industrial 
relations. Indeed, no other example of such an approach comes 
readily to mind. This highlights both the dangers and the interest 
of such an approach. The question of which of these two prevails is 
left to the considered judgement of the reader. 
OUTLINE OF tHE RESULTS 
The exposition of the results of this study presents a 
particular challenge. It must ground the comparative analysis of' the 
sample unions within the process of TOC policy-making which, in .turn" 
must be located in the context of political and economic developments 
of the period. The mobilization of consent and opposition to incomes 
policy provides a partial focus for the integration at the different 
levels of the analysis, . particularly in terms of the links between 
TUC policy-making and individual union policy-making. However, these 
internal union processes can only be understood in relation to the 
larger development of the Social Contract incomes policies. Thus, the 
exposition necessarily moves between these different levels of 
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analysis seeking to establish the interconnections between them. 
Chronology or the actual history of the period serves as the primary 
organizing principle. However, some chapters deal exclusively with 
events. and processes at a macro-level focusing on the development of" 
relations' between the government or the Labour Party and the ruC. 
Others concentrate on a detailed comparative discussion of the sample 
unions' : in relation to the elaboration and implementation . ot'" 
,~ 
government. and TOC policies. Yet others deal rlth both levels of 
;.; ::'/; ~4.(;;·~' .~.~ ~ 
analys.~s~. in an attempt to establish the pattern ot .links between' 
them. 'llle outline of the restUts is, therefore. a combination of' 
historical development, thematic analysis and case study. A simpler 
research" design would undoubtedly have f'acilitated a more 
straightf'orward exposition. However, it is hoped that, as the 
complex pattern of interaction between different. organizational. 
levels emerges over the oourse of the analysis, the heavy demands 
placed on the reader will result in a more sensitive understanding of 
the internal and external dynamics or the trade union role. in 
:: .,.".,' :'.: 
voluntary incomes polioies. . 
. lbe first three ohapters set the stage- for- the actual. 
implementation of the Social Contract incomes . po~ioies and, thus,. 
focus ~.n ,the pre-1974 period. Chapters 2. and 3 locate the origins or-
the Social Contract, trace its formulation and identify the events 
which resulted in its trans forma tion from ,electoral. strategy to 
government programme. nU! legacy of the 1960s Labour Government was a 
rift between the leadership of the Labour Party and many of its 
affIliated unions. The creation of the TUC-Labour Party Liaison 
Committee and its subsequent advocacy of the concept of a Social 
Contract between British trade unions and a future Labour government 
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represented the renewal of trade union and Party leadership links. 
!he apparent unity behind the idea of a Social Contraot, however, 
concealed 'a oritical ambiguity between social democratic and 
socialist oonceptions of su~h a paot. '!he soaial.1.st oonception 
focused on industrial policy and envisaged the Sooial. Contraot as a 
. 
kind of trade union IOOtor towarcts the achievement of socialism during 
the life of the next Labour government.· The sooial democratic 
conception emphasized the proolems of pursuing pOlioies of growth 
under conditions of full employment without enge!lder1ng high levels 
of inflation and consequent balance of payments proole!IJ3. It derined 
trade union cooperation in wage restraint as the essential oond1t1.on 
for the pursuit of social democratiC policies. 'lhere was further a 
fundamental disjuncture between 'trade union' and 'politioal' roles 
in this formative period because key trade union leaders remained 
largely outside the debates over the nature of the Social Contraat. 
As is argued in Qlapters 5 and 6, this no doubt facUitated the 
eventual predominanoe of the social democratio oonoeption. Thus, 
Qlapters 2 and 3 investigate the place of incomes polioy in the 
discussions between the TOe and the Labour Par~ leadership du~ 
the Party's period in opposition in the early 19705 and the apparent 
reluctance of the ruc leadership to make any wage restraint. . 
oommitments on behalf of its membership. Chapter 3 also explores some 
of the variations between the sample unions in their approaches to 
bargaining and incomes policy under the Heath Government and the 
problems that this entailed in the creation of a common TOC approach 
to the· question in its discussions with the Labour Party. 
Chapter 4 focuses more systematically on the policy and 
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practice o~ the sample unions towards incomes policy' and, government 
intervention in collective bargaining during the post-war period and 
considers their quite different profiles on the relative merits of 
incomes policy. It is suggested that the readiness of' individual 
union leaderships to support or oppose trade union participation in 
policies of wage restraint must be understood in relation to the 
particular internal political and' organizational requirements of that 
union. Thus, Chapter 4 explores in some detaU the patterns of 
support and opposition for incomes policy and their linkages with the 
composition of membership and industr~al location~ bargaining policy, 
and internal and external political practice within the sample 
unions. 
Chapter 5 focuses on the evolution of TUC-Government relations 
over the Labour Government' s first eighteen months in office in 1974-
1975. It highlights the process of 'consensus-building' in the 
construction of a TUe policy response to Government requests for 
moderation in wage bargaining, considers the constraints acting 
against individual leadership participation in such a consensus, and 
looks at how the TUe policy was translated into affiliate industrial 
; 
practice. It also charts the changing direction of Government 
,economiC pollcy in the face of mounting economic pressures. 
Chapter 6 is concerned with the period of tight voluntary wage 
restraint from 1975 to 1977. It outlines the pressures which led to 
the change 1n policy, examines in some detail the negotiation of 
Phases One and Two by the TUC, charts their relative industrial 
impact, and considers why the TUC General Council agreed to 
participate in such policies. 
Chapter 7 looks at the mobilization of policy consent for this 
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period of wage restraint within the sample unions. It focuses on the 
internal political processes of the unions and, in particular, looks 
at the downwards mediation of policy in union executives and polioy 
conferences and how this was translated into industrial practice. 
Chapter 8, in turn, focuses on the mobilization of oppposition 
to wage restraint within the sample unions. It chart 3 ho~ the 
industrial impact of the policies was ar~ioulated via different 
organiz~tional struotures into union policy processes. This upwards 
mediation of polioy sharply circumscribed· the capacity and 
inclination or union leaders to parti~ipate in fort:ler- rounds of wage 
restraint and led, first, to the withdrawal or TUC policy agreement 
for a formal wage guidelines in Phase 1bree and, later, to the 
repudiation of Phase Four by the TUG. The collapse of the Social 
Contract incomes polioies in the winter of 1978-1$79 seemed virtually 
irrevocable in the light of such internal union pressures. 
Chapter 9 concludes the analysis with an overview of the 
argument. It focuses on the internal and external dynamics of the 
Social Contract incomes policies, the implications of the study for 
an understanding of both individual and TUG pol1cy-making, and the 
limits and possibilities of future attempts by governments or the TOe 
to construct and implement such voluntary pay policies. 
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CHAPTER 2 
THE ORIGINS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
.Relations between British trade unions and the Labour party were 
at a low ebb following the defeat of' the Labour Government. in June 
. - -
1970. Moreover, the question .of' union. pc-wer had ccme to be 
identified as the principal problem confronting any British 
government. ,By early 1974, union power continued to bere~e~ as 
an outstanding policy problem and a minority 'Labour Gover~ent was 
elected at least in part because of its c~ to a specia~ r~ation 
with the unions. This understanding between unions and government 
was based on a pact between the TOC and the Labour Party which. Ca:lle 
to be known as the Social Contract. The purpose o'r· this chapter is 
to locate the origins of' this Social Contract. Chapter 3 will trace. 
its formulation and identify the events which resulted in its 
transformation frOm electoral strategy to government programme. 
The Social Contract consisted of several distinct strands. Its 
specific shape was the result of the complex interplay between the 
often competing c 1aims wi thin these diverse strands and the 
development of events during the Heath .Government. Some 
understanding of this interplay and of the resulting ambiguities in 
the purpose and comp~sition of the pact is essential for any 
comprehension of how these ambiguities come'to be resolved in favour 
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o£ the ~plementation of a voluntary inoomes polioy from 1974,to 
1979. Sinoe the subjeot of this study is the trade union role in 
incomes policy, this and the next chapter focus very heavily on 
attitudes to pay bargaining and the evolution of related polioy 
debates. They do so to the exclusion of a fuller treatment of both 
, . 
other aspects of the Social Contract and' the many industrial 
relations developments during the Heath Government" particularly the 
camp~ign against t~e Industrial Relations Act. Relying on hindsight 
and historical selectivity, the next two chapters seek out the 
'incomes policy ghosts' of the pre-1974 period. However, these 
'ghosts' were far from invisible. 
It is first necessary to outline the political and economic 
context' from whioh the diverse strands of a potential Social Contract 
emerged. Prior to and after the 1970 election, there existed 
considerable tensions within the labour movement. These centred on 
the Labour Party and reflected a complex variety or dlv1S;o~s: 
between 'left' and 'right', between industrial and political wings of 
the Party, between parliamentary and extra-parliamentary approaches 
to political activity, within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), 
and within and between trade unions. Fundamentally different 
political and eoonomio oonceptions of the labour moveaien~ and its 
future were in play. Three areas of debate were particularly 
revealing: on political strategy, on industrial relations policy, 
and on eoonomic polioy. These three areas of debate might be 
oonsidered the component strands of the future Sooial Contract. The 
bulk of this chapter will ooncentrate on examining each of them in 
turn, for it was from these three areas of debate that a potential 
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pact em~rged. 
I.t must be emphasized that the main thrust for this pact came at 
least. initially from the politicians - on both the right and the left 
of the Labour Party who, in their role as the official opposition, 
soughtto develop alternatiye policies to present to the electorate. 
The trade union response'was somewhat differentiated. Leaders of 
unions with a tradition of staunch loyalty to the part.y lea.dership 
were well disposed to the idea of closer links between the party's-
industrial and political wings. 'However, the TGWU and AUEW 
leadership, to cite the most important examples, indicated that they 
were not prepared to ent.er into'discussio~s ~ the ou~ome was 
assumed to be some agreement on an incomes policy. A reconciliation 
between key trade union leaders and the party leadership was 
necessarily prerequisite to the detailed formulation of any pact. 
That leaders of" the two large unions' identified with the left of the 
party and were perceived by the party leadersh.ip to be altogether 
less cooperative than the traditional loyalist union leaders made 
their later inclination for reconciliation all the more remarkable. 
The last section of this chapter looks at the' impetus for that 
reconciliation and how it led to the creation of the wC-Labour Party 
Liaison Committee., 
mE COMPONEIT STRAJDS OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 
The relationship between the trade unions and the Labour Party 
was at the top of the political agenda for both the PLP and the 
party's affi liated unions following the defea t of the Labour 
Government in the June 1970 election. Inquests in to the causes or 
the dereat took place in a number of quarters and concentrated on 
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three interrelated areas. First, there was the question of political 
and electoral strategy. What had happened and why? The defeated 
Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, had previously po~~rayed the Labour 
Party as the 'natural party of government'; yet, it was now out ot." 
office. Secondly, there was the debate over an appropriate industrial 
relations policy- Both the defeated Labour Party and the victorious 
Conservatives had presented their respective approaches to industrial-
relations as one of the central planks of their economic strategies. 
. ' 
The dispute over In Place of Strife (Department of Employment and 
Productivity, 1969) was deemed qy many'to have cost the" Labour 
Government its electoral credibility. The Heath Government's plans 
to al ter radically the character of industrial relations through 
extensive legal intervention virtually assured a fUrther period of 
Government - trade union confrontation on this issue. Finally, 
there was the question of economic policy. The trade unions bad 
become increasingly disaffected with the previous Labour Government's 
economic policies. One approach suggested that their cooperation, 
particularly in the moderation of wage demands, was nonetheless, 
essential if the Labour Party was to offer the eleotorate a credible 
non-inflationary polioy designed to stimulate economio growth .. 'A 
quite different conception identified a more substantial trade union 
presenoe in party policy-making as a way of holding the'party, 
leadership to the implementation of a more radical set of economic 
policies. Behind the apparent unity of calls for closer links with 
the unions, therefore, there existed quite different conoeptions of 
what a fUture Sooial Contract might possibly entail. Eaoh of these 
three policy areas oontributed significantly to the momentum of the 
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growing debate about relations between the party and the unions. 
The primary movement towards a Social Contract arose from a 
concern to renew the Labour Party in terms of both policy and 
strategy. The axis of these debates was located in the PLP and in 
the party's National Executive Committee (NEC) and its subcommittees. 
Ther,e is little evidence that trade union leaders wer,e not at this 
early stage acti~e participants in the basia strateg~c conception of 
the Social Contract, particularly as regards the debate over economic. 
policy. Rather, the trade union espousal of a Social Contract,. at 
least initially, came from an overricling (fomt:T'~ taent to the Labour 
Party as the most sympathetic possible interlocutor in government, as 
a promoter of favourable economic policies (especially on growth and 
unemployment), and, very importantly, as an agency that would ensure 
the eventual repeal of the contentious Industrial RelatiOns Act. The 
Social Contract would indeed be a 'contract' of sorts designed to 
hold the occasionally recalcitrant party leadership to its promises 
once in government. This disjuncture between the 'trade uni0rl:' and 
'political' roles 1n addressing economic policy will be revealed as 
extremely important at critical pOints in the subsequent histor.y of 
the Social Contract, particularly in terms of the resolution or 
ambiguities between different strategic conceptions of the pact. To' 
trace this subsequent path, it is first necessary to assess the" 
debates over electoral strategy, industrial relations and economio 
polioy. 
Political Strategy 
The assessment of Labour's defeat at the polls reflected a 
number of diVisions conoerning the most appropriate politioal 
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strategy for the party. The debate over electoral strategy had 
emerged .very e1early during the controversy whioh f?llowed the 
pUblication o~ the Labour Government's plans for industrial relations 
legislation contained in the 1969 White Paper, In Place of'Strife 
(Department of Employment and Produotivityu. 1969). The opposition 
of a! substantial proportion of the Parliamentary·'Labour Party to the 
proposals as well as the public split between James Callaghan and. 
, . 
ather senior members of the Cabinet primarily concerned electoral. 
Btrategy. In an effort to end more than a decade out of power, the 
party's 1960s electoral strategy had attenipted to broaden the--appeal 
of the Labour Party. Too olose an identification with the large 
manual unions affiliated to the party was seen as an electoral 
liability (Minkin, 1978b: ~63). There was an attempt to abandon the 
.. oloth cap' image in favour of a party of sooial reform and 
teohnologioal ~hange whioh might also, prove attraotive to the 
expanding middle classes. Under the leadershlp of Harold Wilson, the 
party was very suooessful in both the 1964 and 1966 eleotions in 
projeoting this new image as the ~natural party of government~ !he 
suooess of the party at this time perhaps should be linked to its 
plans to promote an aocelerated rate of national economia growth. 
These plans were modified substantially, however, as balanoe of 
payments dif'ficul ties led to restrictive economlo polioies and a 
relianoe on statutory wage restraint (Panitch, 1976: 85-164; 
Beckerman, 1972). By mid-1968, union opposition to the Government's 
wages polioy made its operation virtually impossible. 
Moreover, the Donovan Commission Report in June 1968 had further 
fooused the publio mind on industrial relations reform (Donovan, 
1968). The onus was on the Government to act.· Industrial relations 
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re£orm was increasingly seen as something which might suitably 
replace incomes policy legislation (Panitch, 1976: 164). Indeed, 
the Prime Minister began to portray such reform as a matter of urgent 
economic necessity on which the whole future of the Government, 
depended (Jenkins, 1976: 100). However, the Government decision to 
introduce the politically contentious measures .proposed by 
In Place of Strife was surely more related to electoral strategy than, 
it w~s to any impact that it might have on economic performance. As 
Peter Jenkins (1970: 164) observed, 'in order to win and hold the 
-vItal -centre ground the Labour GQvernment needed to ShOll that its 
programme for reforming the major institutions of society did not 
exclude the main vested sectional interests within the Labour 
Movement'. Callaghan, however, drew different strategic conclUSions 
from the party's unpopularity in the opinion polls. 
For victory to be possible, he believed, the Government had to 
stop antagonizing its own people and win back the support of the 
working people organized in trade unions. He was nailing his 
personal standard to this policy; Wilson wa5 committed to the 
contrary policy of trying to recapture the centre ground even at 
the risk of jeopardizing his traditional territorial base 
(Jenkins, 1970: 80). 
The defeat of the Labour Government in the 1970 Genera~ Election 
seemed to validate Callaghan's assessment. The defeat was'not 
attributed to any failure to woo the middle class; rather, to "the 
disaffection of the working-class voter~ In an electorate which was 
nearly five million larger than ,in 1951, Labour's total vote was 
actually two million less than in that election. Giles Radice (1970: 
8) was but one of many to draw the same conclusion from these 
results: 'If Labour is to win back its working-class supporters, who' 
either voted Conservative or abstained at the last elec,tion, it must 
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retain the support of the unions'. This was a view that gained 
increasing currency as various sections of opinion within the party 
conducted their own autopsies on the 1964-1970 Labour Government. 
Numerous senior. Labour Party politicians as well as some prominent 
trade union leaders spoke of the urgent need to develop a new 
dialogue between the trade unions and the political wing of the 
party. This priority was further endorsed by the view that it was 
imperative for the party to offer new po~icies. , Not only had the 
previous Labour, Government seemed increasingly' bereft of new policy' 
-initiatives, but the policies pur~ued by the Baath Government marked 
a new departure with what had prevailed in the past. It would not be 
sufficient for the Labour Party simply to offer the electorate more 
of the same. Alternatives had to be Offered. Reviewing the Heath 
Government's first year in office, the New Statesman leade.r (18 June 
1971: 826) concluded: ~The task of the Labour Party has been 
determined by the strategy of the government. It cannot afford to 
sit back and wait for a harvest of votes ••• What Labour needs to 
do is to devise for the next election a programme that by its logiC 
and coherence will win votes on its own merits'. The urgency or this 
task was heightened by ,the possibility of, a snap general elect.lon. 
It was feared that with the Labour Party so obviously divided over 
the question of entry to.the European Economic Community, the Heath 
Government might' seek a new mandate from the electorate on the terms 
negotiated for Britain's entry.1 Thus, pressures on the party 
leadership to open a dialogue on policy matters with the trade union 
movement remained at the top of the political agenda. 
What was such a dialogue designed to acoomplish? The answer' 
depended at least in part on the respondent's place in the political 
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spectrum. Some of these divergences will be ·considered in the 
section be10w on the economic policy debates leading to the Social 
Contract... Nonetheless, it is important to distinguish some of the 
different approaches for they later contribute to the ambiguities in~ 
the nature of the Social Contract itself". A common point of 
departure emanating from the centre of the party, but spreading well 
beyond, was the view that it was imperatiye to rebuild bridges to the 
part~'s traditional constituencies - the unions. Certainly the most 
important argument, which was by no means li.Diite.d·to the right of" the 
party,. was that it was necessary to c.ome to scme- accommodation with 
the unions on wage bargaining and inflation if Labour was to offer 
convincing policies to achieve economic growth. Socialist Commentary 
(July, 1970: 1-2) on the right of the party also expressed the hope 
that the party leadership would endeavour ~to build. an understanding 
of the problems of government among trade unionists and party 
activists, to explain to them the key issues of the 1970s, and the 
values at stake in the way they are handled'.· Dialogue witb the 
unions was therefore in many senses an educative exercise - an 
attempt to foster some appreciation of the constraints ~ace~ by 
social democratic governments in a mixed economy. 
Many on the left of the .party, on the othe~ hand, felt that the 
party leadership could only be pushed into bolder SOCialist pOliOie~ 
with the support of the unions. A common strategy with the trade 
unions might work as a motor towards socialism. There were two 
interesting variations in this approach on the left. Barbara Castle 
(1970: 356-357), on the one hand, wrote that a Labour Government 
could not be tUrned into a SOCialist one without winning cooperation 
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about the means to do so from the trade union movement. 'The time 
llas come to forge a common strategy'. It was clear in her mind at 
least that this would involve unions converting their wage militancy 
into a more positive expression of political change~ Tony Benn, on 
the other hand, was more enthusiastic about the socialist potential 
of wage and redundancy struggles.2 He was espec1a~ly critical of his 
. . 
former ministerial colleagues for what he 'regarded as their lack of 
accountability to the labour movement • He argued that opposition to 
. 
the Vietnam war, an upsurge in trade union mi2itancy, lobbies in 
favour of the environment,. student protests-and many' other movements 
of the 1960s were evidence of a desire for greater political 
partiCipation and a challenge to the authority of the existing system 
that politicians ultimately would be compelled to acknowledge. 
It is arguable that what has really happened has amounted, to 
such a breakdown in the social contract, upon which 
parliamentary democracy by universal suffrage was based. that 
that contract now needs to be re-negotiated on a basis that 
shares power much more widely, before it can win general assent 
again (Benn, 1970: 11). 
While the right-wing of the party concentrated its energies on the 
question of EEC membership, Benn was instrumenta2 in promoting the 
assiduous subcommittee work that would eventually bind the party 
leadership to a more radical set of policies.3 However, trade union 
support was' crucial to this strategy; and Benn spoke of the 
impossibility of fighting the battles ahead 'unless we can forge 
powerfully within this Movement the union between industrial and 
political sides' (LPCR, 1970: 153). Stuart Holland (1975: 37-38) was 
possibly the olearest exponent of this strategy: 
progress to sooialism would be an on-going prooess, but one in 
which the critical centres or capitalist power and olass were 
transformed by a socialist government, backed by the trade 
unions ••• 
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To expect eighteen or twenty people round a cabinet table 
to initiate such change would be ,unrealistic unless they were 
backed by the economic and social force of the organized working 
class. It will only be through the negotiated and bargained 
support of the trade union movement that such critical change 
will prove possible. 
Ironically, it was precisely because of this vision of a future 
Labour Government that a number of social democratic MPs to the right 
, 
of the party leadership had misgivings about the advantages and 
practicability of closer links with the Unions. Already alienated by 
the - party's oppqsi tion to EEC entry, they attacked what they 
perceived as the 'left populists', such as ~e_'!rlbune Group and Tony 
Benn, who were 'pledged to support every trade union position' 
(MacKintosh, 1972b: 470-484). Some of these MPs and their supporters 
judged that the electoral advantages to be gained from offering a 
speCial relationship with the unions as a basis of economic policy 
were outweighed by the unpopularity of unions amongst voters (Minkin, 
1979: 238). Peter Jenk1ns (1970: 169) for instance, noted that if 
Labour was to form a government again soon, 'it wi.!l have to persuade 
the people once more of its will and capacity to govern the trade 
unions and not be governed by them'. Others suggested that i.t. might. 
ultimately be necessary to loosen the ties that bind the Labour-. Party 
to the trade union movement; though this would be difficult because 
of the party's financial dependence (Beckerman, 1972: 73). Thus, 
there were considerable disparities in the various assessments of the 
prospect and potential of a dialogue with the unions. 
The unions, meanwhile, were more preoccupied with the Heath 
Government's legislative agenda than with Labour .Party electoral 
strategy. The Government's industrial relations policy and the 
bitter internal divisions over an appropriate trade union response 
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that this provoked wi thin the TUe were of particular significance. 
, . 
The debate over electoral strategy was' thus largely confined to the 
PLP and the NEC. 
However, the 1960s Wilson Government had left a legacy of 
mistrust on the part of many union aotivists and leaders.toward~ the 
party leadership_ For some trade unionists p the exigencies of , 
electoral strategy was not a sufficient basis to become engaged 
in , a' new dialogue, particularly if that ,was 
• """ .. 'II: 
• ~,~.~ i:"~ :-~, 
-
. '-
to be a means or 
obtaining trade union commitment to wages policies, thus named or 
other,wise.' However, debate o,ver, industriaL.rel.ations an,d ~nomic 
policy matters continued to push the parliamentary leadership and 
affiliated unions closer together •. The strands of a future Social' 
Contract emerging from these debates are examined in the next two' 
sections. 
Industrial Relations Policy 
Although relations between the TUe and the leadership of" the 
Labour Party had been strained by the conflict over 
In Place of Strife (1969), the result of the bitter 'TUe campaign 
against the Heath Government's Industrial Relations Act was ~ gre~tlY 
enhanced identification between the trade unions and the Labour 
Party. As one then member ot the TUe General Council stressed, it is 
.. 
difficult to overestimate the impact of the Industrial Relations Act 
on the thinking of trade union leaders at this time (Interview, 18 
November 1982).' The profound impact of the Act was as much a result 
of the internal tensions that it provoked as the direct conflict 
between the Heath Government and the TUC. The eventual resolution 
of these internal tensions, in favour of a strong, collective campaign 
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against th~ Act with provisions for the .expulsion of those affiliates 
which did not comply with Congress policy had two direct results. 
Firstly, the TUC became involved in a dialogue with the leadership of, 
the Labour Party over how best to oppose the Act and what might 
. ,'-
replace it in the future. Secondly, the TUC General Council entered 
sUCh; negotiations with greatly enhanced authority to speak on behalf 
of its ~friliates; for the TUC had never previously succeeded in 
maintaining such collective disc~pline •. The controversy over 
industrial relations legislation was thus a crucial element in the 
eventual development of a Social. ~ntract. --]. -scbe:natic treatment of 
this significant episode in British industrial relations history must 
suffice.5 To situate the importance of the industrial relations 
policy debate in the eventual pact between the. Labour Party and the 
TUC, it is necessary to sketch the background to the legislation, 
outline the extent of the threat as perceived by- the TUC, and traoe 
briefly the evolution of the unions' campaign against the Act. 
By the time the Labour Government had fought the battle over ~ 
Place of Strife in 1969, the Conservative Party had already developed 
its own .comprehensi ve set of proposal.s to reform industriu 
relations. These were set down in a pamphlet entitled Fair Deal at 
I 
~ which was published several months· before the Donovan Commission 
submitted its final report in 1968 (Conservative Party, 1968; Butler"· 
and Pinto-Duschinsky, 1971: 83-85). This pamphlet was most 
remarkable, for, following the Conservative Party's 1970 election 
victory and with neither much conSUltation nor alteration, it was 
virtually reproduced as the 1971 Industrial Relations Bill (on the 
lack of conSUltation and relative isolation in which the pol~cy was 
formulated, see Moran, 1977: Chs. 5 and 3 respectively; Barnes and 
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Reid, 1980: 131-141). Concern over Britain's deteriorating economic 
position in the world economy and the alleged part that strikes, 
restrictive practices, the closed-shop and the growth of trade union 
power in general had playe~ in this continuing economic decline had 
already prompted calls for a more radical approach to the reform of 
I ' 
industrial relations within the Conservative Party (see e.g., Inns of 
Court Conservative and Unionist Society, 1958),_ The 1964 election 
defeat, however, 'precipitated a root-and-branch,re-examination of 
policy' which culminated in the publicati.on of A Fair Deal. at Work 
(Moran, 1977: 59). Whereas there Was, a fairly' w~ agreement on the 
need for some reform of industrial relations practices, the 
architects of A Fair Deal at Work differed from the authors of the 
Donovan Report in seeing the law as the "'main instrument' in· 
achieving reform (Lewis, 1983: 370). In opposition to the traditions 
of legal abstentionism that had prevailed in many areas of industrial 
relations in the United Kin~dom, the 1971 Act proposed an 
unprecedented, interventionist role for the state. It did so through 
the creation of a National Industrial Relatlon.s Court as well as a 
Registrar to whom trade unions would be obliged to apply for 
confirmation of their legal status. It a~so provided for legally 
enforceable collective agreements, introduced a list of unfair 
. . 
industrial practices that restricted trade union immunities, and' 
changed the definition of various individual rights in a way which 
threatened many aspects of collective union organisation (on the 
provisions of the 1971 Act, see Wedderburn, 1972; Thom~on and 
Engleman, 1975; on the tradition of legal abstentionism, see Lewis, 
1976). Wedderburn (1972: 270) described the Act as an attemp~ at 'a 
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revolutionary change' in British labour law. 
If In Place of Strife had generated a hostile response from the 
Tue, the Industrial Relations Act was perceived as a far more 
insidious development. The Government's seeming unwillingness to 
engage in anything more than token consultation on such an important 
legislative measure further raised the ire of the Genera~ Councll~ 
r 
However, the legislation was cleverly drafted. It placed the onus o~ 
individual unions to deregister under its provisions. Registration 
ofrered substantial advantages - not only the new rights to 
recognition and the sanctioning of agency or c10sedshopsr but also 
the maintenance, of many of the traditional' legal immunities whi~h had 
provided trade union "rights" under common law. The loss of such 
immunities represented a serious threat to many unions, particularly 
if other unions recruiting in a similar area retained legal 
protections by remaining registered. Moreover, although most unions 
were opposed to many of the provisions of the Act, they were reticent 
to cballenge the authority of the Government either through 
industrial action or by deliberately breaking the law. A spec~ TUe 
in March 1971 basically supported this approach. While voting over-
whelmingly not to cooperate with the implementation of the Act, the 
Special Congress (TUe, 1971: 40-98) rejected the calls 'for the use of 
the strike weapon to resist the Act. More importantly, despite 
vociferous calls from the ,two largest affiliates, the TGWU and the 
AUEW, for a more vigorous campaign of opposition, it narrowly voted 
only to 'strongly advise', rather than instruct, affiliated unions 
not to register under the Act. It became inoreasingly clear, 
however, that a number of unions intended to remain registered. This 
endangered the entire TUe c,ampaign against the Aot. As Harry Unwin, 
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deputy Genera1 secretary of the TaWU and a leading advocate of 
mandatory deregistration put the case, 'if reputable, long 
established unions became registered it will mean the gradual 
acceptance of the legislation and will' diminish the possibility of 
its ever being repealed by a future Government' (rUCR, 1971: ~29). 
It was in this context, and despite the reluctance of tne majority of 
the TUC General Council, that the 1971.Congress (TUCR, 1911: 448) 
optea in favour of an instruction that affiliated unions should 
deregister under the Act. This signi.ficant assertion of Congress 
authority 'over both its affiliates and the Gene.!'·al. Co un ill"later 
culminated in the suspension of thirty-four unions for failure to 
observe the 1971 Congress instruction (see TUCR, 1972: 354-368 and 
341-342). 
, Apart from the attempt to neutralize the impaot ot the Aot 
through non-registration and non-oooperation, the TOC (1971: 40) also 
agreed ,to 'seek from the Parliamentary Labour Party an explicit and 
unoonditional assurance on the repeal of the Act.' The disparity of 
views within the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) on the politicai 
advantages to be gained from close~ links with the unions naturally 
led, to, some debate over the desirability of an unqualified commitment' 
to repeal. However, by the time of the second reading or the 
-Industrial Relations Bill in December 1970, the PLP had produced a' 
statement which called on the NEC of the Labour Party and the TUC to 
develop an alternative to the Bill 'whioh will ensure that a workable 
accord between a future Labour Government and the unions and their 
members can be put before the electorate as a firm basis' for its 
repeal (Heffer, 1973: 199-200).6 It was neither politically nor 
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pract~ea11y sufrlcient to simply call for the repeal of the Act~ As 
Clegg (1972: 8-9) noted, 'Straight repeal is out of the question, for 
the Act itsel~ repeals most of the legislation which gave prot'ection 
to the unions up to 1971 ••• new legislation is needed.'7 In order., 
to discuss parliamentary opposition to the Heath Government's' 
industrial relations proposals, 'a liaison committee of senior General 
Council members and PLP representatives was constituted in Decembe~ 
. ,. 
1970~ At its first meeting the foll6wing month, the PLP 
. . 
representatives stressed their desire to commit the whole of the PLP 
to the' fight against the Bill. It.-was also "ag::ead that the "!U~ the 
PLP and the NEe of the Labour Party 'should jointly work out a 
position' on the repeal of the Act (Liaison Committee on the 
Industrial Relations Bill~ 5 January 1971). This was the basis on 
which the TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee 'was formally set up 
later in ,the year (see below). 
The logic of the TUC and Labour Party oppOSition to the Heath 
Government's industrial relations legislation led them to adopt a 
joint commitment to devel9P some alternative pOliqy'as the basis on 
which a future Labour Government would be pledged to repeal the 
Industrial Relations Act. This was a significant departure ~ tbe-
more cautious path of formal political neutrality which the TOe bad 
, -
pursued through the 1960s •. The TUC had successfUlly attracted many, 
of the "apolitical" white-collar affiliates such as NALGO and the NUT 
on the basis of its ability and willingness to deal with whichever 
political party was in power. The strength of feeling agCl,inst the 
Industrial Relations Act had, however, pushed the TUC away from this 
neutral stance and into the embrace of Labour Party policy-making. 
It did so, moreover, with 'a renewed sense of common purpose' 
67 
(Taylor, 1982: 193). 
!he particular design of the Act meant that it held some appeal 
to a number o~ unions and the tensions that it therefore provoked 
within the TUC were considerable. The ultimate resolution of these 
tensions in favour of a strong colleotive disoipline in opposing the 
Aot, however, greatly enhanoed the authority of the TUe and its' 
I 
General Council., This was precisely the, kind of interlocutor with 
whom many in the leadership of the PLP hoped they might negotia tee 
Moreover, as the :TUe was committed to achieve the repeal of the 
Industrial Relations Act and the labour Part-I -seemed' to be the most' 
appropriate vehicle through which it might attain such a goal, the' 
Labour Party leadership gained greater bargaining leverage to pursue 
its policy goals vis-a-vis the TUC. To understand these goals, it is 
necessary to turn to the economic policy strands of the Social 
Contract. The trade union strategies in this relation will. be 
explored further in the last section of this chapter and in Chapter 
'" Econaaic Policy 
The critical core of the debate about relations between the 
state and the unions was located .in the area of economic policy. 
Although many of the post-mortems of the 1964-1970 Labour Government 
touched on both industrial relations policy and political strategies, 
, ' 
they invariably returned to questions of economic policy. There were 
two stimuli: one past and one present. Firstly, there had been 
widespread disappointment with the economic performanoe of the last 
Labour Government (see, e.g., Beckerman, 1972: 29-74). Not only did 
it fail to achieve the promised growth targets and consequent 
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increases in ~~ving standards, but its economic policies seemed 
perpetua~~y chained to balance of payments problems. The economic 
planning wh~ch was to accomplish the modernization to whioh the 
Government was pledged had been relegated along with the ill-fated 
Department of Economio Affairs. Moreover, the Government· had to rely 
on stringency in publio expenditure and the restraint of wage 
increases to meet its economic targets. It was felt that the Labour 
Party subsequently had to pay a high e"leotoral price for such a 
mixture of polioies. Secondly, there was a reaction to the "new 
style' economic policies of the Heath. Gove~t.. The Conservati.ve 
- . 
. 
Party had oampaigned in 1970 on the basis of a return to radical 
free-market polioies - a new laisser-faire. This programme featured 
commitments to low taxation, trade union reform, minimum government 
intervention, reduotion of public expenditure, British membership of 
the EEC, and the pursuit of commercial efficiency and privatiZatj,ons 
in the nationalized industries and public service (Butler and Pinto-
Duschinsky, 1971: 91).8 Although the strategy was to b~ short-1.1ved, 
during the term of Heath at least, ~t marked a radical break w~tn the 
kind of' consensus politics which had prevailed since 19145. These two 
stimuli generated considerable debate about econom~c. policy within 
Labour .Party and trade union circles. A range of' contrasting 
diagnoses and possible remedies were. advanced. From their midst~. 
eI!lerged several distinct strands of an inCipient Social Contract.': 
These were concentrated in two areas. Firstly, there were the 
strands emerging from discussions over macro-econom~o policy and 
distributional relations, particularly the role that incomes policy 
might play therein. Secondly, there were the debates concerning 
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production, especially industrial policy_ Although the debates in 
these two separate areas were not always incompatible, emphasis on 
one or the other tended to reflect contrasting approaches to the 
operation of the economy as a whole. The Social Contract was 
ultimately subject to quite disparate interpretations. Some 
understanding of the differences. in these approaches. is therefore 
central to grasping the ambiguities which became increasingl~ 
manifest. 
Many in the Labour Party had been greatly disappointed with the 
1964-1970 Labour Government's poUci.es of retre!lcl:ment and restraint, 
rather than growth •. Surely, it was argued, a social democratic or 
socialist party should be the promoter of growth, a fairer 
distribution of income, increased public expenditure, and full 
employment. The predominant view of the economy held that increased 
public expenditure and stimulus of consumer demand would,' in 
combination with a prices policy and restraint of' wage increases, 
result in increased investment, full employment and· a higher rate or 
economic growth without either balance of payments problems or an 
unacceptable level of inflation.. This happy equation meant that 
there could be higher real liVing standards for aLl, including the 
low-paid •. The success of such a formula was,. however, crucia~~y 
-dependent on th~ compliance of trade unionists. This was essentially: 
the problem of post-war capitalist economies. If the government was 
to pursue positive Keynesian demand policies under conditions of full 
employment without engendering reCUrring balance of payments 
problems, it had to be able to maintain a low rate of inflation. 
Maintaining a low rate of inflation in these circumstances entailed 
alleviating wage pressures. This had generally been achieved through 
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a series or short-term incomes policies. These were, howover, 
subject to chronic breakdown, and it was questionable whether their 
longer-term impact was not in itself inflationary.. Thus, the basic' 
_. 
problem of' reconoiling full, empl,oyment with growth, stability of' 
prices and a surplus balance of payments remained.. 'A future Labou~ 
Government could only pursue policies designed to aohieve full 
employment. and the high rates of growth to which it aspired if it 
ooultl restrain th~ level of inflation. Thus, policies to deal with 
inflation were 'seen as a political priority. 
More particularly, it was asKed what role~ ir any, ~culd trade 
unions be willing to play in restraining the rate of inrlation? This 
debate was further stimulated by the Heath'Government's initial 
advooaoy of free-market rather than interventionist policies. It was 
necessary in response to develop a cogent alternative to the IIDnth 
approach. Moreover, although the Governcent had initially dismantled 
some of the wage and price oontrol institutions of the previous 
Labour Government, the rising level of inflation increasingly pushed 
it towards the elaboration of a pay and prices policy; first, in the 
publia sector and, eventually, in the private sector as well.9 
The calls to develop an alternative econemia policy were very 
much in evidence in the political, if'not the industrial, 'Wing of the 
-
Labour Party. The first step was to exorcize the ghosts of the 1964-'-
1970 Government. This oonsisted of publicly asserting a commitment 
to growth, 1n contrast to the slavish attachment to a balance of 
payments surplus whioh seemed to dominate Treasury thinking from 1964 
. 
to 1970. Harold Lever (1970: 744), a former Financial Secretary of 
the Treasury and close adViser to Harold Wilson, argued that the 
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party.must reject the orthodoxies of the stop-go poiicies which it 
had pursued in the past. 'It should now firmly declare itself to be 
committed to growth. Only an explicit and convincing commitment to 
maintain growth for some years ahead produces the essentia~, 
investment element in an economic expansion.' Anthony Crosland 
(1971a: 39-40), probably the most influential, thinker on the right of 
the party and a former Cabinet Minister, admitted that he bad been 
too·complacent about growth in the past •• He rejeeted the 
environmentalist position and argued that a future social democratle 
Britain would depend on the resonrces crea:e.d by growth' (see ai~o 
Crosland, 1971b). Quite apart from the critics of tbe previous 
Government's economic policies within the party, tbere were an 
, increasing number of former Cabinet Ministers who were willing to 
'g1 ve an absolute priority to growth at the expense, if need be, of 
the balance of payments' (Watkins, 1970: 403, listed Crosland, Lever, 
Crossman and Castle; on the increasing prevalence of this approach, 
see Stewart, 1972). According to this analysis, however, the problem 
with this strategy was the inflation that it would provoke. 
Therefore, a policy to curtail inflation - an incomes policy ~ was 
seeri to be essential. Barbara Castle (1970) suggested that over tbe "', 
next few years the Party must develop 'a socialist incomes policy' in 
dialogue with the trade unions. At the 1970 Labour Party Conference 
(LPCR, 1970: 164-165), James Callaghan stressed that there was a need 
to address the question of how to secure social justice for and 
between groups of wage earners. 
We must get down to this d1scussion for the sake of our 
colleagues who will form the next Labour Government ••••• 
We need all of us to si t down and discuss what instruments 
will be available, whether they are praoticable, whether 
they can be expected to bear the weight that we shall place 
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upon them to achieve our economic ends. 
Haro~d Lever (1971b: 68) reiterated that 'the cooperation of the 
trade union movement is essential to solving inflation on a 
. . 
democratio basis and that unions would be responsive if offered a 
reasonable deal on growth, unemployment, prices and pay'. John-
Torode (1970: 291) summed up much of the political commentary that 
was prevalent at the time: 'until Mr. Wilson and the. WC settle down 
for a series of discussions about hoW' th~ Labour movement wi.ll run-
the E!conomy next time round nothing can change'. 
The basic di lemma was thus identified as how a future Labour 
Government could pursue polioies des1g!led to "'''''COlI:-.-ge gro ..... ..h without 
undermining the balance of payments through a high rate of inflation. 
It was increasinglY argued that the solution to this problem should 
oome from a radical rethinking of economic and social attitudes and 
institutions. Such an approach was by no means new. Already in the 
mid 1960s, Andrew Shonfield (1965: 219) had sketched out the essence 
of this argument when he suggested that it was necessary to engage in 
the rational planning of wages and such 'a fully .fledged "incomes 
polioy"' really implied' the equivalent of a new Sooial. Contract'. 
In an influential pamph~et, Labour and Inflation, Thomas Balogh. 
(1970b: 11) echoed this recycling of Rousseau's phraseology 'When. he 
wrote: 'We need a new "contrat social", a deliberate agreement on 
economic and social policy.10 Geoffrey Goodman (1971: 8) translated 
this into a more popular formula: 
a prices and incomes policy, to be even moderately·successfUl, 
must be part of a wider social and economio programme of radioal 
reform •••• any prices and incomes polioy must, by its very 
nature, be part of a general move towards greater equality ••• 
when we talk of a prices and incomes policy what we are really 
discussing in the socialist oontext (or what we ought to be 
disoussing) is an entire social contract. 
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It was a theme, tloreover, which had ,been picked up by the Party 
leader, Harold Wilson. In a widely reported speech to an industrial 
relations conference in New York in May 1971, he spoke of the need 
ror 'a voluntary compact·' between Government and both sides of 
industry so that a Government could promote economic policies 
designed to increase production 'knowing that this need not lead to 
inflation' (cited in LPCR, 1971:, 165). He returned to thi.s message' 
. ' 
'at the 1971 Labour Party Conference. Stressing the need for 'an 
':Jllderstanding' between the party and the tra.~~ !?,nton movemen~ Wilson 
stated that they must begin meettnS soon to work out 'the conditions 
of that essential mutual compact between us' (LPCR, 1971:- 165). Thus 
the idea of a 'Social Contract' emerged as both an economia and 
political strategy. 
The basic question confronting the advocates of such a strategy 
was whether or not trade union cooperation and compliance might be 
forthcoming. This question could not be separated, moreover. f'rom 
the debate within the party about the desirability and practicability 
of incomes policies. Some unions were surf'iaiently steeped In 
'Labourism' or loyalty to the Labour Party that, depending on the 
economic context, they could be persuaded to cooperate withmos~ 
policies. ,- Al though a number of' moderate unions had been seriously 
alienated from the last Labour Government by the impact of statutory 
wage restraint and the battle over the In Place of Strife ,proposals, 
the industrial relations and economic policies of the Heath 
Government, if not the recantations of leading Labour politicians, 
were bringing them back into the fold (on the breakdown of the 'bond 
of mutual confidence' between the parliamentary leadership and the 
, .. 
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major1.ty of trade union leaders, see Panitch, 1976: chs. 6 & 7). At 
the 1970 Labour Party Conference, the general secretary of the GMWU, 
Lord Cooper, emphasized the need to establish a consensus between the 
party and the unions (LPCR, 1970: 173; on the GMWU"s approach to. 
, ."".' ., ,;" ' • ,. ., • I .. , ... • ~:: 
incomes policy and collective bargaining, see Chapter 4). Al~ Allen, 
the leader of USDAW, suggested the creation of a new p.olicy-making 
body which would combine the' highest level representation trom the 
, ,,; ',,' -
. . ... 
._ .NEC, the PLP, the TUe and the 'cooperative movement to discuss common 
" .' \ ... ' , ", 
pol1cies !LPCR, 1970: 175). However, the divisions and tensions were 
also quite visible. 
The trade union opposition to both incomes policy and industrial 
relations legislation, especially the development of the campaign 
against the Industrial Relations Act, had etrected. a shift in the 
weight of strategic decision-making towards an alliance between the 
two largest unions, the TGWU and the AUEW •. These two unloD!5 shared a 
common hostility to income policy and a common leadership commitment 
to greater democracy and otten militancy in the pursuit or wage 
claims.11 For the leadership of the TWGU and AUEW, attempts to 
~ resurrect the debate over incomes policy demonstrated a lamentable 
,inability on the part ot politicians and some trade,union leaders to 
~ ", ." .. fil\·. " . 
learn from past mistakes. Harry Urwin or the, TGWU warned t.he J970 
Party Conference: 'Trade unions ••• are always the first vIctims of 
a corporate state' (LPCR, 1970: 224). When a resolution calling for 
the party to develop an incomes policy was put to the 1970 Conference 
with NEC support, the TGWU and AUEW delegations were instrumental in 
ensuring Its defeat.12 Hugh Scanlon"s scathing attack on the 
resolution was a particularly articulate expression of the prevailing 
union opposition to the idea that an incomes policy shOUld feature 
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prom.nently in a future Labour programme. 
It is incomprehensible to us that after all the blood-letting, 
after al~ the confrontation in 1968 and 1969, ••• ' this issue 
is going to be reopened •••• Wha t possible assurance have we 
that a wage claim, a legitimate wage claim foregone, will 
benefit in any way, under the type of system that is envisaged" 
over the next decade? What possible assurance have t.he trade 
unions that a legitimate wage claim foregone will go in lower 
prices and be of benefit for the consumer? What possible 
, assurancehave we that they will not go in higher .dividends for 
the shareholders of the particular company? What possible 
assurance have we that a legitimate wage claim foregone will 
result in greater benefits for'the aged, the sick, the 
unemployed, will build more roads or hospitals? Surely. these 
• things will Qome about by the fiscal policy of the Government in 
power, based 'upon the revenue that it can raise by such 
pOlicies. What possible connection is there be~Jeen toe type of 
incomes policy envLsaged, or practised, what possible 
connection is there, with the redistnout:ion of wealth? ••• 
we will sit down at the appropriate time, with the N.E.C., with 
any others, but we will not sit down with the issue pre-empted • 
•• we will sit down and really consider how to attaclc the 
bastions of power, the commanding heights, we will sit down to 
see how we will redistribute wealth, and we will sit down to see 
how we can make a bigger and better cake, and we will fight like 
hell to ensure that the workers get a fair share of that bigger 
and better cake (LPCR, 1970: 222-223). 
In separate debates at the same Party Conference, however, both James 
Callaghan, and Roy Jenkins, the two most like~y potential leaders of 
the PLoP, literally pleaded with the trade unions not to foreclose 
their options on the incomes policy front. callaghan made ~t 
abundantly clear: 'In due course, • •• we shal.l need to agree 
collectively what is our positive pOlicy, and I beg comrades - I. beg 
Jack Jones - not to take a final view on this this morning (LPCR, 
1970: 166; Roy Jenkins stated that 'we will go on seeking it because 
we must,' LPCR, 1970: 226). For the political wing of the party, the 
obstacles to the realization of their political and economia strategy 
were readily apparent. 
The seeming unlikelihood of achieving trade union agreement for 
what some considered the essential element of the party's economia 
76 
strategy - restraint of money wage increases to combat inflation -
led a nwn.ber on the right of the party to despair of any voluntary 
solution. Peter Jay, (1970), for instance, wrote that even if some 
moderate trade union leaders might be convinced to support publicly a 
voluntary polioy, there was little evidence that their members would 
follow them. More likely, it would merely lead to "an ugly slaughter 
of all "moderate" trade union leaderships.' Jay suggested that, the 
. . 
only viable alternative to Heath's laisser-faire strategy was a 
oomprehensive statutory polioy. There were oertainly other 
proponents of the statutory approach, bu~_m~ of its poLitical 
appeal dissipated when subjected to closer scrutiny. Firstly, the 
institutional and ideological bias of the Labour Party towards the 
affiliated trade unions ensured that its policy options were 1im1ted 
to the extent that a Labour Government had to oarry a la!'ge degree of 
union complianoe to maintain Party Cont'erenoe support - extremely 
unlikely in the oase of statutory inoomes pOlioy. Seoondly, 
statutory policies had never been partioularly effeoti~e.. A~n 
Flanders (1972) was a persuasive proponent of this latter argument. 
"The inoomes policies that have worked have worked because of union 
commitment to them. Governments have had an exoessive beliet in ~at 
the law could do.' Flanders suggested that only a tripartite 
. ~ '.. ' 
", 
.. ' It 
volunta~ approaoh might work •. 
trade unions ••• ' oan only be persuaded to partioipate in 
an incomes polioy if it offers them solid advantages. A 
government-proclaimed policy cannot, a tripartite-
negotiated one could •••• for the unions as organizations, 
involvement in tripartite negotiations, far from weakening 
them, would add to their strength and standing. Without 
lOSing any of their existing fUnotions and power they would 
be helping to create a larger framework in which they 
could exert more influenoe and more oontrol on behalf of' 
all their members' economio interests. 
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The fragmented nature of workplace bargaining in Britain in fact made 
dirigiste pol.1.c:1es particularly difficult to enforce. Trade union 
cooperation was thus identified as a necessary element in the 
creation or an effective pay policy. Thus, political and praotical 
considerations continued to push the leaders or the,PLP to seek trade 
union cooperation in their economic strategy. 
: There was, however, a subtle but important shift in tactics. If. 
the ~nions could be engaged in wide-ranging discussions on economic 
policy without any prior commitments on pay bargaining, and it the 
Labour Party was committed to imposing effective priCe ccntr01s and 
delivering a wide range of social policiesp then perhaps some 
understanding might eventually emerge from either the discussions or 
actual implementation of the policies. SOCialist Commentaa; (1972) 
reproved Labour Party politicians for their~dequate understanding 
of union problems. It emphasized that a prices policy must be- the 
"foundation o~ a p,ositive incomes policy'. !he Party's new approach 
to incomes policy was further specified in the NEe policy document, 
"Economic Strategy, Growth and Unemployment',. which was approved by 
the 1971,~Party Conference. Rather than seek an. independent"f. dea~ on 
" , 
wages,",something which appeared highly unlikely, j.t suggested that 
. ~,' ' . 
once a tuture Labour Government had established an effective prices 
~l' 
policy, and was "pursuing a clear polioy of growth geared to the 
priorities and' objeoti ves of democratio socialism, it should not 
prove impossible to work out with the unions some kind of permanent 
long-term policy to contain inflation (LPCR, 1971: 374).13 The 
adoption of such an approach in combination with growing trade union 
disquiet over the policies of the Heath Government. made the 
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possibility of reconciliation between party and trade union ,leaders 
much greater. Before turning to this reconciliation in the next 
section, it ~s first necessary to examine the emergence of an 
alternative vision of economic strategy which would' contribute 
substantially to the formulation of the Social Contract. 
'While many in the leadership of the Parliamentary" Labour Party 
wrestled with the perennial dilemmas posed by the social democratic 
econQmio equation, there gradually emerged on the left of the party 
an alternative view of what would constitute ~ appropriate economio 
strategy. In its most traditional. form and ve.-.~9' tIllch in opposition 
to the view that the economic programme of a fUture Labour Government 
would depend on its ability to secure trade union cooperation ~ wage 
restraint, it was simply stated that socialists do recognize the need 
to plan incomes. However, that could only be done in the context of 
overall economic planning; and such planning was Impossible when the 
means of production were in the control of private hands. This was 
by no means a novel position on the left - both inside and outside 
the Labour Party. What was new was the genesis of a specific 
transformative strategy, a strategy to transform British capital1sm~ 
which could be incorporated into the Labour Party's policY 
, ' 
commitments and election manifesto and which would advance the 
, ~ 
British economy towards socialism. Transf'ormatl ve strategy Is no' 
doubt too grand a formulation; it was the product of a number of 
stimuli and remained relatively undeveloped. Far from homogeneous, 
its oomponent parts were loosely formulated and often subjeot to 
disparate interpretation. It was however given more speoifio 
expression by certain intellectuals within the party, especially 
those associated with the Institute for Worker'S Control such as 
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Michael Barrat Er-own, Ken Coates and Stuart Holland.14 Moreover, the 
strategy gained increasing currency on the lert as it was expounded, 
boweve~ vaguely, by many in the Tribune. Group' of MPs and, most 
notably, by Tony Benn, the former Ministe~ of Technology. The 
relatively close association of the new generation of "militant' 
trade union leaders, especially Jones and Scanlon, with the founding 
~ 
of the Institute for Workers' Control gave the strategy an added 
. . , 
impetus. What the various exponents and theorists of this loose 
. 
coalition shared was a common desire for some kind of 'alternative 
strategy' which would commit the Labour Pa..-ty to a more vigorous 
conception of sooialism than had prevailed in the recent past.. As 
was noted earlier, many on the left of the party hoped that a common 
strategy with the trade unions might act as a motor for such a 
change. The idea of a .. socia 1 contract' had already been placed on 
the political agenda as a .method of' resolving the basia economic 
dilemnas confronting social democracy. It also came to represent a 
quite different conception. According'to this lattet a "social 
contract. might be an appropriate vehicle for the pursuit ot' an 
alternative set of economic policies 'Which could ultimately transform 
the economic sys~m.· To comprehend better the coexistence or these 
competing conceptions of the ~soc1al contract', .it 1s perhaps uset'tll. 
to outline the factors which fostered the development ot tbe_ 
alternative strategy on the left. 
The more radical conception of the "social contract. initially 
stemmed from disillusionment with the "modernizing project' of the 
Wilson labour Governments in the 19605. It was further stimulated by 
the attempt of the Heath Government to implement its laisser-faire 
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econom.1.:c: strategy. Quite apart from the balance of payments 
problems~ many argued that the failure of the previous Labour 
Government to achieve its projected growth targets should be 
attributed to a lack of effective economic planning. It was not 
'. ~ :-
"~ 
technology that Britain lacked, but rather industrial po~icy (see 
e.g., Benn, 1976: 76). Thus, it was wrong to identify wage inflation 
f 
as the principal obstacle to a programme of growth. Higher levels of 
, . 
wage and price inflation only dated from the .late 1960s, whereas the 
.. ' . . 
major problems of· the UIe economy were longer-term in nature. The 
~istoric lack of growth was in fact th~.result of ,both. under 
investment, often linked to the outward flow of capital, and the 
ineffective utilization of existing investment. 
TUC policy was very much in accord with such an approach. In 
an effort to persuade the Labour Government that any attempt to plan 
incomes had to be made in the context of wider economic planning, the 
TUC began publishing annual economic reviews in 1968 (WCER,1966)·15 
The advent of the Heath Government rurthe~ stimulated.the lOe 
economic department to develop plausible alternative policies. 'lb.us, 
in contrast to the Government's advocacy of the merits ora free 
market, the TOC espoused a greater state planning role in relation to 
.. ;. " 
both regions and individual enterprises, an enhanced role for public 
enterprises, an extension of the scope of collective bargaining and~, 
increased company accountability (TUCER, 1971 and 1972). Criticism 
of previous planning efforts and industrial policy as well as an 
awareness of different forms of European industrial initiatives 
also directed attention towards new initiatives in public ownership 
and the strategic direction of capital investment. Stuart Holland, 
for instance, recommended the creation of a ~state holding company' 
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,. 
wh~1e the InC called for a new public investment agency.16 The 
appeal of fortifying the levers of state control over the flow of' 
oapita~ and the organization of production was further enhanced by 
the Heath Government's 'U-turn' in industrial policy •. Despite its 
pledged non-interventionism, particularly in salvaging 'lame duck' 
industries, the speotacular finanoial collapse of Rolla Royce and the 
six-month work-in agaInst the threatened closure of the Upper Clyde 
.Shi~builders in 1971 forced the Heath Government into a series of 
large-scale public interventions in industry whioh culminated in the 
-tabling of its 1972 Industry Bill..:7 
Simple disillusionment with previous industrial poliaies and 
the elaboration of a more actively interventionist role for the state 
in the mixed economy was, however, oompatible with most approaches to 
economic policy within the Labour Party. What distinguished the 
left's approach, and there were certainly significant variatioD3 in 
both degree and detail, was the view that it was not possible to 
reform the capitalist economic system in the way suggested by the 
sooial democrats. It was argued that capitalism would. not be 
transformed through either modernization, expansion or alterations in 
~ 
the distribution of resources. It was wrong to vlewinflation as the 
result of a vicious ~merry-go-round'over wage bargaining which t~ 
-impeded growth. Inflation was not the Simple produot of 
., 
distributional struggles. Rather, it had to be understood in terms 
of the process of oapital accumulation, attempts by the state to 
regulate this prooess, and the impact of crises on both of these 
taotors (Rowthorn, 1980: 129). Moreover, even if growth was 
achieved, it would be far from unproblematio. The changing structure 
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o~ ownership through its increasingly transnational character, on the 
one band, and through the increasing concentration of production with 
the attendant mergers, rationalization and job loss, on the other 
hand, was surely sufficient evidence of the problem~ of growth. 
Trade unionists were continuously experiencing the direct effects of 
the changing organization of'capital; and it was a sub~ect for much 
. ~ 
discussion on conference agenda. Between 1968 and 1913, whe~ 
manufacturing investment and productivity growth were relatively 
, ," .: 
high, "well over half the industries in manufacturing were showing a 
net loss of jobs' (Massy and Meagan, 1982: 9).-- This' was the result 
of an active attempt to reorganize and restructure industrial 
production - .. shakeouts' in Harold Wilson's fal'llous phrase. Nqr could 
this be divorced from the wave of mergers, takeovers and closures 
with the consequent increases in the concentration of ownership. 
Thus, it was argued that it was not sufficient simply to advocate 
policies which would stimUlate growth. Private accumul.ation was 
anarchic and anti-social, and the tendency to monopoly ana the 
concentration of private economic power had been accentuated (Barrat 
"Brown, 1972: 12). 
l .' 
Future:·Labour Governments could not,. therefore, simply 
implemenithe 'right' blend of macroeconomic policies; and growth, 
, . 
greater equality and extended social services would then prevaii.:-
Rather, it was neoessary to challenge the power of private oapital.· 
As Barratt Brown (ibid.) summarized the strategy, "While capitalism 
cannot be reformed, its power - that is, the power of private capital 
accumulation - can be increasingly challenged by reforms'. It was 
proposed that this could be accomplished in at least two phases. 
Firstly, it was necessary to commit the Labour Party to a political 
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programme or social ownership and control of the eoonomy_ There 
would have to be a 'fight to oapture the Labour Party for sooialism' 
so that sooialist options might be presented to the unions' (K. 
Coates, 1970: 15). It was really a question of 'converting the 
unions to socialism' (K. Coates, 1973). There existed two potential 
torces within the trade union movement:- ~the one tending to 
. incorporate the unions in sustaining ~he consensus politics or a 
. mildly reformed private capitalist economy; the other reaohing 
" . 
torward to impose work1ng- olass priorities upon a political movement 
-that will open the way to social qwnership and. soc:i.a.l control of the 
eoonomy (Barratt Brown, 1972: 184). A socialist ~ social contraot' 
would be based on this latter torce, the assertion of working-class 
priorities. Secondly, with the Labour Party and trade unions 
committed to such an approach, a future Labour Government might then 
attempt to use the levers of" state power, however imperfeotly, to 
implement sooialist policies. Thus, unlike 'many of" the 'new lett' 
strategies outside the Labour Party that were pledged to the creation 
of a revolutionary party and the Ultimate overthrow of" state power', 
this strategy envisaged the mobi~ization behind and implementation of 
a Labour Party eleotoral programme that might press ref"orms to the 
limits of capitalism and 'beyond' (Barratt Brown, 1972: 13). 
-" 
such a strategy, it was arguedJwould be viable in Britain 
because of two tactors: the strength of th~ working olass and 
Britain's international economic position. Firstly, there was 
relative agreement that the British working class through its trade 
union organizations had reached a new pinnaole in terms of industrial 
strength. In organizational terms, there had been 'a strong 
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resurgence' of union membership from 1968 onwards· which arrested and 
" reversed the decline in union density that had occurred since 1948' 
(Price and Bain, 1976: 339). There was also considerable statistical 
evidence of an intensification of overt industrial conflict (numbers. 
~:': 
of strikes, workers invol ved and working days lost were all on a 
vir~ually continuous upward trend from the mid - t.o late 1960's 
-
through to 1974; see, e.g., Crouch, 1978: 201-205).' In addlt;f.on to 
much lamented 'unconstitutional' strikes, that. had been typical of 
industrial relations in the engineering industr,r or the 1960's, there 
'was an increasing tendency for llni;0n leaderSh.ips', t::r sancti:m-1arge-
scale official disputes. Furthermore, traditionally quiescent groups 
of workors, particularly in the public sector, were engaging in 
industrial action for the first time (e.g., local author-ity manua.l 
workers, health service auxiliary workers, some teachers and civil 
servants, workers in public utilities, coalmining and the railways; 
see Winchester, 1975: 7~-78). At. a national level, a more militant 
leadership had prevailed over the traditiona1 domination o~ the 
'moderates' within the General Council, and successfully opposed 
various industrial relations and economic policies of" both tho- Wilson 
, and Heath Governments. At. the level of" the workplace, the shop 
, ; ., •. :... ~ 
steward organizations of many' unions were sufficiently powe~ to· 
-
extend the scope of co~lective bargaining, challenge managerial'; 
prerogatives and)occasionally, even question the power of capital. 
The growing incidence of new forms of indUstrial tactiCS such as 
factory occupations and sit-ins were claimed to pose 'a radical 
challenge to the divine right of property ownership (K. Coates, 1973: 
42). These domestic trends were linked, moreover, to an 
international context where it seemed that riSing levels ot 
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industr~a1 and political confliot throughout Europe, particularly 
events such as May 1968 in France and the ~hot autumn' in Italy, were 
indicative or a breakdown in the post-war settlement between trade 
.~ .. 
unions and the parties qf the left on the' one hand and their 
respeoti ve national states on the other (see e.g., Crouch and 
. 
• Pizzorno, 1918; Barkin, 1975). Ironically, whereas the socia~ 
-democratic version of a 'new social contract' sought to come to terms 
with-this apparent trade union strength; it was precisely on this 
.. , . 
strength that the exponents of a ~radi.cal soc.iU cont.ractt aspired. to 
base their transformative strategy; 
Secondly, the left strategy was argued to be viable because 
Britain was identified as one of the weaker links in the chain of 
advanced capitalist powers. Ken Coates (19T3: 9) suggested that 
socialists should recognize this fact, ~and se~ to' break the chai~ 
by beginning the work of social transformation that would demooratize 
both economy and sooiety, changing the aims of. both in the ,pr,ocess'. 
I"- ," ~, ",. 
This was to be accomplished through a range oC po~iay initiatives, 
but they focused primarily on industrial po~cy and controls on the 
flow of capital. This assessment had crucial. implications far it was 
.~ ... '; ~ .~ f,!, ' : . 
,argued. that it would be impossible to pursue such policy initiatives 
without distanoing Britain from the prevailing eoonomic order in the" 
r, 
advanoed capitalist countries. In particular, membership of the" 
European Economic Community would mean further British subordination 
to the dominance of international oapital and prevent the pursuit of 
, , 
effeotive polioies to halt the decline of the UK national eoonomy. 
Import and capital controls would form a vital part of any programme 
to expand the British eoonomy and regenerate manufacturing industry. 
86 
It wou1d not~ however, be feasible to implement such controls within 
the framework of the EEC.18 Thus, advocates of the strategy first 
opposed Britain's application to join the BEe; and, subsequently, 
campaigned for a Labour Party commitment to withdraw ~ritaints 
membership. The result of this campaign was the 1975 referendum on 
EEC membership. The defeat of the left's position in the vote 
symbolized for many the defeat of the socialist conception of the 
soci!11 Contract (see Chapter 6). 
Although fragmented and sometimes undeveloped~ this analysis was 
incorporated into the programme of the Labour Party. The left in the 
party was notably successful in promoting it; for by 1973 many ot the 
major elements of industrial policy had been adopted for the party's 
electoral programme. Through the latter 1960s, the party's National 
Executive Committee had become an increasingly assertive voice or the 
extra-parliamentary party against Government polLcy (Minkin, 1980: 
327). Through increased activity and organ1zation~ as much as 
numerical strength, those on the left of the NEe were able to exert a 
growing influence in the formulation of the party's econom~~and 
,. 
industrial policy (Hodgson, 1981: 79). After the 1970 election, the 
NEe's Home Policy Committee had agreed to upgrade. the old adv1.:sory 
committees and create six major subcommittees which would formulate 
policy suggestions for a future Labour Government (LPCR, 1971: 31-
40). The left was particularly successful in seizing the initiative 
on the Industrial Policy Subcommittee. This committee subsequently 
established its pre-eminence in matters of industrial and economic 
strategy wresting control away from the Financial and Economic 
Committee (Hatfield, 1978: 44-66).19 This was of considerable 
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importance because the latter was chal~ed by the former Chancellor, 
Roy Jenkins, and largely espoused the social democratic view of the 
economy as discussed above. Thus, key individuals on the left of 
the party such as Ian Mikardo, Tony'Benn and, later, St~art HOlland~ 
were able to advance their blend of al ternati. ve economic poli.cies 
, 
through 'the party machinery. Labour'S Programme 1973 was_ 
:.' 
described by many as 'the most radical political and economic 
programme for th~ Party since the Second World War' (Hodgson, 
1981:84) __ 
However, this strategy to secure a socialist transforzatlon in 
Bri tain depended on both Labour Party and trade union support. If 
the agencies of state power were eventually to be used to create 
openings to the left, then it would require the mobilization of the 
working class behind the strategy, - both to cballenge the power of 
capital and to hold the party leadership accountable to the 
programme. Thus, the idea of a compact or contract between a tuture 
Labour Government and the trade union movement~ as bad been mooted by 
a number oC social democrats as a means of holding down the level of 
inflation, also appeared to be an attractive vehicle for the pursuic 
of a more radical strategy. A ,"soc1al contract', 1n the words o~ 
Stuart Holland (1975: 40), should be "a contract for' a socia11~t 
--=...tf\ 
'~. 
programme'. In Tony Benn's now famous phrase, it would be designed 
to bring about 'a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance 
of power and wealth 1n favour of working people and their' 
fami11es.,20 
There appeared, therefore, to be relative unity within the 
Labour Party behind the calls for closer links with the unions and 
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the pursuit o~ detailed negotiations over futut:'e economio polioy .. 
Underlying this unity, however, was a distinot ambiguity of approach~' 
There coexisted two quite different conceptions of an inoipient 
, 
"'sooial oontract'. The first sought to address thli'! predicted, 
.' .. 
inflationary consequences of' any active government commitment to 
economio expansion under conditions of full employment through an 
I . 
accord with the unions. The second aspired to transform the economi~ 
system itself, also on the basis of an accord with the uniOI1!l. The 
. 
conflicts between these two approaches would ultimately constitute 
the basis of more fundamental tensions in th~ operation of the Social 
Contraot. 
'l'HE RECONCILIATION 
A basis for the future Social Contract has now been traced to 
the oonvergence of debates within the Labour Par~ over po1itical 
strategy, industrial ~elations policy and economic p~lioy - all 
oomponent strands of the eventual pact. If they were to be woven 
together, there had ,to be a specifio reconciliation between the party 
and the unions. The leadership of the Party had appealed to trade 
union leaders for a joint understanding on future policy. Trade 
. ".' , _~,f,,:,y, ,,' -... .J :' 
union cooperation 'Was viewed as necessary for both the electoral and 
economic implementation of the social democratic formula. Some 6n-: 
the left of the party had equally identified more active trade union 
participation as a key element in the ,implementation of a 
transformative strategy. There was a differentiated trade union 
response to these appeals. No doubt sensitive to the appeals of the 
parliamentary leadership, the leaders of the GMWU and the Shopworkers 
Union (USDAW), moderate unions with a tradition of exceptional 
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1,,, 
~oyalty to the Labour Party, had already in faot proposed the 
creation of a new policy body which might meet at frequent intervals 
and work out joint policies (Lord Cooper and Alf Allan respeotively, 
LPCR,1970: 172-175). The r.esponse of Jack Jones and Hugh Scanlon;-
leaders of the two largest unions, was more problematic for the party 
. 
, 
leadership_ They had indicated that they would not be willing to. 
'" enter into such disoussions if it simply entailed seeking some form 
of restraint on wage bargaining (see above). The obstacle to the 
conclusion of any jOint pact was therero~e_c~ear. However, the 
development of the trade union campaign aga~nst the Heath 
Government's Industrial Relations Act and the willingness of the 
party leadership to engage in discussions without any preconditiOns 
created the neoessary climate for closer liaison. 
_ ·The threat posed by the Industrial Relations Act played a 
crucial role in renewing the strained relationship between a number 
of key union leaders and the leadership of the Parliamentar.1 Labour 
Party. By October 1971, not only had the TUe seoured the Labour 
Party's commitment to repeal the Industrial Relations Act~ but the 
most vociferous trade union opponents of the Industria~ relations 
policies of the previous Labour Government had been successful in 
forging a united TUC line against the Act. Moreover, the NEe policy 
document, Economic Strategy, Growth and Unemployment, submitted to 
the 1971 Labour Party Conference (LPCR, 1971), made it olear that the 
willingness to negotiate an incomes policy was not a precondition for 
wider discussions between the party and the unions on economic 
policy. There was also growing pressure within the trade union 
movement for closer liaison. Moderate trade union leaders, of 
go 
course, favoured closer links, but the 1971 TUC (TUCR, 1971: 448-451) 
supported immediate discussions between the General Council and the 
NEC of the Labour Party to work out pr'oposals that cou,ld form the 
basis of legislation to replace the Industrial Relations Act. lbe 
wariness of certain trade union leaders towards the party 'leadership, 
engendered by their experience with 'the Wilson Government in the late 
19608, meant that the negotiation of specific policy 'commitments, 
particularly on the repeal of the Indu.strial Relations Act, was-
prefEU'able to more open-ended prOmises from poUtiaians who, in their 
View, had been overly inclined to bow to the d1.tficulties which 
invarlably confronted social de~cratic gcve::::::ne'1ts (Interview, 16 
May 1980).21 Thus, the political and industrial wings of the Labour 
Party were mov ing towards greater unity, but a comp lete 
reconoiliation required a specific impetus. 
The origins of the Social Contract have been rightly attributed, 
to Jaok Jones's speech to the Fabian SOCiety meeting at the 1971 
Labour Party Conference. John Elliott (1978: 21) described it as ~a 
historic speech burying the hatchet of' In Place of Strife, calting 
for a newunity, and even foreseeing the'possibility of a wages 
policy'. Coming publicly from the, union leader who was regarded'as 
the cornerstone of the left alliance within the we which had caused 
the leadership of the PLP so much discomfort in the later 1960s, it 
. -
was perceived as an important peace initiative. More importantly-
again, it was the specific impetus required to launch more detailed 
negotia tions between the TUC and the. Labour Party on fu tUre po1ioy' 
commitments. The Labour Party leader, Harold Wilson, was quick to 
seize Jones's peace offering. The next morning 1n his keynote 
address to the 1971 Labour Party Conference, Wilson referred to· his 
91 
call ror a ·voluntary compact' which would permit a government to 
. pursue expansionist economic policies without fear of inflation 
because it could count on industrial cooperation and restra1nt. He 
also reminded the conference that the party was pledged to the repeal., 
. . 
of the Industrial Relations Act and to discussions on what voluntary 
. . 
measures would replace it. Wilson noted that when he had called, the 
previous year, tor the polit1cal and 1n~ustrial wings of the Labour 
Party to get together and work out a mutualiy agreed pol1.cy. it had 
been too soon. However, they would be failing the Labour movement, 
"if we are not soon meeting and working out the- conditions or- that 
essential mutual compact between us' (LPCR, 1971: 165; on the 
reconciliation between Jones and Wilson, see also ~ Statesman, 
1971a). Not only did Jack Joncs lead the standing ovation for Wilson, 
but he was the next speaker in the debate. 
let us go on, on the foundations of the pledge to repeal and 
create a new approach. As Harold said, the time is ripe. 
The trade unions and the parliamentary leaders are aloser 
than tor many years and will remain firm. and united. 
(Applause!) It is possible for the Party and the TUe to 
agree to a policy, because every union in the TUe, whether 
pol1.tical or not, is united in wanting' this Act repealed ... 
<I" •. ' 
• There 1s no reason. why a joi.nt polley aannot be worked 
out. But let us have the closest poss1.ble liaison. 'this 13 
not just a matter for brainstorming in the backroom3 o~ 
Congress or Transport House before the next election .. · In 
the past we have not had the dialogue necessary. The unions 
and the Party leadership perhaps have both been .unsure or 
their own ground but we can make this policy into a great -
campaign to open up the approach to genuine industrial .. 
democraoy based on the unions, which will be to· the benefit 
or the whole community (LPCR, 1971: 169). 
The reconoiliation was thus accomplished. Jones was outlining the 
basis of a f"uture'" SOCial contract'. He env isaged more than a deal 
on future employment legislation; it was a political vision of how 
the state and the trade unions should conduct their relations. The 
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movement.. to develop lay participation and of ricer accountability 
within the !aWU, the very movement which had carried Jones and other 
. 
like-minded officials to the leadership of the TGWU and, ultimately, 
or the trade union movement, was to be extended. 'Shop steward 
'-
power t bad init1ally been extended beyond the workplace to the 
oper,ation of the union as a whole; it was now to embr~ce first the 
Labour Party and eventually the state. 
'>- 'Jones thus became the trade union arch1.tect of the Social 
Contract. He played a central role in its origins, formulation, 
realization and, ultimately, its demise. The -position' of the- sample 
unions in this study with regard to the early evolut1on of the Social 
Contract and collective bargaining policy under both Conservative and 
- -
Labour Governments will be detailed in Chapters 3, 4 and 5. It is 
essential at this pOint, however, to identifY the key ,brokerage role 
, '.'-': .' .... ~ 
of the TGWU and, in particular, its General Secretary, Jack Jones. 
This role transcended the notion of simple representative functions, 
for the General Secretary played a crucial mediating role- between 
factors and events external to the union and those which were 
internal. In common with many trade union general secretaries, Jones 
f 
could ,transmit messages both inside and outside his union. 
<",..-~ .. ~..gJ.t,?, 
Host 
trade:~unlon general secretaries also attempted to structure-
expectations within their own unions in accordance with -their 
perception of external developments. What distinguished the TGWU 
General Secretary was his ability to structure expectations outside 
his own union as well as within. He could therefore initiate 
policies in both directions. This unique capacity was undoubtedly 
subject to a var!ety of limitations; an understanding of which will 
be a central theme in the following chapters. However, it would be 
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useful to iden~ briefly the internal and external factors whioh 
then combined. to endow Jones with this crucial mediatory role. 
Within the TGWU, Jones enjoyed a unique authority. This derived 
~rom two sources. First, there were the powers of the general 
secretary's position. The ·TGWU General Secretary, both by design and 
by tradition, held a unique authority. The original design of the 
amalgamation provided for a strong, oentral official to 
counterbalanoe the decentralized struc'ture of the regions and the 
autoi:rrony of the trade groups.22 Indeed, the tradition of strong, 
central leadership - whether to the lett or .. th~ right - had prompted 
the characterization as a 'popular bossdomt (Turner, 1962: 29()"291). 
This had been attenuated toa degree by the movement towards 
democratization and devolution within the union, but the General 
Secretary nonethe less retained considerable powers.23 Secondly, 
Jones's power derived not only from his position within the_ 
organization, but also from the personal authority that he had 
successfully cultivated over a long career as a~ active trade 
unionist. This was very much bound up in, the movement which had 
sought to reform the TGWU and of which Jones and others in leading 
positions, such as Harry Urwin, the Deputy General Secretary .. were 
acknowledged leaders. Jones was seen by members as a nT and G man" 
whose service ,to the union was exemplarY.24 'Ille operation of the 
reforms which he and others bad advocated was overwhelmingly popular 
amongst lay activists. Given his pre-eminent position within the 
union, Jones's personal convictions and behaviour deserve further 
analysis. A self-educated Liverpool docker, Jones enlisted in the 
International ~igade and fought with the Republicans in the Spanish 
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Civil War.. He then settled in Coventry where he quickly went from 
shop steward to union official for the TGWU. He was then 
successively Coventry Distriot Seoretary, West Midlands Regional 
Seoretary and then national organiser before being electe~ 
";::: 
overwhelmingly as General'Seoretary ot the union in 1968 to succeed 
Frank Cousins. Jonesquiokly asserted the mantle of· his new offioe 
, 
and gained a reputation as a fieroe opponent.of both government wages 
. -' 
polioies and legislative interferenoe in co~lectlve trade union 
'. , 
organization (on Jones, Icterviews; see also Beynon, 1975: 255; and 
900dman, 1979: 41, 358). Rather, he believed in the autonomy of 
workplaoe bargainers who should be free to partiCipate in and decide 
on the negotiation of appropriate bargains at whatever level. Since 
Jones's political links were on the ,left of the Labour Party and, 
more specifically, with the Tribune Group, there was oertainly a 
feeling on the left that he could exert a very positive influenoe in 
any disoussions between the uniOns and the leadership of the Party, 
espeoially in light of the role that he bad played. 1D. opposition to 
In Place of Strife. It was presumed that the union's commitment 
to socialist polioies would not be diluted through any "backroom. 
deals' with the parliamentary leadership~ Jones confirmed this 
impression at the union's 1971 Biennial Delegate Conference. In 
response to a motion oalling for closer liaison between tbe trade_ . 
. /. 
union movement and the Labour Party, Jones replied that the neoessary": 
maohinery already eXisted. What was neoessary was an indioation that 
the leadership of the Party understood that they had to work with the 
trade union movement when they were in power, not just oonsul t it 
when in OPposition (TGWU BDC, 15 July 1971). The motion was remitted 
on the assurance that Jones would pursue ways of aohieving a closer 
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liai.scn. Thus, Jones exerted a virtually unchatlenged influence 
within the TGW. As one member of his union's executive commented, 
, . 
he was then at the height of his powers (Interview, 9 September 
1980). 
In the broader political sphere, Jones, like his predecessors as 
TGWU' General Secretary, was in a position to playa key mediating 
role both within the TUC and between the trade union movement and the 
stat,. The structure and tradition of power re~ations withi.n the 
!GWU ensured a solid base from which the General Secretary could 
launch polltical initiatives. This potent~ was. rurther e::lhaneed by 
the location of the TGWU within the trade union movement. As the 
largest union in the TUC, not only did it cast the greatest number of 
votes at Congress, but it had direct access to key postions. It was 
virtually guaranteed a place amongst the six TUC representatives to 
", 
the National Economic Development Council and also generally held the 
greatest number of General Council seats. A strong leader of the 
TGWU was thus in a pesi tion to wie Id decisive power and intl uence 
within the highest councils of the trade union movement. Indeed, the 
astute TOC general secretary would often seek to ally his POsit1~, 
with that of the TGWU General secretary (see e.g. tha re~ation 
between George Woodcock and Frank Cousins in the 19608, Goodman, 
1979). The informal alliance forged between the TOWU and the AUEW: 
after the accession of Hugh,Scanlon to the leadership of the 
engineering union meant that the TGWU could generally count on 
substantial support for its policy initiatives. The highly 
decentralized structure of the AUEW and its internal factional strife 
limited the possibilities for its leadership role. The other large 
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generaL union, the GMWU, certainly possessed a comparable internal 
cohesion and hierarchy to that of the TGWU. It could also boast the 
strength of numbers, but its members often did not wield the same 
economic power and its shop steward organizations seemed to pose les~ 
'.. " .' .i 
of an industrial threat. Moreover, its moderate political tradition 
and strong loyalty to the parliamentary leadership of the Labour 
1 . 
Party limited both its inclination and credibility to pursue 
independent policy initiatives. It was invariably cast more· in the 
~"(~;~~::l':'.~'!~~~~., ~ _ . . 
role of a policy messenger; rather than that of an initiator-. The 
o.ther .. unions in this study, indeed the o~n~ .un!.ons in the TUC, 
commanded neither the size nor spread or membership to play the 
same type of commanding role within the ruC. Quite apart, therefore, 
from the TGWU's recent history of opposition to incomes policy, its 
general secretary was bound to be seen as a key interlocutor by the 
party leadership. Jones's distance from the party leadership and 
perceived proximity to shop steward activists, in fact, enhanced his 
bargainIng power in any exchange with party leaders. Ironically, hJ.s 
negative power as an obstacle to the. formulation and implementation 
of party policy increased his own powers to initiate. From the 
earlies.1;stages of the Social Contract, this constellat1.on- of 
", ; '_~ ,.;01"' ...... 
internal." and external factors assIgned a key mediatory role to Jones, 
_ .;~ ,t 
the trade union leader and the individual. This would remain the 
.. 
case during the subsequent history of the Social Contract. As long 
as Jones could carry Scanlon and lor the leader of GMWU with him, 
most other TUC unions would then follow. This permitted him a 
remarkable latitude to pursue his own vision of what a 'sooial 
contraot' should entail. The very faot that Jones was seen to be 
playing a key role, moreover, rebounded on the internal political 
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proc~ss or his own union to legitimize his actions. 
!he reconcLliation between the Labour Party and the TUe was 
. . 
given institu.tional form in late 1971. The Labour Party General 
Seoretary, Sir Harry Nicho las, wrote to Vic Feather, General 
Seoretary of the TUC, to ~ropose tha~ disoussions should prooeed" 
between the TUe and the Labour Party on eoonomic and industrial 
policy with a view to preparing labour's election mani"festo. There 
was some initial oonfusion as to who should partioipate in these' 
discussions. The Home Policy Committee of the Labour Party NEe took 
the view that it should be confined to representatives of'" the mc and 
the NEe (Hatfield, 1978: 76; Elli'Ott, 1918: 3i). !he TUC's Finance 
and General Purposes Committee was persuaded by Jaok Jones, however, 
that any discussions must involve the Shadow Cabinet. As Jones told 
the delegates at the TGWU's Biennial Delegate Conferenoe (15 July 
1971) earlier in the year, 
at the moment the leadership of the party is disposed to 
want to oonsult with the trade union movement, but we want 
to maintain that sort of'" oontaot and liaison when Labour 
goes back into Government. I think that we have got to 
commit the Party leadership to the understanding that they 
will be prepared to work much more closely with the trade 
union movement when they are back than they did on ~e last 
occasion. 
Jones believed that Labour politicians could not always be trusted to 
come forward of their own aocord with polic.ies favourable to .the 
trade unions. If these talks were to be of any value, then fUture:-. 
. , 
ministers had to be oommitted to speoific policies (Interviews, 16 
May 1980 and 7 October 1980)-25 'Ibis could only be done by involving. 
the Shadow Cabinet in the discussions and securing their agreement. 
It was a measure of Jonests influenoe that this view prevailed. The. 
new 'TUC-Labour Party Liaison Committee' (henceforth referred to as 
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the Liaison Committee) consisted of six representatives from each of 
the NE~ PLP, and TUC. It met monthly from February 1972 and played 
, . 
the key role in the formulation of the Social Contract. 
, '. 
CONCLUSION -' 
This chapter has attempted to trace the origins of the Social 
Contract in the debates which preceded and followed the 1970 
ele;toral defeat of the Labour Party~ More. specifically, Jot has 
identified three component strands of an incipi.ent social. contract 
-arising out of the debates over. political. strategy, industrial 
relations policy and economic policy. Each of these areas pointed 
towar~s the need for closer links betwee~ the Labour' Party and. the 
trade unlons. This apparent unity, however, conta1.ned a fundamental 
ambiguity; there co-existed two quite different conceptions of the 
nature and purpose of a 'social contract'. These might be roughly 
labelled as the social democratic and social.ist concepti.ons. 
Whatever their differences, both depended on some kind of specific 
reconciliation between trade union and Labour Party leader:ships. The 
obstacle to closer relations was the opposition of key union leaders 
such as Jones and Scanlon to discussions which presupposed as their 
object agreement on incomes policy~ This highlights a rurthe~· 
important distinction. Both conceptions of the Social Contract were 
derived, however implicitly, from theories of economic and social 
change. There is little evidence, however, that trade union leaders 
at this time subscribed to either conception. A desire by trade 
unionists to maintain closer links with the party leadership was not 
predicated on either of these conceptions of the Social Contract. 
99 
,. -, 
~. '~, ~ .".,~"~, t • 
There ex:1.sted,. thus,. a crucial disjuncture between "political" and 
"trade uni.on' ~oles in the strategic formulation of the basis of a 
socia~ contract. Whatever the ambiguities and disjunctures, any 
future pact depended on a reconoiliation between party leadership and 
,;' 
key trade union leaders. !Ehe impetus for this reconciliation. came';.'" 
from Jack Jones who as leader of the TGWU was ideally,placed to. 
I 
effect it. The reconciliation was quickly institutionalized in the 
form of· a new body, the TUC-Labour' Party Liaison Committee. 
subs~q'uent.' Liaison Committee discussions, juxtaposed as they were 
with the TUC campaign agaitl3t the Industr1.al.1ie!at1ons Act, the Heath 
Government's" u-turn' in economic' policy and the debates that this 
provoked within trade unions over their collective bargaining 
policies, and the continuing elaboration of new industrial policies 
by NEC subcommittees, led to the specific formulation of the Social 
Contract. This process is the subject of the next chapter. 
t - ~r' :. 
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CHAPTER 3 
THE FORMULATION OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 1972-1974 
Having previously identified the diverse strands from which the 
Social Contract originated and established the reconciliation between 
the trade union and Labour Party leadsrships, this chapter examines 
the formulation of the Social Contract in the 1972-1974 period. The 
essentially fluid and dispa~te character of the Social Contract 
should be stressed. It was constantly defined and redefined on 
several fronts: in the Liaison Committee, in the National Executive 
and PLP of the Labour Party, within individual unions and, not least, 
in the TUC's relations with the Heath Governoent. Thus~ 'the 
formulation of the Social Contract was an incremental process in 
~ich each event played a part in further clarifying or obscuring tlle 
nature of the project. By the time of the February 1974 election. 
therefore, the Social Contract carried both the visible and invisible 
imprints of the volatile period in which it was formulated. Its 
disparate parts had a greater meaning as a result of ~he events which 
brought the project to realization. This chapter charts the' 
direction of the Liaison Committee discussions and, to a lesser 
extent, debates within the Labour ~arty and the TUC; explores some of 
the internal dynamics affecting individual union approaches to 
collective bargaining, the economy, inflation and politic~l strategy; 
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and identifies the key formative influences in the transformation of 
the Social Contract first from, 'political' embryo' to electoral 
programme in 1972-1973 and, then, from electoral programme to 
government policy in 1973-1974. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part 
traces" the creation of a Labour Party programme which was based 
specifically on the notion of the Social ,Contract and carried the 
TUC's .seal of approval. In charting' the development of' this 
programme, particular emphasiS is placed on th.e interplay betwen 
-. -
the Liaison Commit tee discussiOns (and also the policy forcill.ation-
within the subcommittees of the Labour Party) and events outside the 
committee rooms such as the impact of the Industrial Relations Act, 
the tripartite ,negotiations with the Heath Government, the imposition 
of a statutory pay policy and the reactions that these provoke<1 
within the individual unions. The second part of the chapter 
considers variations between and within the sample unions on 
oolleotive bargaining policy, inflation, incomes policy and political 
practice. The imposition of statutory wage controls. the possibility 
of renewed 'lUe talks with the Heath Goyemment on the economy and the 
continuing dialogue between the Labour Party'and the TUC on economic 
pollcy pushed most 'lUC affiliates to define in some way their 
approach to economic policy, particularly on inflation and incomes 
policy_ These approaches were generally closely linked to their 
collective bargaining policy and were often indicative of prevailing 
political rationalities in terms of the limits and possibilities of 
trade union relations with the state. The variations 1n individual 
union collective bargaining policy and their approaches to inflation, 
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the economy and the state are particularly significant in terms of 
their influence on the readiness of union leaderships to support or 
oppose trade union partioipation in various pay policy phases during 
the 1974-1979 Labour Government. !his chapter, the~fore, explores 
some of these variations during the 1972-1973 period. Subsequent 
chapters will sorutinize them further. Finally, the third part of 
the chapter deals with the transformation of the Social Contraot from 
programme to power. Once again, the oontext in Wich this occurred 
, . 
and the consequent aotions of the TUC had crucial implicatiOns for 
the future development of the Socia~ Contract. In particular, the 
lUC'" demonstrated . a willingness to .exert an- - fii:!'lllence over - the -
formulation of wage claims by its affiliates. Wnat the Labour Party 
leadership failed to secure in words, the events which brought the 
Social Contract to power secured in aotion. The stage was thus 
prepared for trade union participation in a series of voluntary 
inoomes policies. 
FROM STRAmy TO PROGRAMME 
The first meeting of the newly constituted link between the TOe 
and the Labour Party, the Liaison Committee, took place in February 
1972. By the autumn of 1973, sixte,en meetings later, the terrain ot' 
the Social Contract had been largely mapped out. .!nis first part of 
the chapter will focus on the 'formulation of the Sooial Contraot 
during this period. It would be misleading to imply that the Social 
Contraot was simply the output of these meetings. It was not defined 
by any single statement. As was suggested in the previous chapter, 
propo'nents of quite different conoeptions of a Social Contract had 
commonly advocated closer links between the Labour Party and its 
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afflliated unions, but the meaning of such a project remained fluid. 
The three statements produced by the Lia;ison Committee during this 
period were certainly important in defining the nature of that closer 
link; but so too was the formulation of Labour's Programme 1913 
(Labour Party, 1913). Indeed, this document was regarded by man~ as 
the high-water mark of socialist consciousness in the Labpur Party -
the very essence of a Social Contract I Yet, many of the most 
important aspects of this document, especially those concerned with 
industrial policy, ·had already been worked out by various Labour 
Party subcommittees for the 1912 Party Confer~e and appea.reC in-
Labour's Programme 1912 (LPCR, 1912) - well before the Liaison 
Committee ever addressed these questions. 
Thus, the Social Contract was made up of disparate parts and 
subject to quite different interpretations. In its broadest· sense, 
the Social Contract was being defined quite independently of the 
specific institutional link established by the Liaison Committee • 
. Contacts between senior officials of the labour Party and the 'l'UC 
were frequent. Many senior trade union officials also held 
positio~s within the Labour Party. The trade union block-vote was 
decisive on all policy decisions at the Labour Party Conference (see 
Minkin, 1918a). Not surprisingly, there was a high degree of overlap 
in TUC and Labour Party policies. The Liaison Committee, however, 
enabled senior trade union leaders to carry on a direct dialogue with 
the Shadow cabinet and give specific expression to What was already 
common in the programmes of the Party and the TUe. It signified a 
general TUe commitment to the objeotives of Labour's programme. Most 
importantly, the presence of senior trade union leaders implied some 
104 
' .. 
commitment to mobilize their respective memberships in . that 
direction. As much as the specific content, this'was the symbolic 
importance of the three documents that the Liaison Committee produced 
during this period. 
The Social Contract was not the subject of widespread discussion 
during this period. Indeed, the term was hardly mentioned at trade 
union 'conferences. David Basnett, the newly elected general 
secretary of the GMWU, was possibly the fir~t union leader to mention 
the concept to his union at its annual conference in June 1973 (GMWU 
. , 
AC, 1973: 370-371). Basnett was party to ~"le Liaison Committee 
. - . 
discussions. In contrast, the chief union "'a:-:::!..tect' o~ the 
concept, Jack Jones, did not even employ the term at his union's 
biennial delegate conference in July 1973 (TGWU BOC, 10 July 1973). 
There ~s, however, an atmosphere of considerable 1ndustr1a~ and 
political effervescence, and the calls from trade union activists for 
the return of a Labour Government and the implementation of pollcies 
favourable to trade unionists were numerous. The SOcial Contract was 
rather the product of the committee rooms in both the Labou~ Party 
and the roC. Since the deliberations in these committee rooms 'Were 
shaped by outside events, it is essential 'to focua on this 
interrelation. 
The content of the Liaison Committee discussions might be 
broadly ,subdivided into several distinct phases. 'lhese divisions 
owed as much to the development of outside events as they did the 
pursuit of any internal agenda. !be first six meetings were largely 
concerned with hammering out a joint TOC-Labour Party approach to the 
repeal of the Industrial Relations Aot. The TUe played a decisive 
role during this phase. If symbolic confirmation of the importance 
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of these discussions was necessary, the discussions coincided with a 
dramatic escalation of the TUC campaign against the Industrial 
Relations, ~t and the first general strike call from theTUC since 
1926. The second phase of meetings covered the period from the 
autumn of 1972 through to the 'spring of 1973 when the agenda· was 
dominated by economic issues and the Liaison Committee produced two 
important statements on economic policy. Once again, the discussions 
coincided with the development of key formative events outside' the 
committee rooms. The tripartite econom1cdiscus~ions which were the 
symbol of the Heath Government t s new att?:~hEle!lt to 'consensus 
. 
politics I collapsed with the Chequers talks in Nove::Iber. The Prime 
Minister subsequently announced a statutOry wage freeze, and the TUC 
hardened its opposition to statutory wage poliCies of any 
description. In a third phase of discussions, ~~e Liaison Committee 
returned to the subject of new industrial relations legislation and' 
actually set down its detailed legislative priorities. This phase, 
however, ,was largely overshadowed by debates within the trade union 
movement' on collective bargaining policy (the subject of the second 
part of this chapter) and the debate on industria~ pollcy within the 
Labour Party between the social democratic and socialist 
interpretations of the Social Contract. It was planned that a fourth 
phase of Liaison Committee discussions would have considered economic - _' 
and industrial issues in greater detail. These plans, however, were 
displaced by the energy crisis in the winter of 1973-1974, the 
miners' dispute, and the imminence of a general election. This 
period is the subject of the final part of this chapter. 
Throughout this entire period of Liaison Committee meetings, a 
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number or tenslons were visible and influenced the tenor of the 
discussions as well as their results. There was a continual tension 
between the PLP's agreement to pursue .the industrial relations 
legislation as proposed by the TUC, . and Jones in part~cular, and the 
TUC representatives' apparent unwillingness to agree to what the PLP 
representatives most ardently desired - some form of qUid pro qua on 
pay whereby the TUC would exercise a voluntary restraint· on money 
wage increases in return for expansionary ec,onomic policies. The ruc 
felt doubly constrained however. .First, while they were engaged in 
. . 
intensive discussions with the Heath Government on economic policy, 
TUCleaders were necessarily cautious in their d; '""c!:ssions with . the .. 
labour Party. This constraint was relaxed somewnat 'when the' talks 
with the Heath Government collapsed, but the hardening of 'l'UC 
opposition ·to the new,statutory policy effectively precluded further 
PLP attempts to secure an agreement from the TUG on this ~ont. 
Secondly, the ruc leadership was constrained in what it could· agree 
on pay with the Labour Party leadership by the autonomy and sectional· 
economic power of its affiliates. The PLP representatives felt 
similar constraints. Anxious constitutionalists . and 
parliamentarians, they were. loathe to pursue intensive negotia:t1o~ 
with the TUC when the latter was heavily inVolved in talks with the 
Government. They were also wary of circumventing the clear poUcy-
making role of the NEC as set down in the constitution of the Labour 
Party. The PLP representatives were to some extent caught between 
the representatives of the NEC and the TUC respectively; for these 
two could push the PLP to agree to what the Heath Government had 
refused. 
There was also the continuous tension between the different 
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conceptions of the Social Contract, as advanced by socialists and 
social democrats. It should be emphasized that the radical 
conception of the Social Contract seldom surfaced in the Liaison 
Committee discussions. Rather, it was emerging quite independently 
in the subcommittees of the NEC, and only provoked major 
confrontations in the months leading up to the 1973 Labour Party 
Conference. As has already been noted, these Liaison" Committee 
discussions took place almost uniquely at leadership level. There 
was, therefore, a tension between what was being discussed and the 
competing definitions of what would be acceptable t.o both party and 
union activists and the broader "electorate. These different 
tensions, of varying importance according to the issue and context, 
surfaced on numerous occasions through the eighteen months of 
discussion under investigation in this section - as well as during, 
the months preceding the 1974 election. They were sharpe~ed, 
moreover, by the volatile environment in which the discussions took 
place. If anything, it heightened the urgency tor the elaboration of 
an electorally oredible alternative. Ironically, it was precisely 
1;>ecause of the various ambiguities in the Social Contract project. 
that the conflicts between the different tensions and interpretatiOns 
could be submerged. The following sections will focus on the first 
two phases of the Liaison Committee discussions and the parallel 
events that shaped them: the 'lUC campaign against the Industrial 
Relations Act, the Olequers talks and the debate over industrial 
policy within the Labour Party. 
The Liaison Committee Discussions: the first phase 
The Liaison Committee was constituted in January 1972. The 
108 
first phase of discussions largely concentrated on the repeal of the 
Industrial Relations Act and culminated in a joint TUC-Labour Party 
statement in July 1972. It was appropriate.that this new bOdy should 
have focused on employment legislation, for the TUC had originally 
been created in response to' the legal threats to the existence of 
trade unionism and the precursor of the General Council, the 
Parliamentary Committee, had been formed to lobby parliament in the 
interests of labour. Indeed, the TUC later gave birth to the Labour 
Party 1n order to ensure the existence of a more sympathetiC voice in 
parliament (on the early polltical activity of be TUC, see Ross 
Martin, 1980). 
In a seminal New Statesman article published just before the 
first Liaison Committee meeting in February, Jack Jones (1972) 
outlined the kinds of industrial relations measures he felt they 
should be discussing. It is worth summariz1r..g his proposals. lbey 
effeotively determined the agenda of discussions on new labour 
legislation and bore a remarkable resemblance to the eventual 
legislative output under the future Labour Government. Drawing 
largely from a speech that he had given to the National Conference of' 
the Institute of Personnel Management in 1969 (Jones, 1969), Jones 
envisaged the replacement of the Industr-ial Relations Act with a 
number of new agencies and procedures. He advocated the creation of -
a voluntary conciliation and arbitration service so that trade 
unionists might have access to a truly independent conciliation and 
arbitration service. The Department of Employment's servioe had been 
compromised by Government intervention in public servioe disputes, 
especially those following its eleotions in 1970 (see Winohester, 
log 
1983: 166). Jones proposed measures to promote voluntary 
collective bargaining with provisions for statutory recognition and. 
unf~ dismissals procedures. He also recommended the operation of 
fair wages legislation to protect the low-paid. Finally, Jones 
particularly stressed the need for a major extension of industrial 
democracy. The impact of these proposals underlines the crucial role 
played: by Jones in the formulation of the SOcial Contract; As Lewis 
Minkin (1978a: 406) has observed, 'The ev:idence of participation in 
the I4aison' Committee discussions indicates that Jack Jones was a 
major source of policy initiatives, and the most powert'UJ. siegle 
.. 
voice on the committee in the discussions of the Pa:-ty's industrial 
and prices policy.' . 
Although the Liaison Committee was almost exclusively concerned 
during this period with labour legislation, the tensions between the 
• 
trade union and PLP representatives over the role of pay policy 
surfaced very early; indeed at the first meeting, there was some 
tentative jousting. When the Labour Party representatives asked the 
TUe to comment on the recent conclusion of the miners' dispute, the 
. TUC drew the lesson that the Government 'could not carry through a 
policy of a national norm to be applied throughout the pubUc seater 
and to Wages Councils' (LCR, 21 February 1972). The PLP 
representatives did not conceal their disquiet. '!hey noted that ~1t 
would not be a happy situation to approach the next Election with a 
rate of ten per cent inflation without specific ideas to counteract 
this' (ibid.). 
OVer the next several months, more detailed discussions 
continued on the nature of Jones's proposed arbitration service and 
the substance of the legislation that would replace the Industrial 
110 
Relations .Act.. The nJC played the'leading role preparing more 
detailed documentation and responding to the queries of the ' Labour 
Party representatives. It had been agreed that they would present 
the broad lilles of repeal legislation to the autumn ruc and Labour 
Party Conferences (LCR, 24 April 1972). By the end of this first 
phase of Liaison Committee talks, the roc's 'shopping list' of 
, 
proposed changes had been largely accepted and the basic elements of 
the legislative strategy were in place. !he idea of implementing 
1 
this strategy in three phases or bills was agreed in mid-1973 • 
. _- Some of the Labour Party representatives were clearly res~ive 
about the apparent lack of TOC concessions in return for their 
cooperation on future industrial relations legislation. They argued 
that while the ~general lines' of the proposed conciliation service 
as well as·the repeal legislation 'were becoming clear, anotner 
matter on which discussion was needed ••• Was the problem of' how to 
avoid inflation in a full employmen~ economy' (LeR, 19 June 1972). 
At this stage, the PLP representatives were 'in a weak position to 
~mpose any quid pro quos on the TUC. On the one hand, they were to 
some extent 'squeezed between extra-Parliamentary and 'ruC pressure' 
(Minkin, 1978a: 331). Party pollcy proper, as distinct from the 
beliefs that prevailed within the Shadow cabinet, differed very, 
little from that of the TUC. On the other hand, in response to a· 
number of policy changes that had been signalled by the Heath 
Government and which would later be labelled its 'U-turn', the TOC 
had commenced a series of negotiations with the Government to advance 
the blend of policies that it wished to see implemented. As Barnes 
and Reid (1980: 192) aptly put it, 'Jones and his colleagues from the 
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General COunaLl were in the enviable position of negotiating with the 
Heath Govermnent in pursuit of policies to which they would ensure 
the next Labour Government would be committed'. 
The PLP representatives continued none~~eless 1n their 
discussions with the TUC to seek some opening on .counter-inflation 
policy. Their efforts were no doubt encouraged by the results of a 
questionnaire t "Participation 72", which had been sent to 'all Labour 
Party branches. This revealed that a large number of respondents 
felt th~t pay policy was the largest gap in Labour Party policy. '!'he 
Financial Times (14 June 1972) noted that this discovery 'will. 
'. . 
greatly strengthen the hands of those metlbe!"S o~ . the executive, 
particularly Mr. James callaghan, who have been pressing for a viable 
incomes policy for the next Labour Government in the party's current 
2 
discussions with the TUC'. When . the Party's 1972 Conference 
document, "Programme for Britain', was launched at a press conference 
in July, Harold Wilson expressed the hope that some kind of agreement 
on economic policy would emerge from future Liaison Committee 
discussions (Hatfield, 1978: 128). James callaghan was more specific 
again: "We also attach considerable importance to a voluntary 
incomes policy, with the accent on co-operation and not the bludgeon' 
(ibid: 129). !he Liaison Committee published a Joint Statementarter 
its July meeting which outlined the purpose of the Committee and 
detailed its proposals to repeal the Industrial Relations Act. It 
also undertook to discuss "the wider economic and industrial polioies 
of the next Labour Government' (reproduced in TUCR, 1972: 107). 
ThQ __ Campa1sn Against the Industrial Relations Aot and the Chequers 
Talks 
The relevance of the Liaison Committee discussions was orucially 
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influenced by two factors during the period: first, the escalation 
of the campaign against the Industrial Relations Act; and, seoondly, 
the collapse of the tripartite disoussions on eoonomic polioy and the 
subsequent imposition of a statutory wage and prioes polioy •. 
The interest of the Liaison Committee discussions on the repeal 
of thEi Industrial Relations Act was highlighted by an o':ltburst of 
industrial conflict in opposition to the implementation of the Act. 
On 18 July 1972, the Prime Minister Edward Heath jointly met the roc 
and the CBr to commence a series of discussions aimed at securing an 
accord on economic polioy. 'lhese talks later-·cuJ m<4nated in the 
collapse of the Chequers talks in November and the imposition of 
statutory price and wage freeze. Government hopes of effecting a 
smooth shift to more consensual relations with the unions quickly 
evaporated, however, when on 21 July five London dockers, all 'l'CrJU 
members, were jailed by the National Industrial Relations Court 
(NIRe) - the body set up to oversee the operations of the Industrla~ 
Relations Act. 
A number of disputes over the issue of containerization in the 
~docks' had been seething for some months, and the resulting 
confrontation between the NIRe and the TGWU had been toe source ot: 
considerable and prolonged tension. In the spring of 1972, two cases 
involving TGWU docks t members blacking goods ooming from oontainer 
firms had gone before the NIRC. These became known as the Heaton's 
and Craddooks' cases. The TOWU refused to appear in court on the 
basis of the TUC's policy of non-cooperation with the implementation 
of the Industrial Relations Act. The NIRC imposed a fine on the 
union which the latter refused to pay_ The Court then levied a 
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further tine for 'contempt of court' and threatened sequestration of 
the union's assets if it did not pay_ At this juncture, the TGWU 
invited the TUC to express its views on .the best course o~ action. 
The TUC's Finance and General Purposes Committee (F&GPC) reviewed its 
pollcy of unions not becoming involved in the proceedings of the 
NIRC, and decided that 'Where 'an offensive action was being 
underta'ken against a union or its members', the union shouid have the 
right to defend itself before the court. ·Given the possibility of 
sequestration and the paralyzing effect that this could have on the 
operation of the union, it advised the TGWU to pay the fine. '!he 
TGWU executive considered the lUC advice, and ve.7 ::la.."roW'ly vo.tad to 
pay the fine.'subject to financial responsibility being accepted by 
the TUC' • It also demanded that the General Council call a SpeCial 
Congress "urgently to clarify the strategy to be pursued' • The TOe 
General Council accepted financial responsibility, but rejected the 
call for a SpeCial Congress by fifteen votes to eleven.. 'l1'le TGWU 
thus paid. the fines, but it also initiated a succsssf'lU appea~ before 
the Court of Appeal. The NIRC decision to impose the fines was set 
aside on the basis that the union could not be held responsible for 
the action. It had given no authority for the orig~l blacking, 
nor did the union rule book give the stewards any 'implied authority' 
to initiate industrial action. '!he companies involved then made a 
further appeal before the Law Lords. Meanwhile, on the basis of the 
Court of Appeal decision, the NIRC began to tackle the 'blackers' on 
an individual basis. When five shop stewards refused to observe an 
NIRC order to cease picketing the Midland Cold Storage Company, an 
East London container depot, they were sent to Pentonville Prison for 
contempt of court (on this sequence of events, see TGWU ECM, 1972; 
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TOeR, 1972~ 81-93; and Moran, 1974: 138-142). 
The trade union reaction was vociferous. Within a few days the 
count~ hovered on the verge of a general strike as widespread 
industrial action paralyzed the docks and sympathy action affected 
signifioant proportions of some other industries inoluding 
engineering and newspapers. When the TUC General Council met on 26 
, 
July, it suspended its participation in the tripartite talks Which 
had oommenced only the previous week. Moreover, on the initiative 
. 
of Scanlon and Jones; it called for a one-day general strike to take' 
place on 31 July if the dockers were not released {for a deta.1led 
aooount of this meeting, see Paterson, 1972 and Moran, 1974). 1his 
was an important psyohological hurdle. It effectively consolidated 
the previously wavering determination of the General Counoll to 
reoommend the expulsion of individual unions which had not follOwed 
TUe advice and deregistered under the Act by the time or the 
September Congress. It was also the first time that the General 
Counoil had called for general strike aotion since 1926, albeit fof" 
the duration of a day_ In the event, the immediate crisis was. 
defused on the same day when the Law Lords overturned an earlier 
Court of Appeal. They ruled that the 'l'GWU was responsible tor the 
blacking aotion of its stewards (see above). In the changed 
circumstances, the NIRC ordered the release of the imprisoned - . 
dockers, and the TUC suspended its call for a general strike. This 
Whole episode played a key role in uniting the,divided ranks of the 
TUC. Its September Congress took the unprecedented aotion of 
suspending, thirty-two affiliates for failure to observe the TUC 
policy of deregistration (TUCR, 1972: 354-368 and 3ll1-3ll2). 
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Meanwnile, the tripartite discussions on economic policy resumed. 
The soured atmosphere, however, meant that the prospects of achieving 
any accord seemed very slim indeed. 
Although several tripartite meetings took place in August and 
September, they did not really gain any momentum until after the 
completion of the conference season in October,(the TaCt Labour Party 
and Conservative Party Conferences). At its 1972: Congres-s, the TOe 
determined its initial bargaining position. The Tawa motion 
expres&ing opposition to wage restraint in any form carried the main 
economic debate. It was further noted that 'no consideration can be 
given to any policy on incomes unless it 1.5 an i!::.t~"'<1l part or 
economic strategy which includes control of rents, profits, dividends 
and prices and is designed to secure a redistribution of incomes and 
wealth nationally and globally' (TUCR, 1972:479). Such an approach 
to economic management 'WaS ultimately unlikely to rind much favour 
with either the CBl or the Government. For the formulation of' the 
Social Contract, however, the wording to.'aS s1gni.ficant. If the ml'lu 
and the TOC could envisage a 'policy on incomes' as 'an integral part 
'of an economic strategy', then there 'Was indeed a basis f'or 
negotiatiOns within the Liaison Commission on pay. 
The discussions with Heath intensified through the month or 
October. Heath had told the Conservative Party Conferenoe that- he 
wanted 'the trade unions and the employers to share fully with the 
Government the benefits and obligations of running the national 
eoonomy' (TOe, 1973: 54). At a meeting on 26 September, he had 
invited discussion on a specific set of proposals. These included a 
commitment to a five per oent rate of, growth, a maximum price 
increases target of five per oent, a maximum limit of two pounds 
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weekly on pay increase and the possibility of a system of threshold 
pay increases when the rate of price inflation exceeded six per cent 
(TUCR, 1913: 214-216). The TUC responded readily with its own 
package of counter-proposals • Hugh Scanlon later expansively 
. 
described it as something 'that no trade union movement has ever 
offered to a government in peace time before': 
That offer was to limit wages to an agreed figure in retum 
for the compulsory and statutory control of all prices, 
including food prices... in addition to sometn~ for 
pensioners, to po something to stop the fantastic land, rent. 
and house speculation and ••• tc have soma mean1ngtu~ 
amendments to the Industrial Relations Act _ .. '.:roc., 1973: 83-
84) •.. 
The discussions centered on the role of price controls. ruc leaders, 
Jones in particular, insisted on the need to control food and rent 
prices, and they argued endlessly on the feasibility of such 
controls. '!he Government maintained that they were impracticable. 
Jones insisted that they could be made to work (Interview, 16 May 
1980). '!he Government refused to yield ground on these points, and 
the negot1a tions collapsed in a final flurry of meetings at Chequers 
·in early November amidst Government recriminatio.ns that the· trade 
unions were attempting to usurp its constitutional role. Following 
its failure to secure a voluntary agreement, the Government on 6 
November 1972 announced a ninety-day statutory wage and price freeze 
to be fOllowed by further stages of a statutory policy (Stage One, 
1972) • 
In retrospect, Heath's efforts to achieve a voluntary accord on 
the restraint of money wage increases. perhaps seemed doomed to 
failure. Richard Hyman (1974) has suggested that whether or not th·e 
Heath Government intended to conclude an agreement with the TUe it 
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was a considerable victory to maintain its participation in the 
discussions. The TUC participation, he argues, helped to bolster the 
view that irresponsible pay claims were responsible for the rising 
level of inflation and the country's economic problems and that 'some 
form of restraint would benefit both the low-paid and the, "national 
interest'rt. Certainly, the long process of negotiations and their 
ultimate breakdown helped to deflate some of the opposition to the 
announcement of the wage and price freeze. 'Ille trade tmion response 
to the p,olicy was characterized by a high degree of acquiescence (ror 
criticism of the TUC General Council on its t:lUted opposition to the 
Heath pay policies, see TOC, 1973). 
However, it might also be suggested that Heath in fact aspired 
to pursue a model of 'consensus politics'. In the face of virulent 
trade union hostility to the Industrial Relations Act, this might 
seem rather strange; but it was not necessarily in contradiction. 
The Government's hope had been that through legal intervention along 
the lines of the Industrial Relations Act trade unions could be 
induced to engage in more orderly collective bargaining, procedures. 
Thus, 'the Industrial Relations Act provided for legally binding 
, . 
collective agreements 'and the NIRC adjudication of many industrial 
relations procedures. It' trade union leaders would exert a higher-
degree of discipline over their members, then selected trade union - " 
leaders could prove to be very usefUl interlocutors in the management 
of the corporate state (Urwin and MUrray, 1982). The apparent 
failure of the 'Selsdon Man' free-market polioies no doubt pushed the 
Government more rapidly in this direction. The CBI had also been 
coming round to this view. Part of the impetus to find a voluntary 
accord on wages in fact emanated from the success of the ,CSl in 
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persuading its membership to restrain price increases over the 
previous year (see note 9 in chapter 2). For the CBr, this was its' 
first real success in delivering its membership in a 'corporate 
policy, and there was no doubt a feeling that it was an initiative 'on 
3 
,which it might be possible to-build. 
Heath's subsequent identification with ... consensus politics' 
within the Conservative Party would seem to confirm this 
, . 
interpretation. He expllcity attached a positive value to trade 
union participation in state bodies. In negotiating the creation of 
the concilla tion service and Minpower Serv!c~_ Co::mU.ssl.on,. tor 
instance, he was willing to concede numerous points in order" to 
assure a continued trade union presence (Interviews, 24 October and 
16 December 1980). Heath was reported to have been deeply impressed 
with the West German model of trade union - government relations. 
After the 1972 miners' dispute, he had argued for 'a more sensible 
way of settling our differences (Fay and, Young,. , 1976a). Indeed, 
Heath had first to make considerable efforts to persuade his own 
Cabinet of the value of the "'consensus approach', and he mobil 1 zed 
the, enthusiasm of key NEDO, civil service and. CBr figures in thi3 
task (in particular, Frank Figgues, the director-general of' 'NEDO; 
William Armstrong, the head of the Civil Service, and Q\.mpbell 
Adamson, the director-general of the CBI, all played an important~· 
role in this process; see Fay and Young, ,1976a; Bames and Reid, 
1980: 169-170). Very much in line with later CBr policy documents, 
Heath aspired to a system where central trade union leadership, 
managing orderly collective bargaining procedures and unenoumbered by 
excessive sectional autonomy at the level of the shop-floor, could 
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meet with employers and the government each year to determine 
guidelines on pay in keeping with projections on prices, foreign 
trade and economic growth. 
As was suggested in Chapter 1, this was one' of a number of 
possible state strategies to qeal wit~ the trade union movemen~. In 
moving away from this model, the 1970-1972 experience had seemed to 
produce' many more problems than results. 'lhe reversal of the trend 
towards increasing state intervention in economic activities and 
regulation of market relations was not as simple as had been 
imagined. In assuming a more interventionist aDd directive role 
after- ,its 'U-turn I in economic policy, the pre::tsu:-es on the Eeath 
Government to return to a more consensual approach were certainly 
growing. It was a model, however, that a Conservative Government 
found exceptionally difficult to construct., The TOe entertained at 
best a dubious authority over- the ,sectional autonomy of' its. 
affiliates, and the authority of the leadership in many of these' 
affiliates over 'shop-floor bargainers was also often limited because 
of the decentralized system of collective bargaining in the UK. By 
the same ~ken, the central employers' organiza~!on,. the eBI,.' 
probably enjoyed even less authority over its member firms. j The 
Labour Party, on the other hand, did benefit from an organie link 
with the decentralized British unions. The ethos of ,'labourism' oould 
provide an important springboard from Which some form of the 
consensus model to which Heath aspired might be built. Indeed, such 
a project was, in essence, the sooial democratic conception of the 
Social Contract. The problem of securing active trade union 
cooperation in this project and surmounting the institutional and 
economic difficulties was a formidable task. It was nonetheless what 
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many of the ELP representatives hoped to achieve'in the Liaison 
Committee discussions. 
'!be Liaison Comrrlttee Discussions: the Second Phase 
The Joint Statement of 24 July 1972 cOmmitted the Liaison 
Committee to further consideration of economic and industrial policy_ 
I 
lhese discussions began in September- and culminated in February 1973 
with the publication of a second joint statement, Economic Policy ~ 
~ ~ of Living q .. C, 1973). . It was approved the follo-"ing month 
by the labour Party NEe, the Shadow Cabinet and the. lUC General. 
Council. In tandem with the July statement outlining the provisions 
with which a future labour Government would replace the Industrial 
Relations Act, this document basically fixed the Liaison Committee's 
approach to the Social Contract. Its approa~~ to economic' and 
industrial relations policy would change very little before the 
election in 1974 of a Labour Government. During this crucial second 
phase of Liaison Committee discussions, the familiar- tenaions between 
the PLP and TUC representatives over collective bargaining and the 
trade union role in any counter':"1nflation polley' ms much . in 
evidence. On the one hand, a number of Shadow cabinet members went 
convinced 'that unless trade union voluntary consent were at the 
centre of the next Labour Government fS industrial . polley , there was _ 
no possibility of coming to terms with shop-floor power' (Mink!n, 
1974: 34). This conviction had no doubt been reinforced by the 
pol!tio!zation and scale of industrial conflict in opposition to the 
Industrial Relations Act. On the other hand, the TUC was constrained 
in both what it could and was willing to offer. It was limited, 
first, by its simultaneous discussions on pay with Heath anQ, 
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subsequent.ly'" by the implementation of a statutory policy. The 
possiblity of the lOC reaching any agreement on a pay policy was 
rurthe~ limited by its own policy of opposition to restrictions on 
wage bargaining and the autonomy of its affiliates in this area. '!he 
tensions between the diff~ring positions of the TUC and PLP 
representatives on counter inflation pollcy. continually surfaced 
during 'the discussions. The Labour Party representatives continued 
to seek some kind of concession on ·wages while the TOC 
representatives remained studiously non-committal. 
'!he revealing exchange at the September meeting of the Liaison 
committee characterized many of the !ate~ discuss10llS. The Iabou~ 
Party representatives asked if the policies proposed in the party's 
recent document, Labour's Programme for Britain 1972 "would create a 
climate within which there could be active trade union cooperation 
with a Labour Government' (LCR, 25 Septembe~ 1972). In response to 
this gentle euphemism, the TUe welcomed the policies contained in the 
programme, but cautioned that 'the Labour Party shoUld not have too 
Simple an approach to the area of· wage negotiations' (ibid.). 
Stressing the need for the party to develop a pubUc profi~e 011 i.ts 
solutions to the problem of inflation, the Labou~ ·Pa~ty 
representatives asked if the TOC could be mo~ specific about ~some 
of the problems in the field of wage negotiations'. The rue 
responded that 'it was difficult to assess how fa~ it would be 
possible to go in defining concrete problems and solutions in the. 
field of wage negotiations'. Still hoping for something more 
specific, the Labour Party representativE6suggested that a working 
party might explore these issues. Once again, however, the TUC 
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refused to be cOmmitted as it expressed a preference for discussions 
at. the ~eve~ or the Committee as a whole. 
It was certainly difficult for the TUC to go very far in the 
discussion of wages policy when it was in the middle of negotIations 
with the Heath Government on exactly the same topic. Ironically, 
. . 
wilen the breakdown of talks with the Heath Government should have 
facilit,ated a more specific agreement between the TUC· and t.he Labour 
Party, the announcement of a statutory wage freeze, with fUrther 
limitations to follow, all but excluded the possibil1.ty of anything 
other than the very 'vaguest of agreements on the role of co llect.lve 
bargaining. It was, therefore, ~erative fo'r""the Labour Party t~·-
distance its approach to wage bargaining from the statutory polieies 
of the Heath Government. The party leader, Harold Wilson, rejected 
statutory policies as ultimately unworkable. Only a favourable 
economic climate where real wages were. not falling might inflUenoe 
the direction of collective bargaining. '!hat was precisely t.'le 
formula that was adopted by the Liaison Committee. Although the PLP 
representatives continued to hope for something more concrete, 
politica~ oircumstances made it virtually impossible to obtain • 
. lhe November meeting of the Liaison Committee focused on the 
breakdow of the talks with Heath. It was agreed that. the Committee 
should try to reach some agreement on economic policy in the. near 
future. This was the genesis of the February 1973 document, Economio 
Policy; !mt ~ ~ .Q£. Living. Prices policy had been a major area 
of diffiCUlty in the disoussions with Heath. It, therefore, became a 
4 
priority item for discussion in the Liaison Committee. Possibly 
under the influence of their attempt to find common ground with 
Heath, the TUe representatives were slightly more forthcoming on the 
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question of' wage bargaining. Conceding that further work needed to 
be done on the issue of wages, prices and· the national income, the 
TUC recognized that the quest10n "of how these matters would be 
arranged between the TUC and an incoming Labour government was 
clearly a vital one, but it would depend to some extent on the 
specific circumstances of the economy at the timet (LeR, 20 November 
1972). 
This was precisely the approach that prevailed when the January 
.. 
meeting of the L1aison Committee approved the final. draft of Economic 
Polley and the Cost of Living. The,reference to a pollcy on: \ot~es· 
and prices was sufficiently oblique that it was compatible with a 
variety of interpretations. Noting that trade unionists were as 
concerned as anyone else to keep the cost of living down, for they 
realized that 'what matters is real wages', the document cautioned 
that 'the problem of inflation can be properly under5tood only within 
the context of a coherent economic and social strategy - one designed 
both to overcome the nation's grave economic problems, and to provide 
the basis for cooperation between trade unions and the Government' 
(LC, 1973: 311). TIle joint statement then outlined the details or. its 
proposed economic and social strategy or, as it later came to b& 
called, Social Contract. Apart from the propoSals for industrial 
relations legislation which were set out in the July 1972 statement, 
a wide range of measures were offered: direct statutory action on 
prices, especially food prices, and a permanent system of price 
controls; changes in the housing and rent legislation and an increase 
in the construction of public housing; increased public transport; 
tax changes that would bring about a large-scale redistribution of 
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inoome and wealth; inoreased pensions and enhanoed, sooial servioes i 
agreed policies on investment,. employment and economic growth 
including a new regional policy and better training services; and a 
muoh greate~ democratic control and publio accountability of 
decision~king in the economio field where joint regulation of areas 
. 
such as investment and closures could be extended through collective 
bargaining. Intriguingly, there was no direct reference to the 
possibility of increased public ownership. This issue. was at the 
. . 
time the source of much contention in the labour Party and will. be 
further scrutinized in the next section. 
. Economic Polioy and the Cost of Living ~ti in. :naoy ways a-
; 
familiar catalogue of Labour Party polioies. \olhat distinguished' it 
was its status as a joint agreement. It was suggested, that the 
approach set out in the two Liaison Committee statements would 
fur.ther engender 
the strong feeling of mutual confidence which alone will 
make it possible to reach the wide-ranging agreement 'Which 
is necessary to control inflation and achieve sustained 
growth in the standard of living. • •• it will of. course be 
impossible to specifY" what,will be the precise economi~ 
oiroumstanoes in which the next Labour Government will take 
office. Nevertheless it will be the first task of that' 
Labour Government on taking office, and having due regard to 
the circumstanoes at that time, to conclude with the nrc, on 
the basis of the understandings being reached 011 the Liai:30n 
Committee, a wide-ranging agreement on the pOlicies to ,be 
pursued in all these aspects of ou~ economic life and to 
discuss with them the order of priorities of their 
rulfilment (LC, 1973: 8). 
In one sense, the TUC's minimalist strategy had prevailed. As the 
roc had told the Heath Government in the Cllequers talks, if a 
government could ~get the atmosphere right' as ·far as prices, 
employment and growth were concerned, then cooperation from trade 
5 
unionists on the wages front would follow (Interview, 16 May 1980). 
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This was the approach that the TUC representatives carried forward 
into their discussions in the Liaison Committee. At the same time, 
the document clearly inferred that the PLP representatives might hope 
for something more once this necessary confidence had : been 
engendered. The formula was sufficiently vague to withstand a 
variety of conflicting interpretations, while promising somethi.ng to 
everyone. ~re significant was the willingness of" the PLP 
representatives to promote the roc to the status of a full partner in 
the determination of state policy priorities in order to secure some 
agreement on wages, particularly their readiness to present all. other 
policy initiatives as a form of quid pro s=. !.::l. t!lis end.... A 
contributory factor to the collapse of the Cllequers talks was Heath's 
apparent objection to an alleged usurping of the government's 
constitu~ional prerogatives by the TUC. lbe Social Contract, ~ 
conceived in Economic Policy and the Cost ot' Living, did not. raise 
any such objection. Indeed, the entire framework of its policy 
programme would be based on the pursuit of a model of bipart1.te, 
rather than tripartite, consensus politics. 
!be modus vivendi on collective bargaining as worked out in the 
Liaison Committee document prevaUed over the next year. As the 
inevitable anomalies in wage d1.fferentlals and relativities emerged, 
and the protest over the statutory pay policy then mounted, there was 
olearly a declining marginal return for senior trade union leaders to 
get involved with Labour Party leaders on the specifics of wages in 
any counter-int'lation policy. Yet, it remained the sensitive subject 
of the hidden agenda. As Barbara Castle (1980: 10) recalled, 
So bruised and sensitive were the trade unions that any 
mention even of a voluntary policy was taboo. When at one 
of the meetings someone dared to refer to the role of 
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incomes in the management of the economy, Jaok Jones jumped 
in at onoe: "It would be disastrous if any word went from 
this meeting that we had been discussing prioes and inoomes 
polioy". 
Indeed, at the Maroh 1973 Special TUC, a joint TGWU-AUEW motion 
pushed the General Counoil to take a more assertive, line in " 
opposition to the Heath Government's pay polioies (TUC, 1973: 97). 
When J.:'6ference w"as made to the model of Chequers and Down.ing Street 
talks at the Liaison Committee later in March, it was concluded that _ 
it would be inadvisable to stake too much on this type of endeavour, 
partioularly as previous attempts in the field of incomes pol1cyhad 
been of doubtfU~ economic and political benefit· (LCRp" 12 March 1913).' 
. 
Rather, the context in which any voluntary incomes policy might 
operate needed to be considered. lherefore, items such. as 
comparability, low-pay, taxation, and the preferential treatment of 
wage earners as opposed to shareholders would be placed on the agenda 
for fUture discussion (ibid.) 
The inoomes policy issue remained so sensitive that when at the 
1973 Labour Party Conference some long-time proponents of pay policy, 
.Tom Jackson and Reg Prentice, complained that Labour's Programme 1973 
lacked any clear policy on wages, neither senior trade union. nor 
party leaders made any comment. In summing up the debate on behalf 
of ,the NEC, the Shadow Chancellor, Denis Healey, judiCiously steered 
a wide berth insisting that the key to oontrolling inflation was 
action to oontrol prioes. However, if the next Labour Government was 
to acoomplish a redistribution of wealth, then such a oommitment, 
suggested the future Chancellor, inevitably led to the question of 
taxation pOlicy and the eXisting distribution of incomes and, then, 
'we are Plunged immediately into the problem of incomes policy'. In 
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line with his parliamentary colleagues on the Liaison Committee, 
Healey expressed the hope that the Party might, therefore, achieve a 
voluntary agreement with the unions on these questions in ,the next 
phase of Liaison Committee discussions (LPCR, 1973: 117-129). 
!his phase of' the Li~ison Committee discussions was never 
reached. OVer the following six months, the Liaison Committee also 
adopted" a statement on 'Food Policy and the BEe' 
. (rUCR, 1973: 315-
316), but the main focus of its detailed di'scuss1ons was the content 
and agenda of rutur~ industrial relations legislation (see Note' 1 
above) • !he discussions were subsequently deflected,' from their 
intended course by the oil crisis in the autu::l:n:t ot: 1973 and. the 
imminence of a general election. Thus, by March 1973, the Liaison 
Committee's approach to collective bargaining policy had been largely 
set. '!he PLP representatives had attempted to obtain f1rxoor 
commitments on a voluntary incomes policy from the TUe. '!be we 
representatives, led by Jones, had often hinted at the future 
possibilities but refused to extend any specific commitment. 
Despite the PLP representatives' hopes of acb,ievins somethir.g more on 
this front, the preoccupations of both the' Labour Party 
representatives and the TUC were moving elseWlere. 'lbe Labour Party 
was embroiled in a crucial battle over industrial policy. It was 
essentially a public dispute between, the social democratic and 
socialist conceptions of the Social Contract. The stakes were 
significant because industrial policy was identified by SOme as the 
most important item in the Social Contract programme. The programme 
agreed by the 1973 Labour Party Conference was basically that Which 
was presented to the electorate the following year. Consideration of 
this debate will, therefore, complete the analysis of the formulatlo~ 
, 
'. 
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of the Social. Contract in 1972-1973. Meanwhile, the imposition of a 
statutory pay policy and the Government's invitation to the ruc to 
continue talks on economic policy pushed trade union preoccupations 
in the direction of their own 'collective bargaining policies. The 
second part of this chapter will consider some of the variations in 
these policies between and within the sample unions in this study. 
The Labour Party and 'Labour's Programme for Britain 1973' , 
It- should be r.e-emphasized that the formulation of'the Social 
Contract was not the sole prerogative of the Lia.i~, Committee.. By 
. 
the summer and autumn of 1973, the focus of ~~ch, of the debate had 
shifted to the contents of Labour's Progra.mIlle for Britain 1973 
(Labour Party, 1973). At stake was the shape of the next election 
manifesto which would be largely based on this document. This was 
the occasion When some of the ,underlying ideologica~ differences 
between the social democratic and socialist approaches to the Social 
Contract first surfaced in public debate. !be chief protagonists in 
this debate were almost exclusively from the politicu wing of the, 
Party. '!he differences centred on the Programme • s speo.iri~ 
commitment to extend public ownership in industry. In gajning 
• 
control of key NEC subcommittees such as the Industrial Policy 
Subcommittee, the proponents of the socialist conception of the -
Social Contract had won their "war of position' within the internal 
organs of the party. The proponents of a more social democratic 
conception of the Social ,Contract were thus forced to go public and 
engage in a 'war of manoeuvre'. Appropriately, this was the taotic 
in which the party leader, Harold Wilson, excelled. Despite their 
long history of policy support for nationalization, the major trade 
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unions affiliated to the Party remained broadly agn9stic throughout 
this controversy. The major trade union leaders had not been closely 
involved in the elaboration of the Party's proposed industrial 
policy, and they were not keen to see party unity sacrificed over 
this issue in a pre-electorai period. This attitude was a key factor 
1n the eventual conflation of the divergent conceptions or the 
Social Contract at the 1973 Labour Party Conference. 
'!he most contentious issue 1n the publ1c ownership debate- WclS 
the proposal to bring into public ownership twenty-five of' the 
largest firms in the manufacturing sector (Labou:" Pa..-ty, 1973: _34) •. 
A Public Sector Group had been formed as a sub-group of the 
Industrial Policy Subcommittee of the NEC after the 1971 Labour Party 
Conference (on the Industrial Policy SubCOmmittee, see Chapter 2). 
It concentrated its efforts on plans to create a State Holding 
Company or National Enterprise Board as it came to be called. It 
reported its recommendations to the Industrial Policy Subcommittee 
which, in turn, reported to the Home Policy Committee of' the Nat.ional 
. Executive (LPCR, 1972:42). In October 1972, Stuart Holland succeeded 
in convincing the majority of the NEe's PubliC Sector Group that. the 
basic ownership portfolio of the proposed National Fnterprise Board 
should consist, of twenty leading manufacturing companies, one or the 
big three lending banks, and two or three leading insurance companies ;-, 
as well as British Petroleum, Rolls Royce and British Airways. When. 
the Industrial Policy Subcommittee first considered Holland's 
proposal, the following month, one of the leading exponents of the 
social democratic view, Tony Crosland, vehemently opposed the scheme. 
Crosland ~argued that there was no point in all this bureaucratic 
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intervention at the level of the firm and that it would be 
electorally disastrous to go to the country on a platf~rm of 
excessive nationalization' (Hatfield, 1978: 149). 
For the socialist conoeption of the Social Contract, however, 
intervention at the level 'of the firm and extension of publia 
ownership were key elements of the strategy to secure greater control 
over the flow of capital and organization of production. Its 
transformatlve programme to achieve socialism depended specifically 
.. 
on the use of the levers of state power to challenge the power of 
private capital through increased soo1al. ownershi;J and control of' .the _ 
economy. \oJhUe the social democratic view of the Social Contract 
might concede that there was a role for publia enterprise, the 
proposed extension of public ownership far exceeded its conception of 
an aoceptable balance between public and private enterprise. Indeed, 
it began to challenge the very notion of the "mixed economy'.. Ooe of 
the fundamental incompatibilities between the divergent approacees to 
the SOcial Contract had thus surfaoed. It inevitably led to 
confrontation. 
In AprU 1973, the Industrial Policy Subcommittee endorsed the 
Public Sector Group':5 riMl draft of Holland' s proposals, and the 
idea of a large state holding company was thus incorporated into the 
industrial strategy to be considered by the NEe (Hatfield, 1978:-
156). Senior members of the Shadow Cabinet were immediately critical 
of the proposed publio ownership plans. When the S'ladow Cabinet met 
the NEC, however, there appeared to be considerable scope for a 
compromise. Those most closely assooiated with the proposals for the 
extension of public ownership were not particularly insistent that 
the number of companies envisaged be specified. Thus, at the NEC 
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meeting wh1..ch approved the final draft of Labour's Programme, it oame 
as a considerable surprise when the motion to delete the specifio 
reference to twenty-five oompanies was narrowly defeated (Hatfield, 
1978: 194). The Party leader, Harold Wilson, was furious. The next 
day, he issued a terse pre~s statement noting that he would not 
hesitate to use his oonstitutional prerogative to veto the inolusion 
of this polioy in Labour's next eleotion manifesto. 
The oontroversy over the, "'twenty-five oompanies, proposal 
inoreasingly dominated the debate in the months prior to the. 1973 
Labour, Party Conferenoe. It was, in faot, symptomatio; for the roots 
of the sooial demoorats t unease w-al3 that Labour-'s ~ogt-...mme 191J 
'" appeared a more Left-wing programme than many in the parliamentary 
leadership favoured' (Minkin, 1978a: 338). The two oontrasting 
'approaches oould not have been more olearly on display than in the 
publio ownership debate at the 1973 Labour Party Conferenoe. For' the 
sooial demoorats, Roy Jenkins cautioned that the next election was 
far from won. He oalled for a '" rational and responsible' programme 
which did not promise more than it could achieve - partioularly in 
~iffioult eoonomic oiroumstances. The Labour' Party might. then 
suooeed in broading the appeal of its message beyond the 38 per cent 
of Labour voters (LPCR, 1973: 183-184). In stark contrast, Tony Benn 
agreed that the party would inherit a orisis \o4len it came to power,_ 
but the crisis should be '"the occasion for the fundamental change and 
not the excuse for postponing itt (LPCR, 1973: 187). These two 
contributions clearly refleoted the divergences whioh existed in 
the political debate over the Social Contraot. 
The left within the Party had been notably suocessful in 
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advancing the 'socialist' conception of the Social Contract through 
detailed committee work. It could therefore deal from a position of 
strength because the approach was already incorporated in the 
programme. In the words of Michael Foot, it was "the finest 
Socialist Programme I have se~n in my lifetime' (cited in D; Coates, 
1980: 6). Ironically, that very success in the committee rooms was 
also a: source of weakness, for the proposals had been worked out 
amongst a relatively narrow circle of intellectuals and activists, 
and seoured the approval of subcommittees and committees througn the 
interest and assiduous attendance of those invoLved. Trade union 
representatives, for instance, had not been signiMcantly invol.ved in 
the formulation of the industrial strategy. 'Ille reference to the 
"twenty-five companies' was ultimately dropped front the debate at the 
1973 Labour Party Conference because the large union delegations made 
no concerted attempt" to push the more radical interpretations of the 
role of the National Enterprise Board t (Minkin, 1978a: 344). In the 
interest of party unity, only the motions which called for a general. 
extension of public ownership received the support of the large 
1:1llions. The reference to the "twenty-five' companies was ccmposited 
.out of existence. '!he main motion, moved by the AUEW, remained 
sufficiently vague to attenuate the immediate anxieties of tbe 
"social democrats'. It called, instead, for the 'early 
nationalization of important parts ot the British economy' (LPCR, 
1973: 170-173). 
The unions were scarcely involved in the splits between left and 
right within the political wing of the Party during this period. At 
a time of crucial policy formation and the determination of politioal 
priorities for the Labour Movement, the leadership of the largest 
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affiliated unions, who were also the major figures in the TUC, were 
primarily intent on elaborating the details of the TUC's proposed 
industrial relations legislation and ensuring a degree of unity 
within the Labour Party that would inspire eleatoral aredibility. In 
keeping with the strategia role enjoyed by the general searetary of 
the TGWU, Jones played a key part in both of these objeatives. While 
I , 
the Liaison Commit tee aontinued to work on his initial legislative _ 
agenda, Jones worked to keep open the lines of'communication between 
the party leadership, the unions and the polltical left. This was 
the beginning of the Jones-Foot-ililson axis whiCh-'.oul.d characterize' 
the early years of the Scaial Contraat in power (on the background to 
this axis, see Minkin 1978a: 344). Wilson was to aarry the right of 
the party, while Miahae1 Foot moderated the left on the NEe, and 
Jones ensured trade union support. This political mediation allowed 
the oompeting oonoeptions of the Scalal Contraot to oontinue to co-
exist within the same programme. 
The controversy over the extension of public ownership aga~ 
highlighted the retioenae of trade union leaders to play an active 
politioal role in the Labour Party.. The emergence of a more mil ftant 
trade 'union leadership in the late 1960s and the early 1970s led many 
to believe that the Labour Party was in the throes of a fundamental 
transformation. However, as Ralph Mi1iband (1972: 374-375) wrote in 
1972, 'the evidenoe is entirely laoking that the new Trade Union left 
has the slightest inolination to bring about sweeping changes in the 
leadership of the Labour Party'. Rather, trade union leaders, 
inoluding left-wing ones, envisaged a very limited role for 
themselves within the Labour Party. They were 'representatives of 
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organized labour, involved in a bargaining relationship, notably over 
industria~ and economic issues, with their political colleagues in 
the Labour Party t and not in the least as" political rivals intending 
to capture control of the party for purposes radically different from' 
those of the men who now control it' (Miliband, 1972: 375). As Lewis 
Minkin (1979: 238) has observed, prudential and ideological 
, 
consideration have restrained the behaviour of union leaders within 
the Labour Party inhibiting a rapid left radicalization and 
contributing substa~tiall1 to the party's cohesion. Similarly, in 
1973 the major un.ion leaders remained aloof of' the pollcy vrangles. 
Dissa tisfied with the perf'orcance of' the fieath. Gcve.~nt;, tile task 
at hand was to ensure the election of a Labour Government that would 
be sympathetic to the aspirations of' organized labour. The competing 
claims of' the social democratic and socialist conceptions of the 
Social Contract and how these would be incorporated in Labour's 
Programme were therefore subordinated to this priority. !he 
relationship between the economic power of trade unions; its 
political expression and the way that these two were mediated through 
the Labour Party will remain central to the development of the Sac~ 
Contract. First, however, for the Social Contract programmeo to be 
implemented, the Labour Party had to be elected. The third p~t. at' 
this chapter deals with the transformation from programme to power'. 
COLLECnVE IWGnHlNG, I.NCCMES POUCI AJID POLITICAL PRACnCE: 
THE SAMPLE UNIONS 
Through the spring and summer of' 1973, the imposition of 
statutory wage controls and the question of any further TUe 
partioipation in talks with the Government emerged as a major item on 
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the policy ag~ of many union conferences. These debates on trade 
union collectLve bargaining policy merit closer scrutiny. They 
provide a first opportunity, before more d~tailed analysis in Chapter 
4, to cast a comparative glance towards the six sample unions in this 
study during a period of wage restraint. Moreover, these 1973 policy 
debates provide an initial source of understanding on the individual 
union 'policies on collective bargaining and counter~inflation 
measures. Certainly, they reveal both a variety of' trade union 
understandings of inflation and a number of specific strategies or 
rationalities vis-a-vis the state. 111ey also sugge.st variations. in 
policy and degree between individual. unions and the acnstraints that 
these impose on individual union leaders' scope to draft common 
positions in their discussions both within the Liaison Committee and 
with the Government. This, of course, will be or- central concern in 
the analysis of the TUC's relationswlth the new Labour Governmen~ in 
Chapter 5. Thus, these 1973 policy debates provide a first 
opportunity to explore the dynamics between individual. union poUq-
making and TUC policy-making, a relationship of central concern 
t?roughout this study. 
Resumption of the TUC-Government Talks 
Even bef'ore the TUC's token day of action on the first of May in 
protest of the Government's counter-inflation policy, rumours of a 
possible resumption of talks between the TUC and the Government on 
economic policy were gaining increasing credence. Although the TUC 
was clearly opposed to the Stage Two policy and the freeze that had 
preceded it, few major pay deals had actually breached the 
guidelines. A number of the major public sector bargaining groups 
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such as the gas workers and health service ancillary workers, despite 
industrial ac.t.1.on, ultimately settled within the guidelines. 'lhere 
appeared to be little further serious opposition on the horizon. The 
Prime Minister was reportedly committed to the idea of seeking an 
agreement with the TUC on a St,age Three. He was no doubt encouraged 
by the comments of union leaders such as Hugh Scanlon who' had 
" 
indicated that he favoured a resumption of talks if the Government 
was willing to show more 'earnest' than the last time (AUEW NCR, 
1913: 191). The Priple Minister responded f'avourably in the Sousa to 
reports of' Scanlon's comments and reiterated over the following 'Weeks 
his hope that tripartite discussionS might rem:me (n, 11 and 30 
April 1913). 
The prospect of agreement, however, appeared rather unlikely. 
Having previously refused to negotiate on what the TUe viewed as the 
two most contentious pieces of' legislation, the Industrial Relatioll3 
Act and the Housing Finance Act, Heath 'had nothing to offer' (Barnes 
and Reid, 1980: 175). However, with rising rates of inflation, the 
Government was not about to abandon its wages policy. 'Even if a 
further round of talks did not end in agreement, as John Elliott 
suggested in the Financial Times (10 April 1973), it might. at. least 
attenuate some of the potential opposition to the next stage ot pay 
policy in the same way that the previous round 'of discussion had 
seemed to affect the responses to Stages One and Two. The TUC 
General Council seemed to favour further discussions but there were, 
of course, fears of being too closely associated with the very 
polioies that it had hitherto opposed. The TUe, therefore, accepted 
the Government's May 1913 offer to conduct a series of discussions on 
the condition that the agenda inoluded the restoration of tree 
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collective bargaining imd the non-opera t10n of' the Industrial 
Relations Act. !he Government replied that it was willing to discuss 
any items and the discussions proceeded periodically over the course 
of the summer (ruCR, 1973: 283-288). Even as the talks dragged into 
September, the Prime Minister still maintained that 'none of the TUC 
proposils had been ruled out and that all were being studied 
carefully' (TUCR, 1974: 218). 
Both the TUe participation in these talks and hostile union 
reaction to the Government·s pay legislatIon featured prominently on 
the policy agenda of many union conferences dur..:lg th.!..a perio~ nus' 
was bound to be the case, if only in simple terms of timing. In 
fact, most of the locally submitted motions which make up the agenda 
of annual union conferences taking place in the spring and summer are 
formulated no later than the early part of the year. In other words, 
these motions were formulated in the wake of the ~~e freeze Which 
followed the breakdown of the protracted 1972 TUC negotiatiOns witll 
the Government. Thus, on the spring and summer conference agenda of 
,1973, there were numerous motions condemning the Government's anti-
inflation measures and many other motions calling on the TUC to' 
withdraw from dealing with the Government on wages policies i . the 
latter motions, of course, referred to the ruc partiCipation in the 
.' . 1972 talks. With the resumption of discussions in 1973 they became ,~ 
relevant again. Individual unions were thus obliged to consider both 
the appropriate political role for unions vis-a-vis the Conservative 
Government and the formulation of alternative approaches to inflation 
and collective bargaining policy. 
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Policy Debates Within the Sample Unions: An Overview 
Each of the six sample unions in this study was unequivocally 
opposed to the Heath Government's stage One and Two wage policies and 
expressed this opposition in their respective conference deoisions 
from April through July 197~~ '!bree of the unions - the AUEW, the 
GMWU and the TGWU - also debated the desirability of oontinued TOC 
, 
talks with the Government. '!he interest of these debates was 
certainly linked to the fact that the leader of each of' these < unions -
was both a party. to the discussions with the Government in his 
capacity as member of the 'NEDC Six' and also personally advocated 
.< 
oontinued TOC involvement in economic pollcy< d~ se'lSsions wi.t:h the 
6 
Government. Thus, these individual union polley debates called into 
question both the leader's personal authority and his relative 
oapacity to deliver the support of his union to TUe strategy. As 
will be seen in later chapters, these factors are of particular 
significance in ultimately securing the consent of individual unions 
to TUC-Government agreements on successive phases of wage restraint < 
under the Social Contract. 
In the other three unions under investigation, it was perhaps 
assumed that these discussions'with the Government would proceed in 
any case. Their respective conferences either did not debate the < 
desirability of the talks or were oontent to express opposition to 
.C 
the Government's wages policy. The debates in all of the unions -
provide an initial basis to compare some of the similarities and 
differences in attitudes and polioy both within and between the 
sample Unions. In partioular, these ooncern colleotive bargaining 
polioy in the oontext of inflation, the practicability and 
desirability of incomes policies, trade union relations with < the 
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government and, by extension, the future direction of this. still 
imprecise pact between the TUC and the Labour Party which would 
become popularly known as the 'Social Contract'. '!be publio 
reasoning of key trade union leaders at this time . provides 
interesting insights into their conceptions of the economy and the 
state and tbe role that unions should play in both, particularly as 
regards collective bargaining policy. However implioit, these 
concept.ions, subject to complex organizational, politioal. and 
eoonomio constraints, ultimately inform their industrial and 
political practice. 
The debates of both the FEU and NUPE conferences reflected a 
considerable hostility to the operation of the pay policies. This 
was no doubt indicative of a high degree of bargaining frustration. 
Both unions had either been engaged in or were . contemplating 
industrial action in pursuit of claims in excess of the Stage Two 
limits. Tbere seemed little probability of suocess . for e~ther. 
Although the general secretaries of both the FBU and NUPE, Terry 
Parry and Alan Fisher, were members of the TUC General Council and, 
therefore, party to the decision to resume discussions with the Heath 
Government, the conference debates of both unions provide little 
evidenoe or overt opposition to TUG participation in the talks. 
Rather, there was more concern with the constraints imposed on the" 
unions' bargaining activity by the Government's wages policy (see 
NUPEJ, 1973; NUPEAC, 1973; and FBUAC, 1973). 
The general secretary of ASTMS, Clive Jenkins, was not a member 
of the TUC General Council. He did not disguise his feeling of 
exolusion and grievance that the leader of what was then the eighth 
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largest TUC affiliate did not have a representative on the General 
. . 
Counci.L. This was finally remedied at the 1974 TUC. Jenkins 
emphasized this exclusion to the union's 1973 conference. 'We want 
to say to the Trades Union Congress that we thoroughly disapprove of 
secret talks held discreetly and anonymously with the Gov·ernment.· 
stressing that the agenda must be made public, he concluded that 
because' ASTMS was not party to the negotiations it could not possibly 
be bound by any decisions reached (AS'lMSJ,. 1913, No. 3: 4)~ In 
accordance with its traditional stance on this issue,. moreover, ASTMS 
remained a vociferous and high-profile opponent of incomes policies. 
Its 1973 COnfer-ence reaffirced ~ its total opposition to any form of 
wage restraint, whether voluntary or imposed by government statute', 
'regardless of the government seeking to introduce them', and 
instructed the union's executive 'to completely reject any form of 
cooperation with such policies and to campaign vigorously for 
enhanced salaries' (ibid). As will be explored further in Chapter 4, 
this approach was entirely consistent with ASTMS's previous 
opposition to incomes policy and the impact that such a policy might 
have on the differentials of the white-collar membership . that it 
either represented or aspired to recruit. Such an approach made any 
ASTMS cooperation in a joint TUC-Labour Party initiative on a 
voluntary incomes policy highly unlikely. 
In the three sample unions which discussed TUe partioipation in 
detail -the TGWU, theAUEW and the GMWU - each of the leaders. 
personally favoured a resumption of the talks. It is difficult to 
gauge whether or not the trade union leaders involved believed 1n the 
possibility of an agreement. The seriousness of the Chequers talks 
in the autumn of 1972 and the preparedness of the Government at least 
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to conside~ TOC policy proposals such as pension inoreases had 
certainly left a deep impression on the TUC negotiators. Indeed, 
Hugh Scanlon had speoifically emphasized this point (TUC, 1973: 83-
84). Moreover, most trade union leaders regarded inflation as a 
problem that had to be tackled, if only to prevent trade unions from 
being fmade a soapegoat for eoonomic problems. Trade· unionists, 
however, held differing views on the causes of and solutions to 
inflat~on and the role of colleotive bargaining therein. Suoh 
understandings had important implications for botn trade union 
collective bargaining policy and tb.e kind of pol!.ttral stance that 
unions adopted Vis-a-Vis government economio polioy. Before 
proceeding to oonsider the results of the 1973 policy debates within 
the three largest sample unions in this study, these eoonomic and 
political understandings merit closer sorutiny. lhey provide one of 
the keys to an understanding ot trade union attitudes towards incomes 
policy. 
Approaohes To Inflation And Inoomes Policy 
Most trade unionists agreed that rapid increases in the cost ,of 
living created economic and social problems. Hugn Scanlon talked to 
his union conference of the 'the disease of inflation which so 
drastically hits working olass families' (AUEWAC, 1973: 66). Trade_ 
union negotiators were espeoially wary of the oonsequent volatility 
of the bargaining olimate. There was even more emphatio agreement 
however, that trade unions and their oolleotive bargaining pOlicies 
were not the prime cause of rising rates ot inflation. For instanoe, 
while the 1973 Tue Eoonomic Review expressed its conoern, about 
inflation or, as it preferred to define the problem, how the 
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Government could simultaneously reduce unemployment and the rate of 
price increases, it totally rejected the idea that the 'prime 
responsibility fo~ price inflation' could be 'laid at the door of 
trade unions' (TUC, 1973: 12-13). This understanding wa~ repeated 
and re-emphasized at virtually every union conference in 1973. It 
implieq that co~lective bargaining should not have to bear. the brunt 
of measures intended to reduce the level of inflation. However, the 
implications for trade union participation in the planning of wages 
. . 
were more complex and varied. Indeed, there were signiticant 
variations in 'trade union' solutions to . inflation. 
At one end of the spectrum was what might be termed the 'left 
free collective bargaining' approach. Quite siI:lply, inflation was 
portrayed as but one of many problems generated within the capitalist 
system. It was argued that as long as the anarchy of the market 
place prevailed, production remained privately owned and controlled, 
and profits and prices were unplanned, then trade unionists should 
take no part in the planning of wages. As one TGWU activist 
suggested in moving ,the main motion on collective bargaining policy 
at the union's 1973 conference, 'we cannot have a statutory-control 
on wages wh.1le we live in a capitalist SOCiety' ('l'GW BOC, 10 July 
1973). By extension, the 'left free collective bargaining' approach 
implied that there should be no controls on wages as long as the-
inequities of the capitalist system prevailed. The AUEW's joint 
Divisional Committee for Glasgow and the West of Scotland was but 
one of the many divisions in the union that advocated this kind of 
approach at the union's 1973 National Committee. Its motion was 
unequivocal: 'Incomes poliCies under capitalism do not solve the 
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problems o~ the workers ••• We are therefore opposed to any incomes 
policy' (AU1r~ NCR, 1973: 94). 
At the opposite end of the political spectrum, the 'right free 
collective bargaining' approach arrived at the same conclusion, but 
by way of a slightly different analysis. Its proponents argued that 
government interference in the free market determination of wages had 
not nor would not improve economic performance. Rather, such 
intervention resulted in inflexibility, rigidity and many 
differentials and relativities problems which were u~timately best 
resolved by leaving the co~ective bargaining system to operate 
freely. A number of wn1te collar unions su~ as AS!MS had 
traditionally been quick to invoke this approach in defence of 
differentials as had some craft-oriented unions (on the need to 
reward skill and experience, see, i.e., Jenkins and Mortimer, 1968: 
168). Thus, both 'left' and 'right'. free collective bargaining 
approaches maintained that there was neither scope for nor merit in 
trade union participation in government-sponsored wage restraint or 
incomes policies, voluntary or otherwise. 
If trade unions were not responsible for rising levels of 
inflation, how was this phenomenon to be explained? '!he different 
answers to this question were more varied in their implications for 
union partiCipation in incomes policies. The relative balance 
between them was critical for the formulation of TUe economic policy, 
especially as regards the Liaison Committee discussions on what role, 
if any, unions might play in a counter inflation policy. As will be 
further explored in Chapter 4, an understanding of particular union 
approaches to inflation and incomes policy must be grounded in the 
organizational, economic and political realities of that union and· 
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its leadership. This section focuses only on the possible range of 
approaches. 
How, therefore, to explain and, ultimately, cure inflation? 
Most trade union policy-makers did not sUbscribe to 'demand-pull' 
theories of inflation because they advocated expansionary monetary 
policies and increased levels of public expenditure to maintain high 
levels of employment. 'Cost-push' theories were, therefore, more 
appealing • It might be argued that inflation was a complex process 
. 
initiated either by factors outside the domestic economy such as 
increases in international commodity i?rices, cu..'""re:::q s?eculation and 
multinational firms pricing policies or by particular domestic 
factors such as enhanced profit margins arising from corporate 
monopoly power, land speculation, and the nature of government 
policies on taxation, rents in public sector housing, credit and 
nationalised industry pricing." Trade union negotiators were 
consequently forced to chase prices in an effort to maintain real. 
wages. 
The question of trade union culpability in this process was more 
complex again. Was collective bargaining simply derivative ot this 
process or, once the phenomenon was initiated, did unions share a 
responsibility for the push on costs, the consequent escalation or 
prices, and a perpetuation of the 'vicious circle'? Many non-trade 
unionists maintained that unions were a significant cause of the push 
on costs; some argued that the fragmented structure of colleotive 
bargaining in Britain was itself inherently inflationary. M:lny of 
the most vocal advocates of incomes policy, including a signifioant 
group within the Parliamentary Labour Party, believed that 
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inflationary wage pressures were the inevitable by-product of a high 
level of demand, to Which the Party was committed, and tight labour 
markets, Which the demand policy was designed to produce. Othe~ 
economists countered, however, that inflation could not be explained 
on the basis of labour market activity; r~ther it was a question of . 
monetary and/or credit policies. This study is not. designed to 
I 
resolve these issues. They were in the mid-1970s, and indeed 
continue to be, the source of lively debate among economists (see 
Chapter 1; also Balogh 1970b; Brittan and Lilley, 1971; Jackson at 
al, 1975; and Trevithick, 1977). What is important; for the purposes 
. 
of this ~iscusslon is that particular unders~ of th~ .process 
of inflation by trade unionists implied different courses of action 
in the resolution of the problem. 
There was fairly common accord amongst trade Unionists in this 
period that a solution to inflat~on entailed action on prices. For 
instance, the TUC document ~Collective Bargaining, Prices and Social 
Priorities', submitted to the Government in July 1973, suggested that 
~All prices must be legally and rigidly controlled' and that this 
would entail subsidies for food and housing prices (TUCR, 1973:' 371-
.383). Equally, it was recommended that investment income should be 
subject to more stringent taxation policies in order to shift wealth t 
stop property speculation and· monopoly profits, and provide inoreased _ 
revenue for price subsidies and higher pensions. However, were such 
a policy to be implemented, there were slightly different views on 
the appropriate role for trade unions. For a free collective 
bargaining approach, once this kind of policy package was 
implemented, the rate of increase in money wages need not be large. 
Perhaps, as was to be suggested by the TUe during the first year of 
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the 1974 Labour Government, there would not be 'scope for increases in 
real wages. Alternatively, wages might increase in relation to 
either the prospects of the firm or an overall economic assessment. 
There was no doubt a sanguine optimism that under conditions of 
voluntary collective bargaining wage bargainers would respond 
positively to this kind of policy package and exercise restraint when 
, . 
the situation merited it. The TUC representatives adopted exactly 
this approach in the Liaison Committee disoussions. As Jack Jones' 
suggested, if the atmosphere was right on prices, employment and 
growth, then cooperation from trade unionists on ~e ~~e ~t would 
follow (Interview, 10 May 1980). 
However, a number of prominent trade unions leaders, including 
some within the Liaison Committee, felt that trade unionists and the 
roc must be prepared to go further than this. Alf Allen, the General 
Secretary of the Union of Shop,~ Distributive and Allied Workers 
(USDAW), for instanoe, told the 1973 Special TUe: 'I do not believe 
we can abandon our commitment to the planning of t.'le growth and the 
distribution of money incomes within our general strategy for the 
expansion of the economy (roc, 1973: 76). Similarly, Frank Chapple, 
the General. Secretary of the Electrical, Electronle, 
Telecommunication and Plumbing Union (EETPU), 'bluntly asked what 
trade unions were willing to do in return for the application of the· 
TUC's recommended policies? He suggested that 'it surely cannot be 
reasonable to insist on totally unrestricted voluntary collective 
bargaining' while demanding control of key prices, increased social 
benefits and action to raise the earnings of the low-paid (ibid: 87). 
Tom Jackson, an outspoken advocate of incomes policy and the leader 
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of the Union of Post Office Workers (UPW), later renamed the Union of 
Co~unications Workers, saw 
no merit in the slogan: 'Back Free Collective 
Bargaining', because collective bargaining is not free, and 
has never been free as far as, public service workers are 
concerned. It is not collective, because we will not do it 
together. ~t is not bargaining, unless you have enormous 
industrial strength to back up your arguments. !here is 
nothing marvellous about free collective bargaining. It has 
go~ nothing to do with Socialism. It is a ~omplete 
acceptance of the capitalist ethos. • • Free collective 
bargaining means poverty for many people in this country, and 
it is time that we stopped pretending'that free collective 
bargaining has cured any of our particular' problems (ibid: 
93}. 
David Basnett, General Secretary of the GMWU, suggested to the 1973 
TUe that, in order to mintain economic growth, the voluntary 
collective bargaining system could respond to long-term economio 
problems such as the low rate of investment by defining bargaining 
priorities. There was particular scope, he suggested, for an 
expansion of the TUC coordinating role 'in this respect (TUCR, 1973: 
511). He had earlier told the 1973 GMWU Congress that the TUC should 
play a greater role in advising affiliates on collective bargaining 
policy (GMWUAC, 1973: 373). A number of TUG public sector affiliates 
did favour an enhanced TUC role in the coordination of public sector 
. 
bargaining (TaCR, 1973: 520-521). However, the inclination or 
autonomous TUC affiliates to submit to a greater degree of TUe 
coordination and regulation must be understood in the light of the 
particular structure of a union, its collective bargaining 
arrangements, and prevailing conceptions of trade union political 
practice, particularly as regards its links with political parties 
and the state. 
One of the basic conflicts in this debate concerned the merits 
of free collective bargaining. In many respects, the different 
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, . 
approaches reflected profound philosophical differences about the 
practice of trade unionism itself. On the one hand, there were a 
number of trade union leaders, especially those associated with the 
development of the shop stew~rd movement in the engineering industry 
in the post-World War Two period, who suggested that free collective 
bargaining was at the very basis of political and: industrial 
democracies. Thus, Jack Jones told the 1973 TUC: 'Unions must be 
free to represent their members. Restrictions and restraints on 
their efforts are characteristio of Fascist SOCiety and are 
intolerable to a free trade union' Movement (!OCR, 1973: 512). 
Similarly, in addressing the question of industrial democracy, Hugh 
SCanlon (1974: 245), wrote: 'Not only must all restrictions on free 
collective bargaining be removed, but the structure of bargaining 
must correspond to reality by gi~~ng more power and responsibility at 
shop floor level. This is a basiC issue of industrial democracy_' 
This particular vision of autonomous workplace organizations 
operating largely independently of either government restriction or 
centralized union interference was not easily reconoiled with a view 
of more centralized trade union organizations coordinated under the 
umbrella of a TUe collective bargaining policy_ As will be further 
explored in Olapter 4, many who espoused the former view of trade 
unionism had long struggled against a system of national, industry-
wide negotiating machinery and fought for the devolution of 
bargaining power within their own unions in order that shop stewards 
could effectively negotiate wages and conditions at the workplaoe 
(see, i.e. Urwin, 1973: 3-4). They, therefore, maintained that free 
collective bargaining was the very basis of the rights to associate 
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and to be directly involved in the determination of ,rates of pay and 
conditions of' employment. 
Conversely, the notion of greater ruc coordination of union 
collective bargaining policy was supported by many other trade union 
leaders, particularly, but not exclusively ,those in the lowest-paid 
sectors of the economy. They maintained that there was no justice 
under free collective bargaining for the weakly organized in the 
labour market. Moreover, many groups of workers such as those in the 
health service and public utilities could not realistically use their 
industrial muscle because of the ,adverse consequences on the public. 
They also argued that government intervention was inevitable in many 
sectors. As Derek Gladwin, a GMWU Regional Secretary, expressed this 
view to his union's 1973 Congress: 'If intervention is inevitable, 
then let it be intervention by our own people, implementing 'a policy 
that we had a hand in framing (GMWUAC, 1973: 375-376). The 
implication was, of course, that the ruc should have greater power 
and influence over the collective bargaining policies of its 
affiliates and, ultimately, develop its own policy on incomes. 
Political Rationalities 
In dealing with the direction and variations in trade union 
collective bargaining policy and their' implications for TOC 
discussions on economic policy with the Heath Government, within the 
Liaison Committee and, eventually, with the next Labour Government, 
the previous section proposed and attempted to document a number of 
distinctions. Tbese included differing views on the process of 
inflation and the role of collective bargaining therein; whether 
there was scope for any form of incomes policy; whether the'role of 
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the TOC in tne collective bargaining activities of its affiliates 
should be laisser-faire, mildly interventionist, or highly dirigiste; 
and certain philosophical differences inherent in contrasting 
approaches to trade unionism. In terms of these varying 
. . 
understandings of' trade union industrial and political practice, it 
is possible to make one further distinction. Simply, should trade 
union leaders negotiate and deal with all governments, only with 
Labour governments or with no governments whatsoever? Some trade 
unionists vehemently rejected the possibility of an agreement with 
any government. on economic policy, whatever its col.our., In contrast, 
others felt that it was necessary to negotiate with whatever 
government was in power. Still many other trade unionists suggested 
that it might be possible to reach some kind of agreement on economic 
policy, perhaps even on incomes policy, with a Labour government, but 
not with a Conservative governmen~. Of course, there were numerous 
sub-variants on these positions. Some felt, for instance, that it 
was possible to negotiate on some items with certain governments, but 
not on other items. Thus, some of the proposals that migb.t be 
offered to a Labour government should not or could not be offered to 
a Conservative government. !his range of' variations, in fact, 
introduces the question of differ~nt trade union understand1ng~ of 
and strategies towards the state. Certainly, these were' readl1y-
apparent in the different union debates over whether or not the TUC 
should be engaged in discussions on economic policy with the 
Government. 
As was noted above, . three of the sample unions in this study _ 
the AUEW, the GMWU and the TGWU - in fact debated this question at 
their 1973 delegate conferences. Their leaders personally 
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recommended rue -participation in the talks. Their r'easoning and the 
opposition ,to their recommendations provide some insights into the 
different understandings among trade unionists of the role of trade-
unions vis-a-vis the state. Moreover, the results of these debates 
also merit brief consideration. The ability of the leaders of the 
three largest TUC affiliates to win support for TUC strategy is an 
interesting comment on the particular orga:nizational and polltioal 
features of their respeotive unions as well as a key indioator of the 
variations in affiliate support for TUC policy -a central theme in 
subsequent chapters. Significant variations in their respective 
positions were likely to affect the overall direction of TUC policy; 
if only because these three unions represented 33.1 per cent of the 
ten million TUC members in 1973 (calculated from the 'Statement of 
Account", TUCR, 1974: 477-625). A significant change in approach to 
economic policy in anyone of the main sample unions could, thus, 
possibly shift the direction of TUC policy. 
Many TUe leaders had been impressed by the potential of their 
'previous discussions with the Heath Government. '!hey certainly 
appreciated the Government's clear commitment to pursue a policy of 
economiC growth. Sir Sidney Greene, Olairman of the TUe EconomiC 
Committee, noted that it was a polley to which the TUe had been 
committed for many years and was, therefore, 'an acceptable basis for 
discussion [with the Government] on the economy' (TUCR, 1973: 506). 
The arguments advanced in favour of continued TUe partiCipation in 
talks with the Government were perhaps indicative of prevailing trade 
union understandings of their relations with the state, as were the 
arguments deployed by union activists against oontinued 
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participation. Several distinct rationalities, emerged' from the 
debate. Eoweve~, it must be emphasized that, in practice, these 
rationalities were completely interwoven in trade union discourse -
more often pursued simultaneously than exclusively, in terms of 
mutual contradiction rather t~an logical 'compatibility. 
Most visible in the argumentation of the leaders of the three 
largest sample unions was a representational rationaiity. They 
suggested that the TUC had a duty to deal with whatever government 
was in.power. David Basnett, for instance, stressed to the 1973 GMWU 
Congress that the union movement had a dual purpose: "it is to 
represent our members as workers in· industry •••• it is also to 
represent our members as citizens (GMWUAC, 1973: 367-388). The union 
must therefore, he argued, deal with the Government in order to 
express its opposition to the policies to Which, it ,was opposed. 
Similarly, Jack Jones noted to his union's Biennial, Delegate 
Conference that the leader of the TGWU had a responsibility along 
with the TUC to put the union's case to the government of the day 
(TGWU BDC, 10 July 1973). Thus, there was a representational role 
incumbent on the TOe; it was to rep~esent trade unionists as citizens 
in the political sphere. Expressing 'What might be termed a more 
adversarial,. indeed instrumental, rationallty, Jones argued, 
moreover, that trade union members' standard of. living,could not be 
determined by negotiations with employers alone. 'We do have to 
bring our weight to bear on the government of the day, to put our 
case and to negotiate' (ibid.). Jones added that you can never get a 
wage increase by standing outside the door. Thus, talking with 
gO,vernments was, in this sense, an extension of the collective 
bargaining relationship to the level of the state. Jones emphasized: 
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'just as we present our case to employers of labour, we pull no 
punches, and I do not pull any punches with this crowd (the 
Government]. r hate them as much as you do' (ibid). Moreover, in 
strictly instrumentaL terms and as in most bargaining relationships, 
there was the prospect of gains. If the talks failed, then it would 
be because the Government was unwilling to negotiate. As one speaker 
suggested in the TGWU debate, it was wrong to tie the hands of the 
General Secretary, 'let them go in and get"What they can for us ••• 
. 
even if it is with the Tory Government' (ibid). Hugh Scanlon, 
President of the AUEW, also invoked these representatlcx:al. and 
instrumental rationalities. He suggested that par~-cipation in such 
talks was contentious, but none~~eless politically necessary. 
Speaking to the AUEW National Conference, he said that 
'there is a responsibility on the trade unions' to respond to 
invitations, even to initiate discussions with the Government 
of the day, whatever its colo~r, for a refusal to do so could 
provide the greatest excuse' for any Government to proceed 
with outrageous policies on the grounds that the trade unions 
were unwilling to search for'a common solution'(AUEWAC, 1973: 
68). 
Thus, not only might something be gained, but damage might also be 
forestalled.. In this sense, instrumental strategies could be minimal 
as well as ma.xha·l. 
There were also social demooratic rationalities. Indeed, as has 
previously been argued, attachment to the Labour Party and the ethos-
of 'labourism' exert complex and powerful determinations on the 
political and industrial practice of British trade unions. This 
study is in part designed to investigate these determinations'and the 
question of sooial democratic rationalities will figure prominently 
in subsequent chapters. At their 1973 conferences, the TGWU, AUEW 
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and GMWU all carried motions whioh oalled for the return of a Labour 
government at the next general election. Ironically, the task for 
the exponents of talks with the Government 1n this case was to 
convince union activists that talks with the Heath Government .would 
not demobilize trade union members, loosen links with the Labour 
Party and reduce the chances of an early· return of. a Labour 
government. Opponents of TUC participation in talks with the 
Government at 1973 union conferences frequently invoked a social 
. 
democratic rationality in order to win suppo~t for their motions. In 
opposition to the position of the Qeneral Sec.""eta.""Y at the GHWU 
Congress, for instance, a motion called for an end to the meetings 
with the Government because ~they lead to an identification with Tory 
aims and a blacklash when agreement cannot be reached (GW~AC, 1973: 
376). Similarly, the opposition motion at the TGWU Biennial Delegate 
COnference completely rejected 'any cooperation with the Government t 
and called 'for the united efforts of the trade union movement to 
remove this Government and work for the return of a Labour 
government t (TGWU BDCM, 1973: 9). A oomparable motion at the AUEW 
National Committee from the Joint Divisional COmmittee for the 
northeast region recommended rejection of any talks with the Tory 
Government and the exertion of pressure to remove the Tory Government 
and establish a Labour Government committed to 'socialistio polioies' 
(AUEW NCR, 1973: 110). 
This specification of 'socialistio polioies' merits closer 
inspection, for it qualified the language of loyalism that was so 
often associated with the oommon identifioation of trade union 
politioal practice and Labour Party eleotoral interests. Social 
democratio rationalities, primarily in terms of loyalty to the Labour 
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Party, had often been invoked in the past by various trade union 
leaders seeking to rally the support of union members and union 
pollcy-making forums to Labour governments. In the case of the 1960s 
incomes policies and proposals for new labour laws, to~ example, this 
loyalty came under increasing strain. (see Panitch, 1976). The 
disaffection with the performanoe of the 1960s Labour . government 
'" 
stimulated the articulation of what might be called a transformative 
rationality. The simple election of a Labour Government, according 
to this view, was not sufficient in trade union political terms; it 
must· also be committed to the pursui·t of socialist 'Policies.. '!his 
rationality was certainly at the heart of what has been described in 
the previous chapter as the socialist conception of the Social 
Contract, a veritable transformative strategy. Within the Labour 
Party, this approach was articulated primarily in the work of the 
sub-committees of the National Executive. 
As was argued in this chapter, the programmatic proposal:, of' a 
socialist conception of the Social Contract surfaced at the 1973 
~bour Party Conterence to conflict with the more social ·democratic 
approach espoused by many in the leadership of the Parliamentary 
Labour Party. These latter maintained that such an explieltly 
transformative approach was neither electorally viable nor 
practicable. In trade union policy terms, apart from conference 
motions in favour of commitments to the extension of pUblic ownership 
and the pursuit of a more rigorous industrial strategy, this 
transformative rationality was expressed in resolutions specifying 
that a future Labour Government should be pledged to a socialist 
programme. This explains the apparent paradox of trade union 
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activists debating motions calling for a socialist party to pursue 
'socialist policies'.' It was, of'course, a political code implying 
criticism of previous manifestations of social democratio 
rationality. If priority was no longer to be the language of 
SOCialism, then at least language might be the priority of socialism? 
Thus, at the 1973 Conference of the AUEW, a motion calling on the 
union's executive to work for the return of a Labour Government was 
successfully amended, by forty-one votes to·twenty-seven, to add that 
Labour. Government should be 'pledged to implement a real sooialist 
programme' (AUE.WAC, 1973: 91). Similarly, the unsuocessful 
opposition motion at the 1973 BDC of the TaiWU specL.*ied that the 
Labour government, for whose return it called, should be 'pledged to 
aot in the interests of the working class through socialist policies' 
(TGWU BDeM, 1973: 9). 
Opposition to the TUC talks with the Government' was also 
manifested in terms of an oppositional rationality. In contrast to 
the espousal of a representational conception of the trade union role 
vis-a-vis the state, an oppositional rationality implied that there 
~s no benefit for trade unionists to become involved in the 
administration of state policies. Indeed, such. participation might' 
ultimately compromise the ability of 'union leaders to act 
independently in the economic and political interests of their 
members. As the future leader of the' Technical and Supervisory 
Section of the AUEW (TASS), suggested to the 1973 TUe, 'If the 
Government is in such a bloody mess', it is not 'the duty of 
organized workers to discuss their problems with them and. to set ••• 
[them] on the right path' (TUCR, 1973: 513). An oppos1tIonal 
rationality implIed that there was little or no scope for economic 
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agree~nt with government under the existing social system. The 
principal task was, therefore, to seek a social transformation. 
Thus, the Engineering Union's joint Divisional Committee for Glasgow 
and the west of Scotland suggested in its motion to the' National 
COmmittee 'that only the emergence of a Socialist Society can solve 
the problems of the workers of this Country' (AUE.W NCR, 1913: 94). 
The arguments ,both for and against lYe participation in the 
talks demonstrated an intriguing interweaving of rationalities. The 
three leaders concerned advocated continued talks. !herefore~ they 
identified the interests of thei~ members in ~-rying blends of 
representational, adversarial and instrumental rationalities. 
Opponents of the talks could, of course, invoke an oPPositional 
rationality. However, they could also make an implicit link with 
social democratic rationalities and the language of loyalism, at 
least inasmuch as it could be 'argued tha't trade union political 
activity was better harnessed in joint action with the Labour Party 
than in talks with the Conservative Government. Clearly trade union 
> leaders in favour of the.se talks could not argue that they were doing 
so in order to boost the chances of the Labour Party in the' next 
General Election. Rather, it was in terms of that rationality that, 
in addition to the talks with the Government, they simultaneously 
called for support of the work of the Liaison Committee, a support 
which came without challenge in all of the sample unions. 
The Policy' Debates and Their Impaot on TOe Policy-Making 
What then was the result of this competition between different 
rationalities? In the three major unions where the debate took 
place, two out of the three, the TGWU and the GMWU, supported the 
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TOC's participation in the talks. In the GMWU, there was little 
opposition apart from the existence of the opposition motion itself 
(GMWUAC, 1973). In the TGWU, according to an estimate of the 
Financial Times (11 July 1973), the opposition motion was defeated by 
a margin of three to one. . The AUEW National Conference narrowly 
voted, by thirty-five votes to thirty-three, against continued ruc 
presence in the discussions (AUEWAC, 1913: 80-81). These results 
roughly mirrored what transpired at the 1973 TOC Jbere, by a margin 
. 
of 6.8 million to 2~7 million votes, a similar motion was defeated 
(TUCR, 1973: 512-531). 'Hall are the results of these debates within 
individual unions to be explained? Was it sim~ly a question of the 
deployment of more persuasive argumentation? Although unlikely in 
itself, even if this was the case, why did comparable arguments 
appear to be more persuasive in some unions than others? 
The answers to these questions must be located 1n a oloser 
scrutiny of the particular unions concerned. Such scrutiny is the 
intent of subsequent chapters, partioularly Chapter~. How 
particular union conferences come to the policy conclusions that they 
do will be of central concern in Chapters 7 and 8. However, it 
would seem apparent from the above discussion that the results ot 
particular policy debates, especially those concerning the key 
question of collective bargaining polioy, must be understood 1n the-
context of the specific organizational and political features of 
these three unions. A defeat, it should be emphasized, for the 
General Secretary of either the TGWU or the GMWU on this or any other 
motion which they had endorsed in strong p,ersonal terms would have 
constituted a major reversal of tradition. A recommendation from the 
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platform at both union conference was rarely defeated (see Undy, 
1978: 5&; Clegg, 1979: 211). However, in the 'AUEW, Where there 
exists a complex network of factional, political alliances and the 
possibility of the institutional expression of opposition at a number, 
of levels within the union, the recommendations of its leaders were 
more often defeated (see Minkin, 1918: 175-206; Undy, 1919; and Undy 
et al,' 1981). Whereas Jack Jones and David Basnett could be 
relatively confident of winning the support of their respective 
policy. conferences, the inability of Hugh Scanlon to convert, his 
union's policy body to his recommended approach was evidence or the 
greater pol1tical constraints imposed 'on the president. or the AU~ by 
the structure and culture of his union. 
The debate within the AUE.'I1l was complex. The combination of the 
factional system operating in a decentralized and culti-tiered system 
of government provided, what Lewis Minkin (1978a: 176), described. 10 
., 
an excellent case study of the role of the Engineers in the Labour 
Party Conference, as 'a ,remarkable recipe for 1nstitutionalized 
conflict about what constituted the will of "the membership'''. 
Relations between the factions were seldom cordial and often 
internecine, and these divisions permeated the many elected decision-
making bodies within the union. Relations between these often 
autonomous bodies were governed by a detaUed rulebook.. Thus, 
attention to procedure was elevated to a veritable theology, replete 
with controversies of interpretation worthy of any religious 
scripture. This political culture, of oourse, affected relative 
calculations as to how 'to play' certain issues. This was 
particularly the case with the meetings of the National Committee and 
National Conference since the President and Executive Council were 
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formally in the position of interpreting and aoting upon the 
decisions of these policy-making bodies. Thus, the relative soope 
for subsequent manoeuvring on the part of the union's leadership was 
crucially subject to the timing, precise oontent and tenor.of polioy 
decisions. 
F~elings against the Heath Government were sufrioien~ly strong 
and the balanoe within the National Committee such. that a motion was 
passed at the April 1973 meeting of the Committee whioh urged the TUC 
not to participate in 'any discussions with the Government· on any 
form of wage freeze' (AUE'w NCR, 1973~ 20!l-20S). lic-wever, after this 
deCision, Scanlon maintained that sinoe he had no intention of 
negotiating a wage freeze he felt free to participate in disoussions 
with the Government (FT, 12 April 1973). . ~~o months later, at the 
union's· National Conference, he elevated the issue to a point of 
principle. 'If... this Conference deoides that the talks should 
not prooeed, then it is inoonoeivable that the President of the Union 
oould be present' (AUE'wAC, 1973: 72). An amendment designed to 
delete the referenoe to ·'withdrawal from ~,e talks' in this 
substantive motion was defeated by thirty-five votes to thirty-three 
with one abstention (ibid: 80-81). Soanlon later confirmed that he, 
therefore, would not participate in any further TUC talks with the 
Government (FT, 21 June 1973). There was some aorimony within the 
Engineering Onion over this interpretation. Keith Harper reported in 
the Guardian (21 June 1973) that the decision stunned delegates, 
especially as hardly anyone during the debate had talked about 
calling off the talks completely. Many of the 'left' delegates had 
in fact argued that the motion need not preoludeScanlon's 
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participation in the talks (FT, 21 June 1973). Formally, at least, 
Scanlon was participating in the talks as a representative of the TUC 
General Council and not in his capacity as President of the AUEW. A 
prominent 'moderate' member of the executive, obviously, delighted 
with the discomfiture of the 'left' on this issue, suggested that the, 
National Committee delegates propose an amendment if they. wanted the 
union represented at Downing steet (FT, 21 June 1973). Another 
executive member on the 'left' later accused Scanlon of "political 
jingoism', suggesting that he had deliberately placed an eccentric 
interpretation on the motion (Interv;ew, 18 March 1980)'. 
In contrast to the apparent political homogeneity of the two 
general unions, the TGWU and the GM'tlU, such factional and 
organizational battles were typical of the AUEW. Clearly, these 
types of internal political, cultural and organizational faotors were 
, , 
bound to affect the kind of initiating, intermediary and constraining 
roles that each of these major trade union leaders would play in both 
the early formulation of the Social Contract and its subsequent 
development in the form of successive phases of voluntary wage 
restraint. 
The actual mechanisms of conference defeats and viotories, 
particularly those concerned with collective bargaining 'and pay 
policy, will be the object of much more detailed scrutiny in 
subsequent chapters. For now, it is simply worth noting the 
implications of the above observations on individual union collective 
bargaining policy and policy-making for TUC polioy-making. '!here was, 
clearly a complex interrelation between the dynamics of individual 
union polioy-making and colleotive bargaining behaviour, on the one 
hand, and TUe policy-making and POlitioal mediations, on the other. 
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The significance of these interrelations for the de~elopment of the 
Social Contract incomes policies should become increasingly apparent. 
They are, of course, a central objeot of interest in this study. 
'!'his kind of interrelation was certainly apparent in the 1973 
TUC decisions on collective bargaining and counter-inflation policy. 
As noted above, a marked difference in emphasis separated the 
approaches of the GMWU and TGilU to collective bargaining and anti-
inflation policy. The GMWU executive's motion to its 1973 Congress 
expressly urged the TUC to determine its own guidelines .. for a prioes 
and incomes policy within the cO;ltext of greater social justi::e and 
economic expansion' (GW~UAC, 1973: 368). The TGWU executive, on the 
other hand, at the union's BDC expressed opposition to "statutory 
control of wages, or interference with collective bargaining' (TGWU 
BDCM, 1973: 9). The GMWU leadership had previously demonstrated its 
willingness to mention the words ;'incomes policy' in the context of 
TUC and Labour Party discussions. The TG"l1U leader, on the ,other 
hand, appeared to be strongly opposed to 'any interference with 
,collective bargaining. 'nlese were quite different signals as regards 
What a future Labour Government might anticipate in terms of trade 
union cooperation on incomes policies. Yet, Significantly, these 
apparently contradictory positions did not prevent the two unions 
from moving and seconding the same composite motion on preoisely this -
issue in the 1973 TUC economic debate. 
Ibe original GMWU motion to the 1973 TUC welcomed the Liaison 
Committee initiative on inflation and urged the TUe 'to determine and 
publish its own guidelines for a social and economic policy within 
the context of greater social justice and eoonomio expansion' (TUCR, 
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1973: 635). Jack Jones apparently persuaded the TGWU executive to 
amend the GMWU motion (according to a senior TGWU offioial, 
Interview, 5 August 1981). This enabled the TUC to maintain a 
semblance of unity on a very delicate issue. The TGWU proposed the 
addition of the phrase 'co~bined with a restoration of 'voluntary 
collective bargaining' to the Gt-r~u's call for 'a planned growth of 
real incomes'. It also replaced the GMWU's suggested plan for the 
TUC to publish guidelines for a social and 'economic policy to combat 
inflation with a simple endorsement of the work of the Liaison 
Committee in this area (ibid: 636). Jones and Sasnett, key figures 
in the Liaison Committee's work, were thus able to attach their 
unions' joint stamp of authority to a motion on collective bargaining 
and counter-inflation policy. It was widely endorsed at Congress and 
became the consecrated trade union formula on the subject. The 
delicate wording, of course, refle,cted the same kind of modus vivendi 
that had prevailed, albeit uneasily, within the Liaison Committee. 
What precisely was the TUe policy? The TUC was agreed that the 
problem of inflation could only be tackled 'within the context of a 
coherent economic and social strategy'. It, therefore, favoured 'a 
planned growth of real incomes', 'a restoration of voluntary 
collective bargaining', and, on the basis of a strong feeling of' 
mutual COnfidence arising from discussions within the Liaison 
Committee, early negotiations with the next Labour Government to 
conclude 'a wide-ranging agreement on the policies to be pursued. • • 
and the order of priorities of their fulfillment' (TUCR, 1973). Such 
a formula was, of course, sufficiently vague to withstand a variety 
'Of interpretations. There was just, enough to whet the appetites of 
Labour Party politicians looking for an incomes policy accord, but 
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" 
not enough to offend any vehement advocates of .free collective 
bargaining. !here was, indeed, a wide variety of interpretations as 
to what such a future agreement with the next Labour Government might 
entail; as were there some doubts about its advisability in the first 
place. 
This section has attempted to indicate that such a modus vivendi 
, 
reflected a more complex balance of forces than a simple dichotomy 
between the approach of the PLP leadership and a number of leading 
trade unionists. There were numerous differences within and between 
TUC affiliates. Although British trade L-rt 0:-:5-;S were not 
necessarily guided by any global conceptions of the economy and its 
operation, there were a number of important differences in their 
understandings of inflation, collective bargaining and the 
appropria te role for the TUC there1Il. Equally, there were also V 
marked differences in their· ·relative emphasis on different 
rationalities of trade unionism vis-a-Vis the state. All of these 
conceptions informed and shaped attitudes to incomes policy. It has 
been argued that any comprehension of the interaction of. these 
different conceptions and attitudes to incomes policy must be 
grounded in a more detailed scrutiny of the complex, material 
circumstances of individual unions. '!he dynamics of their collective 
bargaining policies must be linked to their relative organizational-
and political constraints. The analysis of these internal dynamics 
of incomes policies in the sample unions in this study is the subject 
of Olapter 4. As regards th.e development of the Social Contract in 
1913, however, the relative policy flexibility available to the TGWU 
and GMWU General Secretaries enabled them to propose what appeared to 
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be a oommon approaoh to oollective bargaining and counter-inflation 
polioy. This approach reoeived overwhelming TUC endorsement. 
However, the balance of opinion on collective bargaining policy both 
within the TUC and within and between the sample unions in this study 
was far more complex. Many of the ambiguities in the TUC collective 
bargaining and counter-inflation policies were soon put to the test. 
A miners' dispute during a crisiS in the supply of oil from the 
Middle Fast sparked off a remarkable chain of events. By March 1974, 
the TUC had voluntarily agreed to exert greater influence over the 
wage claims of its affiliates. A minority Labour Government, 
campaigning on the basis of its 'Social Compact', had also been 
elected. 
chapter. 
lhese events are the subjeot of the final part of this 
FR(M PROORAHME TO POWER 
... ' 
The period from October 1973 to March 1974 witnessed a 
remarkable eoonomio and political transformation' in ~itain. 
Relative optimism about the economy gave ~~y to an acute industrial 
and political orisis. In the oontext of' rapidly rising energy prioes 
and a major international oil crisis, the National Union of 
Mineworkers embarked on its second national industrial dispute in two 
years. The Government responded by deolaring a National Emergenoy_ 
and placing most of the economy on a three-day working week. TUe 
leaders were suffioiently anxious about the political implications of 
the dispute to offer to moderate substantially their opposition to 
the Government's statutory pay policy in return for concessions to 
the mineworkers. With the NUM and the Government deadlooked in a 
major industrial confrontation, the Prime Mlnister, Edward Heath, 
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called an election in an attempt to renew his mandate and settle the 
dispute on his own terms. 
The pol1ticization of industrial conflict which had developed 
through the campaign against ,the Industrial Relations Act, ,thus, 
reached new heights. At issue, it was argued, was who governed 
Britain: the trade unions or the state? As prices ~ere rising 
rapidly, counter-inflation polioy also became a major issue. In 
oontrast to the oonfliot over the Heath Government's inoomes policy, 
the Labour Party offered a more consensual relation with the unions. 
A Labour government, it promsed, would secure the voluntary 
cooperation of the trade unions to ourb riSing prices on the basis of 
a 'social contraot'. By the narrowest of margins, a minority Labour 
7 
Government assumed power in early March. For the Social Contraot, 
whatever the ambiguities between social decocratic and sooialist 
conceptions, the transformation from electoral strategy to government 
programme was complete. 
This part of the ohapter does not fully document this 
remarkable series of events. Rather, it outlines the oontext in 
which this transformation took place. In particular, it focuses on 
the TUC's offer to the Government to influence the formulation of 
affiliates t wage olaims during StaBe Three in return for a settlement 
of the political and industrial crisis. At the same time, the TUe 
remained unwilling in discussions with the Labour Party to clarity 
what role it might play in any SOCial Contract counter-inflationary 
policy. The tension between these two pOSitions was awkward. On the 
one hand, the 'crisis' highlighted the TUC's potential intermediary 
role between state power and the sectional power of its affiliates. 
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Yet, there were definite, albeit imprecise, limits on the extent to 
which ~~e TUC might infringe on the bargaining. autonomy of its 
affiliates. On the other hand, it seemed that there was still scope. 
for concessions on pay bargaining under a future Labour government. 
stage Three 
Although Edward Heath had maintained that he was prepared to 
consider any and all economic proposals, the options available must 
have seemed more limited. It was unlikely that an incomes policy 
. 
would be easily abandoned. The economy was expanding rapidly and the 
rate of unemployment had experienced a remarka~le decline OV~ the 
course of 1973. From a high point of 4.1 percent in early 1972, 
unemployment had declined successively to 3.4 percent in .November 
1972 and to 2.2 percent in November 1973, its lowest level since 
1967. With the number of job vacancies only sixteen thousand less 
than the number of unemployed, the level of unemployement was nearing 
the conventional economic definition of full employment (statistics 
obtained from DE Gazette December 1973: 1298-1315). Pressure on 
wages was therefore likely to increase. In addition, the targets 
Which had been set for average wage increases over the first two 
stages of the Heath pay pOlicies had been dramat'ically overshot.. As 
opposed to the target of 7.5 percent, the index of average earnings 
for all employees indicated a 12.3 percent increase over the year to-
November 1973. OVer the same period, retail prices had risen by 10.3 
percent. By the autumn of 1973, the UK economy was in the full 
throes of what has been called the ·Barber boom'. In the second half 
of 1973 the money supply was expanding at an annual rate of 30 
percent (Glyn and Harrison, 1980: 86). Predictions that the growth 
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10 gross domestic product would run at three and half percent or more 
fUrther confirmed ~~e buoyant state of the economy. !he CBI's 
November 1913 Industrial Trends Survey indioated a general 'buoyancy 
in produotion, orders, employment and investment, with strong trends 
in exports experienced and antioipated (BJIR Chroniole, March. 1974: 
128). With hindSight, a NEDO analyis of October 1973 on the short-
term prospects for the economy possessed an almost touching optimism 
in its examination of the potential problems created by the very 
rapidiey of the upturn in eoonomic aotivity (NEDO, 1973). An 
internal document prepared by the TUe Economic Dep~-t:ent generally 
shared this optimism (TUC ECD, 8 october 1973). 
lbe immediate problem for the Government, therefore, was to 
design an incomes policy that could hold down wage increases, but was 
sufficiently flexible to cope with both the upward pressures created 
by tight labour markets and the frustrations already engendered by a 
.: . 
year of statutory oontrol. Not SUrprisingly, the Government had 
little success in its attempt to reach agreement with the TUC; on 27 
September it announced that it would publish its own proposals as the 
basis for future discussion (TUCR, 1974: 218). Thus, the Government 
declared its intention to proceed unilaterally. On October 1973, it 
published a very detailed and sophistioated set of provisions as the 
basis of Stage Three of its statutory policies. 'lhese included a_ 
choice of either seven percent, or two pounds and twenty-five penoe 
in wage increases with a limit of three hundred and fifty pounds per 
person per year; an additional one percent possible inorease for 
changes in pay structures with other payments permitted for genuine 
produotivity increases; threshold payments on the basis of a flat 
rate increase for every peroentage pOint increase in the Ratail Price 
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Index greater than the anticipated rate; and, finally, some reserve 
flexibility to dea~ with special cases (Stage Three, 1973). Although 
the 'roc was critical of the proposals and maintained its opposition 
to statutory controls on collective bargaining, the new provisions 
came into operation in early November. 
The Miners' Pay Claim and the Oil Crisis 
In preparing its Stage Three provisions, the Government had been 
particularly wary of 'possible confrontations with powerful bargaining 
groups. One imp or tan t defeat mig.~t ensure the de::rl..se of the policy. 
Barnes, who was a senior member of the Department of E:lployment staff 
at that time, notes that private talks were held with officers of 
trade unions 'whose power and militancy might provide the most 
serious threats' (Barnes and Reid, 1980: 176). The policy had to be 
flexible enough to contain the 'demands of special groups, especially 
the miners and e,leotricity su~ply workers. Indeed, t.i.e origins of 
the Government's 'U-turn' in economic policy were generally 
attributed to the suocess of the miners in breaching the publio 
sector pay limit in February 1972. On the day that the 1972 miners' 
strike ended, Heath was reported to have said: "We have to find a 
more sensible way of settling our differences' (ibid.: 155). The 
irony of these elaborate preparations for Stage Three was that the 
Government w~s to lose offioe 1n its defence of the guidelines 
against the miners. Acoording to the investigations of Fay and Young 
(1976a), Heath believed that a secret July 1973 meeting with Joe 
Gormley, President of the NUM, had laid the basis for a settlement 
8 
with the miners in the winter to come. The miners would be awarded 
a speCial payment for their 'unsocial hours'. When the National Coal 
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Board made its ofter to the NUM in October 1973, it included all that 
the Government L"ltended to offer. lbe NUM rejected it in the belief 
that something more would be forthcoming (Fay and Young, 1976a). 
Instead, the NUM declared that it would operate an overtime ban from 
12 November. 
The NUM decision was remarkably fortuitous in its timing. The 
October 1973 Yom Kippur War in the Middle East had sparked. both an 
oil embargo and a sudden increase in oil prices. On 17 October 1973, 
the price of Arabian crude oil rose by a minimum of sixty-six 
percent. Moreover t shipments to some destinations, suc.~ as the USA 
and the port of Rotterdam which served much of the European market, 
were banned entirely_ On 5 November, Arab producers rurther 
announced their decision to reduce total production by twenty-five 
percent. This 'oil crisis' suddenly undermined the confidence of the 
Government in dealing with the miners' overtime ban. Estimates of 
the rate of consumption of existing coal stocks had to be 
substantial.ly altered. By' 13 November, the second day of the 
overtime ban, the Government declared a State of Emergency -
ostensibly to deal with the ten percent reduotion in oil supplies. 
The sudden increase in oil prices exacerbated an already sharp 
reversal in the country's balance of payments. When the publication 
of the October trade figures in mid-November revealed a huge visible-
trade deficit, the Government was obliged to implement restrictive 
measures such as a one and three-quarters percent inorease in the 
minimum lending rate. With continuing pressure on the pound, 
disputes pending in both the mining and electricity supply 
industries, and a fUrther deterioration in the trade balance, ~e 
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Government argued the case for drastic action. On 13 December 1973, 
it announced ~~e ioposition of a three-day working week in most 
industries from the beginning of January. It was argued that the 
three-day working week would reduce energy consumption and, thereby, 
preserve fuel stocks. A few days later, the Chancellor also 
introduced an emergency mini-budget which cut public expenditure by 
1.2 billion pounds. 
Trade union leaders were immediately sceptical of the 
Government's emergency measures. An early December analysis from the 
TUC Economic Department, 'The Oil Situation and ~onomic Prospect', 
. 
concluded that, provided certain restrictions on ~QSte and non-
industrial energy use were implemented, a ten percent reduction 1n 
oil supplies did not undermine the case for the policies that the TUC 
had been urging the Government to adopt. Indeed, it underlined the 
need for such policies (TUC ECO, .: 12 December 1973). ' \-lhen the TUC-
Labour Party Liaison Committee met in December, it was agreed, that 
the Government's action was unnecessary. '!he three-day working week 
was 'in tended to put pressure on the miners, through causing 
resentment towards them among ot.'ler sections of the community (LCR, 
17 Decemb'er 1973). At a special meeting of the National Eaonomio 
Development Council (NEDC) on 21 December 1973, the TUC 
representatives tried in vain to 'get the Governmant to abandon or at-
least postpone the introduction of the three-day week (TUCR, 1974: 
220). Not only had the decision been taken without consultation, but 
they argued that it was unnecessary and would have far more damaging 
consequences than the ill it was supposed to treat. The Government 
refUsed to alter its measures. Deadlock ensued. Neither for the 
first nor the'last time did a Conservative administration suspect 
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conspiracy in the coalfields. Many of its opponents~ partioularly in 
the trade union movement, felt that the Government was intent on 
pursuing a lengthy confrontation with the miners, and that was why it 
was imperative to preserve fuel stocks. 
The TUC Initiative 
It was in this atmosphere that the TUC attempted to break the 
deadlock. The TUe, traditionally, has mediated between the sectional 
. 
autonomy of its affiliates and the state. Its rules, moreover, 
specifically empower the General Council to intervene in the dispute 
of an affiliate if, as a result, other bodies of workpeople 
affiliated to Congress are 'involved in a stoppage of work or their 
9 
wages, hours and conditions of employment imperilled'. The three-
day working week was arguably linked to the miners' dispute. It had 
obvious negative consequences in' ~erms of earnings and employment for 
most TUC members. There "~s growing concern, moreover, that other 
settlements were being delayed until the strike was settled in case 
the Stage Three norms were either relaxed or abandoned. Thus, prior 
to the January 1974 NEDC meeting, the TUC representatives ~agreed 
that there was a distinctive and exceptional situation in the mining 
industry'. '!he TUC Economic Committee was prepared on that basis to 
'give the Government the assurance that if the Government were· 
prepared to make possible a settlement between the miners and the 
NCB, other unions would not use this argument in negotiations for 
their own settlements' (NEDC, 13 February 1974). During the course 
of the subsequent NEDC meeting, the Chancellor, Anthony Barber, 
dismissed the offer outright. Indeed, the TUC representatives felt 
obliged to repeat it in order that the significance of the concession 
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might be properly understood. The Chancellor again responded with 
disinterest, but agreed to convey the offer to the Prime Minister. 
It has subsequently been argued by both senior civil service and 
CBI officials that the Government and CBr representatives at this 
NEDC meeting did not sufficiently grasp the significance of the TUC 
offer and, therefore, failed to build on a possible opening. Sir Leo 
Pliatzky, (1982: 120), then Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, later 
noted that' the Chancellor of the Exchequer, who was in the chair, 
did not seek to build on the TUC proposition'. Similarly, a senior 
member of t..'le eEl staff suggested ~at t."le CBI DL~ctor General, 
Campbell Adamson, had not really understood the 'face-saving nature 
of the gesture'. Indeed, only two weeks later, wen the CBI 
attempted to find a joint solution to the strike with the TUC, it 
very much regretted that the TUC formula had not been used 
(Interviews, 22 September and 4 October 1979). However, at the tice, 
Government Ministers 'made no secret in private that they regarded 
both the TUC "offer" and Mr. Wilson's employment of it in the COmmons 
as little more than an electoral red herring' (Guardian, 11 January 
1974). Indeed, the possibility of an election was very much under 
discussion both inside the Government and in the media. Heath was 
under considerable pressure from certain groups within the 
Conservative Party to call an early election. A specially 
commissioned Opinion Research Centre poll had indicated that the 
Government's best chances would be in an early election. To delay to 
the end of February or longer might mean defeat (Fay and Young, 
1976c). Given the cold response to its NEDC proposal, the TUe 
presumed that it had been rejected. It was therefore much surprised 
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When, the next day, the Prime Minister took up its offer to continue 
discussions. Indeed, the TUe General Secretary was so certain of the 
Government's rejection that he had rejoined his family on . vacation, 
only to be recalled upon arrival (Sundal Times, 13 January 1974). 
The protracted series .of negotiations which ensued finally 
collapsed on 21 January. The Government rejected the TUe formula and 
maintained that there could be no exceptions to the stage Three 
limits (Guardian, 22 January 1974). It tiad insisted on a tighter 
formula· which entailed an explicit TUe recognition of the Stage Three 
limits. Although the TOe could ensure affiliate support for its 
relatively elliptical formula, indeed it held a 5peci~1 confer~c~ of . 
affiliated unions on 16 January to endorse the initiative, it could 
certainly go no further (TUe, 1974a: 9-10). There had been wide 
coverage of declarations by the leaders of the largest unions that 
they would observe the TUe formula (see, 1.e., 'Top Ten Take the. 
Pledge', Daily Mail, 14 January 1974'; "'!he Colour of the TUe's 
Special Offer, Sunday Times, 13 January 1974). However, attention 
also focused on the statements of union leaders such as Hugh Scanlon, 
the president of the Engineering Union, who advised that ~ the 
question of coderating the engineers' pay cla~ did not arise. Their 
claim was in and they would pursue it (Guardian, 11 January 1974). 
The Financial Times leader (11 January 1974) praised the TUC. 
initiative, but remained dubious about the TUC's real authority over 
its affiliates. 'An undertaking not to use a special award to the 
miners as an argument in pressing other pay claims. •• may well be 
acceptable to the majority of the member unions simply because it 
means so little I.. The Government remained adamant that if the miners 
were to receive any special treatment, the rest of the TUe would have 
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to confo~ to Stage Three. According to a report ~n the Guardian 
(11 January 1974), ~It was no secret that Ministers regarded this as 
an impossible demand for union leaders'. 
In fact, the TUC representatives in the discussions with the 
Government went some distance to meet this demand. The Finanoial 
Times (15 January 1914) reported that ~the union leaders emphasized 
that they could see "no other possible exceptional cases on the 
horizon". It was with carefully phrased remarks such as these that 
the TUC tried in vain to impress the basically sceptical Ministers'. 
The attempts by the TUC to secure Government rec.og::.!.tion of' the 
miners as a speCial case did imply a de facto recognition of the 
Stage Three pol~cy. As Keith Harper observed the day after TUC 
affiliates voted overwhelmingly in favour of the formula, 'Although 
union leaders will not admit it openly, the new formula amounts to 
tacit acceptance by the union of the pay policy, something Which 
would have been undreamt of at last year's Trades Union Congress' 
(Guardian, 17 January 1974). Although the talks Ultimately resulted 
in failure, 
significant 
the TUC's position on pay policy had undergone a 
change. If the roc did not promise \olbat it could ~ot 
deliver, strict adherence to Stage Three, it did give 'a wink and a 
nod'. This was a clearer public deolaration of intention than What 
the PLP representatives had been able to secure in the previous two-
years of Liaison Committee discussions. 
Eleotoral Preparations 
The Labour Party had hastened its electoral preparations through 
the autumn of 1973. Its policy committees were concerned to oomplete 
the eventual manifesto, Labour's First Five Years. Meanwhile, the 
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Liaison Co~ttee continued discussions of 'Paying for Labour's 
Programme', a costing document which had been introduced at the 
September meeting. This attempted to balance the cost of Labour's 
programme against methods of financing increased public expenditure. 
At the 1973 Party Conference, the Shadow Chancellor, Denis Healey, 
had warned that a future Labour government could not po~sibly meet. 
the cost of all its programmes in the first years of office. He_ 
proposed that there should be discussions wit.h the unions over the 
coming months on social priorities and, more particularly, 'a 
voluntary policy on incomes' (LPCR, 1973: 129). At the November 
meeting of the Liaison Committee, the PLP representatives stressed 
that. in the first years of a new Labour Government, even if taxation 
for the rich was increased, there would be a massive shortfall in 
revenue, 'and not all of this shortfall. • • could be met as a 
result of economic growth' (LCR,': 26 November 1973). Even if the 
first years of the legislative programme were taken up by such 
costless items as the repeal of the Industrial Relations Aot, there 
would still be increased taxation. The PLP representatives therefore 
wanted to k:loW what kind of impact various forms of taxation increase 
'might have on the climate of wage negotiations under a Laboura 
Government, given Labour's social and economic priorities' (ibid.). 
The TOC representatives reaffirmed their belief in economic growth. 
Moreover, a TUC briefing prepared for the meeting emphasized that 
very substantial amounts would have to be taken from the rich before 
discussing any further increases in the burden of taxation on the 
great mass of wage and salary earners (ibid.). It was agreed that 
the whole issue of taxation and its effect on wage negotiations and 
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the overall economic situation would have to be discussed at future 
meetings. 
In response, however, to the rapidly deteriorating economic 
situation and the plan to implement a three-day working week, the 
Liaison Committee turned its attention to the energy situation. 
There was general agreement on the Committee t.lotat the three-day week 
was an unnecessary ploy on the part of the Government. As rumours,of 
an impending election intensified, the pressure on the Labour Party 
. 
to Iinalize its election document, Labour's First Five Years, 
increased. Waen the Shadow cabinet and the NEe met ·on 12 December to 
discuss the document, their main oonoern was the absence or any 
referenoe to inoomes policy. It was decided that a working group 
would consider the problem before their next joint meeting in January 
(Hatfield, 1978: 226). The Labour Party representatives felt that it 
was imperative to engage the'ruC representatives 1n a serious 
discussion of this subject at a special Liaison Committee meeting on 
4 January 1974. 
The January Uaison Committee meeting marked the last major 
attempt before the February election to secure a more specific 
commitment from the TUC on wage bargaining. As Barbara Castle (1980: 
19), one of the Labour Party representatives, noted, 'The imminence 
10 
of an election concentrates the mind wonderfully'. '!he PLp· 
representatives might also have gained some comfort from their 
relative strength in numbers. Of the ten Labour Party' 
representatives present, nine were MPs. The TUe represented by its 
General Secretary and two members of the General Council who were 
perceived as incomes policy 'moderates'. The most vooiferous 
opponents of incomes policy, Jones and Scanlon, were both absent. 
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The mee~ing considered the progress that had been achieved in 
drafting the Party's campaign document. According to James 
Callaghan, there remained one serious weakness in the document: its 
lack of reference to incomes. ~Without this our posture at the 
election would not be credible' (ibid.). 'Harold Wilson and a number 
of other MPs present all endorsed this point of view. They felt that 
there was a need for a more specific understanding on pay. The 
Shadow Chancellor, Denis Healey, requested 'a statecent from the TUC 
which would go beyond a description of what might happen if the 
collective bargaL~ing climate w~re changed; and co~~-se a statement 
of intention by the TUe that it would respond in a changed collective 
bargaining climate (LCR, 4 January 1974). Healey continued that what 
was needed 'was an indication that, if the Labour 'Government 
fulfilled its'side of the compact, the TUC for its part would try to 
make the economic policy work (Castle, 1980: 18). No doubt aware of 
the.growing tension and relative imbalance in ~~e ceeting, Callagran 
attempted to round off the discussion in a more conciliatory way. 
'We don't want a debate between ourselves on this. All we ask' is 
that when our campaign document is published you will study it and 
see how you can help us on it (ibid.: 19). 
The TUC representatives responded that there 'could be a broad. 
understanding with the Labour Party'. Indeed, there already was 1n~ 
the statement, Economic Policy and the Cost of Living. The TUC, 
however, 'was not going to give an absolute firm pledge on wages 
'(LCR, 4 January 1974). Le~ Murray noted on behalf of the TUC that 
'calls for an incomes policy were often made without specifying the 
reasons for one, and without specifying What interventions in 
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collective bargaining were needed'. Incomes pOlicies had not altered 
relativities, nor improved the balance of payments, nor decrease.d 
unit' wage costs. 'The TUG hoped that the phrase "incomes policy" 
would be forgotten' (ibid.). Murray asked the Labour Party to think 
again for there was not going to be any statement expressing 'some 
kind of commitment by the TUC to some kind of incomes· policy.' He 
noted that the greatest disservice the TUG could do a Labour 
Government was to pretend it could do moore than it. could: the 
disillusion from that would be far more damaging than the refusal to 
make impossible promises in the first place (Castle, 1980: 20). The 
. 
very frankness of the exchange alleviated some of the tension. It 
was abundantly clear that the TUG was willing to enter into a compact 
with the Labour Party but that did not mean that the PLP would enter 
the next election with any TUC commitment to partioipate in an 
incomes policy. Harold Wilson found the measure of the compromise 
when he suggested: '\fuat we need is more the creation of a mood than 
a compaot' (ibid.). 
The Labour Party's oam?aign document drafted by Miohael Foot on 
this issue suggested that a futur.e Labour Government would have to 
demonstrate that the SOcial Contraot was not about restraining wages. 
It was necessary to win the consent of trade unionists: 
Only practioal action by the Government to create a muoh 
fairer distribution of the national wealth can convince the 
worker and his family and his trade union that "an inoomes 
policy" is not some kind of trick to torce him, particularly 
if he works in a public service or nationalized industry, to 
bear the brunt of the national burden. But as it is proved 
that the Government is ready to aot - against high prices, 
rents and other impositions falling most heavily on the low-
paid and on pensioners - so we believe that the trade unions 
voluntarily (which is the only way it can be done for any 
period in a free society), will oooperate to make the whole 
policy successful. We believe that the action we propose on 
prices, together with an understanding with .the TUC on the 
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lines we have already agreed, will oreate the right eoonomio 
o lima te for money inoomes to grow in line with' production. 
That 18 the essenoe of the new sooial contract. whioh the 
Labour Party has discussed at length and agreed with the TUC 
and which must take its place as a central feature of the 
new eoonomic polioy of a Labour Government (oited in IDS 
Report 177, January 1974: 9; see also Labour Party, 197~a~ 
This formula maintained the ambiguity and equivocation whioh had 
characterized the nature of the TUC-Labour Party understanding on the 
role of wage bargaining under a future Labour Government over the 
previous two years. 
After the failure of sucoessive peace initiatives and still 
facing the prospect of a national miners' strike, Eeatn finally ended 
a long period of vacillation and oalled a general election for 28 
February. Labour's strategists were split on the best approaoh for 
the party (on the differences in eleotoral strategy within the Labour 
Party, see Butler and Kavanagh, 1974: 124-126). Many on the left of 
the party held the view that the ,:eleotora te would respond favourably 
if the Social Contract was presented as a radical programme to effect 
fundamental sooial change. Others on the 'right' of the party, 
especially amongst the leadership of the PLP, strongly felt that the 
party should attempt to hold the middle ground and demonstrate that 
Labour could best bring the country back to oonsensual government and 
social peace'. The Social Contraot was a good vehicle to oontain any 
tension between the two pOSitions since, as has been previously· 
argued, there oo-existed quite different conceptions of the nature of 
the project. The differenoe in electoral strategy was in essence a 
difference between socialist and social demooratic conceptions of the 
Social Contract. 
The eleotion campaign was dominated by twin themes: -Who 
governs?' and counter-inflation policy. In each case, the Labour 
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Party referred to its pact with the TUC. Heath attempted to exploit 
the tentative character of the Social COntract by demanding to see 
the piece of paper upon which it was written (castle, 1980: 21). At 
one pOint, Hugh Scanlon caused acute embarrassment to the Labour 
Party Leadership by disclaiming knowledge of any specific contract. 
11 
He later retracted this denial (DT, 20 February 1974). Other 
major trade union leaders, especially Jack Jones, pointed to the 
existence of the Social Contract and urged their members to support 
it and vote for the Labour Party. TIle TUC attez:lpted to bolster the 
impression that there existed a spec:ific unders7':lnding ',between the, 
Labour Party and the TUC; while pursuing its studied ambiguity on the 
question of incomes policy. The TUe General Secretary, Len Murray, 
certainly hinted that unions would have to consider their wage claims 
under such a programme. 
'The Labour programme imposes very heavy obligations on 
trade unions. It would not be a soft option. • • This 
could mean very difficult problems for us. It could mean 
asking the trade union movement) in the context of such an 
agreed programme and an environment in which we felt our 
help was generally being sought and understood, to accept 
responsibilities (Guardian, 14 February 1974). 
More revealing was the TOC's proposed action on the miners' pay 
claim. Len Murray was cited as saying: 'We have bitten 00 the 
, 
bullet (Sunday Times, 17 February 1974). The preCise meaning was to 
be revealed in the first months of the new Labour Government. 
CONCLUSION, 
This chapter has attempted to trace the formulation of the 
Social Contract in the 1972 to 1974 period.' It first outlined the 
creation of a Labour Party programme in 1972-1973 based specifically 
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on the notion of a Social Contract with British trade unions and 
negotiated in several phases within the TUC-Labour Liaison Party 
Committee. The main union priority during these discussions was a 
commitment from the Party leadership to repeal the Industrial 
Relations Act and replace it with a legislative programme largely 
drafted by the TUC. The escalation of the TUC campaign against the 
Act confirmed the priority nature of these disaussions. The PLP 
representatives were particularly preoccupied with obtaining somo 
kind of specific TUC.commitment on the role that its affiliates might 
play in any counter-inflation policy. A specific c~itcent was not 
forthcoming and the phase of the Liaison Committee discussions when 
economic policy was to be discussed in detail never transpired. In 
the meantime, the internal policy apparatus o~ the Labour Party was 
also preoccupied with the formulation of the Social Contract, 
particularly in the area of industrial policy. Onion representatives 
. . 
did not appear to be deeply involved in this part of the policy 
process. In the interest of party unity, they supported the party 
leadership When it rebuffed what it considered to be the more 
electorally unpalatable aspects of the socialist conception of the 
Social Contract. 
The imposition of a statutory pay policy by Heath as well as a 
continuing invitation to engage in discussions on economic policy_ 
meant that all of the sample unions in the study were in some way 
involved in policy debates on collective bargaining, the economy and 
pay policy during this period. The second part of tho chapter 
considered some of the variations within tho sample unions. In 
particular, it was argued that different economic and political 
rationalities can shape attitudes to incomes policy and trade union 
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polieica1 practice. It was also suggested that the-degree of policy 
discretion available to individual union leaders in the TUC polioy 
process must be understood in the context o~ particular 
organizational and political constraints. Thus, the balanoe of 
opinion on collective bargaining and incomes polioy within - the TUC 
was necessarily a complex amalgam of different rationa.lities and 
subject to particular policy variations and organizational 
oonstraints within the affiliates. The external. dynamios of incomes 
policy, at the level of TUC policy-making and TUC relations with the 
government, were subject to t..~e il''lternal dyna!llic.s c'f incomes polioy, 
in terms of political processes within the sample unions. This 
suggests that in order to understand the later evolution of the 
SOcial Contract a sensitive appreciation of variations within the 
sample unions is req~ired. This is, of course, the rationale of the 
researoh design in this study (see Chapter 1). 
Finally, the third part of the chapter traced the transformation 
of the Social Contract from programme to power. This was primarily 
the result of a remarkable turn in the political and economiC 
fortunes of the country in late 1973 and ea"rly 1974. As an election 
became :immjnent, the PLP representatives oontinued to press the TOe 
within the Liaison Committee for a specific oommitment on pay. Once 
again, the TUe remained unwilling to specify its role in any Social 
Contract counter-inflationary policy. The economio and politioal 
orisis, however, pushed the TUC to offer to exert a greater influence 
over the wage claims of its affiliates in return for a solution to 
the miners' dispute. This overture was rejected by the Government, 
but it thus became olear that the TUC was willing, albeit 
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reluetantly, to go further than it had hitherto specified in its 
Liaison Committee discussions. 
The election of a minority Labour Government committed to the 
implementation of the Social Contract raised several immediate 
questions. How far might the TUC be willing to develop an active 
role in a Labour Government counter-inflation policy? To What degree 
would such' a policy be politically feasible within the ~C? What 
tensions might this create within its affiliates, particularly the 
sample ~nions in this study? What role did the Social Contract play 
within the sample unions? lhese questions ~l be central to 
subsequent chapters for the TUC did' become enoeshed in a voluntary 
incomes policy over the next several years and eventually withdrew 
its support for the policies because of growing internal opposition. 
Chapter 4 explores some of the variations in the sample union 
approaches to incomes policy and attempts to place them in their 
specific organizational and political settings~ Chapter 5 charts the 
development of the Social Contract during the first sixteen months of 
the new Labour Government, particularly the, 'Mark It voluntary pay 
policy, and considers its impact on the internal dynamiCS of the 
sample unions. 
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CHAPTER 4 
PAY AND POLITICS: INDIVIDUAL UNION APPROACHES TO INCOMES POLICY 
The previous two chapters traced the origins and formulation of 
the Social Contract between the TUC and the Labour Party. This 
chapter focuses on the policy and practice of the sample unions 
towards incomes policy and government intervention in collective 
bargaining during the post-war period. An understanding of ,union 
behaviour during the entire period under investigation must take 
account of the past and, to a degree, attempt some general 
explanation of a particular union's previous profile on the central 
questions of incomes policy. Towards this aim, the section on 
collective bargaining policy in Chapter 3 explored some of tho 
'differences both between and within TUC affiliates on approaches to 
inflation, the role of collective bargaining in any counter-inflation 
policy, the appropriate role, if any, for ,the TUC in the colleotive 
bargaining policy of its affiliates and conceptions of trade union 
political practice vis-a-vis the state. It was suggested that these 
kinds of understanding would inform a union's relative disposition 
towards incomes policies. It was fUrther argued that the dynamics of 
a union's collective bargaining policy including its approach 'to 
incomes policy must 
political constraints. 
be linked to its specific organizationa1 and 
Chapter 3 noted the unanimous opposition of 
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the sample unions to the Heath Governmentts wages policies in 1972-
1973. However, it was also suggested that there were in fact 
considerable differences in their respective approaches to incomes 
policy. Before examining the development and impact of the Social 
Contract incomes policies in subsequent chapters, this chapter 
investigates the different approaches of the sample unions towards 
incomes policy and government intervention in collective bargaining, 
especially When initiated by Labour governments, . in the context of 
their specific organizational settings. 
To pursue ,this line of inquiry, the chapter is organized in the 
following manner. A first section gives a brief historical overview 
of the stance of British trade unions on incomes policy, particularly 
those implemented by Labour governments with varying degrees of TUC 
support. The second section identifies patterns of opposition and 
support for such policies among the sample unions. These patterns 
are based on the position taken by the individual union 1n TUC 
debates on the subject. The third section investigates further the 
policies of the individual sample unions. In particular, it attempts 
to identify some of the links within the individual sample unions 
between their organizational structure and membership composition, 
their collective bargaining policies and industrial practice, their 
political practices, both internal and external, and their approach 
to incomes policy. This section examines eaco of the sample unions 
in detail. Finally, the conclusion identifies some of the key 
factors affecting union approaches to incomes policy. This chapter 
should thus provide the basis for further analysis of the sample 
unions during the Social Contract period in Chapters 5, 7 and 8. 
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AN HIstoRICAL OVERVIEW 
To locate historically trade union approaches to incomes policy, 
in Britain, it is necessary to return to the immediate post~orld War 
Two period. It was the Attlee Labour Government,confronted with 
serious economic problems in 1947-1948, that first asked trade union 
leaders voluntarily to link their wage bargaining demands to overall 
economio performance and, therefore, seek only money wage increases 
if justified by concomitant increases in production. Government 
intervention in collective bargaining machinery was, of course, not a 
new phenomenon. Long before the advent of inoomes polioies, 
individual trade unions were required to take a variety of positions 
as regards the role of the state in industrial relations, 
particularly in terms of their willingness to oontemplate the role of ' 
third parties in wage bargaining and industrial disputes. Unions, 
like employers, varied considerably in their readiness to aocept 
arbitration, for instance, as a method of determining wage rates (for, 
examples from a variety of trades, see Clegg et al., 1964: 14, 155, 
265, 436 and 485). This was no doubt largely derivative of 
industrial circumstances and is a salutory reminder of the complexity 
and diversity of union wage policies. Indeed, the Webbs (1911: 593), 
ever optimistic in their quest for a rational method for the 
deter~ination of wages lamented that 'the better~paid seotions of the 
wage earners ••• would naturally objeotto any departure from the 
Dootrine of Supply and Demand'. 
The Government first sought active cooperation from trade union 
leaders in the modification of the operation of colleotive bargaining 
machinery in the First World War in order to put the economy on a war 
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footing. Its primary concern was to increase production in the 
engineering industry. Apart from one unsuccessful attempt to freeze 
wages (see Ross Martin, 1980: 134), the Government attempted to 
secure a continuity of production through the maintenance of 
industrial peace, quite often at the cost of wage concessions. 
Compulsory arbitration was the main vehicle for the accomplishment of 
this task (Allen, 1960: 131; Jeffreys, 1945: 177). While national 
officials were willing to lend their consent to this and other 
concessions, this frequently provoked considerable opposition within 
their own unions. The most notable example was the revolt of the 
shop steward movement on the Clyde (see Hinton, 1973; Jeffreys, 1945; 
and Allen, 1960). Apart from the exceptional circumstances of war-
time, wage rates demonstrated a considerable elasticity, particularly 
downwards as influenced by the trade cycle and levels of 
unemployment. In many industries, such as engineering, ,wages were 
directly related to level of output through payment-by-results 
systems suoh as piecework. 'Equally, wage negotiations were 
frequently local rather than national in scope; though the First 
World War did seem to exert an influence in the direction of more 
national-level negotiations (Jeffreys, 1945: 189; Ross Martin, 1980: 
1~6). Certainly, there was no modern notion of an annual wage round. 
Where the government was employer and sought to reduce levels of 
expenditure, it attempted periodically to influence the level of 
arbitration awards for its own employees or, alternatively, cancel 
altogether its commitment to arbitration as a method of wage 
determination (on variations in government wages policy for its own 
employees, see Allen, 1960: 80-83). On the whole, it seems that 
demands for wage increases and decreases were related primarily to 
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the current economic circumstances of a particular employer' or 
industry, not to the abstract notion of national eoonomic 
performance. 
The Second World War' saw the resurrection of compulsory 
arbitration to ensure relative industrial peace in a period of 
national emergency. However, because of the insistence of the TUe 
and its chief spokesperson in the war cabinet, Ernest Bevin, the 
Minister of Labour, wage-setting machinery remained primarily 
voluntary in charaoter (see Bullock, 1967: 22, 86-90; B.C. Roberts, 
1958: 26-39). At the end of the Second World War, the Tue firmly' 
reasserted its commitment to voluntarism and free collective 
bargaining. Although the General Council would continue to accept 
recourse to compulsory arbitration in order to ensure continuity of 
production in perilous economic times (see Allen, 1960: 268), it 
would 'neither seek nor agree to the imposition of l,egal restraints 
upon the right of Trade Unions to formulate their wage policies and 
to pursue activities in support of those polioies' (cited in Barou, 
1947: 227). Indeed, while some union leaderships were well disposed 
to either the intervention of third parties in or the coordination of 
their wage bargaining (on the case of NUPE, e.g., see Cra~.k. 1955), 
TUC affiliates were virtually unanimous in their opposition to the 
idea of wage restraint. For instance, the two uni~ns whioh proved 
the most ardent supporters of the government's wage restraint 
policies in the 1948-1950 period, the GMWU and the TGWU, were both 
opposed to government interference in voluntary collective bargaining 
machinery (see Clegg, 1954: 261; and Allen, 1957: 120-123). 
The year 1948 marked the 'beginning of a new phase in trade 
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union behaviour in relation to the state', (Allen, 1960: 286). In the 
face of deteriorating economic circumstances, the Labour Government 
led by Clement Attlee increasingly had appealed to TUC affiliates to 
exercise moderation in the pursuit of wage increases. Thus, trade 
union wage policy and wage restraint, in particular, beoame 
assqciated with the question of nationa 1 eco,nomic performanoe. In 
response to the Government's appeals, the ruc leadership insisted on 
the right of TUC members to pursue their own wage claims. From 19~8 
to 1950, however, TUC leaders agreed to support the Government's 
policy of wage restraint. They did so despite the mounting 
opposition to the policy within their own unions and the position of 
the Gener~l Council in support of a proposed wage freeze was 
ultimately defeated at the 1950 Congress (TUCR, 1950; on this period, 
see Panitch, 1916; Allen, 1960; and B.C. Roberts, 1958). 
It can be argued that the TUC supported this first example of 
I 
voluntary incomes policies because of 'the loyalty these leaders felt 
for the Labour Government and its ideological position' (Panitch, 
1916: 30). This interpretation is reinforced by the'TUe's subsequent 
refusal to lend its support to any of the successive attempts by 
Conservative governments between 1951 and 1964 to restrain wage 
increases. Such refusal contrasts markedly with its willingness to 
support Labour government po licies first for vo luntary wage 
moderation in 1964 and 1965 and then a very tight policy of restraint 
from July 1966. Once again, as in the period from 1948 to 1950, this 
support gradually eroded in the face of mounting pressures within 
individual unions. By 1969, the General Council was unable to muster 
Congress support even for a much diluted policy. It was then that 
the Government attempted to legislate its controversial In Place of 
- -
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Strife proposals which, as indicated in Chapter 2, did much to 
aiienate further many trade union activists from its cause. 
The 1948-1950 and 1964-1969 periods provide fascinating insights 
into the patterns of individual union support and opposition as 
regards incomes policies sponsored by Labour governments. The next 
section will examine the patterns of support and opposition. during 
these periods within the sample unions. 
PATTERNS OF SUPPORT AND OPPOSITION 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2 attempt,to gauge the degree of sample union 
support for Labour government incomes policies as measured by their 
formal support for or opposition to TUC General Council Congress and 
SpeCial Conference recommendations in support of voluntary and/or 
Labour government incomes policy initiatives in the periods 1948-1950 
and 1964-1969. While it is possible that these tables in fact 
measure the propensity of the sample unions to support or oppose 
General Council recommendations at Congress and SpeCial Conferences, 
rather than sample union support for or opposition to incomes 
polioies, it is clear in the substantive oontributions by sample 
, , 
unions to these debates that attitudes to inoomes policy were central 
to decisions to support or oppose. It must also be emphasized that 
Tables ,4.1 and 4.2 reoord only the· formal union position at the time 
of the vote. They are not, therefore, a barometer of debates and the 
relative balance of opinion within the sample Unions over incomes 
policy and union collective bargaining policy. The next seotion 
attempts to convey some flavour of the debates within the sample 
unions. It is first necessary to look at their historical profiles 
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on this question. 
Table 4.2 reveals quite distinot sample union prof tIes as 
regards TUe support of inoomes policies. At one end of the spectrum, 
the GMWU confirms its reputation as a 'loyalist' union within the 
TUe, as regards Labour governments and in support of the latter's 
incomes policies. On the fifteen oocasions when it had the 
opportunity to support incomes policy initiatives, it did so without 
exception. In contrast, the Assooiation of Supervisory Staffs, 
Executives and Technioians (ASSET) Which merged in 1968 with the 
Association of Scientific Workers (AScW) to form ASTMS supported 
incomes policies on only two of the twelve occasions when accurate 
observations could be ascertained. The FBU also struck an 
oppositional stanoe opposing incomes policy resolutions on five out 
of the seven observations. NUPE tended to support the pay policy 
resolutions slightly more often than not, on five out of eight 
observations. The TGWU and AUEW were roughly divided in terms of 
opposition and support. The AUEW supported on eight of fourteen 
observations and the TGWU on eight of fifteen. However, when the 
. 1948-1950 and 1964-1969 periods are separated, a more differentiated 
pattern emerges. The TGWU was completely loyalist in the earlier 
period, supporting on all five observations. It was rather more 
oppositional in the later period, opposing on seven out of ten 
observations. Similarly, the AUEW was more oppositional in the 1948-
1950 period,' opposing on three out of four observations. It then 
consistently supported the poliCies from ·1964 to 1967, at least 
offioially, when Lord carron was President. From 1968, when Hugh 
Scanlon assumed the presidency, it consistently opposed the policies. 
These more differentiated patterns of opposition point to the need 
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TABLE 4.1 
SAMPLE UNION SUPPORT FOR LAOOUR GOVERNMENT INCOOES POLICIES· 
Patterns of Union Support for and OppOSition to TUC General Council 
Recommendations in Support of Voluntary and/or Government Incomes 
Policy Initiatives, 1948-1950 and 1964-1969. 
ASSET AUEW FBU GMWU NUPE TGWU RESULT 
(ASTMS) 
19118 Special 0 0 S S S S 
1948 congress 0 0 0 S S S 
1949 Congress S S 0 S S 
1950 Special S 0 S S S 
1950 Congress S S o· 
1964 Congress S S S S S S S 
1965 Special 0 S S S ·0 S 
1965 Congress 0 S 0 S 0 S 
Royal Commission 0 S S 0 
1966 Congress 0 S 0 S 0 0 S 
1967 Special 0 S S S S S 
.1967 Congress 0 S 0 S 0 0 o· 
1968 Special 0 0 S S 0 S 
1969 Special 0 0 S S S S 
1969 Congress 0 0 S 0 0* 
- : Position not indicated in TUe records or secondary sources 
S : Support o : Opposition * : Platform Defeat 
Congress: annual 
Special: Conferences of Executive Committees of Affiliated 
Organizations. 
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I , 
~ 
'" VI 
WION 
ASSET 
AUEY 
FBU 
GMWO 
NtJPE 
lGW 
Total Possible 
~, 
',--: -',"', 
TABLE 4.2 . DmIVIDUAL UNION PROFILES ON INCOMEs POLICY:: 
. calculated from Table 4.1 
1948-1950 1964-1969 TOTALS 
. . 
Support Opposition Support Opposition SUllPort opposition 
1 1 1 9 2 10 
1 3 7 3 8 6 
o 2 2 . 3 2 . 5 
5 o 10 o 15 a 
1 1 4 2 5 3 
·5 o 3 7 8 7 
s ·10 15 
, ',.., 
~' ,'" ~ 
, .,'> 
Number of 
Observations 
12 
14 
.7 
. 15 
; I:.·' 
I 
8 
15 
Degree of 
Support 
16.6% 
57.1% 
~a."% 
100.% 
62.5% 
. 53.3% 
BOTES AHD SOURCES FOR TABLES 4.1 AND 4.2 
The data in these tables is derived primarily from TUCR, 1948-
1950 and 1964-1969; TUC, 1948, 1950, 1965, 1967, 1968, and 1969; 
and trade union memoranda to the Donovan Commission (see ABU, 1966; 
ASSET, 1967; GMWU, 1961; and TGWU, 1966). Indications of the 
individual union positions are also taken from Allen (1957), Clegg 
(1964), Craik (1955), Fisher and Dix (1974), Goodman (1979), Minkin 
(1978a), Muller (1973), Panitch (1976), and Richter (1973). 
Individual union positions are judged in relation to What is 
identified as the key incomes policy debate either' at the TUC 
Congress or at special conferences of executives of affiliated 
organizations convened to discuss a General Council report on inoomes 
policy. The approach of the TUC General Council, of course, has 
varied' considerably in relation to external circumstanoes, the 
balance of opinion within the TUC and the phrasing of particular 
items on the agenda. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 only report individual union 
positions in relation to the recommendations of the TUC General 
Council in these debates. They are not fully indicative of the 
substance or complexities of individual union policy approaches. 
However, they do provide some indication of variations in the 
approaohes of the sample unions and the relative propensity of a 
sample union to support a General Council initiative favourable to 
inoomes policy. 
The TUC General Counoil has most often recommended that 
affiliates support some kind of trade union role in an incomes policy 
agreed with a Labour government, but the meaning of those 
recommendations has frequently varied. At the 1965 special 
conference (TUC, 1965), for example, support was for a voluntary 
policy; whereas at the 1965 Congress support was for the Government's 
statutory wage and price freeze (TUCR, 1965). The 1967 special 
conference recommendation was in fact critical of the Government's 
policy, but favourable to the development of an alternative voluntary 
trade union policy (TUC, 1967). Similarly, the 1969 Congress opposed 
the General Council's recommendation that the National Board for 
Prices and Incomes should be retained (TUCR, 1969). By that time, 
however, TUC affiliates and the General Council were virtually 
unanimous in their opposition to Government attempts to revive even a 
',modified version of its statutory polioy (Panitch, 1976:' 206). 
Where there is no indication of a union's pOSition, this is 
because it could not be asoertained reliably from either the TUC 
report of proceedings or secondary sources. Since the Donovan 
Commission asked unions to state their polioy views on the value of 
inoomes polioies under full employment, their support or opposition 
has also been reoorded. Two of the unions in this study, the FBU and 
NUPE, did not submit memoranda to the Royal Commission. 
Table 4.1 indioates the unions' position on fifteen different 
ocoasions during the operation of some kind of a policy on incomes by 
a Labour government. Table 4.2 summari~s the data presented in 
Table 4.1. It totals the overall extent of support and of opposition 
in the two different polioy periods and oalculates the relative 
propensity to support General Council reoommendations on this issue. 
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COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AND INCOMES POLICY 
This section investigates the historical profile of each of the 
sample unions on incomes policy. In particular, it attempts to 
explore the links between industrial practice, internal and external 
political practices, and approaches to incomes policy. The section 
first i considers the case of ASTMS, a union which has consistently 
opposed government intervention in pay bargaining. It then looks at 
the GMWU which has consistently supported Labour government inoomes 
policies. The other' sample unions all present mixed profiles and 
will be examined in turn. The TGWU and AUEW have experienced 
particular variations in their approach to pay policy and the role 
that they played on this issue within the TUC. The FBU and NUPE 
share similar industrial settings and policy orientations. 
ASTMS 
During the 1960s, the two constituent unions that would later 
merge to create ASTMS, ASSET and the AScW, were amongst the most 
,outspoken opponents of incomes policy. This was olosely connected to 
the unions' bargaining policies which, in turn, oan be linked to the 
composition of their membership, their bargaining struoture and 
growth strategies. Both were white-oollar unions with a significant 
proportion of their membership concentrated in manufacturing. The 
ASoW represented techniqians in both the public and private sectors 
as well as a considerable number of qualified scientists and 
engineers. ASSET's membership was evenly divided between foremen and 
techniCians other than draughtsmen and laboratory assistants (see 
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Bain, 197G: 30-31). Both unions had conducted long struggles to gain 
recognition for their claim to represent white-collar staff. In the 
engineering industry, for instance, each had been forced to obtain 
grade-by-grade recognition. The difficulty in securing recognition 
and the often fragmented basis on which it was achieved fundamentally 
influenced the unions' approach to bargaining structure, bargaining 
policy and, ultimately, incomes policies (Interviews, 28 July and 21 
August 1980). 
First, they were obliged to fight for every increase in 
membership. Improvements in membership benefits could often be 
secured only through the achievement of majority rep~esentation. 
Thus, the unions were obliged to engage in aggressive recruitment 
tactics. ASSET expanded particularly rapidly, leading all other 
white-collar unions in growth in the 1948-1964 period (Bain, 197Q: 
. 34). Its 
recruitment 
flair for publicity and reputation for successful 
became the hallmark of both the union and its general 
secretary, Clive Jenkins. It was particularly important where a 
union was engaged in first generation bargaining to achieve the 
maximum possible improvements in wages and benefits. Otherwise, 
there was no significant 'demonstration effect' to encourage further 
recruitment. Wage norms were quite simply an impediment. to the 
union's ability to achieve such an effect. As ASSET ·(1967: . 2257) 
submitted in its evidence to the Donovan CommiSSion, 'it is not an 
easy thing to secure an advanoe in wages and salaries: trade unions 
can only win such increases in the usual way 1n the face of stiff 
employer-resistance. Salary movements are much stiCkier than price 
increases. We are opposed to laws which will make such movements 
even stickier.' 
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Secondly, expansion on a grade-by-grade basis meant that, even 
before representation rights were' achieved, the union must be 
committed to the zealous defence of differentials for that p~ticular 
grade. The defence of differentials and incomes polioies were 
scarcely compatible, especially in industries where incomes policies 
tightly controlled the wage and salary rate increases of white-collar 
staff while not limiting the increases of those that this staff 
supervised because their earnings were determined by paynent-by-
results systems. Wootton (1955: 136) notes that ASSET members, 
primarily foremen and chargehands, were 'particularly likely to be 
overtaken by those working below them'. ASSET's 'National Charter' 
maintained that supervisors should be paid a basic rate sixtr-six and 
two-thirds above that of those supervised (ibid.). 'This narrow 
defence of differentials was extended into a broader case fOr skill 
and training on behalf of ASTMS's white-collar membership. It was 
argued that the British economy 'had suffered because of the poor 
rewards it had prov ided to many who have sCientific and technical 
skill' and incomes policy would not resolve this problem (Jenkins and 
Mortimer, 1968: 168). 
Finally, the differential development of bargaining rights, 
fragmented bargaining structure and scattered membership which 
characterized ASSET, in particular, necessitated a strong union 
commitment to bargaining autonomy. Moreover, such a philosophy 
proved attractiv,e to newly unionized, white-collar groups and staff 
associations that were often reluctant to surrender their autonomy. 
Thus, the aggressive pursuit of expansion, the need to demonstrate 
the tangible benefits provided by unionism to achieve this expansion, 
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the zealous defence of differentia ls' and a philosophy of maximum 
bargaining autonomy in a decentralized structure did not dispose 
either the AScW or ASSET towards the support of incomes policy. 
This opposition to incomes policy was readily apparent in the 
1964-1969 period. In common with virtually all TUC affiliates in the 
pre-electoral 1964 Congress, both the ASoWand ASSET supported an 
omnibus motion on economic policy, planning and wages which, as 
Geoffrey Goodman (1979: 389) described it, "embraced the aooeptance 
of incomes policy but was hedged around with so many qualifications 
that it was hard for any union, however sceptical, to objeot to it'. 
Thereafter, neither union supported any of the new Labour 
Government's initiatives on pay policy, either voluntary or 
statutory. Indeed, they were part of the group of five white-collar, 
technical unions that actively opposed the TUC's espousal of a 
voluntary pay policy and subsequent acceptanoe of the addition of 
statutory powers. Their response to the Joint Declaration of Intent 
was A Declaration of Dissent, a document which was severely critical 
of the Government's overall economic policies, particularly its 
policy on wage restraint (ACTT et al, 1965). ASSET went further 
again in opposing the 1966 wage freeze when it launched a sucoesstul, 
judicial challenge to the right of employers to defer wage agreements 
when they involved a breach of individual contraot. !his forced the 
Government to implement new provisions in order to plug the potential 
gap in its policy (Panitoh, 1976: 121-122). 
Such contestation did little to endear either the AScW or ASSET 
to the majority of TUC affiliates that had voted, albeit 
reluctantly, to abide by the Labour Government's pay policy. Any 
hostility was exacerbated by the proclivity of the ASSET general 
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secretary, Clive Jenkins, to vaunt his union's sucoess at avoiding 
the restraining effects of the policy (Interview, 21 August 1980). 
One local ASTMS official described the image of ASTMS on incomes 
po licy as one of 0 lever officers and c lever members avoiding the 
policy. ASTMS gained a reputation for produoing documents 'with 
copious notes on what to do and what to go for in order to get around 
the policy' (Interview, 15 July 1960). This matched the image of the 
union as projected by Jenkins, what Robert Taylor (1978: 373) has 
described as 'too clever by half'. Without -exception, the ASTMS 
officials interviewed in this study emphasized that the publicity 
generated in ASS~Tts vooal opposition to pay policy in the 1960s was 
very useful for recruitment. Indeed, a number of senior officials 
cited it as the main motive in the union's vocal opposition during -
this period (Interviews, 16 July, 11 and 21 August 1980). If growth 
was an indication of success, then the union's policy approach was 
very successful. It can be argued that ASSET was at liberty to play 
such a role-because of its relatively small size, its exclusion from 
the inner counoils of the TUe leadership, its tiny affiliation to the 
Labour Party and the relative distance of its membership from both 
TUe and Labour Party polioy-making. Indeed, ASTMS offioials 
frequently point to the apparent oontradiction of what they perceive 
as the relatively conservative nature of the union's membership and 
the union's reputation as a 'left-wing' union (Interviews, 7 June and 
16 July 1980). 
ASTMS political practice was certainly identified as 'left-
Wing'. It played an oppositional role within both the Tue and the 
Labour Party through the 1960s and into the 1970s. It was, moreover, 
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exceptionally active, at least rhetorically, in both these forums .. 
Such a strategy was no doubt derivative of the union's pursuit of a 
high public profile in order to advance recruitment. The ASSET 
general secretary, Clive Jenkins, was also adept at cultivating this 
reputation and did not appear to have any aversion to publicity. It 
can also be argued that the ASSET leadership sought to advance 
membership interests in both political and judiCial forums where a. 
weak industrial base otherwise' impeded effective gains. Indeed, it' 
has been suggested that industrial action might 'frighten away actual 
and potential members' making lobbying the preferred mode of action 
for the union (see, i.e., Carter,' 1983: 276). Certainly, in relation 
to many larger unions, ASSET was exceptionally active in the 
Parliamentary Labour Party through the use of its parliamentary 
panel. It also sought to dispense its limited financial resources 
for maximum political gain (see Richter, 1973: 180-189). Suoh 
political instrumentality did not, however, entail any unquestioning 
loyalty to either Labour government policies or the TUC leaders who, 
sometimes reluctantly, supported them. 
Apart from their very public defence of differentials, the 
central thrust of the substantive arguments advanced by the AScW and 
ASSET in their opposition to the 1960s incomes policies revolved 
around a oritique of the government's economic policY and the TUC 
General Council's support for it. Both Unions had previously 
espoused the values of planning and modernism. Indeed, ASSET 
supported the General Counoil position on pay policy at the 1950 
SpeCial TUC Conference because of the need to achieve a long-term 
policy for a stabilized wage system (TUC,1950: 26) and, the following 
year, moved an unsuccessful motion in favour of' a TUC inquiry into 
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the possibility of a 'planned wages policy' (TUCR, 1951: 526-527). 
Similarly, the AScW supported the omnibus economic policy motion at 
the 1964 TUC (450-451) because of its enthusiasm for planning. From 
1965, however, both unions were very critical of the Government's 
economic planning effort, particularly its emphasis on wages policy. 
Jenkins argued that it was not possible 'to plan wage and salaries 
adequately and justifiably. • • unless we deal with the whole 
problem of the distribution of wealth in this country' (TUC, 1965: 
48). Thereafter, Jenkins persistently attacked what he labelled a 
'pathetically threadbare and dangerously wrong economic analysis' on 
the part of both the TUC and the Government (TUCR, 1965: 482; see 
also TUCR, 1966: 470; TUC, 1967: 27-29; TUCR, 1967: ASSET motion and 
amendments; TUC, 1968: 121-122; TaCR, 1968: 562-563; and TUe, 1969: 
89-90). He suggested that British wage costs did not undermine 
competitiveness. Rather, wages were too low. The union therefore 
favoured increased production, not restraint. 
Within a planned economy, with industrial expansion, 
full employment, steadily advancing living standards and the 
redistribution of income and wealth in favour of those who 
work and against those who live primarily by ownership, an 
incomes policy would make sense. It does not make sense 
when its purpose is to accommodate excessive Government 
overseas spending, primarily for military purposes, and 
when it forms part of a wider policy of economic stop-go 
and the maintenance of the gross inequality which at 
present disfigures British society (Jenkins and Mortimer, 
1968: 179). 
Such a position a~lied ASTMS with much of the criticism emanating 
from the left of the Labour Party at this time. Some of the Labour 
MPs most closely associated with the union, . such as Ian Mikardo and 
Russell Kerr, figured prominently in the Tribune group's 
parliamentary opposition to the Government's economio policies (see, 
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i.e., Kerr, 1966). 
Such an oppositional profile was certainly predominant in ASTMS 
political practice. Unlike some of the other sample unions, there is 
little evidence of internal opposition to the union's political 
practioe. This is possibly because of the coincidence of interests 
between the union's industrial practice and the economic and 
political analYSis which purportedly sustained it. Thus, it was 
possible to advocate economic planning, as opposed to the inequities 
of market distribution. However, the union oould simultaneously seek 
to defend and advance the partioular position of white-collar 
teohnioians and supervisors in the labour market and vehemently 
oppose any government policy which might entail the erosion of the 
differentials which were enjoyed by those particular occupational 
categories and which were, after all, supposedly determined by the 
free-market allocation of reward. Equally, as in many other unions, 
there was often a marked distance between union policy positions and 
industrial praotice. Aocording to a number of observers within 
ASTMS, the General Secretary was literally free to pursue the 
polioies that he ohose and was generally assured of both exeoutive 
and conference support (Interviews, 15 and 16 July, 11 August, 5 
September, and 15 December, 1980). When he oould not oommand 
oonviotion for his approach, he oou1d usually persuade. This 
explains neither why nor how both ASSET and the ASoW oame to be 
associated with suoh an oppositional disoourse. This requires a more 
detailed historioal analysis of the industrial location and formative 
inf1uenoes of both the AScW and ASSET. Such an analysis re'mains 
outside the scope of this study (for an historical overview, see B.C. 
Roberts et aI, 1972: 87-106; and Bain, 1970). It must suffice to 
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indicate that from the 1940s into the 1970s, at least, the leadership 
of each of the constituent unions has been associated with a 
particular political discourse which continued to command activist 
support within ASTMS. 
As was noted in Chapter 3, ASTMS opposition to pay pOlicies 
continued into the 1970s. The union opposed the concept.of wages 
I 
policies in a free-market economy. Jenkins described the Heath 
Government pay policies as 'robbery by statute' (ASTMSJ, 1973, no. 
1). In contrast with the reluctant acqUiescence of many other unions 
in the imposition of the Government's policies, ASTMS went to 
considerable lengths to indicate publicly its opposition to the 
policies. For instance, Jenkins issued a circular to all negotiating 
officers emphasizing that the union's policy was 'to ignore 
Government legislation on pay and conditions' (ASTMSIM, 8 November 
1973). Whether rhetoric or reality, . such an approach was but a 
continuation of the bargaining policies developed by both ASSET and 
the AScW through the 1940s and 1950s and, inasmuch as incomes policy 
is concerned, perfected in the 1960s. ASTMS continued to expand 
rapidly; its approach to pay policy appeared to be an important 
ingredient in its success; and there was no significant group within 
the union which advocated the support of incomes policies under 
either Labour or Conservative governments. 
GMWU 
-
In contrast with ASTMS, the GMWU was altogether more supportive 
of incomes policies. Tables 4.1 and 4.2 confirm its reputation as a 
'loyalist' union. Indeed, in every available observation on TUe 
polioy-making with regar~ to wages polioies from 1948 to 1951 and 
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1964 to 1969, the GMWU supported the position advocated by the TOC 
General Council. Even though it opposed the specific implementation 
of the Heath Government pay policies in the early 1970s, as was 
indicated in Chapter 3, it continued to stress the merits of TUC 
involvement in wage bargaining and expressed a desire to see the 
'right' kind of pay policy. The GMWU's industrial and political 
practice in the post-war years has been well documented (see Clegg, 
1964 and 1954; Minkin, 1980: 98-101; and Panitch,' 1976). Throughout 
this period, the notion of industrial and political cooperation has 
echoed through the discourse and practice of the union. Cooperation 
has been an industrial statement and a political philosophy. Support 
of incomes policies fully reflected this ethos. To understand better 
this approach, it is necessary to review briefly the union's 
industrial composition, collective bargaining policy and political 
practice. 
The membership of the GMWU was, and continues to be, widely 
dispersed acrosss a range of industries in both public and private 
sectors. The union organizes in a number of lower-skilled grades for 
. which there is open competition among several general unions. Like 
the other 'new' unions, the founding organizational principles lay in 
an ethos of general labour, what one GMWU general secretary, Tom 
Williamson, once described as 'a solidarity of labour lying deeper 
than the consciousness of craft' (GMWU, 1949: i). The modern union 
was formed in 1924 from the amalgamation of three general unions, the 
National Union of General Workers, the National Amalgamated Union of 
Labour and the Municipal Employees' Association. By the mid-1960s, 
its membership was dispersed in a range of industries: 28.8% in 
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engineering; 22.5% in public administration, especially local 
authorities; 13.2% in gas, water and electricity; 'and the 
remainder spread across numerous other industries, partieularly 
building materials, chemicals, food, drink and tobacco (GMWU, 1967:· 
1795). Many of its members in both the public and private sectors 
were comparatively low-paid, especially the significant proportion of 
women. 
The GMWU's collective bargaining policy reflected the 
composition and nature of its membership. The union has a tradition 
of support for arbitration which continued through into the post-war 
period. Arbitration, of course, offered many advantages for a union 
which was 'spread over many industries, some of them only weakly 
organized' and which operated in competition with unions possessing 
greater industrial muscle (Clegg, 1954: 260-261). However, the union 
did not formally support the concept of a wages policy until the 
Labour Government initiated one in 1948. The change came with the 
new GMWU general secretary, Tom Williamson, who in response to the 
Labour Government's request for wage moderation suggested that the 
'old pull-devil-pull-baker method of deciding wage claims is 
inconsistent with a policy of full employment t and that unions, 
therefore, should voluntarily develop a oommon policy (GMWUJ cited in 
Clegg, 1964: 263). This did not mean the abandonment of a system of 
voluntary collective bargaining to whioh GMWU leaders continued to 
attach a oonsiderable value. Rather, Williamson envisaged the 
creation of machinery whioh could review voluntary collective 
agreements arrived at 'by direct negotiations and advise how such an 
agreement can be given effect to, having regard to all the relevant 
circumstances of the industrial and national situation' (ibid.). 
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Thus, from an early period, the GMWU leadership was willing to 
envisage both the, coordination of collective bargaining and its 
specific association with the question of national economic 
performance. Significantly', the GMWU support for some kind of 
coordinated bargaining policy endured beyond the immediate exigencies 
of a Labour government. Thus, it was industrial circumstances as 
much as prevailing political practice that influenced its approach to 
pay policy. 
During the post-war period, the GMWU has tended to grow more 
slowly than its competitors. In the private sector, it was 
outdistanced by the TGWU in the 1950s (see Clegg, 1964: 180) and 
again in the 196009 (see Undy et al, 1981: 128-138). Similarly, while 
it has experienced considerable gains in the public sector, NUPE g~ew 
even more rapidly (Clegg, 1976: 65). This growth performance can be 
attributed to both a slower rate of natural growth and a failure to 
attract merge~s (Undy et al, 1981). Through the 196009, as the GMWU 
was outdistanced by its rivals, its slower rate of growth became a 
source of increasing concern. This concern was exacerbated in the 
late 1960s and early 197009 by some traumatic internal revolts over 
the union's industrial policies and a general change in the 
bargaining climate. 
The GMWU was basically slow to respond to the general movement 
towards more workplace bargaining', autonomy and participation. 
Operating asa general union in a multi-union enVironment, the GMWU 
was heavily involved in national joint industrial councils (NJICs) 
regulating the terms and conditions of all unlonmembers in an 
industry at national level~ However, the, post-war period was 
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characterized by a growing wage drift in the private sector in which 
workplace union organizations, particularly shop stewards, played an 
inoreasingly significant role in the determination of wages and 
working conditions. Too often, GMWU offioials found themselves 
defending national or even company level agreements in the faoe of 
shop-floor hostility. 'The union was ill-suited struoturally, and 
possibly 'temperamentally', to respond quiokly to the trend towards 
greater workplaoe autonomy. Its adaptation has been slower and 
sometimes more painful than in some of the other major unions. Its 
branches were generally organized on the basis of geographioal rather 
than industrial divisions. The oontinued preference for this mode of 
organization no doubt reflected the strong regional divisions whioh 
shaped the union's administrative structure. The GMWU has often been 
portrayed as conSisting of strong regional fiefdoms in whioh eaoh 
regional seoretary was the baron. This made it more difficult for 
the union to aocommodate potential merger partners, usually 
industrially-based, on anything other than a regional basis. 
Both the branoh and regional struotures also contributed to the 
peroeption ,of the union as bein~ dominated by rull-t~e offioials 
'who had little contaat with shop stewards. !he GMWU, thus, gained a 
reputation for being unresponsive to the shop-floor. It appeared to ' 
respond to members more as 'olients than partiCipants' (Lane and 
Roberts, 1971: 55). Indeed, its benefits sahemes tended to refleat 
this approach offering members much in the way of insurance and 
pension sohemes but less scope for industrial partioipation. Lord 
Cooper, the union's general seoretary from 1963 to 1973, had 
described the practice of referring agreements back to the membership 
for ratification as 'an abdication of responsibility' (Lane and 
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Roberts, 1971: 53). This contrasted markedly with the more 
participative mode adopted by its main competitors, espeoially. the 
TGWU and AUEW. Few work stoppages received official support. Clegg 
(1964: 190-195) notes the general reluotance of the union to 
participate in industrial action and its outright hostility to 
unofficial disputes. Lord Cooper developed a reputation as being a 
particularly zealous custodian of union finances, judging the health 
of the organization in terms of the size of its g~neral fund. 
As was argued· above, the GMWU's industrial praotice or 
collective bargaining policy certainly did influence its approach to 
incomes policy. The GMWU represented comparatively low-paid workers 
in either weakly organized industries or in multi-union industries 
where it competed for members with other unions. Its growth 
performance in relation to its competitors was poor. Moreover, its 
approach to collective bargaining seemed to be inoreasingly out of 
phase with developments in its industrial sectors. It is perhaps not 
surprising then that it should seek to mitigate the competitive wage 
race in which many of its members risked being the 'losers'. This 
industrial disposition was already apparent in the union's readiness 
to embrace arbitration as a method of wage-fixing and its support for 
the coordination of wage claims in the 1948-1951 period. To its 
peril, however, a union Which prided its cooperative ethos 
inoreasingly found itself in an era where militanoy seemed to pay 
greater rewards. The GMWU thus became the most vocal proponent of 
incomes policy within the TUC. In 1958, Jack Cooper, the futUre 
general secretary, suggested that the TUC should do more to promote 
'modest real wage increases instead of demanding substantial 
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N"'Wc~"rnN" T'b'ilfffi'essIOn'S'''' \ih"icn;·"ft~~e'a1'i"z'e'd~'wc'ari'··'dIl1y:.o.Raggregate-our'-'economrc-~'-'-­
difficulties' (Clegg, 1964: 198). In 1961, he recommended that 
'local bargaining should be coordinated and brought into closer 
relationship with what is done at national level' (ibid.). Indeed" 
there was such frustration at the level of wage drift that many in 
the leadership of the union believed that a permanent solution 'could 
only come as part of a generally agreed national wages policy' 
(ibid.: 196-197). This was particularly important for a union with 
a large proportion of its membership in the public sector which was 
not benefiting from this supplementary wage drift. The union 
consistently argued in favour of a more rational approach to pay 
bargaining; namely, through the vehicle of an incomes policy. Thus, 
the union's support for the 1960s Labour Government pay policies was 
not only a manifestation of that loyalty to the Labour Party, wh.ich ' 
had become synonymous' with the GMWU. It was also a continued 
expression of the union leadership's willingness to relate wage 
claims to national economic performance and its search for a 
coordinated, more 'rational' system of pay bargaining. 
These twin themes were clearly articulat,ed in the union's 
,evidence to the Donovan Commission. The GMWU (1966: 1780) reiterated 
its support for prices and incomes policy and 'the consequent need to 
modify collective bargaining and relate it' to wider economiC 
considerations'. It further argued that 'the State through an 
incomes policy, can and should act as an instrument of eqUity, both 
in relation to the distribution of incomes between the owners Of 
capital and workers and to its distribution among different groups of 
workers' (lbld.:1774). In other words, the union looked to incomes 
policy to mitigate the excesses of the competitive wage race suffered 
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by its members. 
The link between the GMWU's collective bargaining policy and its 
approach to pay policy was further strengthened by its political 
practice. Internally, there was little opposition to the polioies 
pursued by the leadership. Externally, the GMWU had been completely 
loyal to the leadership of the Labour Party, even when this entailed 
placing the union out of sympathy with the majority of TUe 
affiliates. The internal political process of the GMWU and other 
sample unions is the subject of further analysis in Chapters 7 and 8. 
It must suffice to indicate here 'that the G~iU leadership was 
internally unencumbered to pursue externally political issues of its 
choosing. This was primarily manifested in terms of the overriding 
loyalty to the Labour Party dating back to the formation of the 
amalgamated union in the 1920s (see Minkin, 1978a: 98). The centre 
of power in the GMWU resided in the full-time Regional Secretaries as 
well as the General Secretary. They interacted with each other on 
the union's two-tier national executive (from 1975, the two tiers 
were integrated into a single executive body). 
Although there was also lay representation on the executive, 
there was little history of factional opposition in the union. As 
early as 1926, the GMWU executive took a dim view of communist 
activists within the union. Membership of the Communist Party or the 
'Minority Movement· was declared to be 'inconsistent with loyal 
attachment to the Union'. This position was endorsed by the 1928 
Congress and reaffirmed in 1943 (see Clegg, 1954: 118-121). Union 
policy was formally approved at the annual Congress though key policy 
items were most often initiated by the executive. Delegates to the 
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COngress were elected by ballot on a district basis and attended in a 
regional delegation which included the regional secretary and a third 
of the full-time officers. Officers had the right to speak, but not 
to vote. The integration of the regional secretaries into national 
policy implementation and the integration of the delegates into a 
regional delegation, usually under the sway of the regional, 
secretary, generally ensured that opposition to the platform was 
muted.' The platform enjoyed, moreover, a range of procedural 
controls which facilitated the achievement of its policy objectives 
(see Chapter 7). The platform has sometimes been challenged by 
certain regional delegates or delegations, particularly London, 
Birmingham and Lancashire (Clegg, 1976: 102), but it invariably has 
prevailed. From the end of the war to the early 1970s, the platform 
was defeated on only two issues: the training of German troops , in 
Wales and unilateral nuclear disarmament. The latter deoision was of 
such significance that it was quickly reversed at a special recalled 
Congress in 1959 (Minkin, 1978a: 100). Harrison (1960: 152) notes 
that apart from this temporary deviation the GMWU Congress 'had not 
adopted one resolution deviating from Party policy', since the war, 
'nor had the union voted against the Party leadership. 
This internal policy 'cohesion' ensured a significant ro~e for 
the union within the Labour Party. Clegg (1976: 102) described it as 
the most consistent supporter of official Labou'r policies among major 
trade unions'. It follows that the GMNU was 'a major asset for the 
political leadership in securing the majorities it needed at the 
Party' Conference' (Minkin, 1978a: 98). This was particularly true in 
the incomes policy debates of the 19605 when Lord Cooper gained the 
reputation among his critics as the 'first incomes policy peer' (see 
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Panitch, 1976: 78). Despite occasional internal rumblings, the union 
consistently supported the Labour Government's policies until, 1958 
when, despite the obvious reluctance of the GMWU General Secretary, 
it voted with the majority of the TUC to oppose legislative 
interference with collective bargaining and then also expressed its 
opposition to the In Place of Strife proposals (see Minkin, 1978a: 
100; Panitch, 1976: 120-176). As Minkin (1978a: 100-101) put it: 
'Neither of these decisions 'was out of line with the movement of 
Party opinion, 'but for a union which prided itself on its loyalty to 
the Labour Government they were not easy to take'. Significantly, 
this marked the tentative beginnings of a series of changes within 
the GMWU which would be more clearly articulated when David Basnett 
replaced Lord Cooper as the union's general secretary. The GMWU 
would remain a staunchly loyal ally of the Labour Party leadership, 
but its own leadership became much more conscious of remaining in 
line with the majority of TUC opinion. This approach was confirmed, 
again despite the reluctance of Lord Cooper, with the decision to 
comply with TUC policy and de register under the prOVisions of the 
Industrial Relations Act (see Moran, 1974). This less conservative 
orient'ation of GMWU political practice was in large part the result 
< , 
of both changes in the bargaining climate and significant industrial 
ruptions within the union. 
The GMWU had already began to make soma changes in its internal 
industrial practices and collective bargaining policy in the lata 
1960s. It implemented an informal, non-binding and non-obligatory, 
system of consultative industrial conferences in 1959 (GMWUAC, 1959). 
It also sought to increase direct officer coverage of the workplace 
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(Clegg, 1916: 116; Undy et ai, 1981: 288). However, the impetus for 
reform was greatly increased by both internal revolts and external 
industrial trends: firstly, the loss of the unions's membership at 
Ford Halewood in Liverpool in 1969 through a mass defection (see 
Benyon, 1915: 266); secondly, in 1910, the seven week, unofficial 
strike of GMWU members at Pilkingtons in St. Helens and their attemp,t 
to form a break-away union (see Lane and Roberts, 1971); thirdly, 
and certainly related to the previous two factors, the general rise 
in private sector wage militancy and official and unofficial disputes 
in many of the industries covered by the GMWU (see, e.g., Hyman, 
1974); and, finally, the emergence of public sector wage militancy, 
again official and unofficial, in the late 1960s and early 1970s 
which was spearheaded by the GMWU's main public sector competitors, 
the TGWU and NUPE, and which was orten directed at the public sector 
effects of the incomes policies which the GMWU had so loyally 
supported (see Winchester, 1983: 16~-168). External industrial 
developments certainly highlighted the G~~U's relative industrial 
quiescence. The internal revolts centred around dissatisfaction with 
both bargaining policy and the lack of scope for participation and 
officer accountability. This series of events ensured that 'reform 
continued to be on the top of the agenda. When David Basnett was 
elected general secretary in 1912, even though he had long service as 
a full-time official, he was identified as a proponent of reform. 
This provided the signal for a more progressive orientation by 
officials who have worked to give the union a more dynamic image. 
This conscious 'reform effort' was evident in all 'the interviews 
conducted with GMWU activists and officials during this study. 
Moreover, the assessment of Basnett's efforts in this direction was 
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overwhelmingly positive. 
Thus, at the beginning of the Social Contract period, the GMWU 
was in the early throes of reform. This did not mean that it had 
radically altered its policies. Rather, the unswerving loyalism that 
was associated with the external political practice of the·union was 
now consciously mitigated by the new leadership inasmuch as it sought 
to align itself with the mainstream of TUC opinion. As was discussed 
in Chapter 3 and for all of the industrial reasons explored earlier 
1n this section, the GMWU remained favourably disposed to the idea of 
planning wages and vesting an enhanced coordinating role in the TUC 
(see, i.e., GMWUAC, 1973: 373). It also maintained that its large 
public sector membership would inevitably be regulated by some kind 
of policy; so it.was advisable to be involved in the determination of 
that policy (ibid.: 375-376). Finally, Basnett appeared to accept 
the idea that bargaining behaviour could be modified in exchange for 
favourable economic and social policies which would entail full trade 
union participation at the level of policy determination (see, i.e., 
Basnett, 1973). This was certainly Basnett's, if not the GMWU, 
·vision of the Social Contract. Such an approach was apparent in the 
GMWU motion to the 1973 TUC which called for the TUC to determine its 
own guidelines 'for a prices and incomes policy within the context of 
greater social justice and economic expansion' (TUCR, 1973: 368). The 
GMWU leadership was clearly willing to embrace the concept of an 
incomes policy. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the final incomes 
policy composite at the 1973 TUC was much more ambiguous on the 
question because the TGWU was unwilling to endorse the concept. The 
next section deals with the approach of the TGWU. 
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I 
l'Q!'m. 
The TGWU presents a mixed profile in its approach to incomes 
policy in the pre-Social Contract period. As was indicated in Tables 
4.1 and 4.2, along with the GMWU, it gave its unqualified backing to, 
ruc support of the 1948-1950 Labour Government pay policy. In the 
1960s, however, only ASTMS among the sample unions opposed the 
General Council's recommendations in favour of incomes policies more 
frequently than the TGWU. TGWU collective bargaining policy is of 
singular importance in this study. As was discussed in Chapter 2, 
the TGWU General Secretary, Jack Jones, played the key intermediary 
role, first, in the formulation of the Social Contract and, later, in 
the !UC's support for a tight period of wage restraint from 1975 to 
1977. The fate of the Social Contract was ultimately contingent on 
TGWU policy. To comprehend fully the evolution of the TGWU's 
approach to incomes policy, it is necessary to review the position of 
the union's general secretaries. However, the union's industrial 
composition, internal and external political practice and bargaining 
policy must first be examined briefly. 
The TGWU was formed in 1922 from the amalgamation of fourteen 
different unions, representing mainly general workers in the docks, 
transport and manufacturing. It rapidly expanded through growth and 
natural mergers to represent general workers and soma white-collar 
staff in a wide range of industries. In the process, it became and 
has remained Britain's largest union. To achieve ,this growth and 
service its broad coverage, the structure of the union consisted of a 
blend of regional and industrial groupings. Each union member was 
attached to both a national trade group for industrial purposes and a 
region for policy-making. Policy is formally made by the union's 
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Biennial Delegate Conference to which delegates are eleeted on a 
regional and trade group basis. Bargaining is conducted through the 
trade groups which are largely autonomous, though reponsible' to the 
union's executive. Thus, the TGWU is a series of mini-illdustrial 
unions in which the structure of authority is fairly deceotralized 
except where national bargaining predominates as a metholi of wage 
determination. 
The General Executive Council 'of the union consists of 
territorial representatives elected within the regions and national 
trade group representatives elected by national trade group 
committees. The general secretary is elected through a national 
ballot and is responsible to the General Executive COunci1. Given 
the union's diffuse structure, the general secretary has 
traditionally played a pre-eminent role within the union. This was 
the case with the four main general secretaries from the original 
amalgamation to the beginning of the Social Contract period - Ernest 
Bevin, Arthur Deakin, Frank Cousins and Jack Jones. Each was able to 
command the loyalty and policy support of both the executive and the 
BDC. It was because of this tradition of the pre-eminent general 
. , 
seoretary that Turner (1962) labelled the union as a 'popular 
bossdom'. This oreated considerable' scope for external policy 
initiatives. As was discussed in Chapter 2, the union's size meant 
that its policy positions were of oritical importance for the 
orientation of TUC and Labour Party policy and, in the case of Labour 
governments, fot" the Government itself. In. terms of its external 
political practice, the union had a strong loyalty to the Labour 
Party, but a loyalty which was mitigated by the demands or its own 
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industrial practice as interpreted by the TGWU general seoretary. 
Each of the aforementioned general secretaries has played a orucial 
mediating role within both the TUe and the Labour Party. For that 
reason, in discussing the TGWU approach to oollective bargaining and 
incomes policy below, it is necessary to highlight the particular 
approach of the general secretary at the time. 
The oomposition and spread of TGWU membership as well as the 
diffusion of industrial authority has meant that the union has rarely 
pursued a Single, cross-union bargaining policy. The condItions of 
each industrial sector were too different. Indeed, the union did not 
make industrial policy at its policy conference because the 
bargaining aims of one trade group were like ly to be incompatible 
with those of another. As the union grew in the 1920s and 1930s, in 
often difficult economic circumstances, it sought to establish 
minimum working conditions across an entire industry in order to 
proteot the general worker. Thus, it strongly supported the oonoept 
of industry-wide, na tiona 1 bargaining (see TGWU, 1919a; and 
Interview, 24 October 1980). As a general workers' union, it alsO 
argued for reduced differentials. The Second World War had a 
tremendous impact on trade union organization. The encouragement of 
jOint production committees in order to stimulate maximum output with 
a minimum of confliot greatly stimulated both workplaoe negotIations 
and the development of shop steward organizations in manufacturing. 
As labour markets tightened during World War Two and remained tight 
in much of the post-war period, the focus of wage determination in a 
number of industries shifted to the workplace, often to payment-by-
results systems. This move was taking place regardless of union 
bargaining policy. When Frank Cousins became general secretary in 
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1956, the union began to give this shift much more positive support. 
This trend accelerated with the growth of productivity schemes in the 
1960s, a growth which was greatly stimulated by certain inoomes 
policy phases (see Undy, 1978: 48-51; McKersie and Hunter, 1973). As 
Undy et al (1981: 288) remarked, many other unions experienced 
decentralization in bargaining during this period 'but in none was 
the change so comprehEmsive,or so purposefully executed as in the 
TGWU' • 
These changes included movement from national to lower levels 
of bargaining, expansion of the scope of workplace bargaining, 
increased lay representation on negotiating committees, and enhanced 
and more frequent reference-back procedures (see Undy, 1978). By the 
time Jack Jones became general secretary in 1969, the commitment to 
workplace wage determination or local-level bargaining activity, at 
the least, had become a virtual article of faith within the unioQ. 
Jones and,Urwin, the deputy general secretary, were both products of 
the workplace bargaining model in the West Midlands and were typical 
of the young officials in the late 1940s and 1950s who increasingly 
challenged the union's attachment to national-level negotiating 
arrangements (see, i.e., Urwin, 1970). These changes in bargaining 
policy were clearly reflected in the evolution of tbe union's 
approach to incomes policy. The union had been consistently opposed 
to statutory intervention in wage bargaining, but Deakin became a 
strong proponent of wage moderation and voluntary incomes policy' 
during his tenure as general secretary. The developing TaWU 
commitment to workplace bargaining, however, was fundamentally 
incompatible with government wages policies which were specifioally 
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designed to impinge on looal-level, wage settlements. This 
evolution of the TGWU approach to incomes policy merits closer 
sorutiny. 
The TGWU has been one of the most persistent advocates of 
"voluntarism' in wage bargaining. Ernest Bevin, the founder of the 
amalgamated union and the TGWU's first general secretary, was a 
powerful advocate of a voluntary system of wage bargaining. '!his was 
apparent throughout the war when, as Minister 'of Labour, he 
suocessfully resisted repeated Treasury arguments in favour of wage 
controls (Bullook, 1967: 87-92; Allen, 1957: 119). Bevin's 
sucoessor as TGWU general secretary, Arthur Deakin, shared Bevin's 
distaste of attempts by governments to regulate wages in place of 
colleotive bargaining. This was a sentiment shared, moreover, by 
most members of the TUC General Counoil at the time. In his union's 
journal in April 1946, Deakin wrote: ""wages policy" is a term so 
vague and uncertain that it may not mean anything but might, in a 
general way, at some time be interpreted as constituting a "wage 
ceiling" which the Trade Union Movement is not prepared to accept' 
(cited in Goodman, 1979: xviii). This position was reflected by the' 
TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference in 1947 which was "strongly 
opposed tfny attempt to freeze wages at existing levels' (Allen, 
1957: 123). 
Deakin, however, was probably the strongest advocate of the 
Labour Government's 1948-1950 incomes policy. This is clear in Table 
4.1 which shows the TGWU supporting the policy in all observations. 
Deakin in fact changed his views on incomes policy in this period 
because be was impressed by the gravity of the economic crisis and 
the threat that this posed for both his members' standard of living 
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and the survival of the Labour Government. His loyalty to the Labour 
Government was certainly strong. It was reinforced by his personal 
loyalty to his predecessor and Labour Government cabinet mtnister, 
Ernest Bevin (Allen, 1960: 289). Even after the TUC's recommendation, 
for continued support of the' policy was defeated at the 1950 
Congress, Deakin suggested to his own executive that the union now 
held the responsibility to pursue a policy of restraint or, 
alternatively, it could 'just allow a policy of drift to operate with 
an inevitable collapse of the nation's economy' (cited in Goodman, 
1979: 88). Thus, Deakin also came to accept the argument that was so 
central to the genesis of wage policies in modern economies; namely, 
that wage bargaining must be linked to national economic performance. 
Finally, Deakin was 'by nature a leader of groups with relatively 
little economic power'. His 'desire for wage stability was a desire 
for uniformity of treatment to be accorded to different groups of 
workers f who he wanted to retain the relative gains that they had 
made in the post-war period (Allen, 1957: 140). In this sense, he 
reflected the position of the general worker who did not benefit from 
. differentials and whose earnings rarely outstripped the rate of price 
inflation. However, any policy which was to achieve this objeotive 
had to be voluntary. This has been a key distinotion within the TGWU 
as well as in many other unions. An incomes polioy or wage restraint 
was acceptable in exceptional circumstanoes if it was voluntary and 
if government regulation did not replaoe normal mechanisms of 
collective bargaining. Thus, in 19~8, Deakin noted that they refused 
the Government's offer of a national minimum wage because this would 
have undermined the voluntary character of the policy, not to mention 
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the potential impact of a general union such as the TGWU amongst the 
low-paid (on this refusal, see Allen, 1957: 131). 
Deakin was able to persuade his union conference and executive 
to accept the policy of wage restraint during this period (see 
Harrison, 1960: 133), but it was apparent that his. support for wage 
moderation alienated a number of bargaining groups within the TGWU 
(particularly the dockers, road passenger transport, and chemical and 
. 
allied trade groups, according to Allen, 1957: 134-136). Moreover, 
there was increasing opposition to Deakin's vision of collective 
bargaining practice. Deakin was preaching moderation in the pursuit 
of industry-wide national level agreements. However, as was 
discussed above, fuelled by tight labour markets and relatively high 
levels of demand in manufacturing, the trend during these post-war 
years was increasingly towards greater workplace bargaining autonomy. 
When Frank Cousins became TGWU general secretary in 1956, he released 
much of this energy which had been building against Deakin ,(Interview 
with senior TGWU official, 16 December 1980). The change from Deakin 
to Cousins seemed dramatic, but Cousins was essentially able to give 
forceful expression to changes that were already taking place in the 
union. It was immediately apparent that Cousins was totally opposed 
to wage restraint (see Allen, 1960: 104; Goodman, 1979: 133). In 
stark contrast to Deakin's distaste for what he had labelled as the 
'economics of bedlam' (Allen, 1957: 140), Cousins made his now famous 
affirmation of TGWU industrial power at his first TUe Congress as 
general secretary of the TGWU: ... In a period of freedom for all we 
are part of the all' (cited in Goodman, 1979: 134). At its 1957 BDC, 
the TGWU rejected 'the principle of wage restraint in any form' 
(Goodman, 1979: 146). This position was reiterated at the 1958 
223 
Labour Party Conference: 'We have said that we do not accept or 
would not accept a policy of wage restraint' (cited in Harrison, 
1960: 346). Throughout these early years of Cousins's tenure as 
general secretary, the union remained unequivocally opposed to wage 
restraint, wage policy or incomes policy. The TGWU was what !h! 
Times later labelled 'the high citadel of oPPosition to wage 
restr.aint' (cited in Panitch, 1976: 58). 
In the early 19603, however, there was a slight change in the 
union's discourse on incomes policy. According to Goodman (1979: 
327), Cousins gave some indication from October 1961 that if a Labour 
Government was commited to sooialist polioies and oreated the 
eoonomic climate wnere wage increases were not necessary, then he 
might be willing to cooperate on the wages front. Parenthetically, 
it should be readily apparent in the preceding chapters that Jack 
Jones's position on the Social Contract ten years later was 
remarkably similar. Cooperation, for Cousins, did not entail wage 
restraint. Rather, he introduced the concept of 'the planned growth 
of incomes' at the 1963 Labour Party Conference. The TUC General 
Secretary, George Woodcock, was willing to embrace the concept of an 
incomes polioy, provided that it was voluntary. Cousins, however, 
continued to make the distinction between wage restraint or incomes 
policy and 'the planned growth of incomes'. As he told the 1963 ruc, 
'we will not have wage restraint, whoever brings it and wraps it for 
us' (cited in Goodman, 1979: 367). For Cousins, to accept wage 
restraint was to undermine the role and purpose of trade unionism 
itself. Moreover, it was simply not feasible in his view to request 
that trade unions were asked to plan their wages unless everything 
224 
else in the economy was also planned. This was a restatement of 
Bevin's war-time contention that you cannot fix maximum wages whilst 
one section works for another's profits (see Panitch, 1976: 80). The 
TGWU maintained this position throughout the rest of the decade. In 
response to a request by the Donovan Commission to define its role in 
'accelerating the economic and social advance of the nation', the 
TGWU noted in its memorandum that the primary function of trade 
unions was 'to maintain and improve the condition oC their members' 
working lives by efCective collective bargaining - and that by doing 
this well they contribute to the social and economic advance of the 
nation'. It continued: 'If the Government wishes to limit the scale 
on Which unions are free to bargain, it must do so as part of a 
planned economy, not as an attempt to deal with one aspect of a 
general problem' (TGWU, 1966: 1160). 
This approach to incomes policy characterized the TGWU's 
tempestuous relationship with the 1960s Labour Government's incomes 
policies. On the basis of its support for a 'planned growth of 
incomes', as long as this did not compromise the freedom of wage 
bargainers, it was able to support the first voluntary phase of pay 
'policy in 1964-1965. However, the TGWU opposed both the period of 
wage restraint from 1965 and the wage freeze and subsequent policies 
from 1966. Indeed, Cousins who had become a Cabinet Minister 
resigned from the Government in 1966 in protest at the implementation 
of a wage freeze. The TGWU's only support for any kind of wages 
scheme during this period, as can be seen in Table 4.1, came in March 
1967 when it supported the TUC's proposed system of voluntary 
monitoring of wage settlements (TUC, 1967). Otherwise, the TGWU led 
the trade union opposition to Labour government incomes polioies in 
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the 1960s and this opposition was extended to the In Place Of Strife 
proposals which were developed to succeed the pay policies (see 
Chapter 2). 
The union was careful throughout this period to attack the 
incomes policies rather than the Labour Government itself (Panitch, 
1976: 82). As relations between Jack Jones and the party leadership 
improved through the early 1970s, the TGWU remained as committed to 
local-level bargaining autonomy and as fundamentally opposed to 
statutory intervention in wage bargaining and wage restraint (see, 
i.e., TGWU BDCM, 1971 and 1973). Cousins had indicated more than ten 
years earlier that if a Labour Government 'created the circumstances 
in which it was not necessary for us to press for wage adjustments we 
should be happy to cooperate with them in making a success of. • • 
whatever efforts they were making in the economic field' (cited in 
Goodman, 
prior to 
unionists 
1979: 327). Similarly, Jones had suggested in the period 
the election of the Labour Government in 1974 that trade 
would voluntarily respond to the changed industrial 
relations and economic climate. There is no evidence to suggest, 
,however, that at that point such a suggestion entailed either a 
change in the union's opposition to wage restraint or a willingess to 
intervene in detail in the wage claims of its members. 
Thus, at the beginning of the Social Contract period, the TGWU 
maintained the essence of its opposition to pay policy as developed 
through the previous two decades. As was discussed in Chapter 3, the 
union was opposed to 'statutory control of wages, or interference 
with collective bargaining' (TGWU BDCM, 1973: 9) and supported ~a 
planned growth of real incomes combined with a restoration of 
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voluntary collective bargaining' (TUCR, 1973: 635-636). The delioate 
question, however, was how the union could reconcile plannlngthe 
growth of real incomes, which it was disposed to consider if a Labour 
government was pursuing an agreed set of policies, with voluntary 
collective bargaining? Chapters 5 and 6 examine the external 
dynamics of such a commitment'and how it led the TGWU, along with the 
majority of sample unions, to support a period of tight wage 
restraint. Chapters 7 and 8 focus on the internal dynamics of this 
question. First, however, the next two sections will in turn 
consider the case of the remaining sample unions' in this study: 
first, the AUEW and, then, NUPE and the FBU. 
Like the TGWU, the AUEW leadership was for a number of years a 
very lOya~llY of Labour Government incomes policies. As can be 
seen in Table 4.1, this was the case from 1964 to 1967 when the union 
supported incomes polioies on seven consecutive observations. By 
1968, however, the AUEW was with the TGWU perhaps the most vociferous 
opponent of incomes policy and wage restraint. In common with the 
TGWU, this official policy support for incomes policy reflected the 
influence of a union leader, William Carron in the case of the AUEW, 
who was willing to risk unpopularity among union activists because 
of an overriding commitment to the goals of the leadership of the 
Labour Party and a profound belief in the salutory effeot of trade 
union wage moderation on the national economy. In the case of the 
AUEW, the disjuncture between a leadership commitment to pay polioy 
and union colleotive bargaining polioy was even more aoute than 1n 
the TGWU. Apart from the negotiation of a national framework 
227 
agreement for the engineering industry, bargaining authority in the 
AUEW was completely decentralized. Unlike the TGWU, AUEW policy-
making was highly volatile. As was discussed in Chapter 3, its 
industrial and political practice was the subject of complex 
factional battles in the union'S multi-tiered structure. Throughout 
the 1960s, the question of the union's approach to incomes policy was 
one of the most contentious items in Union policy-making. Because 
the AUEW cast a very large number of votes in ruc and Labour Party 
policy-making, the endless procedural battles between oompeting 
factions which constituted the essence of its political volatility 
held a particular interest for a much wider audience. Unlike the 
unions already disoussed in this chapter, the TGWU, GMWU and ASTMS, 
AUEW external politioal praotice was sharply circumscribed by the 
demands and complexities of its internal political practice. This 
continued to be the case during the period of the Social Contract. 
In outlining the policy approach of the AUEW on incomes policy, this 
section will attempt to highlight the links between collective 
bargaining policy, internal and external political practice. To do 
so, it is first necessary to outline the industrial coverage and 
structure of the AUEW. 
The structure of the AUEW provides ample evidence for Turner's. 
(1962: 14) contention that 'British trade unions ••• are historical 
deposits and repOSitories of history'. The AUEW was an engineering 
industry craft union which in the search for organizational stability 
and in response to technological change gradually opened its ranks to 
other crafts and then to a much broader semi-skilled membership. Its 
current structure is the product of amalgamations in 1851 and 1920. 
Craft unionism was the first stable form of union organization to 
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emerge (Flanders, 1968: 27). In response to changing market 
conditions and in the search for greater organizational strength, 
local craft societies amalgamated into the fir~t national, multi-
craft organization in 1851 (see Jeffreys, 1945; Hyman, 1975: 45). 
This was called the Amalgamated Society of Engineers (ASE). The 
organizing principles of the ASE, essentially strict craft control, 
were to a degree undermined by the introduction of new technology, 
the 'dilution' that accompanied the new machinery and the large-scale 
penetration of the new general unions in the engineering industry. 
In 1920, the ASE merged with nine smaller craft unions to form the 
Amalgamated Engineering Union (AEU) which subsequently aspired to 
recruit members industry-wide admitting the semi-skilled to its ranks 
from 1926 and women from 1942. 
The current structure of the AUEW is very much a product of 
these different amalgamations: their attempts to safeguard .the local 
autonomy and control of the amalgamating bodies and to exert local 
control over national administration. Thus, the constitution of the 
AUEW is based on the principle of a separation of powers in which the 
executive, legislature and judiciary all have independent powers to 
exert checks and balances and all officials in each of the areas are 
elected at periodic and different intervals (see Fletcher, 1979: 32). 
The National Committee performs a legislative role. Its annnual 
meeting makes policy, including the union's approach to pay policy, 
on the basis of resolutions forwarded by branches through district 
and divisional committees. Its fifty-two members are elected by 
divisional committees which consist of members elected by district 
committees Which, in turn, are composed of representatives elected by 
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the branc~es. The seven-person, full-time executive 'gives effect' 
to the policies decided by the National Committee and administers the 
union on a daily basis, Its members are elected by region and is 
presided over by a President and General Secretary who are elected by 
the entire membership. The Final Appeal Court, consisting of elected 
delegates, has the right to review decisions made by the Executive 
on the basis of branch, district and divisional appeals. Much 
authority, moreover, resides at local level. Branches make decisions 
about membership of a trade. District Committees have the duty of 
'regulating rates and wages, hours of work, terms of overtime, 
piecework and general conditions affecting the interests of the 
trades in their respective districts' (on the role of the different 
bodies within the union, see AEU, 1966; AUEW(E), 1975). Despite the 
gradual extension of AUEW membership into the ranks of the semi- and 
unskilled, AUEW policy~aking and officialdom has remained very much 
the prerogative of the skilled or 'section one' members. Almost all 
of the AUEW activists and officers interviewed in this study, for 
example, shared a craft background. The predominance of the skilled 
in internal union machinery has ensured the continuation of a 'craft 
ethos', particularly on bargaining policy issues such as 
differentials, despite the changing composition of AUEW membership. 
Thus, ,the high degree of local autonomy, complex system of checks and 
balances, the extent of officer accountability and the craft ethos 
have had important implications for both union' bargaining policy and 
internal political practice. 
Given its wide coverage of skilled and semi-skilled members, the 
AUEW has been involved in a broad range of industry-wide bargaining. 
The most important of these was the National Engineering Agreement 
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negotiated between the Engineering'Employers Federation (EEF) and the 
Confederation of Shipbuilding and Engineering Unions (CSEU) in whioh 
the AUEW played the predominant role. The national procedure 
agreement in engineering dates from the end of the last oentury, but 
the first substantive agreement introducing 'general alterations in 
wages' in all distriots was not signed until 1917 (Clegg, 1976: 201-
204). The trend towards industry-wide national regulation of minimum 
rates and conditions continued to develop through the Second World 
War. While industry-wide bargaining certainly continued in the post-
war period, its signifioanoe was in part undermined, especially in 
the engineering industry, by the growth of domestio bargaining. The 
Donovan COmmission, for instance, noted that there had been 'a 
decline in the extent to which industry-wide agreements determine 
actual pay' (Donovan, 1968: 14). It argued that this was due to 
piecework earnings, additions to the rates at factory level and the 
volume of overtime - all of whioh were determined primarily at 
domestic level. Brown (1973: 9-11) found little link between the 
national agreement and piecework earnings in the engineering 
industry. Indeed, Clegg (1976: 291) suggested that the national 
agreement no longer even provided a framework for domestic bargaining 
in the engineering industry. 
. This trend in wage determination certainly corresponded to 
traditions of local autonomy that were already deeply rooted in the 
AUEW. However, it posed a fundamental challenge to the whole notion 
of a bargaining strategy on the part of the union. One local 
offiCial commented that a bargaining strategy at national level 1n 
the AUEW was simply not possible. Rather, there was a' bargaining 
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skeleton' on which the shop stewards put the flesh (Interview, 23 
September 1980). The primary focus for negotiation was undoubtedly 
at the level of the workplace through the shop steward. Although the 
union did acknowledge the legitimacy of the steward, branch struoture 
was on a geographical basis and, therefore, not ideally suited to 
encourage shop steward participation. The district committee 
generally convened quarterly shop stewards meetings and the election 
of shop stewards was formally approved by the district committee. 
otherwise, steward bargaining activity was not really integrated into 
the union's structure (Eaton and Gill, 1981: 81). This growth of 
domestic bargaining challenged in many ways the relevance of national 
agreements, both substantive and procedural. The union's national 
leadership appeared particularly reluctant to sanction the erosion of 
the national procedure agreement that completely autonomous shop 
steward bargaining seemed to entail. Thus, the union's president 
from 1956 to 1967, William Carron, was bitterly opposed to 
'unofficial disputes' as he made clear to the Donovan Commission 
(AEU, 1966). 
This leadership posture changed dramatically with the eleotion 
of Hugh Scanlon to the presidency in 1967. '!he quantity of. d.ispute 
benefit paid out by the union increased considerably. In 1971 the 
union actually withdrew for a number of years from the national 
procedural agreement. In 1972, it even withdrew from national 
substantive negotiations and pursued what many later considered the 
ill-advised strategy of calling on members to pursue new wage claims 
on either a plant-by-plant or district basis (on the changes in the 
AUEW, see Undy et aI, 1981: 294; on the 1972 local wage 
negotiations, see Armstrong, 1978). The reality of AUEW bargaining 
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policy, therefore, corresponded ,to its decentralized structure. The 
union illustrated perfectly the problems associated with centralized 
incomes policies in Britain. Whether the union formally lent its, 
support to such a policy or not, it appeared to make little 
difference at the workplace unless there were mechanisms to translate 
that formal support into shop steward support. In the AUEW, the 
effectiveness of any such mechanisms appeared highly ,limited. 
Formal union support for pay policy was further complicated by 
the union's internal political process. As mentioned above, this 
entailed an intricate blend of internal checks and balances which was 
the result of numerous past skirmishes between members and elected 
officials (see Richter, 1973; Eaton and Gill, 1981: 84). This 
system was rendered more complex by the union's tradition of 
factional political battles. Such a tradition would appear to date 
back to at least the last century (Edelstein and Warner, 1979: 281-
282). It was no doubt encouraged by both the union's practice of 
frequent elections for all official positions and its deeply 
engrained local and sectional differences. Roderick Martin (1969: 
"183-185), for instance, convincingly suggests that in the 19203 and 
1930s the National Minority Movement was able to make more { rapid 
progress in the AUEW partly at least because of the union's 
organizational structure which had grown by amalgamation and 
incorporated sectional and local separatisms with a weak central 
executive and a high degree of decentralization. 
The Communist Party maintained a significant profile within the 
union. This also probably contributed to factional activity. For 
instance, Tom Mann, the union's General Secretary at the time of the 
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1920 amalgamation, was also a founder member of the British Communist. 
Party. Richter (1973: 92) notes that unlike some of the other major 
general unions Communist Party (CP) members were never prosoribed 
from holding offioial positions within the AUEW. He ascribes this 
'uneasy coexistence policy' to the strength and prestige of the 
Communist Party within the union and the relatively weak position and 
prestige of the national AEU leadership. Factional activity tende~ 
to revolve around communist ,"acceptability' with literally distinot 
cycles of relative factional ascendancy (Interviews with a number of 
AUEW activists, various dates). The left made quite uneven 
organizational inroads from the amalgamation through to the immediate 
post-war period. It certainly played a significant role in 
rebuilding the organizational strength of the union through, the late 
1930s and during the war. (see Croucher, 1982). It appears that the 
'right' or anti-CP faction made considerable gains from the early 
1950s onwards, part.icularly after its president, Jack Tanner, broke 
with his previous support on the left (see Richter, 1973: 45-69). 
It was in response to its dominance that a new "broad left' ooalition 
embracing both CP and 'labour left' activists began to organize with 
~. 
particular success in the Manchester and Sheffield areas in the early 
1960s (Interview, 12 August 1980). This new coalition culminated 
with the election of its candidate, Hugh Scanlon, to the presidency 
in 1967. Once again in response to the suooess of the "left', the 
'right· reorganized and secured considerable suocess through the 
latter half of the 1970s (on the electoral fortunes of the factions 
through the 1960s and 1970s, see Undy, 1979; and Edelstein and 
Warner, 1979). 
The combination of factional struggle and politioal structure 
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produced, 'as was mentioned in Chapter 3, 'a remarkable recipe for 
institutionalized conflict about what constituted "the will of' the 
m~mbership'tt (Minkin, 1978a: 176). Not only was there interneclne 
conflict between the factions, but the union's system of internal 
checks and balances provided virtually unlimited scope for further 
disputes. Moreover, as long as one faction could not achieve complete 
control in the policy, executive and judicial branches of the union, 
there was an underlying potential instability in any policy position. 
Policy was made at National Committee on the basis of 
resolutions from branches filtered through district and divisional 
committees. Unlike the control mechanisms operating in most other 
unions, executive recommendations to the AUEW policy conference 
appeared largely subordinate to factional considerations. 'The 
President and executive members attended National Committee but they 
did not vote. There was only limited platform control over results. 
The main discipline operating on delegates was through factional 
alliances. The political balance on the National Committee was 
invariably olose. It tended to vary from year to year, and even from 
issue to issue, especially when there were several 'floatlng' 
delegates not attached to either faotion. As will be documented 1n 
subsequent chapters in relation to AUEW policy on the various phases 
of the SOCial Contract, it often appeared that key polioy deoisions 
depended uniquely on the position of the handful of 'floating' 
delegates from the southwestern and northeastern divisions (see 
chapters 5, 7 and 8). All the rhetoric and persuasive powers of eaoh 
faction were directed largely towards them. Indeed, manyAUEW 
activists and officers agreed that the variations in factional 
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balance on the National Committee reflected less any clear expression 
of industrial or membership sentiment and more the machinations of 
the electoral machines (Interviews, 26 February,. 24 and 27 July, 11 
and 26 August, 1980). As a result, the AUEW scarcely could claim a 
coherent set of policies. This was in some respects politically 
expedient as the President and Executive were charged with the 
administration and interpretation of policy. . 
lbe infamous 'Carron's law' was grounded in preoiselythis kind 
of ambiguity. Separately eleoted delegations represented the union 
at both the annual Congress of the TUC and the Labour Party 
COnferenoe. The President, General Seoretary and exeoutive counoil 
members also attended. When the union cast its vote, the President 
who led the delegation was obliged to consult the union delegation 
but ui:±imately held the power of interpretation as regards union 
policy. Given this structure of.representation, conflict over what 
the union's policy was erupted on more than one occasion. This was 
particularly t~ue 1n the creation and administration of union policy 
on wage restraint and incomes policy When carron invariably supported 
the platform, often in the face of vehement protestation from the 
union's delegation which tended to be dominated by the left· (see 
Minkin, 1978a: 175-206). External polioy practice has thus been 
linked to the fortunes of the faotions within the union. 
It should be emphasized that neither left nor right in the union 
has shown particular enthusiasm for government intervention in wage 
bargaining. This refleoted the bargaining realities of the AUEW as 
discussed above. As opposed to unions either composed of more weakly 
organized groups or operating predominantly within the publio seator, 
the relative ability AUEW members to secure wage inoreases through 
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domestic bargaining, particularly those most active in union policy-
making, meant that the leadership of the union was less inclined to 
seek any kind of comprehensive intervention in the wage bar.gaining 
system. The u~ion regularly passed motions in favour of tree 
collective bargaining. However, from the 1950s, it also regularly 
expressed its loyalty and support for the Labour Party and Labour 
I 
governments. In common with many unions, there arose a tension when 
the Labour leadership sought restraint in the area of wage 
bargaining. This tension was conjugated in factional terms. The left 
generally maintained that, as an AEU spokesperson put in 1948, trade 
unionists could not accept wage restraint 'in a situation in which 
the ruling class is battling against the working class' (TUe, 1948: 
33). The right appeared more susceptible to 'loyalty' arguments. As 
can be seen in Table 4.1, the Aum~ was less inclined to support 
incomes poliCies in the late 1940s prior to Tanner's conversion to 
Labour loyalism. Richter (1973: 42-44) suggests that there was a 
strong current of syndicalist thought among AEU leaders at this time • 
. Certainly, their contributions to the TUC debates on pay policy 
reflected more concern with the impact of a perceived inequality of 
. 
sacrifice on engineering wage claims than with the problems of the 
post-war Labour Government (TUC, 1948: 32-33; TUCR, 1948: 501-502; 
and 1950: 542~544). However, the 1960s experience displayed a 
different pattern. 
Minkin (1978a: 194) notes that loyalty, qualified by a desire to 
protect free collective bargaining, was the dominant theme in 
National Committee policy-making in the first two years of the 19608 
Labour Government. Whether out of loyalty or a distinct conception 
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of the econom1, William carron was prepared to embrace a oonception 
of wage bargaining that ran counter to the structure and tradition of 
bargaining within the union. In reference to the AUEW's support for 
the government's incomes polioy, the union's memorandum to the 
Donovan Commission noted: 
'We are aware of the possibility of divergence between our 
sectional interests, and national interests, but we 
recognise that in the long run, with full employment, wage 
bargaining defeats its own purpose if full bargaining 
strength is continually exercised so that incomes rise 
faster than productivity, and real incomes show no advance 
because of price rises' (AEU, 1966: 967). 
On a number of occasions, Carron and John Boyd, a leading member of 
the executive later to become general secretary, contended that 1964 
National Engineering Agreement, known as the 'Package Deal' and which 
was to last for the unprecedented period of three years, was tangible 
evidence of the union's readiness, in carron's words, to contribute 
'an element of national stability in following out the policies of 
the Labour Party' (see, i.e., ibid.; Richter, 1973: 96-98). 
Despite the AUEW leadership's staunch support for the Labour 
Government from 1964 to 1967, there was no discernible tide of 
'~nthusiasm for wage restraint within the AUEW. Rather, it required 
all of carron's loyalty to the Labour Government to secure National 
Committee majority votes in favour of the policy. When this was no 
longer possible, from 1965 onwards, he exercised his presidential 
discretion 1n TOC and Labour Party votes to interpret the union's 
policy as he chose to see it, usually on the basis of a National 
Committee resolution professing one hundred per cent support for the 
Labour Government. This became known as 'carron's law' (see Minkin, 
1978a: 175-206; Panitch, 1976: 78 and 94). Carron's total support 
for the Government's policies, however, came at an increasing cost to 
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the electoral fortunes of his faction. 
The broad left's revival in electoral fortunes was clearly 
associated with its opposition to incomes policy. Given Carron's 
controversial methods of maintaining union support for incomes 
policy, the issue of incomes policy became closely linked to the 
question of union democracy (see, Scanlon, 1967; 6-7). In the 1967 
election for the union's presidency, Scanlon represented an end to 
the alienation of national leaders in the union from the workplace 
(Richter, 1973: 127). Scanlon (1975:' 245) successfully linked 
incomes policy to the structure of oollective bargaining and incomes 
polioy: 'Not only must all restriotions on free oollective 
bargaining be removed, but the structure of bargaining must 
correspond to reality by giving more power and responsibility at shop 
floor level t • It was an appealing message to shop stewards in an era 
of wage restraint; possibly it made the difference in Scanlon's 
narrow defeat of the heir-apparent, John Boyd, in the presidential 
eleotion. The political oomplexion of the National Committee also 
moved slightly to the left. Thus, by 1967 the National Committee 
systematioally opposed any mention of incomes polioy (Minkin, 1978a: 
197). While the left was never assured of the oontrol of' the 
National Committee in subsequent years, the union remained completely 
opposed to incomes policy and there appeared to be no substantial 
pressures to reverse this position. 
Thus, as was mentioned in Chapters 2 and 3, the AUEW was amongst 
the most vociferous trade union opponents of pay policy at the 
beginning of the Social Contract period. This was certainly 
reflected in its 1973 policy decisions. In stark contrast to unions 
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like the GMWU which then advocated the merits of some kind of 
voluntary incomes policy accord, a 1973 National Committee 
resolution, passed by forty-four votes to seven with one abstention, 
opposed attempts by any government to freeze wages. It further 
stated that it would not be bound by any TUC-Government-CBI decisions 
'which would plaoe restrictions, voluntary or imposed, upon the free 
collective bargaining of wages and conditions' (AUEW NCR, 1973: 203-· 
205). At the National Conference of the four sections ot the 
amalgamated union two months later, a resolution, passed by forty 
0';"\ 
votes to twenty-nine, was even more uncomp~sing as regards the 
possibility of an entente with a future Labour government. It 
rejected 'any form of Incomes Policy irrespective of any Government 
in power' (AUEW AC, 1973: 81) •. 
The AUEW's position on incomes policy was thus as much the 
product of its internal political process as any statement of 
bargaining strategy. As long· as the left could secure a majority of 
delegates in its policy forums, there would be categorical opposition 
to incomes policy. The 'moderate' faction displayed no great 
enthusiasm for wage restraint, but it d1d remain open to o~ertures 
from a Labour government, provided that any policy agreement would 
not overly compromise workplace bargaining and the defenoe of 
differentials - the oore of AUEW local .bargaining strategy. The 
-t\-e.. 
volatility of policy-making was exacerbated b~xistence of floating 
delegates who could be swayed by the political pressures or the 
argumentation of either faction. Thus, despite its opposition to pay 
policy, AUEW external policy positions remained subject to the 
volatility of it~ internal political practice. 
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NUPE and the FBU 
The other two sample unions, NUPE and the FEU, initially appear 
to present somewhat different profiles in the context of TUC policy-
making on Labour government incomes policies. As can be seen in Table 
4.2, the FBU has struck a more oppositional stance than NUPE. The 
FBU supported General Council recommendations in favour of Labour 
govern~ent pay policies on only two of the seven available 
observations whereas NUPE cast its votes in favour of the General 
Counoil's recommendation on five of eight observations. The fewer 
available observations in the case of each of these two unions 
suggests that their public profile on pay policy was less conspicuous 
than some of the other sample unions, if only because they 
represented fewer votes than the three largest unions. Despite these 
different profiles, there are a number of similarities in the pattern 
of their responses to incomes policies. These similarities arise 
from their common problem of how to define and pursue a coherent 
bargaining policy in the public sector, often in the context of 
direct or indirect government wage guidelines. This section attempts 
to locate the approaches of NUPE and the FBU to incomes policy in 
relation to their respective collective bargaining policies. To do 
so, it is necessary also to take account of their industrial 
composition, structure and political practice. 
NUPE and the FBU share a comparable industrial location. Both 
operate exclusively in the public sector and organize primarily among 
manual workers. The FBU could probably be most accurately described 
as a public sector 'industrial' union. It covers the overwhelming 
majority of full-time, uniformed firefighters, some part-timers, 
fire-service control room staff and a substantial proportion of 
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fire-service officers (the proportion of fire service officers that 
it represents, as opposed to the National Association or Fire 
Officers (NAFO) 'mich is not affiliated to the TUC. is a source of 
continuing dispute; see FBUJ, June and July 1982). The FBU, called 
the Fireman's Trade Union until 1930, was formed as an offshoot of 
the Corporation Workers in 1918. Prior to the Second World War, 
firefight1ng was often done by policemen. The provision of a fire 
service by local authorities was not even obligatory until 1938. 
Thus, the FBU remained a small, primarily London-based organization 
Where there was the greatest concentration of full-time firefighters. 
Despite bitter internal conflict over the issue of dilution, a change 
in leadership in 1939 committed the union to the organization of war-
time auxiliary firefighters and it grew rapidly as a result. It was, 
therefore, able to consolidate its industrial presence when the 
National Fire Service was formed in 1941 and, later, maintain its 
national coverage men the fire service was denationalized into local 
authority fire brigades in 1947 (on the hlstory of the FEU, see 
Radford, 1951 and FBU, 1968). Since then, the FBU has been the sole 
representative of sub-officer, fUll-time firefighters in a system of 
national negotiations with local authority employers. 
The structure of the FBU corresponds closely with the structure 
of the fire service. Its branch unit of organization is the fire 
station which are grouped into brigades. For union administrative 
purposes, the sixty-four brigades are grouped into fourteen regions. 
Each region has a representative on the executive with the exception 
of the London region which has two. Fire officers and control room 
staff each also have an executive representative. All union officers 
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are elected on a regular basis from the ranks of the firefighters. 
Its occupational homogeneity, industrial cohesion, workplace 
branches and system of continuous branch balloting contribute to the 
impression of the FBU as a tightly knit, democratic organization. 
NUPE might best be described as a 'sectoral-general union' 
(Clegg, 1979: 169). The largest proportion of its.members are manual 
workers employed either by local authorities or in the National 
Health Servioe, but it also organizes oomparable occupational groups 
in universities and water authorities. Its membership is relatively 
low-paid, inasmuch as the bulk of its members earn less ~an the 
national average for manual workers (see Fryer, 1982: 11). Two-thirds 
of its members are women, many of whom work part-time. NUPE's 
origins can be traced to a 1908 split in the Municipal Employees' 
Association. One part retained the original name until it merged 
with other general unions to form the GMWU (see above). The other 
part formed the National Union of Corporation Workers which in 1928 
changed its name to the National Union of Public Employees. These 
two unions along with the TGWU have since been engaged in a bitter 
'. competition for the recruitment of publio seotor manual workers. 
NUPE has been particularly known for its aspiration to be the 
'industrial union' of the public seotor, as opposed to the other two 
general unions whioh recruited aoross a wide range of industries. 
From the appointment of Bryn Roberts as general secretary in 1934, 
NUPE pursued an aggressive 'Expansion Plan' aimed at the recruitment 
of county local authority workers and the ultimate aohievement of 
national bargaining. Union membership rose rapidly from only 13,000 
in 1934 to 50,000 in 1939, to 100,000 in 1945, to' over 200,000 by the 
early 1960s, and over 500,000 by the mid-1970s. This growth was no 
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doubt stimulated, first, by the establishment of national local 
authority bargaining machinery during the war and, then, by the 
tremendous expansion of public service employment in the post-war, 
especially after the creation of the National Health Service in 1948 
(on the history of NUPE and its expansion, see Craik, 1955; Dix and 
McKeown, 1968; Fryer, 1982; Eaton and Gill, 1981: 245-246). NUPE's 
: 
growth record was all the more remarkable because it was achieved in 
the face of inter-union competition, largely at the expense ot the 
GMWU (Clegg, 1979: 185). rts early claims to industrial unionism and 
the success of an expansion plan initiated from the top have 
contributed to its legitimate reputation as an officer-led, 
campaigning union. NUPE's reputation in this sense must be 
understood in relation to the particular importance of its general 
secretary, Bryn Roberts, in the development of the union. 
The internal and external- political practice of both NUPE and 
the FBU has been particularly marked by the long tenure of a general 
secretary who, in each case, served in that capacity for more than 
twenty-five years. John Horner was general secretary of the FBU from 
1939 to 1964. Bryn Roberts was general secretary of NUPE from 1934 
to 1962. During this time, both the FBU and NUPE developed from 
small, local organizations struggling to improve quite different 
local rates to national bodies negotiating relatively uniform tenns 
and conditions for their members across an entire industry. Their 
success in achieving this transformation meant that the internal and 
external political practice of each union was closely associated with 
the sty~e, personality and political predilections of the two general 
secretaries. Both in fact had reputations as outspoken socialists 
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and they generally held sway within their own unions in the 
articulation of their views. It is of historical note that Roberts's 
and Horner's predecessors shared a comparable orientation in their 
political practice. Jim Bradley, the founder of the FBU and its 
general secretary from 1922 to 1929, and Jack Wills, the general 
secretary of NUPE from 1925 to 1933, shared a similar orientation in 
their external political practice (see FBU, 1968; Radford, 1951; Dix 
and McKeown, 1968; and Fryer, 1982). Horner was a prominent member of 
the Communist Party. It has also been suggested· that the FEU 
executive was for a time dominated by CP members or sympathizers 
(Interview, 29 August 1980). However, along with other FEU 
officials, Horner resigned from the CP after the Hungarian uprising 
in 1956 (Wigham, 1961:126-127; 1969: 135). Upon retirement, he was 
elected as a Labour MP and remained very much identified with the 
left of the party (Interview, 29 August 1980; see also Muller, 1977: 
178). Roberts was also identified with the lert of the Labour Party, 
particularly the Bevanites in the 1950s, and remained a particularly 
outspoken critic of the conservatism of the TUC leadership (Craik, 
'1955; Bryn Roberts, 1961). Thus, both unions were identified as 
someWhere on the lert or TUC and Labour Party affiliate political 
practice. 
The FBU has been exceptionally active in terms of its external 
political practice. Harrison (1960: 204) referred to it as a 
'dissident left-wing union' noting that between 1945 and 1958 it 
submitted more resolutions and amendments to Labour Party Conferences 
than either the TGWU or GMWU. The FBU championed a wide range of 
causes and was particularly active in the Campaign for Nuclear 
Disarmament (FBU, 1968). ~ankin (1978a: 123) notes that it voted 
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regularly with the left at Party Conferences in the 1950s and 1960s. 
The volume of its activity, he suggests, stemmed from the ~belief 
that the union ought to take a positive political role' (ibid: 39). 
In terms of its internal political practice, the FBU held regular 
workplace branch ballots for all official positions. Horner's 
membership of the Communist Party, at least until 1956, along with 
some of the executive, suggests that there was an element of 
factionalism in these elections. Allen (1954: 201) some~at 
euphemistically observes that Horner's original election ~may have 
been decided by the influence of a determined political minority'. 
Edelstein and Warner (1979: 195) hold that there was continuous 
operation of factions within the FBU during the period of their 
investigation, from 1948 to 196~. However, they confess that their 
information on factional organization 'leaves something to be 
desired'. Interview evidence in this study suggests that 'formal' 
factions in the FBU diminished in importance with the departure of a 
number of leading figures in the union from the CPo Rather, there 
have been periodic, loose and varying alliances at executive level 
Which were not translated into inter-regional factional aotivity 
(Interviews, 10 and 18 July 1980). . . The internal politioal praotioe 
of the union, however, has generally been dominated by left aotivists 
of Whatever partioular persuasion, even though, as many activists 
aoknowledge, this is not necessarily an aocurate refleotion of the 
somewhat conservative, 'uniformed' membership (Interviews, 12 June 
and 10 July 1980). A regular feature of the union's journal,' 
The Firefighter, has been letters from members protesting about the 
volume of articles on 'po1itios' (see, i.e., FBUJ, Maroh, July-
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August, October 1914; December 1976). 
NUPE's external political practice has reflected Roberts's 
particular political vision, most important in which was the concern 
to defend and advance the union's partioular industrial position vis-
a-vis its competitors in the public sector. Although the general 
secretary of NUPE is appointed by and accountable to its exeoutive, 
NUPE has provided a classic example of general secretary dominance; 
what Turner (1962: 291) has labelled .. popular bossdom'. These are. 
unions in Which 'the relations Which aotually exist between the 
membership and key officials will depend very much on the latters' 
style of leadership'. Roberts's twenty-eight years at NUPE's helJn 
provided ample opportunity for ~im to exert his style of leadership. 
Indeed, Clegg (1979: 201) refers to Roberts's 'almost autocratic 
sway' over the union. He remained a 
centralization of power within the union. 
staunch advooate of the 
He opposed the devolution 
of power within unions, which he argued would exacerbate inter-union 
competition and thus, impede the development of industrial unionism. 
He even dissuaded the NUPE executive from its intention to appoint an 
assistant general secretary (Craik, 1968: 80-86). Certainly, the 
Union's external political praotice reflected this internal 
dominance. Thus, as was noted above and in conformity with Roberts's 
particular Vision, NUPE generally remained on the left of the Labour 
Party supporting, for instance, nationalization' in opposition to the 
the revisionists (see Minkin, 1978a: 127). 
There were, however, limits to unbridled 'officialdom' (on the 
case of NUPE, see Fryer, 1982; more generally, see HYman, 1971: 32-
33). Roberts's particular political vision, whatever its 
orientation, could not lead an indefinite existence independent of 
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NUPE's industrial and politioal realities (on the failure of many 
oommentators to link trade union 'politioal' behaviour to their 
'''industrial strategies" and their' refraotions within unions' 
internal relationships', see Hyman, 1983: 62). The predominant them~ 
in NUPE's external politioal discourse, primarily through the TUC, 
was that of rationalizing trade union struoture through industrial 
unionism. Such an industrial vision, indeed NUPE's sustaining myth, 
was, of course, related to its strategy of expansion in the face of 
significant inter-union competition. Thus, the union has regularly 
advocated the merits of industrial unionism within the TUC' and 
vehemently attacked the organizational conservatism of the general 
union leaderships (see, i.e., Roberts, ,1961; NUPE, 1963). Its 
leaders have in this sense argued the merits of enhanced 
interventionist powers on the part of the TUC (see, Craik, 1955: 184-
185). 
It was perhaps this self-conscious concern with union and 
industrial structure, if not with growth, which has more reoently led 
the union's leadership to re-examine internal politioal. and 
industrial practice. A concern to maintain its rhythm of expansion 
and campaigning effectiveness, what sustained the union's historio 
olaim to industrial unionism, was readily apparent in the union's 
1975 reorganization. Prompted by both the impending reorganization 
of local government, health and water authorities 'in 1974 and the 
growing workload on full-time officials result.!ng from the 
introduotion of local productivity bargaining in the publio sector, 
the union commissioned a Warwick University researoh team to 
investigate and make recommendations on possible changes in the 
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union's structure (Fryer et al., 1974; see also Undy et al, 1981: 
299-300). These resulting changes, sponsored by the union's 
leadership, sought to foster a new, more participative mode of union 
decision-making which would modifY substantially the union's 
traditions of centralization and membership reliance on full-time 
officers. Workplace, shop steward organizations were to be 
encouraged and integrated into the 'grass roots', internal government 
of the union; branch and district structures were realigned to 
correspond with the new administrative divisions within the sector; 
links between workplace organization and higher decisional instances 
within the union were clearly 'articulated and formalized; and it was, 
thus, intended that the union achieve an enhanced servicing and 
campaigning ability both nationally and locally (see Fryer et al., 
1974; NOPE, 1975b&c; Clegg, 1979: 217-218; Undy et al, 1981: 299-
300). It is of particular significance for an understanding of NUPE 
policies and industrial behaviour that these changes were implemented 
and first tried during the Social Contract incomes policies. In the 
case of NUPE, this is a theme which will reemerge in subsequent 
chapters. The apparent irony of the democratization was, of course, 
that it was sponsored quite strategically by fUll-time officials from 
, . 
the national office (Interviews with senior officials, various dates; 
Fryer (1982) was well-placed to provide a particularly sensitive 
analysis of this contradictory dynamic witin NUPE). 
The approach of both NUPE and the FBU to past incomes policies 
cannot be dissociated from their common problem of how to define and 
pursue an effective bargaining policy in their oentralized public 
sector negotiating machinery. Each has been involved since the 
Second World War in a system of national bargaining with local 
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authority representatives. National negotiations were partioularly 
important beoause nationally-determined rates aocounted for a 
relatively high peroentage of earnings for members of both unions. 
On the basis of 1966 figures, for instance, the oomposition of the 
average firefighter's earnings consisted of 93.1 per cent from basic 
pay, 5.3 per cent from overtime earnings and just 1.6 per cent from 
other pay such as local allowances (calculated from Appendix 4, NBPI, 
1967a). This ratio remained virtually the same in 1975. Basio pay 
accounted for 92.9 per cent of earnings and overtime for 4.9 per 
cent. Comparable figures indicate that firefighters' basio rates 
were significantly more important than for the average male manual 
worker who in the same y'ear gained 74.2 per oent of earnings from 
basic rates, 14.3 per cent from overtime and 11.6 percent from 
productivity schemes, shift bonuses and other payments (see Fa.llick 
and Elliot, 1981: 151). Similarly, Fryer et al (1974) found that 
until the mid- to late 1960s the amount of local bargaining within 
NUPE was negligible and a high proportion of its members' earnings 
was determined nationally. On the basis of all nationally-determined 
rates inoluding overtime, London allowances and shift premiums, they 
estimated the proportion of earnings determined at this level to be 
87.6 per oent in 1963, 86.2 per oent in 1974 and 78 per oent in 1975. 
The national focus of bargaining has certainly highlighted the 
key role of national leadership in both unions, as should be apparent 
from the importance of Horner and Roberts in the evolution of their 
respective unions. Both their location in the publio sector and the 
structure of the employers' representation have also contributed to 
the importanoe of political action in the pursuit of their bargaining 
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strategies. The employer side in both the fire service and looal 
authority manual worker negotiations is politically mixed 
representing both Labour- and Conservative-controlled local 
authorities. This type of multilateral bargaining has meant that 
political action and public campaigns, both national and local, have 
been important vehicles in the bargaining policy of each of the 
unions. Major changes in the terms and conditions of their members 
have more often come about as a result of public inquiry than of 
negotiation or industrial aotion, though in the 1970s industrial 
action became an important method of securing a public inquiry. 
During the 1940s and 1950s, both unions regularly had recourse to the 
industrial courts for arbitration. They were also profoundly 
influenced by separate references to the National Board for Prices 
and Incomes in the 1960s (see NBPI,- 1967a & b). The importance of 
public sympathy and political action further stimulated the 
leadership of the two unions to launch public campaigns to improve 
the pay and conditions of their members. The FBU has promoted 
successive campaigns to achieve a re-evaluation of the role and skill 
of the firefighter. This resulted in various inquiries in the 19705 
which would provide important arguments in the FBU's eventual 
challenge to the Phase III guidelines in 1977-1978 (see Holroyd, 
1970; Cunningham, 1971; also, Chapters 7 and 8). From the late 1960s 
and during the 1970s, NUPE played an increasingly prominent role in 
successive campaigns to tackle low pay (see, i.e., Fisher and Dix, 
1974). As in the case of ASTMS discussed above, a high publio 
profile was also a useful recruiting device for NUPE Which grew 
rapidly in the face of fierce inter-union competition within the 
sector. 
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Incomes policies have tended to be perceived by FEU and NUPE 
members as more restrictive than for their 'private sector 
counterparts: first, because there has been extremely limited scope 
for wage drift in the public sector occupations covered by these two 
unions; secondly, because it was felt that the government as employer 
often applied incomes policies more rigorously to its own employees 
than to those in the private sector. As was noted in the sections on 
the GMWU, TGWU and AUEW above, the post-war period was charaoterized 
by a growing wage drift in the private sector in whioh workplace 
bargaining, as opposed to the national negotiation of wage rates, 
played an increasingly significant role in the determination of 
earnings and working conditions. There was generally some element of 
fair comparison or comparability in the determination of public 
sector wages with the movement of those in the private sector (Clegg, 
1979: 109). However, the unions maintained that local authority 
employer representatives more frequently made reference to movements 
in wage rates (see, i.e., TUCR, 1965: 486). Incomes policy 
guidelines generally applied to rates more than earnings. Thus, a 
recurrent theme on the part of both NUPE and the FBU was that fair 
comparisons could only be made on the basis of earnings. '!be FBU 
general secretary repeatedly argued that the TUC must seek 'a formula 
for settling wages in the public service that is more equitable than 
simple comparability with wage rate movements.' and solve what he 
perceived as the problem of a built-in disparity between wage rates 
and earnings (TUCR, 1964: 451-452; TUC, 1965: 50; TUCR , 1968; 625 and 
1969: 610). NUPE leaders made Similar arguments. Indeed, the 
union's executive readily endorsed the possibility of pursuing 
252 
productivity schemes for local government and health service manual 
workers as suggested in the Prices and Incomes Board Report No. 29 
(NBPI, 1967b) because 'it presents • ~ • a real opportunity to close 
the gap between the earnings of public employees and those of 
comparable workers' (NUPEJ, June 1967; see also Craik, 1968: 107-108; 
Dix and McKeown, 1968). 
Both NUPE and the FBU have also protested against what thQy 
perceived as the inequity of a differential effect of incomes 
policies on government employees. The Conservative government's 
1961-1962 'pay pause' was probably 'the first clear example of 
government discrimination against the public sector' (Wincbester, 
1983: 164-165). It incited protests from both unions (see FBU, 1968; 
and NOPE, 1963). However, both NOPE and the FBU have been caught on 
a number of other occasions by the introduction of a Labour 
government pay policy and asked either to defer or to drop a claim in 
order to comply with the new wage guidelines. The FBU vehemently 
protested against government interference with its negotiations in 
1948-1949 and clearly blamed the 'wage freeze' for the loss of its 
much valued parity with the police who were able to get a special 
award despite the policy (see TUCR, 1950: 540-541; Radford, 1951: 
179). Indeed, Kahn (1962: 178) notes that the 1948.1950 pay policy 
was highly effective in the fire service. It can thus probably be 
inferred that Tables 4.1 and 4.2 understate the degree of FBU 
opposition to incomes policy because it is most likely that \.the 
FBU opposed the policy on the three occasions when observations were 
not aVailable during this period. Not only was the leadership of the 
union politically opposed to pay policy, but the speoifio polioy had 
particularly severe industrial oonsequences for FBU members. The 
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July 1966 wage standstill invalidated or delayed settlements that bad. 
already been reached by both the FBU and NUPE, resulting in 
references to the Prices and Incomes Board. While the leaders of 
both unions had been willing to support the operation of the 
voluntary policy in 1964-1965, they opposed the freeze and many of 
the policies that followed. Indeed, the FBU opposed the policy even 
before the freeze noting that 'the voluntary participation aspect of 
prices and incomes policy • • has completely disappeared' (TUeR, 
1965: 486). The FBU executive appeared so incensed about the freeze 
that it later proposed that the TUe 'oppose all forms of legislation 
restricting the implementation of trade union negotiated settlements' 
(TUCR, 1967: 638). Both NUPE and the FBU were also directly affected 
by the Heath government's 1972 wage freeze and they opposed it and 
subsequent policies (see Chapter 3). Thus, both unions have 
frequently attacked the effect of inoomes policies, partioularly what 
they perceived as the inequities propagated by rigid wage norms in 
the public sector. 
This dissatisfaction with the impact of sucoessive incomes 
policies on public seotor workers was a prime factor in the general 
upsurge in public sector militancy in the late 19603 and 19703. Both 
NUPE and FBU members have experienced an increasing impulse towards 
industrial action. This erupted in unofficial action on the part of 
NUPE members in 1969 followed by official strike action in local 
government services in 1970 and in the health service in 1973. 
Similarly, the FBU was involved in limited Unofficial action in 
London in 1968 and 1969 and in a more extensive strike in Glasgow in 
1973. 
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The 1967 Prioes and Inoomes Board report created partioular 
problems for the FBU. In lieu of produotivity inoreases which were 
difficult to achieve in a service such as firefight1ng, it 
reoommended that firemen who were 'prepared to extend their hours of 
availability from forty-eight to fifty-six hours a week' could 
inorease their pay through a oonsolidated bonus shift without loss of 
effioienoy to the Fire Service (NBP!, 1967a: 10-13, 17). The FBU 
executive left it to the disoretion of individual brigades whether to 
operate the bonus shift or not. Most brigades ohose to abandon the 
forty-eight hour week and to re-implement the fifty-six hour 
sohedule, an ironio reversal of the reduced working hours that they 
had long campaigned for and only just achieved. The significant 
exception was the Glasgow brigade. Undermanned at the time, overtime 
work was readily available. The Glasgow brigade chose to work casual 
overtime, rather than the bonus shift. This allowed greater choice 
and flexibility in hours. This option, however, soon created an 
anamaly as the bonus shift was consolidated in the calculation of 
pensions and other benefits, whereas normal overtime was not. As 
'earnings continued to lag behind and bargaining results were 
restricted by successive pay poliCies, widespread dissatisf~ctiO~ 
resulted in sporadic unofficial action in a number of localities and 
an attempt to form a break-away union in the London brigade (see, 
i.e., FT, 19 November 1969; 24 September, 22 December 1970; and 8 
October 1971; also ACAS, 1977: 85-105). Indeed, there were 
sutfioient problems in the Fire Service to commission successive 
inqUiries in 1970 and 1971, the latter of which recommended ,a move to 
a torty-eight hour week (Holroyd, 1970; Cunningham, 1971). 
The increasing pressures on the system of national bargaining 
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were evident as local brigades, contrary to union policy, attempted 
to negotiate various "plus' payments to supplement their earnings. 
These pressures culminated in Glasgow where dissatisfaction was so 
intense that it led to a ten day, unofficial strike, the first rull-
scale withdrawal of labour in the history of the fire service, and 
the suspension of local officials by the national union executive 
(Interviews, 18 July, 29 August, 22 and 23 September 1980; see also 
The Times, 10 October 1973; FT, 26 October 1973; DT, 30 October 
1973). Despite the FBU's official opposition to the dispute, it was 
probably because of it that the employers shortly thereafter met the 
union's long-standing demand and conceded the principle or the forty-
eight hour week to be implemented the following year (see FBUJ, 
November 1913). Moreover, pressures within the FBU remained very 
strong. The subsequent .internal discussions culminated in the 
union's controversial policy decision in 1974 to ban all overtime 
upon implementation of the new, reduced working hours (FBUJ, 
November, 1974). This was envisaged as a way of focusing attention 
on the need to improve national rates and would lead, as is discussed 
in Chapter 8, to the FBU's challenge to the Labour government's Phase 
III pay policy in 1977-1978. 
Leading officials in both unions acknowledged that the 
experience of unofficial industrial action had a profound impact on 
attitudes within their unions (Interviews, 10 July, 29 August, 14 
October and 14 November, 1980). Industrial action had hitherto been 
regarded as almost unthinkable in the ~rime public service 
occupations such as firefighting, refuse collection, hospital 
ancillary work, school maintenance and meal preparation and nursing. 
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The experience of industrial action challenged lethargic bargaining 
practices on the' part of many officials, greatly stimulated the 
development of workplace union organization, and encouraged the 
growth of a new generation of public sector activists and offioials. 
This invigoration of bargaining practice no doubt made both NUPE and 
the FBU less acquiescent bargaining partners inasmuch as it 
stimulated workplace pressures on national union leaderships. The 
development of this new publio sector militancy, thus, made both NUPE 
and FBU officials less receptive to pay policy if, as was invariably 
the case, the policy was designed to restrict wage rate increases or 
if acceptance of such policies exposed them to undue membership 
pressure. 
Yet, both unions have continued to be preoccupied by the problem 
of pay determination in the public sector. Certainly, neither 
appeared wedded to the free-market determination of wages and both 
have consistently advocated the merits of planning within the Labour 
Party and the TUC. Their bargaining strategies have generally 
revolved around the search for some kind of mechanism Whereby 'fair' 
comparisons could be made to improve the wages of their members. The 
leaders of both NUPE and the FBU have aoknowledged that'if suoh 
mechanisms were inherently olose to incomes polioy, then they must be 
of a more equitable variety than what had hitherto been the case. 
As is suggested by the somewhat different profiles emerging from 
Tables 4.1 and 4.2, NUPE! representatives have more readi ly embraoed 
the ooncept of incomes pOlioy than ha ve those of the FBU. This is 
possibly due to both different political traditions and different 
bargaining coverage and strategies. The FBU's opposition was 
considerably more outspoken in the late 1940s when its leaderShip was 
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prominently linked with the Communist Party which opposed the wage 
restraint policy (see, i.e., TUCR, 1948: 495). While the FBU 
certainly remained on the left of TUe political practice 1n the 
1960s, its discourse on pay policy was less frequently 'anti-
capitalist' and more specifically industrial. FBUbargaining policy 
was until the 1950s dominated by its claim for parity with the pollce 
(see FBU,1968; Radford, 1951; Wootton, 1955: 133-134). Thereafter, 
the principal preoccupation was the effect on firefighters of the 
growing disparity between wage rates and earnings. Thus, FBU leaders 
expressed their opposition to the effects of particular policies, 
particularly when they directly interfered with negotiated 
settlements. However, they often came close to accepting "the logic 
of some kind of incomes policy. Indeed, prior to the 1966 wage 
freeze, the union's general secretary, Terry Parry, noted that, as 
the union was in the public service and not in the free market, 'it 
1s natural then that we are nat questioning the wisdom of the price 
freeze and an incomes policy' (TUC, 1965: 50). Rather, union 
spokespersons questioned the equity of specifio aspects of the 19608 
polioies, such as controls on prices and profits, and partioularly 
requested that they should address the problems of groups of workers 
such as the firefighters who were excluded from incentives sohemes 
(ibid; TUCR, 1968: 625 and 1969: 610). 
The NUPE leadership has consistently attempted to link notions 
of economic planning and incomes policy with a more rational 
system of wage bargaining, the reform of trade union structure and an 
enhanced TUC role in the coordination of its affiliates. This 
support for a positive incomes policy was a logical extension of its 
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advocacy of industrial unionism and a refleotion of its cwn broad 
bargaining coverage and strategy. Bryn Roberts was a particularly 
persistent advocate of reforms in trade union struoture and a more 
powerful TUC role in bargaining (see, i.e., Bryn Roberts, 1961; also 
Craik, 1955: 184.185). In 1953, for instance, he argued that the TUC 
should investigate the possibility of 'a long-term wage policy ••• 
which will ensure higher, more stable and more equitable wage 
standards to all seotions of the Movement' and that ,it should further 
oonsider 'the ohanges, if any, which may be necessary in the practioe 
and organization of the trade unions in order to give effeot to suoh 
a polioy' (NUPE motion at the 1953 TUC,cited in Wootton, 1955: 118). 
NUPE remained a strong supporter of planning in the 1960s (see, 
i.e., TUCR, 1964: 449). Indeed, it was in the hope of resolving the 
problem of low pay in the publio seotor that NUPE first moved a 
referenoe to the Prices and Incomes Board in 1966 and then supported 
its findings (see above; also, Fryer, 1982). NUPE leaders, however, 
were basically disappointed with the results of the 1960s pay 
policies. As one official put it, the union was not against incomes 
polioy in prinoiple. Rather, it had voted against particular pay 
po licies because they had not done anything for the low paid 
(Interview, 6 Ootober, 1980). However, they also believed that a 
return to free colleotive bargaining would not solve the problem of 
low pay (Fisher and Dix, 1974: 45). Thus, in the early 1970s NUPE 
moved away from the voluntarist position of the large, general unions 
and beoame perhaps the leading advocate of a national minimum wage. 
As opposed to a 'negative policy of unilateral Government wage 
restraint', this, it was argued, would be 'a polioy jointly generated 
by the unions and a Sooia list Governmen't intended to favour the 
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working class by assisting the low paid' (ibid: 46). For the NUPE 
leadership, therefore, the key element of the new Social Contract was 
to be a common strategy on low pay. 
By the early Social Contract period, therefore, both NUPE and 
the FBU demonstrated a oertain ambivalenoe on the question of wages 
policy. Both had accumulated a number of specific grievances about 
the impact of past incomes polioies on the wages and conditions of 
their members. Both opposed wage freezes and policies that did not 
tackle earnings other than wages and prices. Neither union 
leadership subsoribed to the view that wage increases accounted for 
the rapid increase in the rate of price inflation. Yet, both 
continued to grapple with the problem of pay determination in the 
public sector, with particular reference, of course, to their own. 
memberships. The FBU with its relatively small and specialized 
membership tended to concentrate on a narrower range of comparisons, 
rather than global schemes for the determination of public sector 
pay. The FBU leadership, faced with mounting internal pressures, was 
by 19714 primarily concerned with a major redefinition of the role and 
earnings of the firefighter. It had, therefore, sponsored a 
contentious ban on overtime which further increased internal 
pressures for increases in earnings. NOPE, with its larger, low-paid 
membership and virtual seotoral ooverage, tended to address more 
maoro-economio sohemes for wage bargaining, p.lanning and the 
alleviation of problems of low pay. Its leaders had argued the case 
for wages planning and a 'positive incomes polioy' that would 
effectively tackle the problem of low pay. By 1974 NUPE had fooused 
its campaigning activities almost exolusively on the question of low 
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pay and the achievement of a national minimum wage. Its acceptance 
of any type of incomes policy was therefore contingent on the 
provisions of such a policy for the low-paid. Given that Jack Jones 
was also a staunch advocate of the cause of the low-paid, it was not 
entirely coincidental, as is noted in Chapter 5, that a central 
provision of the Social Contract Mark I policy was its scope for 
greater increases in earnings by the low-paid. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to provide an historical overview of 
the approach of British trade unions to post-war incomes policies, 
particularly those implemented by Labour governments with varying 
degrees of TUC support. More particularly, it has identified 
patterns of opposition and support for such policies among the sample 
unions in this study and investigated the internal dynamics of these 
individual union positions. To conclude this chapter, t'WO summary 
points are addressed briefly. First, What were the principal union 
approaches to incomes policy? Secondly, what were the key 
determinants of these different approaches? 
Chapter 3 explored some of the numerous differences within and 
between TUC affiliates as regards their approaches to incomes policy. 
In the case of the sample unions, this chapter has attempted to add 
both organizational and historical dimensions to these differences. 
There are, in fact, a number of common aspects in their approaohes. 
First, all of the sample unions were generally opposed to statutory 
intervention in wage determination. Even the most ardent advocates of 
incomes policy, the GMWU throughout much of the post-war period, the 
TGWU during Deakin's years as general seoretary, and the AUEW during 
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the first years of the 1960s Labour government while Lord Carron was 
still its president, did not support government regulation of wages. 
Rather, they supported the notion of voluntary polioies and remained 
profoundly wedded to this concept of voluntarism, to the extent of 
opposing even a statutory minimum wage. Similarly, both NUPE and the 
FBU changed their support of Labour government pay policies in the 
19608 to opposition when it was judged that 'the voluntary aspeot of 
prices and incomes policy' had been eroded (see, i.e., TUCR, 1965: 
486). ASTMS, the remaining sample union, remained quite simply 
categorically opposed to government intervention in wage 
determination, statutory or otherwise. Secondly, all of the sample 
unions remained formally opposed to wage restraint. there appears to 
be no ev idence of groups of workers campaigning for either lower 
levels of wages or wage restraint. More commonly, in any of the 
unions that did at some point support wage moderation, there were. 
numerous examples of groups within those unions vehemently protesting 
this policy orientation. Thirdly, all of the samp le unions were 
affiliated to both the TUe and the Labour Party and, as such, 
remained open to appeals from these organizations, subject to their 
calls for unity and solidarity. 
Differences in degree within these common approaches to pay 
policy, however, led to quite distinct organizational profiles. 
First, the degree of attachment to the prinoiple of voluntarism 
varied quite markedly between the sample unions. While all were 
opposed to 'statutory intervention' reflecting an historic aversion 
to the ro le of the courts in industria 1 re lations (see Wedderburn, 
1971), some of the sample unions were quite prepared to consider 
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other possibilities of intervention; indeed, such intervention was 
integral to their bargaining policies. ASTMS, the AUEW and the TOWU 
remained strongly opposed to external intervention in wage 
bargaining, with the possible exception of an occasional voluntary 
reference to arbitration in the case of a weakly organized group of 
workers or a particularly recalcitrant employer. The FBU, GMWU and 
NUPE, on the other hand, were more inclined to integrate external 
intervention in their bargaining policies as a solution to the 
problems of either low payor public sector wage determination. 
These same differences tended to be reflected in the preparedness of 
the sample unions to accept TUC intervention in wage bargaining as 
both the GMWU and NUPE consistently advocated an enhanced TUC role. 
Secondly, the sample unions or their respective leaderships also 
differed in degree as regards their willingness to consider the 
possibility of wage restraint, especially in relation to requests 
from Labour governments. This willingness must· be understood, as 
discussed in Chapter 3, in the context of different ideological 
approaches to inflation, the role of collective bargaining therein 
and the nature of trade union relations with the state. Some union 
leaders were clear ly willing to consider their wage bargaining 
behaviour in relation to national economic performance; others were 
only inclined to do so at the request of Labour governments; and yet 
others were prepared to consider voluntary modifications in wage 
bargaining behaviour at the request of Labour governments if they did 
not entail wage restraint. Frank Cousins was, of course, the most 
important proponent of this latter approach arguing that the TOWU 
would not accept a polioy of wage restraint, but it was willing to 
embrace the notion of 'a planned growth of incomes' in conoert with 
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a Labour government, provided that this did not impinge on the 
prinoiple of voluntary oollective bargaining. As was suggested in 
Chapter 3, Jack Jones, the driving force in the Sooial Contract 
negotiations between the TUC and the Labour Party, maintained a 
virtually identical approach in the early 1970s. 
This survey of the dynamics of sample union approaches to 
incomes policies suggests that there are quite distinct 
organizational profiles ,on this question. What are the key 
determinants of these different approaches? It would appear from the 
analysis of the sample unions that a number of factors influenc.e 
union policy orientations. As was argued in Chapter 1, incomes 
policies generally affect unions' industrial and political practice. 
In doing so, they create a unique set of problems and tensions for 
trade unions as intermediary organizations. Certainly, there can be 
no simple explanation for the different collective bargaining 
postures of the sample unions, but it 1s possible to identifY the key 
sets of variables. These include the composition of membership and 
industrial location, collective bargaining policy, and internal and vi 
external political practice. However, no single factor is 
determinant. 
The composition of a union's membership and its industrial 
location are clearly very significant in the determinatien ef unien 
appreaches to. pay pelicy. The FBU and NUPE, for instance, share the 
common problems of a manual membership located exc lusi ve ly in the 
public sector. Although often similar, their profiles en pay pelicy 
have been far from identical. The composition of the TGWU and GMWU 
"1 
I 
memberships is broadly comparable, general manual werkers located 
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across a wide range of industries, indeed often the same ones. Yet, 
their profiles on incomes polic~es have been markedly different. The 
AUEW and ASTMS also share a common perspective in the defence of 
their skilled members, even though the AUEW also has a large general 
membership_ While ASTMS has been a consistent opponent of pay 
policy, the AUEW profile has displayed marked variations which could 
not be easily explained by shifts in the composition of membership or 
the defence of their particular wages and working conditions. 
Union collective bargaining poliCies provide further important 
insights into orientations to pay policy_ They represent a certain 
strategic conception of both the defence and advancement of existing 
members' working conditions in particular industrial contexts and the 
possibilities for consolidation and expansion of the union 
organization. These mayor may not be compatible with the definition 
of wage guidelines external to the union-employer rel~tionshlp. 
There appears to be a olose link between TaWU opposition to incomes 
policy in the 19605, for instance, and the development of a distinct 
bargaining policy. Similarly, GMWU leaders have explioitly linked 
their espousal of incomes polioies with the defence of their members' 
labour market position. NUPE and FBU leaders ba ve also argued at 
various times that the determination of the wages and working 
oonditions of their public sector members was scarcely incompatible 
with the operation of incomes policies, though that by no means 
entailed unqualified support for all pay policies, especially those 
that were targeted at wage rates rather than earnings. Conversely, 
ASTMS leaders have argued, either explicitly or implicitly, that the 
defence of their members and the expansion of their organization were 
incompatible with wage policy guidelines. 
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Such collective bargaining policies are, however, characterized 
by their organizational specificity. In this sense, they are 
defined, as Arthur Ross (1948) has suggested, through a political 
process. Collective bargaining policies are, therefore, subject to a 
range of influences internal and external to the union. Moreover, 
even when a union has a well defined bargaining policy, which 1s not 
always the case, support or opposition on pay policy questions might 
arise despite rather than because of collective bargaining policy or 
involve important shifts in existing policy. Shifts in AUEW policy, 
for instance, are not easily accounted for by the union's collective, 
bargaining policy. Finally, collective bargaining policies or 
strategies are just as likely to be emergent a's deliberate, the 
result of a stream of actions, rather than any readily identifiable 
policy decision (on these distinctions, see Mintzberg and Waters, 
1985). Thus, collective bargaining policy can clearly be significant 
in the determination of union approaches to incomes po 1 icy., However, 
it is the highly specific product of political processes both 
internal and external to the union. Sometimes, it might act as an 
autonomous influence. At other times, it might emerge in tandem with 
a particular approach to pay policy, shaped by the same political 
process. This points to the need for analysis of unions' internal 
and external political practice for an understanding of union' 
approaches to incomes policy. 
Internal political practice, as it is shaped and condItioned by 
the particular structure and culture of a union, provides important 
clues to continuities and discontinuities in union policy and the 
degree of leadership discretion in policy-making. Historical 
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specificity must ultimately playa key role in any explanation of 
union political behaviour. Why, for instance, has ASTMS historically 
struck a 'radical' position when it would seem that the nature of its 
membership would predispose it to a more' conservative set of 
policies? This is also the case with the FBU. Why should an 
organization with its quasi-military ranks and disciplinary 
procedures strike a position on the left of the TUC7 The 
explanations of these types of orientation in internal and external 
political practice are historically contingent rather than 
deterministic. However, trade unions, as repositories of these 
historical contingencies, possess particular structures and cultures 
which contribute to their approach to pay policy. The AUEW's 
complex, multi-tiered structure and culture of rigid political 
factions, for instance, is crucial to any explanation of the marked 
shifts in its official policy~ Conversely, the system of government 
in the GMWU and its associated political culture is significant in 
explaining the high degree of continuity in its approach to incomes 
policy. In the case of the TGWU, it might be suggested that the. 
degree of leadership discretion can at least partially account for 
both continuitiesand changes in its approach to Labour government 
incomes policies. 
Changes in leadership can be indicative of ohanges and trends 
which are generalized throughout a union. They oan alao bring 
substantive policy changes in and of themselves, particularly where 
the degree of leadership discretion is high. Tho TGWU would seem to 
meet both of these oriteria in its change of approach to inoomes 
po licy with the election of Cousins as leader in 1956. The AUEW 
experienced a similar transformation with the election of Scanlon to 
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the presidency in 1966, though his election was more indicative of 
changes already taking place than it was of a particular leadership 
discretion to effect policy changes. In this sense, it is Important 
to assess whether changes in officia 1 po licy orientation represent 
substantive changes in union industrial and political activities or 
only nominal changes in the internal pO.licy process. This requires· 
consideration, inter alia, of the structure of pollcy-making. 
Internal political practice is certainly influenced by the 
structure of union policy-making. Of particular importanoe is the 
link between industrial policy-making and other or 'political' 
policy-making. Such a distinction can often obscure more. than 
inform. Incomes policy is the perfect example of the inseparability 
of industrial and political issues. Indeed, as was argued in Chapter 
1, this is the interest of examining union approaches to pay policy 
and the impact of pay policies on trade unions. It is sltJ.ficant, 
however, that consent to incomes policy is often treated as a 
'political' rather than an 'industrial' question. As such, it is 
dealt with independent of industrial issues in unions with a clearly 
bifUrcated structure such as the GMWU, TGWU and ASTMS. On the other 
hand, incomes policies would be treated on the same agenda as many 
industrial items in the AUEW, the FBU and, to a degree, NUPE. This 
di v ision of labour in certain unions and not others has important 
implications for the internal political process of incomes polioies. 
Moreover, it raises questions about the actual meaning of policy 
commitments either to support or oppose incomes polioies, 
particularly in terms of industrial behaviour. The significance of 
sample union policy positions on pay policy for the internal 
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politioal process will be of central concern in investigating the 
anatomy of the Social contract incomes policies in subsequent 
chapters. 
External politioal practice also exerts a significant influence 
on 'internal political practice, particularly at leadership level. 
Certain unions, or more acourately their leaders, have played a 
crucial mediating role in the determination of TUC policy. Labour 
Party policy, and also in the tenor of TUC relations with govemment., 
The intermediary nature of the relationship has meant that individual 
union policy and the political process which determines it are 
affected by external developments as much as they influence these 
developments. The leaders of the TGWU, GMWU t and AUEW, as opposed to 
those of ASTMS, NUPE, and the FBU, have by dint of the size of their 
unions and their particular location in the hierarchy of TUC policy-
making played orucial brokerage roles. In this sense, the results of 
their particular internal political processes have mattered more 
externally than is the case with the sma ller unions. By the same 
token, the capacity of external agents or intermediaries to influence 
that internal political process is affected by the prevalence of 
partioular politioal traditions,rationalities and strategies within 
individual unions. Certainly, the most important example is that of 
'labourism' or loyalty to the Labour Party; though this might also 
apply to solidarity with TUe policy positions. 
As Labour Party affiliates, it seems that all of the sample 
unions have at some point been willing to embrace policies 
promulgated by a Labour government that they would not otherwise 
accept from a Conservative government. However, some union 
leaderships have been willing to go much further 1n this direction 
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than others. The leadership of th~ GMWU has, for instanoe, 
demonstrated an exceptional willingness to align, if not subordinate, 
some of its objectives with those of the Parliamentary leader3bip of 
the Labour Party. On the other hand, the culture of loyalty to the 
'needs' of the Labour Party would seem to exert a less important 
influence among the white-collar members of ASTMS than many of the 
other unions, even though the leadership of ASTMS has for a yariety 
of reasons cultivated an exceptionally high policy profile in both 
the TUC and the Labour Party. Important elements in the internal 
political culture of a number of the sample unions, especially the 
AUEW and the FEU, have displayed a more 'oppositional' rationality. 
As discussed in Chapter 3 and applied to incomes policies, this 
implied that there was little, if any, scope under the existing 
economic system to discuss with either Labour or Conservative 
governments the distribution of wages. The relative strength of such 
rationalities in unions' internal political practice Is, along with a 
variety of other pertinent organizational variables, important in 
,determining the susceptibility of a particular union leader to 
external political arguments. It would be interesting to extend this 
consideration of the interaction between external and internal 
political practice and its impact on approaches to pay policy to the 
case of a union affiliated to the TUe, but not to the Labour Party. 
Chapter 5 will briefly consider the case of the National Association 
of Local Government Officers (NALGO) in the context of the TUe's 
voluntary pay guidelines. Otherwise, this is a gap in the sample of 
this study which could be usefully reotified in further research. 
What emerges then from this analysis of sample union approaches 
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to incomes policies are a range of specific organizational profiles 
ranging from total opposition to qualified support.' What ~s the 
position of the sample unions in this study in early 19741. ASTMS 
remained . categorically opposed to the concept of incomes polioies. 
This was also the official position of, the AUEW J althovgh its 
president, Hugh Scanlon, had been personally impressed by the 
possibilities of a bargain with Heath in the TUC-Government talks in 
1972 (see Chapter 3). Tne TGWU was also clearly opposed to pay 
policies inasmuch as they entailed either wage restrablt or 
intervention in voluntary collective bargaining. Howeve~, it 
remained open to the possibilities of a 'planned growth or real 
incomes' in the context of a Labour government. NUPE and tile FBU 
were also opposed to formal incomes policies, but they both continued 
to grapple with the problems of pay determination in the public 
sector. In this regard, NUPE with its broader membership coverage 
was more concerned with a global solution to these problems and was 
therefore possibly less averse to the concept of wage planning. 
Finally, the leadership of the GMWU openly espoused What it perceived 
-as the merits of a voluntary incomes policy and argued that the TUC 
should take the lead in designing such a policy. 
Given this range of individual polioy positions on the qaestion, 
it is scarcely surprising that the TUC policy shOUld appear 
profoundly ambiguous as regards the role that it might play in a 
Social Contraot counter-inflation policy. As was argued in Chapter 
3, the TUC was not in a position to endorse openly the concept of 
incomes policy because of these internal political constraints. Yet, 
the General Council was willing to exert a more interventionist 
stance to resolve the miners' strike and TUC leaders were alearly 
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aware that the leadership of the Parliamentary Labour Party was 
primarily interested in a trade union commitment to incomes policy in 
return for the implementation of the Social Contract programme. 
Chapter 5 will trace the development of these tensions between the 
TUC and the new Labour government. 
As regards the determinants of the different positions taken by 
the sample unions, the link between pay and politics is olearly 
important, but the nature of and continuities and discontinuities in 
that link are subject to the influence of a variety of factors. This 
would appear to support Hyman's contention (1983: 65) that union 
mediation between membership and external forces, in other words 
policy formulation' and implementation and the political processes 
Which affect ,them, 'operates ~ithin an area of autonomous influence, 
but this autonomy is likely to vary according to material, and 
historical context'. Thus, union approaches to incomes pOlioy are 
likely to vary between unions and even within unions over time. 
Their analysis requires a sensitivity to a range of faotors, 
partioularly membership composition and, industrial location, 
colleotive bargaining policy, and internal and external politioal 
practice. The second part of Chapter 3 and Chapter 4 have attempted 
to establish the empirical case for the analysis of the internal 
dynamios of incomes polioies. As was argued in Chapter 1, the 
external dyanmica of incomes policies, at the level of policy-making 
within the TUC and the Labour Party and between the TUe and the 
government, are clearly contingent on these internal dynamics. They 
also oondition them. The interface between the internal and external 
dynamics of incomes policy, perhaps What might be termed the 
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dialectic between them, will be a central theme through the remainder 
of this study. Chapters 5 and 6 will be centrally concerned with the . 
external dynamics of the Social Conctract incomes policies. Chapters 
7 and S'will, in the case of the sample unions, examine the internal 
dynamics of these same policies and their implications tor the 
ultimate fate of the Social Contract incomes policies. 
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CHAPTER 5 
THE VOLUNTARY PAY GUmELINES 19711-1975 
Chapters 2 and 3 traced the origins and formulation of the 
Sooial Contract between the TUe and the Labour P_arty.. This chapter' 
.' . 
examines the creation and operation of a voluntary incomes policy 
during the first sixteen months of the new Labour Government in 1974-
1975. This period will be referred to as the Social Contraot 'Mark 
I'. In tracing the development of TUG-Government relations during 
this period, the chapter focuses on the disoussions on pay 
bargaining, the implementation of a voluntary pay policy informally 
administered by the TUC, and the increasing pressures for a more 
draconian set of measures. The central conoern is, therefore, with 
TUC 'policy-making: its searoh to develop a coordinated bargaining 
strategy which would limit the expression of inflationary pressures 
in return for both access to government and the implementation of 
policies agreed within the Liaison COmmittee, the determinants of and 
limits on its capacity to construct suoh a strategy, and the 
operation of this policy of voluntary restraint. Since the Sooial 
Contraot Mark I was but one episode in the longer history of Soaial 
Contract incomes polioies, it also seeks to assess signifioanoe of 
the evolution of relations between the TUG and the Government for the 
competing conoeptions of the Sooial Contraot and how the relative 
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failure of the lUC's voluntary guidelines led to much tighter phases 
of incomes policy between 1975 and ,1979. 
Throughout the 1974-1975 period, the TUe wa~ constantly 
preoccupied with the Question of incomes policy. It should be clear 
from Chapters 2 and 3 that despite ,the pressur~s from the leadership 
of the PLP, the TUC representatives had consistently sought to avoid 
any formal commitment to an incomes policy in their Liaison Committee 
discussions. There were several reasons for this. It was 
politically unfeasible to commit the Congress to an incomes polioy in 
the future when it was at the same time expressing its opposition to 
the Heath Government pay policies. More importantly, the leadership 
of the TUC was far from united in a belief in either the efficaoy, 
practioability or desirability of such policies. The decentralized 
structure of collective bargaining 1n Britain, the veritable 
"Achilles Heel' of British incomes policies, made it difficult to 
exert any form of centralized control in the realm of pay bargaining. 
The lesson of post-war British incomes poliCies seemed to be that 
cen,tralized controls invariably led to a host of anomalies in 
differentials, relativities and other wage oomparisons whioh rapidly 
eroded the legitimacy of the policies and ultimately led to their 
breakdown. The internal authority of the TUC basically reflected 
this bargaining reality. It had few real powers over the bargaining 
aotivities of its affiliates except in extraordinary Circumstances, 
such as the miners' conflict, where it had. limited powers of 
intervention to explore the possibilities of dispute settlement when 
significant numbers of other TUC members were affeoted. A search for 
a solution to this crisis had, in fact, pushed the TUe to a more or 
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less explicit undertaking to abide by the provisions of Stage Three. 
The new Labour Government was clearly counting on the TUe to maintain 
its offer in return for a settlement to.the dispute. The TUe 
representatives on the Liaison Committee had also indioated that 
trade unionists would respond favourably to the new b?rgaining 
climate once a Labour Government had begun to implement the SOcial 
Contraot policies in concert with the trade union movement. It was 
not olear, however, how such a promise would be translated into 
industrial praotice. 
There were clearly quite different app!,_o~ohes among TUe 
affiliates to both TUC intervention in wage bargaining and the notion 
of incomes policy. As was suggested in Chapter 4, some TUC 
affiliates had attempted to decentralize further their bargaining 
activities. Un·ion leaders such as Jack Jones of the TOWU and Hugh 
Scanlon of· the AUEW had sought to bring bargaining activity closer to 
shop stewards at the workplace and away from industry-wide national 
agreements. For this vision of autonomous workplace organizations 
bargaining free of government or central union interference, free 
oollective bargaining was an ideological touchstone. Yet, some 
trade unionists readily accepted the economio arguments advanced by 
social democratio proponents of the Social Contract in favour of 
inoomes policies in a full employment economy. Others, while not 
advocating formal incomes polioies, were certainly receptive to the 
idea of an enhanced TUe role in the coordination of pay bargaining. 
These differences meant that the TUe could not easily become engaged 
in incomes policy adventures, however defined, because there was no 
consensus on the matter. A commitment to abide by Stage Three, taoit 
or otherWise, was already a delioate operation for the TUC. The TUe 
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leadership had no other route to its internal and external polioy 
objecti ves than the careful construotion of a oonsensus among the 
leaders of key affiliates whioh then might be more widely propagated 
within both those unions and TUC affiliates in general. The 
fragility of this prooess was apparent in the oase of the AUEW Whioh 
only narrowly deoided not to intensifY industrial aotion in pursuit 
of an engineering wage claim whioh it had argued was not subject to 
the Social Contraot. Similarly, the limits of the process were clear 
in the case of the National Assooiation of Looal Government Officers 
-(NALGO). In. the spring of 1974, it refused to--comply with a TUe 
request to suspend its industrial aotion in pursuit of a olaim in 
exoess of the Stage Three guidelines. This episode will be explored 
fUrther below. Although the new Labour Government appeared to 
. 
command the support of many trade union aotivists. too overt a 
commitment to pay policy was bound to incite an even more hostile 
response within a number of affiliates and jeopardize future polioy 
initiatives. 
_ How, therefore, was the TUC to reoonoile the contrasting 
approaches between its own affiliates yet alone meet the expectations 
of the new government in terms of a respo~se on wage bargaining? 
This was a question that exercised many minds in the TUC through the 
spring of 1974. It also highlighted the nature of TUC polioy-making 
and the chain of 'consensus-building' on which it rests. The central 
problem was how to design a set of policy -reoommendations which could 
be translated into real bargaining behaviour in an extremely volatile 
bargaining climate. The Sooial Contract Mark I WOuld normally have 
been a 're-entry phase' from a tight period of incomes policy under 
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the Heath Government (see Davies, 1979). The polioy had to appear 
ored1ble, yet command the consent of the overwhelming majority of 
aff1l1ated unions, and be sufficiently flexible so as not to 
infringe too overtly on the operation of free collective bargaining. 
The TUC ultimately proposed a voluntary policy in whioh the wage 
olaims of affiliated unions should not exceed changes in the cost or 
living. It was argued that there was no scope for increases in real 
living standards. The onus of control over olaims was to be placed 
within the affiliated unions where it resided in any case. It was 
hoped that negotiators would adhere to the reoommended guidelines 
because they were voluntary. Trade unionists would do so voluntarily 
because the Social Contract represented a new relationship between 
trade unions and government. It therefore became extremely important 
for the TUC and individual union leaders to promote the merits of the 
Sooial Contract. Since the new Labour Government was re-elected in 
October 1974, it can be argued that the Social Contraot was, indeed, 
sucoessfully promoted. However, many Ministers in the Labour 
Government were increasingly concerned that the Government's economio 
obj~ctives were being undermined by rapidly rising rates of wage and 
price inflation. As the Government's belief in the potential of the 
TUC's Sooial Contract guidelines waned, it hinted at the futUre 
implementation of a much more rigid wage oontrol polioy. By the 
spring of 1975, neither party to the Sooial Contraot seemed 
optimistio about its future. 
This chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part 
examines the attempt by the TUC to enoourage its affiliates to abide 
by Stage Three of the Heath Government's pay polioy in return for the 
repeal of the Industrial Relations Aot and the implementation of 
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other policy items agreed in Liaison Committee discussions. It also 
traces the tentative steps towards the development of a more 
coordinated bargaining strategy by TUC affiliates in response to the 
government's economic policies. The second part highlights the 
fragility and limitations of TUC influence in the process of 
consensus-building towards such a policy and its implementation. In 
particular, it looks at the AUEW's engineering wage olaim and NALGO's 
'London weighting' dispute to illustrate the process. Finally, the 
third part of the chapter examines the operation of the Social 
Contract 'Mark I' policy; considers its implications-'fo'r sample union 
polioy-making and industriall practice; and asseses its significance 
for the fUrther development of the Social Contract. , 
The evolution of TUC-Government relations during this period led 
to growing disillusionment with the Sooial Contract. In the face of 
rising rates of prioe inflation and high wage settlements, the TUC 
sought to defend its policy and demonstrate its viability. The Cal, 
meanwhile, pressed the Government, for new oounter-infla tion polioy 
initiatives. Under growing financial pressure, the Government, 
contrary to both TUC appeals and the joint programme as developed in 
.' 
the Liaison Committee, inoreasingly resorted to stringent 
deflationary measures as the main thrust in its oounter-inflation 
policy. The socialist conception of the Social Contraot meanwhile 
was ec lipsed. This growing eoonomic orisis' se t the stage for two 
years of very tight wage restraint to which the TUC ultimately lent 
its oonsent. This 1975-1977 period is the subjeot of chapters 6 and 
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TOWARDS A VOLUNTARY PAY POLICY 
To comprehend the genesis of the Social Contract Mark I policy, 
it is necessary to appreciate the sense of euphoria in trade union 
circles that accompanied the election of the minority Labour 
government. The election had broken the impasse in the miners' 
dispute. The government was pledged to' a new era of union-govemment 
cooperation. The contentious Industrial Relations Act was to be 
repealed and replaced with a legislative package drafted in concert 
with the TUC. The Pay Board was also to be abolished. The 
appoirit~~nt of Michael Foot, an acknowledged friend of the unions and 
outspoken backbench critic of the polioies of the 1960s Wilson 
govemments, as Secretary of State for Employment seemed to symbolize 
the change in atmosphere. It was seen as an inspired signal by the 
new Prime,Minister, Harold Wilson, that he intended to carry out the 
Labour Party's manifesto and proceed on the basis of the Social 
Contract (see Castle, 1980: 30; FT, 11 March 1974; and Hatfield, 
1978: 230). Jack Jones waxed eloquent on the new possibilities for 
the labour movement: 'a new spirit is abroad at Westminster. The 
voice of the ordinary people has found expression there and in spite 
of the grim economic situation the prospects for social justice and 
sooialism are much better than they have ever been in many a long 
year' (TGWUJ, April 1974). 
The Government's capacity to fulfill expectations was, however, 
limited by its minority status, the oontinuing operation of 
industrial relations legislation and incomes policies initiate,d by 
the Heath Government, and a deteriorating economic situation. First, 
as a minority government, the potential for bold legislative 
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initiati ve was ,certainly circumscribed. Second ly, the lIeath 
Government's Industrial Relations Aot and the third stage of its pay 
policy continued to operate. A confrontation between the National 
Industrial Relations Court and the AUEW over the Con-Mech case was. in 
fact imminent. 1 The repeal of the Industrial Relations Aot wORll'ld, 
however, take several months as legislation to replace it had to be 
drafted. Moreover, parliamentary approval for any repeal bill was 
not assured. Confrontation with a number of bargaining groups aver 
the restrictions in pay increases stipulated under stage Three, Uhich 
were still legally enforceable, also appeare9. l,Jkely. The new 
- -
Secretary of State for Employment had already indicated that the 
miners' settlement did not mean any abandonment of the Stage 'mree 
guidelines. Otherwise, he told the Cabinet, .. the floodgates would be 
opened' before the Government had negotiated a voluntary agreement 
with the TUC (Castle, 1980: 39). The fear of an explosion of wage 
inoreases was particularly acute because of a third constraint on 
government initiatives, the rapid deterioration in the economic 
climate. The new Chancellor, Denis Healey, described Britain's 
economic prospects to an early cabinet meeting as possibly the worst 
ever faced in peacetime (ibid.: 42). The rate of prioe inflation had 
accelerated to fifteen per oent per annum by March 1974 and showed no 
sign of abating. Inflationary wage pressures would increase further 
as the threshold payments outlined in the Stage Three provisions were 
likely to be triggered a number of times in the coming months. The 
balance of payments defioit for the month of February had set new 
reoords and the CBI's industrial trends survey for the month of 
January indicated the lowest level of business confidenoe in suteen 
years (Glyn and Harrison, 1980: 101). Olances of an externallY' led 
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recovery were particularly slim as the western economies slid into 
the major recession of 1974-1975. Thus, the Olancellor warned that 
the Government's financial resources were under severe pressure. 
Public expenditure would have to be strictly controlled and a growing 
deficit would be finanoed through international loans as increases in 
taxation would only augment further the rate of inflation and 
undermine relative international oompetitiveness. As will be made 
olear in Chapter 6, this recourse to the international money markets 
made the pound sterling increasingly vulnerable to currenoy 
. speoulatioif. This, in turn, exerted severe pressures on domestio 
economio policy leading to a period of rigid wage restraint and 
reduced public expenditure. That, however, anticipates events. The 
Chancellor, meanwhile, insisted that apart from the major policy 
items already agreed in the Liaison Committee with the TUe - pension 
increases, food subsidies and rent controls - all other expenditure 
items listed in the Party's programme, such as nationalization, would 
have to be delayed in their implementation. Moreover, he maintained 
that there was no scope for increases in living standards in 1974-
1975. 
These oonstraints, especially the dour eoonomio prospect's, 
created difficul t problems for both Labour Party politioians who 
faced a possible early general election and trade union leaders who 
wanted to sell the merits of the Social Contraot to their respeotive 
union polioy oonferenoes and exeoutives. It must be re..emphasi~ed 
that in most union policy forums, apart from the oooasional and 
unproblematic endorsement of the work of the Liaison Committee, the 
conoept of a Sooial Contraot was not debated until the spring and 
2B2 
summer of 1974. The prinoipal problem for both the Tue and the 
Government, therefore, was how to manage the gap between growing 
expectations and possible ability to deliver. 
'!he Social Contraot had to be dramatized as a credible working 
arrangement between the TUC and the new Government so that trade 
unionists believed that a new legislative agenda, agreed in 
conjunotion with the roc, was being implemented and the electorate 
believed that trade union negotiators would be willing to translate 
their support for these new measures into modified industrial 
behaviour that would not aocelerate further the growing levels of 
inflation.' -The task for the Government,'thererore~ ~s to implement 
as many new measures as possible given its minority status and 
existing financial constraints. The task for the WC was to convince 
its affiliated members that the Social Contract was delivering the 
proverbial 'goods', most notably the repeal of the Industrial 
Relations Act, and that wage bargainers should not excite wage 
expectations with 'exorbitant' wage claims •. Rather, in Jack Jones's 
words, they should concentrate on 'the preparation of realistio 
claims ••• as part of our response to the socially just measures 
brought in by a sympathetic Government' (TGWUJ, April 1974). The TUe 
leadership had to construct as large a consensus as possible around 
this position among its 1<;ey affiliates. Otherwise,- the possibility of 
any concerted positive response would rapidly evaporate. Trade 
unionists had 'to accept that all things cannot be achieved at once' 
(ibid.). The Government had to appreciate the organizational 
constraints acting upon the TUe, particularly the reluctance of a 
number of affiliates to adhere openly, if at all, to the Stage Three 
guidelines and their continued opposition to any interference in wage 
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bargaining. It was a oomplex and sensitive politioal operation 
within both individual unions and the rue. 
The TUe did not openly endorse the observance of the Stage three 
guidelines, nor was it in a position to do so. However, in their 
early meetings with the new Government, the TUe representatives 
privately indicated that they would not oppose the Stage Three 
limits if the Government was proceeding forward with the repeal of 
the Industrial Relations Act (Observer, 17 Maroh 1974; FT, 18 March 
1974; Castle, 1980: 45). As will be discussed in the next section, 
there were-olearly differences of opinion within-the TUe General 
Counoil at this time about the observance of Stage Three. The 
compromise entailed no public recognition of the Heath policy, but rut 
facto acoeptance until they could agree on voluntary guidelines to 
replace it. Thus, in its March Economic Review, the TOe reiterated 
its undertaking that affiliates would not oite the miners' settlement 
in their own olaims, that negotiations WOuld be influenced by the 
oonstruotive polioies of the new Government, and that it would 
encpurage its affiliates 'to adopt negotiating policies which foous 
. , 
on the need to restrain unit oosts and whioh ensure a response to 
effeotive developments on the prioes front' (TU'CER, 1974). We 
Maroh budget featured many of these 'oonstruotive' polioies that were 
aimed to influenoe trade union negotiators. The most important 
features of the budget had been developed in disoussions in the 
Liaison Committee and then requested by the TUe in its Economio 
Review. These inoluded higher pensions, food and rent subsidies, and 
some redistributive measures. This was possibly the first time that 
a government had aocepted most of the TUe budget reoommendations. 
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Even though the overall direction of the budget was broadly neutral, 
if not slightly deflationary, and the Chancellor revised downwards 
the TUC's requested growth target from three and a half to two and a 
half per cent, thereby prompting fears of increased unemployment, the 
measures were greeted with enthusiasm by TUC leaders (see TUC ECD, 27 
March 1974).2 The Guardian and The Times gave equally valid, if' 
~omewhat contradictory, interpretations of the budget strategy. The 
Cllancellor, suggested the Guardian (27 March 1974), 'has deliberately 
angled the Budget to get the TUC on the Government's side'. 
The Times leader focused on the TUC strategy: 'by asking broadly 
for what they thought they could get and then declaring that, 
broadly, they were satisfied, the TUC dramatized the idea of the 
social contract as an arrangement that had something in it for the 
unions' (29 March 1974). 
The onus was, thus, on the TUC to define its 'positIve' 
response to the budget. After a post-budget General Council meeting, 
the TUC General Secretary, Len Murray, stated that there was general 
recognition of ~he very limited. scope for increases in personal 
oonsumption and that the Government was entitled' to look to the 
General Council and the unions to do all that they can to impress "on 
their membership the need to relate collective bargaining to the 
achievement of What are agreed economic and soclal objectives' (~ 
Times, 28 Maroh 1974). The TUC leadership was clearly edging towards 
a much more specific commitment on pay in return for the 
implementation of' various economic and social measures. The limits 
on its ability to do so, however, 'Were two .. fold. Firstly, the TUC 
was not in a position to deliver 'wage moderation' even if ita 
leaders should have chosen to do so. !here were important limits on 
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the TUC's ability to enforce any policy. Len Murray effectively 
illustrated the limits of the TOC's central authority when he stated 
that the ruc could not instruct or command, but only commend policies 
to its members (cited in ~ Report 182, April 1974). As a central 
trade union body with a high degree of affiliate autonomy, the TUC 
depended more on the mobilization of consent for its policies than on 
the use of sanctions. The limits of that mobilization of consent, 
what might be termed a chain of consensus-building at leadership 
level from which point consent is then mobilized, will provide the 
focus .. for the next section as we 11 as reappear in subsequent. 
chapters. Secondly, the scope for TUC policy initiatives was not 
only circumscribed by the limits of its internal authority. There 
was also a prevailing belief within Congress House that wage 
moderation through traditional incomes policies was not only 
unacceptable but ineffective. Thus, it was committed to the concept 
of a voluntary approach which was perhaps the only policy route which 
might also secure internal acceptance. 
If the TUC could not construct an effective. policy, however, 
then the possibility of continued Government cooperation diminished 
greatly. That, of course, was the paradox of the roc's intermediary 
role. As Len Murray told the conference of the National Federation 
of Professional Workers, 'If we have nothing to give governments, 
then they will have nothing to give us' (FT, 3 April 1974). The 
logic of the political exchange" as it was constructed during these 
months and had been implicit in the Liaison Committee discussions, 
was that the TUC exert a moderating influence over the industrial 
behaviour of its affiliates in return for continued access to and 
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influence over government policy formulation and implementation. The 
external limits of this exchange were two-fold. First, the Labour 
Government had to convince the electorate of the viability of its 
special relationship with the unions. It was clearly obtaining a 
measure of success in this objective as the July 1974 National 
Opinion Poll concluded that industrial relations was the one issue 
which stood out in the public mind as better handled b.y one party 
than any other (44 per cent mentioned the Labour Party, 21 per cent 
the Conservatives and 29 per cent no party at all). Otherwise, 
Labour and the Conservatives were equivalent in their public profiles 
(NOP Political Bulletin, July 1974: 22-23). The Labour Party was 
thus encouraged to make the Social Contract the central theme of the 
October 1974 election. Secondly, as regards the external limits, the 
Government had to demonstrate the viability of its economic strategy. 
This was to be achieved partly through performance and partly through 
that chimera known as 'business confidence', both domestic and 
international. As noted above, the internal limits of the exchange 
related to the ability of. TUC leaders first to generate an internal 
co~~ensus at leadership level around the concept of the Sooial 
Contract and the policies that it entailed. '!hey then had to seoure 
the consent and cooperation of trade union members in its 
implementation, primarily within affiliated unions. Clark et ale 
(1980: 92-97) have also identified this process of internal 
consensus-building as extremely important for the subsequent 
implementation of policy within the TUC. TUC leaders insisted on a 
voluntary policy defined within the TUe because they believed that it 
was the only kind of policy which might command consent and, 
therefore, be moderately effective. 
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The TUC, thus, increasingly assumed a more public role in the 
construction of this voluntary policy. Trade union leaders 
simultaneously promoted the merits of the Social Contract to their 
members. It should be emphasized that apart from the very rare 
reference to the idea of a "workers' charter" or "social contract" 
with a future Labour government by union leaders such as Jones, 
Basnett and Jenkins, neither the concept nor the substance of a 
Sooial Contract was debated at any of the sample union policy 
conferences until the spring and summer of 1974 (TOWU BDC, 10 July _ 
-1973;-- GMWUAC, 1973: 370-271; ASTMS AC, 1973h The immediate_ 
priority for the TUe, however, was the tranSitional arran-gements 
until the end of Stage Three and the abolition of the Pay Board. !be 
Government had clearly indicated that unions must hold to the Stage 
Three limits or risk a wage explosion which, it argued, would 
exacerbate already grave economic problems. Potential Tue 
guidelines assumed a particular importance because a number of 
prominent WC affiliates, notably the engineering workers and several 
white-collar groups in the public sector such as MALOO, were pursuing 
olaims and possible industrial aotion in breach of the Stage 'lbree 
guidelines which they argued were not applicable to their cases. The. 
oases of the AUEW and NALGO will be analyzed further below as they 
illustrate the nature of consensus-building within the TOC and the 
limits of TUC authority over the industrial praotice of its 
affiliates. 
As an interim measure towards the construction of a voluntary 
policy, the TOC representatives at the April meeting of the National 
Eoonomic Development Council (NEDC), including Hugh Soanlon, the 
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leader of the AUEW, noted that despite the TUC's 'well known 
objections to a statutory policy, trade unions were willing to settle 
claims broadly in line with the patterns that had been operative' 
(NEDC, 3 April 1974). The TUC would, therefore, try' to persuade • '-
trade union members to be realistic in their wage claims, placing 
emphasis on the cost of living' (ibid.). The TUC Economic Committee 
subsequently issued a circular to affiliated unions oU,tlining the 
positions taken in its Economic Review and by its representatives at 
the April NEDC meeting. It specifically requested that unions 
maintain the general level of settlements, that they not cite the 
miners' settlement in their claims, that they take into account the 
constructive policies of the new Government, and that they seek the 
advice of the General Council if they encountered diffioulties'in 
conforming to the spirit of this policy. The circular noted that the 
TUC would be consulting rurther with the Government and the CDI on a 
policy to take effect upon the abolition of the Pay Board 3. The 
Economio Committee suggested that since there would be little scope 
for real increases in consumption, affiliated unions, while focusing 
on '~he importance of unit labour oosts, should emphasize the 
maintenance of real incomes and the improvement of priority areas 
such as low pay, pensions, equal pay and various non-wage benefits. 
The TUC, it emphasized, did not envisage rigid, centralized 
guidelines. Rather, it proposed to return full responsibility to 
negotiators who could take aooount of the industrial and economic 
situation (TUC Circular 135, 11 April 1974). 
Thus, the TUC embarked on the definition of its own voluntary 
policy whioh had to oommand both the consent and the active 
cooperation of its affiliates. The guidelines for this new polioy, 
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entitled £2,!.lecti ve Bargaining and the Social Contract, were 
submitted to the Economic Committee and, subsequently, despite some 
reservations, approved unanimously at the 26 June meeting of the 
General Council (TUC, 1974; Guardian and ~ Times, 27 June 1974).4 
Collecti ve Bargaining and the SoCial Contract repeated the main 
points in the TUC's April circular. Given the problem of price 
inflation, the limited scope for increases in real incomes, and the 
constructive policies of the new Government including the imminent 
restoration of free collective bargaining, the statement asked union 
negotiators to focus on the maintenance of I'-eal "incomes. ", An 
important element of flexibility, and, ultimately, a source of 
considerable ambiguity, was the choice given to negotiators to claim 
compensation for rises in the cost of living either 'since the last 
settlement' or 'during the period of the new agreement'. A twelve-
month interval between major increases, as previously stipulated in 
stage Three, continued to apply. Priority was to be given, on tho 
one hand, to unit costs and conciliation procedures in the resolution 
of disputes, and, on the other hand, to the improvement of priority 
areas such as low pay below a basic minimum target of twenty-five 
pounds weekly (later increased to thirty pounds), equal pay, and non~ 
wage benefits. The guidelines certainly contained enough flexibility 
to maintain a fragile consensus at General Council level; though 
there was immediate opposition expressed within a number of unions to 
any polioy designed to hold down wages or limit free collective 
bargaining (see, i.e., MS, 11 June 1974). However, when the 
preliminary agenda for the September Congress was published, the only 
motion critioal of the Sooial Contract oame from TASS, then the 
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relatively autonomous white-collar section of the AUEW (FT, 31 July 
1974). As a result of considerable pressures exerted by the 
President of the Engineering Section of the AUEW, Hugh Scanlon, this 
motion was in fact withdrawn at the September Congress (Interviews, 
18 March and 30 April, 1980). 
The TUG, thus, elaborated its Social Contract Mark I guidelines 
with at least surface unanimity. However, sinc.e economio 
circumstances were far from promising, the pressures on the policy 
from without and within were from the beginning very intense. The 
pressures from without were already apparent when the Liaison 
Committee met in June. lbe Chancellor explained that price rises had 
hitherto been fuelled by the increase in commodity prices, not wages, 
but these price rises were now levelling off. Therefore, the key 
element in the control of inflation over the coming year 'WOUld be 
the attitude the unions took to wage claims'. When he suggested that 
the TUe should consider "monitoring machinery', the TUe 
representatives made it clear that such a concept was incompatible 
with the "new atmosphere in which collective bargaining should 
ope.rate· (LCH, 24 June 1974; Castle, 1980: .119-121). Suoh external 
pressures would inorease markedly over the following year. The 
performance of the Social Contraot Mark I and its 'implioations for 
the further development of the Sooial Contract incomes polioies are 
the central theme of the third part of this chapter. The next 
section will briefly consider some of the pressures from within, 
particularly the nature of and limits of consensus-building within 
the TUC. 
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THE LIMITS OF CONSEHSUS-OOILDING 
The previous section traced the TUC's attempt to construct a 
voluntary pay policy dur~ng the first months of the 1974 Labour 
Government. It emphasized the limits of the TUC's internal authority 
in such an endeavour and the need to build a consensus at leadershIp 
level around such a policy, if the policy was subsequently to be 
implemented by affiliated unions. This section explores further this 
process of consensus-building and its political fragility. Although 
the TUC did not explicitly endorse compliance with' the Stage 1bree 
policy; even its muted role in promoting the settlement of claims 
'broadly in line with the patterns that had been operative' (NEDC, 3 
April 1974) created internal problems vis-a-vis the industrial 
practice of its affiliates. The largest potential dispute involved 
the national engineering pay claim which the AUEW President, Hugh 
Scanlon, had argued was not subject to the Stage Three guidelines 
(FT, 8 April 1974). The AUEW National Committee, in the face of 
intense publicity and pleading by the Government, narrowly voted in 
April 1974 to authorize its representatives to settle the olaim, 
rather than accelerate industrial aotion •. In contrast, despite a 
request from the TUC to suspend its campaign of industrial aotion in 
support of a 'London weighting' claim 1n May and June 1974 pending a 
Pay Board report, NALGO continued to intensity its industrial aotion. 
Each of these cases is a telling illustration of the interfaoe 
between internal and external policy-making within unions. In 
particular, they illustrate how external political processes impinge 
on internal union policy-making and how, in turn, a union's internal 
political process affects consensus-building within the TUe. This 
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section deals with each of these examples in order to highlight the 
nature of consensus-building within the TUC and the limits of TUC 
authority over the industrial practice of its affiliates. 
The AUFll and the National. Engineering Pay Claia 
'!he April 1974 National Committee debate of the AUEW Engineering 
section on the national engineering pay claim was generally regarded 
as the 'first real indioation of whether militant unions [were] 
likely to modify pay claims in return for the social policies which 
the Government [was] pledged to pursue' (DT, 22 April 1974). It was 
thus perceived as a symbol of the credibility of the- Social Contract, 
'a major test of the TUC's ability to live up to its side of the 
Social Contract' (FT, 22 April 1974). The negotiations, in faat, 
predated the election of the new Government and the TUC's efforts to 
construct voluntary wage guidelines. The union first presented its 
claim in September 1973. The &1gineering Employers' Federation (EEF) 
responded only in December. Subsequent negotiations were soon 
overtaken by the miners' dispute, the imposition of the three-day 
week and the general election. Progress was in faot so slow that, 
prior to the announcement of the election, in order to adVance the 
, 
olaim a recalled National Committee had authorized the executive to 
impose an overtime ban at an appropriate time (AUEWJ, March 1974J 
Daily Mail, 4 January 1974). The CSEll executive considered imposing 
the ban afte~ the election, but delayed it until mid-April, just 
before the annual National Committee meeting, in order to give the 
new Government and the EEF further time (Guardian, 11 Maroh 1974; 
AUEWJ, May 1974). Thus, when the National Committee mot to formulate 
its next wage olaim, it still had to settle that of the previous 
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year. Ironically, by this time, the national claim had largely been 
superseded by local deals (FT, 8 April 1974). As was suggested in 
Chapter 4, this was in fact typical of the two-tier structure of 
bargaining in the engineering industry in which the nationa 1 tier was 
no longer particularly significant for the dete~1nation of earnings' 
at the level of the workplace. In this sense, the significance of 
the engineering claim for the SOcial contract was more symbolio than 
substantive; though the immediate implementation of a national-level 
settlement might have created some problems at the enterprise level 
for the observance of stage Three. 
In the oontext of TUe and Government attempts to effect a 
smooth transition from the Stage Three statutory policy to voluntary 
guidelines, however, symbolism was extremely important. The 
engineering union was at this time the apotheosis of industrial 
power, primarily because of its sustained challenge to the Industrial 
Relations Act. Indeed, for many activists in the AUEW, the union's 
impending oonfrontation with the NIRC over the Con-Mech case waa 
really the most important item on the April National Committee agenda 
(see note 1 above). If the AUEW breached the Stage Three guidelines, 
it would stimulate the aspirations of other bargaining groups. 
Despite Scanlon's repeated assertions to the contrary, the claim and 
supporting overtime ban were perceived as a challenge to the Social 
Contract (AUEWJ, April 1974). That is undoubtedly why Miohael Foot 
presented his views on pay bargaining and the Social Contract to the 
National Committee. Foot drew the attention of the delegatcs to the 
Government's legislative programme and accomplishments to date and, 
in return, 'called for a year of industrial peace and intelligent pay 
settlements to help overcome the nation's economic problems' (DT, 24 
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April 1974). 
The internal politioal prooess of the AUEW was always 
volatile. In 1974 the National Committee was fairly evenly divided 
between .. left' and 'right' or ' progressives' and 'moderates'. the 
left might have gained a slight edge, but a handful of 'floatIng' 
delegates, those not attached to either faotion, oould tip the 
political balance in either direotion on any given issue. Certainly, 
the support of the union for a Social Contraot which implied any form 
of wage moderation was open to question. The resolutions submitted 
by Divisional Committees to the 1974 National C·ommittee refleoted 
reoent AUEW bargaining polioy in this direotion. They were 
virulently opposed to wage restraint. Moreover. they tended to 
refleot a residue of suspicion about the performanoe of previous 
Labour governments oalling for the return of a Labour government 
'dedioated to socialist policies', 'pledged to implement a real 
socialist programme' and 'pledged to oarry out Labour Party 
Conference decisions' (AUFM NCR, 1974: 95-97). 
. The moderates favoured an end to the overtime ban. for whioh . 
they argued there was little membership support, an early settlement 
of the national claim on the best possible terms with further gains 
to be negotiated at local level, and support of the new Government 
and its Sooial Contraot (Interviews, 26 February, 14 and 28 Maroh, 
and 2 June 1980). The left maintained that the union's polioy or 
improving minimum national rates was more important than any 
impending election. The overtime ban, therefore, should be oontinued 
until the EEF improved its offer (Interviews, 18 Maroh, 30 April. 24 
July, 23 September and .15 October 1980). At that time, tho attitude 
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of the left on the Social Contract, particularly the Communist Party 
whose members played an important role within the left organization 
in the AUEW, was somewhat ambiguous.5 Those on the left within the 
National Committee tended to suggest that if the Government would 
fully implement the Social Contract programme,. only then would the 
union consider what kind of wage bargaining response might be 
appropriate. Ind.eed, Scanlon told the National Committee that 'any 
restraint on our part regarding future wage claims would be dependent 
upon an acceptable settlement of our ourrent olaim and on the 
realization of the most essential points in Labour's programme' (AUEW 
NCR, 1974: 181). 
The result of the vote was typical of the vagaries of the.AUEW 
political process. By a margin of twenty-seven to twenty-five the 
National Committee resolved to obtain 'the best possible settlement 
in the present circumstances' (AUEW NCR, 1974: 193). This, in 
effect, authorized the executive to end the overtime ban and settle 
as quickly as possible. The future AUEW claim would be oonsidered 
later in the year in the light of eoonomic and political 
oircumstances. It was seen as a surprising viotory for the Sooial 
Contract. It had appeared on the day of the vote that the two 
faotions would be evenly split on the pay claim. All of the rhetorio 
was directed at the few floating delegates, primarily three from the 
Northeast and one from Cornwall (Interviews, 14 and 28 March, and 23 
September 1980). When the delegates from the Northeast were 
persuaded to support the new Labour Government and vote for a 
settlement, it appeared that there might be a tied vote. The rosult 
was deCided, in fact, at the tea break before the final vote wen the 
delegate from Cornwall, who it was thought might vote w1th the lett, 
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deoided to .. support Miohael Foot and the Sooial Contract' (Sunday 
Times, 28 April 1974). Thus, neither for the first or the. last 
time, a major external politioal deoision with possible ramifications 
for the future of TUC-Government relations was contingent on the 
volatile internal political process of the AUEW. 
This episode highlights the fragility of consensus-building at 
the level of the TUC. Only two weeks prior to the National Committee 
meeting, the TUC had issued guidelines which endorsed, however 
implicitly, observanoe of the Stage Three guidelines as a trade union 
response to the kinds of policies being implemented by the new 
Government. Scanlon, who was a key party to the Social Contraot 
negotiations and at the centre of TUC decision-making, remained 
extremely ambiguous in his publio oomments on the Social Contract. 
Unlike some of the other sample union leaders, he did not openly sell 
the merits of the SOcial Contract during this period. Indeed, he was 
particularly oritioal of wage moderation schemes noting that there 
'existed no guarantee that savings resulting from trade union 
modification of wage settlements would result in price reduotions or 
increased investments' (AUEWJ, July 1974). He also argued that the 
.: 
wage claim d.iscussed at the April National Committee was not subject 
to either Stage Three or the Social Contract and that the impaot or 
the Social Contraot on ruture wage claims would have to be assessed 
in the light of the imp lementa tion of Labour's programme (DT, 15 
January 1974; ~ Times, 10 April 1974; AUEW NCR, 1974: 181). 
In. the context of TUC efforts to construct an internal oonsensus 
around the need to moderate wage claims as a response to the 
implementation of the SOoial Contract polioies, this could soaroely 
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be interpreted as enthusiastio endorsement of the Sooial Contraot. 
Yet,' Soanlon had privately insisted to Cabinet Ministers that the 
AUEW was not "'out to break the Counter-Inflation Aot' (Castle, 1980: 
55). Indeed, his relatively low-key, "'wait-and-see' approaoh to the 
Sooial Contract at both the April National Committee and June 
National Conferenoe meetings were deemed by many to be sensitive to 
the politioal oontingenoies of his union and helpful for the progress 
of the Social Contraot (Interviews, 2B Maroh and 30 April 1980; CIS 
Report No. lB, n.d.: 5; Scotsman, 25 April 1974; Guardian, 20 June 
1974). This was clearly the oase at the 1974_TgC when Soanlon 
personally prevailed on Ken Gill to withdraw a TASS motion critioal 
of the Social Contraot (Interviews, 1B March and 30 April, 1980). 
The internal political prooess of the AUEW olearly imposed limits on 
its president's relative policy discretion. In particular, his own 
organizational constituenoy in the rigidly factionalized AUEW,the 
"'left', tended to be more critical of the project around whioh the 
TUC leadership was attempting to construct a consensus. If Scanlon 
wished to endorse unequivocally such a projeot, this would leave him 
reliant on the moderate faotion for support. Soanlon could 
ultimately seek the consent of the moderate faotion within the AUW 
for the Social Contraot projeot beoause he did not face the prospect 
of another presidential eleotion in whioh he would require the left's 
organizational support. Indeed, his independence from a rigid 
faotional tie would become increasingly manifest. Scanlon's ambiguity 
on the Social Contract during the spring and summer of 1974 might 
genuinely have been his own, but it also reflected the oonflioting 
interpretations of oontending forces within the union to which he 
remained subject. These internal union dynamios highlighted the 
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fragility of the chain of consensus-building at leadership level 
within the TUC. 
NALGO and the London Weighting Dispute 
In contrast to the success of the TUC and the Government in 
persuading the AUEW to settle its national wage claim 1n accordance 
with the TUC's ~ facto complianoe with Stage Three, NALGO pursued 
one of the most sustained challenges to the modus vi vendi during May 
and June 1974. Although NALGO is not one of the sample unions in 
this study, its 1974 dispute was a telling illustration of the limits 
of TUC authority over its affiliates. It also illustrated how a 
union's internal political prooess constrains its general secreta~ts 
ability to participate in the construction of any consensus at 
,leadership level. If the TUC must commend rather than command, then 
there are necessary links in the chain of consensus-building Whioh 
lead to the effective implementation of TUC policy. NALGO's campaign 
to obtain an improved London weighting allowance, though not a major 
economio dispute, highlighted the rragilit~ of that process. 
~ In common with a number of other publio seotor unions at this 
time, NALGO was experiencing oonsiderable pressure from its 
membership over grievances arising out of What was perceived to be 
the disoriminatory treatment reserved for the publio seotor by the 
Heath Government's pay polioies. There was, moreover, a definite 
push from aotivists within the union to engage in more militant 
industrial action. Unlike many of the other publio seotor unions, 
NALGO had not been involved in major industrial aotion in the late 
19605 and early 1970s. ,However, local militanoy had become mOre 
common and the character of the union was oertainly ohanging (see 
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Undy et al., 1981: 225-230; Taylor, 1980: 343-346). The General 
Seoretary, for instanoe, was rebuffed by the exeoutive on two major 
issues: registration under the terms of the Industrial Relations Aot 
and cooperation with the Pay Board. His defeat on the latter issue 
led to his deoision to seek early retirement not long thereafter 
(ibid.).' This greater aotiv ist mi litanoy, although not always 
translated into membership willingness to embark on industrial 
aotion, was manifested in a metropolitan areas' oampaign to improve 
London weighting allowanoes. Seleotive industrial aotion started 
just prior to the eleotion. 'An improved employe~'offer, over and 
above the stage Three limits, first had to be approved by the Pay 
Board. NALGO, meanwhile, oontinued the dispute., 
Shortly after the TUC's April 1974 'oiroular on colleotive 
bargaining, Len Murray wrote to NALGO at the behest of the TUC 
Economio Committee to request that the union suspend its industrial 
aotion until after the Pay Board had reported on the issue. The 
Government had also made a similar request. This was seen as "the 
TUC's first attempt to persuade a union to ourb its polioies in the 
interests of the Sooial Contraot' (FT, 16 April 1974). Given the 
strength of the membership response in the pay oampaign and the 
ciroumstanoes whioh had led to his early promotion, the new General 
Seoretary of NALGO, Geoffrey Drain, was in a weak position to comply 
with the TUC request. The NALGO exeoutive, in faot, refused to call 
off its aotion unless its olaim was oonsidered as a "speoial case' 
under the provisions of Stage Three (TUCR, 1974: 231-232). The 
Employment Seoretary, Miohael Foot, refused to make suoh a 
concession. The NALGO Genera 1 Secre tary later oonfessed that they 
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had miscalculated the Government's rigidity on this point and the 
refusal caught the executive by surprise (Interview, 29 July 1980). 
The TUC Economio Committee met NALGO representatives to persuade them 
to reoonsider their decision 'in the interests of the Social 
Contract'. The delicate nature of this 'lUC aotion in support of the 
stage Three guidelines was apparent when an NUM and an AUEW 
representative on the General Council, (Laurence Da,ly and Len 
Edmondson) later moved that the Economic Committee withdraw its 
request that NALGO suspend its action. This was defeated by twenty-
one votes to eight (FT, 25 April 1974). In any event, the NALGO 
, -
representatives reiterated their intention to proceed with industrial 
action including the controversial decision not to cooperate in 
forthcoming local government elections. Thus, despite repeated TUC 
requests, NALGO refUsed to modify either its claim or its, industrial 
action and continued its campaign until July when the Pay Board in 
fact recommended payment of substantial increases in London 
weighting. Although the union's June 1974 policy conference rejected 
the notion of wage restraint, its delegation to the 1974 TUC 
supported the Social Contract. Conscious of NALGO's new found 
unpopularity, Geoffrey Drain somewhat painfully explained why the 
union's concern to restore erosions in its pay position and the 
pressures arising out of militancy in the London area 'caused us to 
hesitate perhaps longer than others did about accepting the Social 
Contract' (TUCR, 1974: 425-427). 
The Determinants of Leadership Poartlclpation in Consensus-Dullding 
NALGO's refusal to comply with the TUC request to moderate its 
behaviour and Hugh Scanlon's studied ambiguity on both the TUC's 
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taoit support for stage Three and ·its explioit endorsement of the 
Sooial Contract are interesting examples of the limits of TUC 
authority over its affiliates. This authority derives from its 
ability to build consensus at the leadership level. If individual • ~ 
trade union leaders at the most senior level within the TUC can forge 
a consensus among themselves on a given policy, they can then use 
their power and ~uthority within their own unions in order to 
mobilize consent for that policy and, ultimately, secure its 
effeotive implementation. There are, however, a number of 
oonstraints or links in the chain of consensus-building which 
determine the .varying degrees to which individual union leaders are 
willing or able to oommit their power and authority to the 
mobilization of consent. These inolude both the internal and external 
political praotioe of a union, its leadership's particular polioy 
predileotions, and the location of its leadership within the relative 
hierarchy of TUe decision-making. 
First, as has been suggested in previous chapters, there 1s a 
oomplex range of internal faotors arising from a union's internal 
political practioe which influence the relative autonomy of a general 
seoretary or union leadership to commit a union to a given TUC 
policy. The AUEW's internal policy-making struoture and its rigid 
faotional divisions olearly limited the policy flexibility 01' its 
president. In the case of NALGO, a relatively new general secretary 
might have ~eriously undermined his political credibility had he 
preached wage moderation in the faoe of a restive membership in 
pursuit of a wage olaim. 
SecondlY, union traditions 1n external politioal practice, often 
as they reflect internal political oulture, affect TUe consensus-
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building. Relative loyalty to the Labour Party is a clear 
illustration. The requirements of the new Labour Government and 
Michael Foot's pleas to the National Committee possibly had a 
determining influence on the AUEW decision to settle the engineering 
wage claim. The man who cast the decisive vote in fact explained his 
decision on the basis of his desire to support Michael Foot and the 
Social Contract (Sunday Times, 28 April 1974). NALGO, on the other 
hand. was not affiliated to the Labour Party. Indeed, it had not 
been a member of the TUC before 1965, at least in part, because of 
many members' uneasiness about the TUC's close links with the Labour 
Party. Although Geoffrey Drain was a member of the Labour Party, he 
could not logically persuade NALGO members to forego industrial 
action out of loyalty for a Labour Government. 
A third factor affecting participation in consensus-building at 
leader~hip level is, o~ course, personal predilection. This is most 
important when the two previous factors combine to invest a degree of 
policy autonomy in the position of the union leader. As has been 
argued, Drain's degree of autonomy on this issue was at that time 
very limited, though the same general secretary would later enjoy a 
much greater degree of policy discretion. As was noted in Chapter 4, 
the AUEW president's autonomy has traditionally been more limited 
than is the case in some of the other sample unions in this study. 
The AUEW president's personal position was nonetheless important (viz 
'carron's law'). Although SCanlon studiously avoided any oommitment 
to the observanoe of Stage Three and had argued that the 1973-1974 
engineering pay olaim was not subjeot to either Stage Three or the 
Sooial Contraot, the union did in faot settle within the Stage Three 
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limits (!Q.§. Report 184, May 1974). Scanlon continued to arguo that 
the union would have to assess its response to the Sooial Contract. in 
the light of future economic and political circumstances (AUEWJ, July 
1974). However, it is difficult to. disagree with the assessment, one 
with which Scanlon himself has subsequently agreed, that after the 
decision to settle the engineering wage claim at the 1974 National 
Committee 'Mr. Scanlon [was] much more closely identified with the 
Social Contract than was the case before' .(FT, 29 April 1974; also 
Interview, 30 April 1980). 
Finally, an individual union's position within the oounoils of 
the TUC- also affeots the readiness of its leadership to embrace any 
emergent consensus on WC policy. This relates to both the strategio 
importance of the union. and the relative seniority of the individual 
General Council member. As a rule, it can be argued that the greater 
a trade union leader's involvement in the innner circles of the TUC, 
the greater the likelihood that that individual is prepared to 
actively espouse TUC policies. This stems from the individual union 
leader's greater involvement in actual policy formulation and also 
from the social sanctions that might occur should the individual 
union leader rejeot the consensus. The strategio and numerical 
importance of a union mitigates the influence of social sanation~ in 
some cases. In the early 19603, for instance, it might be argued that 
the TGWU general seoretary, Frank Cousins, actually shifted the 
terrain of consensus through the forae of his personality and the 
sheer numerical importance of the union he represented. Similarly, 
the leader of the AUEW could soarcely be exoluded from the inner 
policy sanctums of the TUC, if only beoause such an exolusion would 
render policy implementation all the mare difficult. NALGO,was then 
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the fourth largest unions in the TUC (see TUCR, 1974). However. 
possibly beoause of its fairly reoent affiliation to the TUC, its 
white-collar status and its perceived lack of industrial musole, 
unlike the three largest unions, its general seoretary was not 
automatioally projeoted to the centre of TUC decision-making. 
Geoffrey Drain was then one of the newest members of the General 
Counoil and not yet very olose to its inner cirole. He reoalled, for 
instance, not being particularly popular at that time and beooming 
involved in General Council debates muoh sooner than he-had planned 
-beoause of-the need to defend NALGO actions' (Interview, 29 July 
1980). Soanlon was oertainly at the centre of TUe deoision-maktng but 
he was, in fact, frequently absent from TUC deliberations during the 
spring and summer of 1974. Due to the death of the union's general 
seoretary,- Jim Conway, in an airplane crash in February 1974, the 
AUEW president temporarily assumed both funotions (Guardian, 4 April 
1974; DT, 21 July 1974). It might be argued that Soanlon was, as a 
resul t of his absenoe, a poorer exponent of the Sooia 1 Contraot, 
par.tioularly as he had not always been present at Liaison Committee 
meetings when the Sooial Contraot was being formulated (soo note 11, 
Olapter 3). Certainly, it has been suggested that Jaok Jones rebuked 
Soanlon on several oooasions for failing to give proper oommitment to 
the Government and the Sooial Contraot (FT, 11 Maroh 1974). It 
appears to be the oase that general seoretarios in tho innor circle 
of the General Council committee structure were more prepared than 
those who were not to risk their personal authority within their own 
unions in order,to defend a 'TUC leadership oonsensus'. This is, 
however, subjeot to the aforementioned internal, external and 
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individual political constraints. 
This section has attempted to explore the nature of consensus-
building within the TUC and h'ighlight the fragility of this process. 
The 'lUC's April 1914 commitment to hold further wage settlements to 
the existing pattern was at best a loose understanding among less 
than the totality of General Council members. It could do little 
more, therefore, than attempt to draw NALGO back into the realm ot 
that "understanding'. The constraints exercing the leadership of 
NALGO not to comply with the TUC request indicate both the limits of 
TUC authority over the industrial practice of its_affiliates and the 
-.- --
strength of centrifugal forces working against the implementation of 
a central TUC policy. The slender margin within the AUEW National 
Committee in favour of effective. compliance with the. Stage Three 
limits for its national pay claim was indicative of the fragility of 
the chain of consensus-building at leadership level as well as the 
real constraints acting on the emergence of any consensus. Any 
dilution of consensus at leadership level, however difruse, in turn, 
made it more difficult to generate consent within individual 
affiliates. That other unions leaders were signalling that their 
members' interests came before any .. social compact~ presaged both the 
potential impact of these centrifugal forces in the implementation of 
a voluntary policy of wage moderation and the diffioulty of 
constructing a viable and enduring consensus at leadership level.6 
This was especially the case with ~oluntary wage guidelines where 
policy consent had to be translated into industrial behaviour. The 
next section deals with the implementation of these Social Contraot 
Mark I guidelines. 
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'l'BE SOCIAL CONTRACT '1fARI: I' 
The earlier parts of this chapter outlined how the TOC came to. 
frame a policy of voluntary wage guidelines known as the Social 
Contrac t Mark I. Particular emphasis was placed on the de licato 
nature of this operation and the limits of ruc authority to commend 
its affiliates to abide by its policy. The final part of this chapter 
is concerned with the 1mplementation of the Sooial Contract Mark I 
from July 1914, its impact on both the sample unions and the 
evolution of TUC-Government relations, and its significance for the 
rutur~_ development of the Social Contract. With hindsight, it was a 
remarkably unfortuitous time 1n which to embark on a voluntary wage 
policy. The period coinoided with a marked deoline in economic 
performance and a cont1nuing rapid rise in the rate of prioe 
inflation. External economic and political preSSures on the fragile 
internal political prooess of ruc policy-making were at a maximum. 
The policy was ultimately unable to withstand these pressures. As 
the Government progressively withdrew from its oommitment to the 
policy and pursued a stringent deflationary polioy as the oentral 
thrust of its counter-infla tion strategy, 1t was open to question 
whether the terms of the original Social Contraot projeot had not 
been altered so radicallY as to undermine the basis of oonsent to 
union wage moderation. That the 500ial Contraot oould beoome a 
'contract for crisis' and sustain a remarkable union oommitment to a 
period of tight wage restraint from 1915 to 1977 1s the subject of 
Chapter 6. This f~nal part of the ohapter first outlines the 
operation of the policy and the growing pressures for a more 
draconian set of measures. It then considers the implioations of tho 
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Sooial Contract Mark I for sample union policy-making and industrial 
practice. Finally, it examines the change in Government eoonomio 
strategy and its significance for the development of the Social 
Contract. 
The Policy in Practice 
The political and economic pressures on the TUC's voluntary 
guidelines were from the beginning very intense. A second general 
election was imminent. The Labour Government had identified its 
eleotoral advantage in its working relationship with the unions and, 
thus, __ made «~he Social Contract the oentral theme_of_ its re-election 
platform. It was essential, therefore, that the Social Contract Mark 
I appear effective and that the Government was seen to be fulfilling 
its Sooial Contract obligations. Both Government and key union 
lea~ers invested much effort in promoting the credibility of the 
Socia 1 Contract as a working arrangemen t between the TUe and the 
Government. The Chancellor, for instance, introduced a pre-eleotlon 
mini-budget Whioh gave a mild stimulus to the eoonomy, attempted to 
reduce selected price increases and, at the particular request of the 
TUC, increased public spending to oounter-act inoreases in the rate 
of unemployment (TUC ECD, 10 July 1974; Labour Researoh, September 
1974; ~Chronicle, XII November 1974). This was onoe again 
evidence of the Government's readiness to embraoe, at laaat, seleoted 
economic priorities as defined by the TUe (on the influenoe of the 
TUC on the budget and publio expenditure, see the memoirs of the 
Treasury Secretary at this time; Barnett, 1982: 60.62). Tho 
Government also appe.ared willing to plaoate partioular bargaining 
groups Which might have undermined a smooth tranSition from the Stage 
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Three statutory policy to the new voluntary polioy. Thus, nurses 
were granted a special inquiry with a guarantee of retroactIve 
increases; a large railway arbitration award was approved; and the 
findings of the Pay Board on London weighting were accepted in order 
to end the NALGO dispute (Castle, 1980: 146-147) •. 
Many other aspects of the Social Contraot as presented 1n 
Labour's February eleotion manifesto were also ooming to fruition 
during this period. The Pay Board was abolished; the Industrial 
Relations Aot was repealed; and a new conciliation and arbitation 
service and a royal commission on the distribution of wealth and 
The Governmen t further issued a wide 
range of white papers and proposals to cover many of the other planks 
in its original platform: plans for the extension of redundancy 
payments, provisions for industrial democracy, a sex discrimination 
bill, an industry bill including planning agreements and a proposed 
National Enterprise Board, nationalization of shipbuilding, 
employment protection legislation and a range of other measures (see 
Labour Party 1974b). 
. Senior trade union leaders were similarly intent on presenting a 
united front and securing the consent of their members to the conc~pt 
of the Social Contract in general and· the wage guidelinas in 
particular. The 1974 TUC was addressed by no less than three sanior 
members of the Government - Wilson, Foot and callaghan. After the 
exertion of considerable pressures within the AUEW (see above) and 
despite the obvious lack of commitment on the part of several 
oonstituent unions, the TUC was able to obtain Congress approval tor 
the Mark I guidelines without any signifioant expression of 
opposition (TUCR, 1974: 420-440). This was certainly a measure of 
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the TUC's success in the construction of a re lative oonsenslIs at 
leadership level. However, in withdrawing the oontentious tASS 
motion whioh was oritical of the Social Contract, its general 
seoretary, Ken Gill, warned that TUC unity had been 'stretohed to its 
absolute utmost' (ibid.: 440). In the October eleotion, the gUlble 
on the Sooial Contraot secured the Labour Government its overall 
majority, but only by a margin of three seats.7 
The eoonomio oontext for the operation of the guidel~es, 
however, was not promising. By November 1974, retail prioes were 
inoreasing at an annual rate of eighteen per oent;' while earnings 
were at a twenty-five per oent rate. The in orease in wages had 
reoeived ,a particular boost from the effeot of the Stage Three 
threshold payments which were triggered repeatedly throughout the 
summer (ill Report 188, July 1974: 26). Moreover, Britain was 
perhaps first,among the major industrial eoonomies to experience the 
reoession of 1974-1975 (see Mandel, 1977: 14; Guttman, 1976). 
Industrial procluotion and investment fell off very rapidly 1n the 
final quarter of 1974. The rapid change in the economio oontext made 
it inoreasingly diffioult for the Government to reoon011e oonflicting 
prescriptions for economio reoovery. The CaI reiterated its earlier 
oalls for immediate relief of company liquidity problem:3 through a 
relaxation of price oontrols and the implementation of tax 
ooncessions (NEDC, 3 July 1974; DT, 160otober1974). The TUC argued 
the oase for a substantial reflationary boost in order to raise the 
rate of growth and mitigate the worst effeots of tho reoossion (Iru!. 
Times, 5 November 1974; TUCR, 1975: 263). The November 1914 budget 
olearly oommitted the Government to the restoration of private sector 
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profitability through tax and price code alterations. While the 
Olancellor also gave a modest boost to overall demand, he warned that. 
wage increases above the TUe guidelines would force him to curb 
demand (on the budget, see Labour Research, December 1974; Guttman, 
1976; Stewart, 1977: 202). The Qovernment' was particularly anxious 
about the doubling of the public sector borrowing requirement due to 
key Social Contract commitments such as food and housing subsidies, 
increases in social benefits including pensions and family 
allowances, and significant public sector wage inoreases. The 
deficit was again to be financed by externa 1 bo~ro!,ing which, as a 
result of the huge balance of payments surpluses among OPEC 
countries, was then readily available from short-term deposits on the 
London money markets (Mandel, 1977: 39). As will become apparent in 
Chapter 6, this rapid increase in the public sector borrowing 
requirement and consequent recourse to external borrowing in tho 
context of a growing balance of payments deficit rendered the British 
economy inoreasingly vulnerable to the vagaries of international 
financial markets. 
'·In the throne speech following its election Victory, the 
Government reaffirmed its commitment to the Sooial contract ~as an 
essential element in its strategy for curbing inflation, reduoing the 
balance of payments deficit, enoouraging industrial investment, 
maintaining employment • • • and promoting social and economic 
justice' (The Times, 30 Ootober 1974). However, the high levels or 
price inflation, the oomparison and relativity probleJll3 assooiated 
with both high levels of wage increases and a re-entry phase of 
incomes polioy, the increasing erosion of prioe oontrols whioh 
originally were to be the central thrust of the Government'a counter-
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inflation polioy, and the growing international sorutiny of the 
British economy all augmented the economio and political pressures on 
the Social Contract Mark I policy. When the Cabinet met for a 
strategy session after the budget, despite the doubts of some 
ministers about the efficacy of the TUC guidelines, it was decided 
'to give the Social Contract until next Faster (unless there was a 
catastrophe first) and then discuss the alternative of unemployment' 
(castle, 1980: 219-224). Without speCifying the timing, the Prime 
Minister made precisely this point to the Labour Party Conference at 
the end of November. If the Social Contraot did-not work, then the 
only ohoices, at least as he presented them, were either deflation 
through publio expenditure cuts or inoreased taxation and both would 
result in unemployment (LPCR, 1974: 204). Thereafter, Government 
statements warned incessantly of the dire consequences of 
inflationar,y wage increases.8 
In a context where the media portrayed every wage olaim as 
either a blow or a boost for the Social Contraot, TUC leaders were 
inoreasingly obliged to defend the credibility of their guidelines 
both internally and externally. While they were largely successfUl 
in maintaining at least the appearance of the carefully oonstructed 
consensus at leadership level, they enoountered inoreasing 
diffioulties in credibly translating it into industrial praotioe. 
The oentrifugal forces were too strong and thu external pressures too 
great. The policy, they insisted, was not a 'soft option' (FT, 15 
August 1974). However, the perennial question of the TUC's limited 
powers of intervention in the industrial affairs of affiliated 
unions, the ambiguities in the polioy and aome oonfusion over the 
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real impaot of the Sooial Contract Mark I guide lines further 
exacerbated pressures for a tighter interpretation, application and 
even renegotiation of the guidelines. 
In an attempt to enforce the voluntary pay guidelines, the TUe 
General Seoretary intervened forma lly and with varying degrees of' 
success in a number of cases. The most successfUl interventions came 
in defenoe of the twelve-month rule. It was feared that if all who 
were dissatisfied with their Stage Three settlement re-opened pay 
negotiations, it would be impossible to maintain the Mark I polioy. 
The building workers' union, UCATT, for instance, opted at its polioy 
~onfei;'-ence"' 'for high wage targets despite its' G~'n;~a-l Seoretary's 
advioe that these would exoeed the Mark I guidelines (~Times, 19 
June 1974). When pay talks began in September in breach of the 
'twelve-month rule', the TUC General Secretary, Len Murray, 
suocessfully prevailed on the unions involved to defer their olaim 
(~ Times, 26 September 1974). However, following sporadio 
industrial aotion in a number of its plants, Ford management opened 
negotiations for an entirely new national agreement only seven months 
aft"er it had conoluded its Stage Three deal. Although both side5 
claimed that the new agreement was within the terms of the Sooi,al 
Contraot, it sparked fears of an explosion of new settlements 1n 
breach of the twelve-month rule (ill Report 193, September 1974; 
castle, 1980: 188). 
As the rate of wage and price increases continued to rise, the 
TUC was less successful in its attempts to persuade affiliates to 
reduce their wage claims. The miners, for instanoe, ignored TUC 
adv ioe and, in ear 1y February, won an increase in eXCeDS of thirty 
per cent. Suoh settlements rapidly became the norm in a wide variety 
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of groups: health service professionals, gas and water workers, 
teachers, civil ·servants, doctors, dentists and eleotricity supply 
and rail workers. In successive consultations with the mining, 
electricity supply and railway unions, the TUC economic committee 
failed to persuade any of them to reduce their claims (TUCR, 1975: 
270; FT, 7 and 12 April, 1975). These failures again highlighted the 
limits of TUC authority and provoked much soeptioism about the value 
of the guidelines. In faot, the intent of the Social Contract Mark I 
policy was that the loous of applioation should be within individual 
affiliates.Where authority over industrial deoisions resided in any 
case. The next section explores some of the implications of the 
Mark I polioy for the internal dynamics of the ·sample unions. TUC 
officials limited their interventions to "'high profile', national-
level negotiations. Otherwise, there were no monitoring mechanisms 
to follow what was happening at workplace level. Indeed, TUC 
representatives repeatedly resisted Government and CBI attempts to 
erect suoh machinery (see, i.e., FT, 16 January 1975; LCR, 20 January 
1975). 
Thus, the interpretation of the Mark I guidelines was lett 
largely to individual union negotiators with varying results. Both 
the TOWU and GMWU, tor instance, maintained a olear polioy commitment 
to the operation of the guidelines while ASTMS was unequivooally 
opposed. General secretaries sometimes argued for restraint or 
attempted to defuse particular industrial tenSions This was, for 
example, the oase with Jack Jones and TGWU members in the Soottish 
road haulage industry and also at Rolls Royoe 1n Sootland (TGWUJ, 
November 1979). However, virtually all of the negotiators 
314 
" ,.. . 
interviewed in this study recalled that they bargained as they 
normally would in a 're-entry phase' of incomes policy (Interviews, 
various dates). One regional official emphasized that 'responsible 
collective bargaining' could not. be translated into real wage demands 
- they got what they could (Interview, 6 September 1979). Moreover, 
by the spring of 1975, settlements' of more than thirty per cent had 
become commonplace in many industries. NegotIators referred to their 
members' vertigo at the sight of their pay packets. Faoed with the 
uncertainties of accelera ting wage and price rises and the persistent 
rumours of an imminent wage freeze, negotiators simply. attempted to 
obtain as much as they could in an increasingly volatile bargaining 
climate. 
It was apparent, moreover, that the TUC guidelines were 
ambiguous in several respects. In the face of repeated requests from 
the Government for a tighter application of the guidelines, and it 
must be recalled that the Government had not been directly involved 
in the drafting of the Social contract Mark I policy other than to 
indicate tha t there was no scope for increases in consumption. the 
pro~lem for the TUG was how to restriot their interpretation without 
inciting open opposition to the policy among certain affiliat~s. 
Such opposition, it was feared, would further undermine tho operation 
of the guidelines and unravel the leadership agreement on their 
value. A November circular drew attention to the main .. loopholes'. 
It recommended that the central provision, oompensation for increases 
in the cost of living, should apply since the last settlement and not 
to any anticipated rate of inflation. It also re-emphasized the 
importance of the twelve month interval between settlements 
reproducing the Prime Minister's specifio assurance that there would 
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not be a wage freeze. Finally, it requested that the special 
provision increases allowed by the guidelines, such as the minimum 
pay target, should specifioally ~rode differentials and not be .~. 
transmitted throughout the entire pay structure (TUC Circular 38, 21 
November 1974; also .!Q.§ Report 197, November 1974; and FT, 2 November 
1974). Given the pervasive foroe of differentials and relativites in 
oocupational and industrial pay structures, however, this last-
request was not to be accomplished easily. Apart from this specific 
clarification of the guidelines and a later admission that the 
problem was not the guidelines but that of securing adherence to them 
(LCR, 20 January 1975; FT, 21 January 1975; Castle, 1980: 283-287), 
the TUC maintained that 'negotiators generally have endeavoured to 
follow the guidelines' and wages had, as a result, risen less than 
might have otherwise been the case (TUCER, 1975: 58-59; TUC ECD, 14 
May 1975; Casttle, 1980': 318-319). The Chance llor, however. 
complained that only sixty per cent of settlements fell within the 
guidelines. 
- Why was there such a disorepanoy between Government and TUC 
peroeptions? It was, of course, partly political. '!he Government 
was attempting to force the TUC into a muoh tighter applioation of' 
the policy. TUC leaders were aware of their limited authority in 
this respect. If the policy did not oommand any oredibility, not 
only would the Government be less forthcoming in its relations with 
the TUC, but the polioy would not command any adhesion from TUC 
affiliates - alienating both those who had already attempted to 
oomply with the guidelines and those who were still formulating their 
olaims. lbe disorepancy was also attributable, however, to a number 
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of factors which the TUe maintained had inflated and distorted the 
official indices of pay increases. The TUG argued that the rate of 
pay increases during this period was overstated by the impaot of 
threshold payments, inoreases in London weighting, speoial provisions 
tor equal and low pay and 'speoial' oases, and large amounts of 
deferred back-pay. Most of these faotors were indeed "lett-overs' 
trom Stage Three. It they were disoounted under the terms of the 
Mark I guidelines, the TUG suggested, then the underlying increase in 
wages in taot oorresponded very closely with inoreases in the cost or 
~lvlng. __ -.-4 - -
The period was unusual in several respects. First, there was a 
negative earnings drift. In other words, rates were increasing more 
rapidly than earnings. Secondly, a number of groups did reoeive 
considerable backpay under the .. specia 1 cases' provisions of Stage 
Three which were originally designed to aocommodate the miners but 
were later extended to a number of publio sector bargaining groups. 
This temporarily distorted figures for monthly inoreases from which 
the annual figures were extrapolated. Finally, because ot wide 
variations in the amount, timing and frequenoy ot settlements, it was 
, 
difficult to identity clearly any norm whioh would be aooepted as a 
fair oomparison and as fair compensation for increases in the cost 
of living (see ~ Report 212, July 1975; ~ 100, Maroh 1975). 
This certainly contributed to the volatility of the bargaining 
climate and the general apprehension of union negotiators in 
approaohing their olaims (on the impaot of this volatility on union 
negotiators, see Meyrick, 1974). In retrospeot, TUC claims that its 
guidelines were having an impact were later at least partly 
substantiated when the annual. rate of wage increases aotually besan 
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to decline before the change in policy in July 1975 had had any 
impact (see ASTMS QER, September 1975: 4).9 Moreover, there is 
little evidence that real disposable income increased in this period 
(see Appendix B, Figure B.2 and Table B.l; also Cohen, 1975). 
Indeed, Labour Research (September 1975) suggested that real wages 
had fallen over the year from June 1974. 
The debate about the real impact of the Social Contract Mark I 
and whether or not trade union negotiators were staying within the 
guidelines was significant for its political implications. In 
'particular,- was the TUC delivering its side of the bargain? 
Certainly, as was revealed in its April 1975 budget, the Government 
was gravitating towards an increasingly hard line on pay settlements. 
Indeed, in a situation that seemed to parallel closely the 1964-1965 
Labour Government experience, a number of Ministers openly regretted 
that they had opted for a voluntary rather than a compulsory policy 
(on the 1960s Labour Government's move to a compulsory pay polioy, 
see Panitch, 1976: 87-88). Perhaps typical of the hardening 
attitude, one Government Minister later suggested that "the only give 
and take in the contract was that the Government gave and the unions 
took' (Barnett, 1982: 49). The oonflioting interpretations of the 
real impaot of the Social contract Mark I policy fUrther oontributed 
to doubts about the TUe guidelines and renewed pressures for a more 
rigid incomes policy. They also made it more diffioult for TUe 
leaders to sustain any internal consensus on the polioy, yet alone 
translate it into industrial practice. Rumours Of the imminence of a 
change in policy made it more difficult again for negotiators to heed 
Tue appeals to observe the guidelines. Thus, the rumours were 
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virtuallY a self-fUlfilling propheoy_ 
As the rate -of wage inoreases cont1nued to sp1ral' upwards, so 
the pressures for a new pay policy intensified. The csr played an 
inoreasingly prominent role in this direotion. The Sooial Contract .""' 
was essentially a bipartite relationship between the Labour 
Government and the TUC. The CBr, therefore, had had to adapt its 
strategies to the new "ideological t situation (Interview, 22 
September 1979). The csr began taking a more overtly political 
stance on issues than what had hitherto been the case (on the 
increasing po11t1cization of the CBr, see Grant ~?~ Marsh, 1975 and 
1977b; Labour Research 1974; and Beeoham, 1980). This was evident in 
its attempts to mobilize public opinion against a number of Soaial 
Contraot items, partioularly the extension of state intervention in 
industry through planning, nationalization and employment law. 
Simultaneously, CBl offioials also sought to cult1vate n better and 
more regular relat10nsh1p with the TUC. An internal dooument 
Buggested that the 'lack of direot and regular talks between the TUe 
and the CSl ••• has been a regrettable omisSion whioh may have been 
detrimental to the national interest and the well-being of industry' 
(Car rM, July 1974; see also note 3 above). The monthly National 
Eaonomic Development Council meetings also beoame an important 
tripartite forum for the CBr to pursue its objectives. Prompted by 
their anxiety over the depth of the reoession and trends in wage 
settlements, csr off1oials attempted, unsuccessfully, to push tho 
Government and the TUC towards a tighter applioation of tho Mark I 
guidelines at the January NEDC (FT, 16 January 1975). Thoy then 
attempted, again unsuccessfully, to engage the TUe in a separate 
dialogue on this question (Guardian, 3 February 1975). 
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csr officials by then had concluded that inflation must be the 
Government's principal economic priority. In their preparations for 
the CBr submission on the spring budget, they decided to push 
publicly for a voluntary incomes policy (CSr IM, n.d.). It was 
estimated that, in order to reduce the level of price inflation, wage 
increases should not exceed five per cent over the coming year and 
run at ten per cent less than the rate of price inflation. Suoh a 
policy of wage cuts, they acknowledged, would be unaoceptable to the 
unions and, therefore, almost impossible to achieve in a voluntary 
way. -However, if it was statutory, then CBr mem~'rs-'would oppose it. 
Thus, it was not a politically viable policy. Yet CBr officials felt 
that they had no alternative. One official prophetically suggested 
that only in "a real crisis' might it be possible to "get a wages 
policy of this kind, without compensating tax cuts, and even if it 
was likely to lead to a large rise in unemployment' (Car rM, 14 
February 1975). Lacking any clear solution to What they regarded as 
a disastrous economic situation, they decided to push publicly for 
drastic aotion without referenoe to specific wage targets. 
Privately, however, they would use the targets in discussions with 
the Government 'to strengthen the hands of those Ministers who would 
be prepared to take a tougher Government approach to the problem' 
(Interview, 22 September 1979; CBr rM, various dates, February 1975). 
By the spring of 1975, those ministers were in the majority in 
Cabinet (Castle, 1980: 352). While the Employment Seoretary 
continued to exhort his ministerial colleagues to hold the line in 
their own departments, they approved large increases for industrial 
civil servants and railway workers among others. Individual ministers 
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argued that they would, in turn, accept more restrictive measures at 
the end of the wage round (ibid.:327-329 and 336-338). Thus, despite 
the TUC's efforts to effect a policy of voluntary wage guidelines in 
response to the implementation of the Social Contract programme, a 
change in policy appeared inevitable. 
The Sooial Contract Within The Sample Unions 
The previous section examined the evolution of relations between 
the TUC and the. Labour Government during the 1974-1975 period and 
how, in the context of rising rates of inflation, the central issue 
soon became the- TUC's increasingly explicit advocacy of voluntary 
wage restraint and the willingness and/or ability of its affiliates 
I 
to aot upon that ad~ocaoy. This section briefly oonsiders the 
implioations of the Social Contract for the sample unions during this 
period. First, how was the idea of the Sooial Contract presented 
within the individual unions and how was polioy oommitmentto ·it 
obtained? Seoondly, in industrial terms, What were the implioations 
of a commitment by individual unions to the Social Contraot and 
~oluntary wage guidelines? 
.. At the time of the election of the Labour Government in February 
1974, the Social Contract remained an abstraot notion. Most union 
activists and offioials.favoured the election of the Labour party and 
olose relations between trade unions and the new govemment, but the 
idea of a Sooial Contract had only been mentioned on rare oooas10ns. 
Yet, as was illustrated above in the case of the AUEW, the 
construotion and implementation of a common TUC leadership approaoh 
to the Social Contract was cruoially dependent on the typos of 
internal political oonstraints acting upon individual union leaders 
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as well as their particular policy predilections. The Sooial 
Contraot was not, of course, a difficult concept for most British 
trade unionists to endorse. Support for the Labour Party was 
certainly the predominant ethos of most unions' political praotioe 
(see Chapter 4). Moreover, the commitment of the new Labour 
Government to repeal the contentious Industrial Relations Aot and 
implement favourable social legislation was bound to commend it to 
union aotivists. Thus, there was no substantial opposition to the 
notion of the Social Contraot in most of the sample unions, and most 
union .leaders encountered little difficulty -in the downwards 
mobilization of support for the Social Contract. By the time the 
Social Contract was actually debated within most of the unions, 
however, the Social Contraot had for many beoome virtually 
indistinguishable from the TUC's voluntary pay guidelines. This 
posed partioular problems for at least two of the sample unions and 
both the AUEW and ASTMS leaderships expressed reservations about 
their support for the pact. 
As was discussed above, the left faotion in the AUEW National 
Committee clearly had a number of doubts about the Social Contraot. 
The studied ambiguity of Hugh Scanlon on the Sooial Contraot was 
probably an expression of both his own personal reservations as wall 
as an indioation of the strength of the left faction in AUEW polioy-
making. As a result, Scanlon suggested that the support of the AUEW 
for the Social Contraot, espeoially in terms of pay bargaining, would 
depend on the Labour Government's progress in the implementat10n of 
its legislative programme. By the time of the September TUe, the 
union was fUlly in line with the TUe leadership oonsensus. Indeed, 
Soanlon played a oritical role in persuading a key dissenting union, 
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the autonomous white-collar section of the AUEW, TASS, to withdraw a 
motion critical of the Social Contract. 
The initial ambiguity of the ASTMS leadership and polioy-making. 
bodies on the Soaia1 Contract, on the other hand, became inoreasingly 
oppositional during the Social Contract Mark I period. The ASTMS 
leadership played a particularly active role in the La~our Party and, 
of course, welcomed the e1eotion of the Government and the 
implementation of various SOCial Contraot priorities, particularly in 
the area of industrial policy and trade union rights. However, 
ASTMS officials also remained true to the union's tradition of 
vociferous opposition to wage restraint. As TUC leaders attempted to 
construct a consensus around a wage bargaining response to the 
implementation of the Government's legislative agenda, Clive Jenkins 
categorically rejected any notion that the Social Contract implied 
some inhibition on the union's ability to bargain on behalf of its 
members: 'Our view has been and continues to be that we seek free 
and unfettered collective bargaining as the surest, the most 
immediate and the most effective way of looking after our member~' 
interests in employment in a free market economy' (ASTMSJ, H3y-Jun~ 
1974). Both the union's executive and policy opnference supported 
this approach (see Plaut, 1978). In response to the TUC's April 
ciroular on continued observance of Stage Three, for instance, the 
ASTMS executive reminded the TUC that it had no right to interfere in 
the negotiations of its affiliates (ASTMS ECM, 19-20 April, 1974; 
also FT, 9 May, 1974). 
However, the ASTMS leadership oontinued to show Q oertain degree 
of ambiguity on the Social Contraot. Tho ASTHS dolegation to tho 
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1974 TUC abstained on the ~neral Council's report on the Sooial 
Contract which it regarded as an interferenoe with free collective 
bargaining to which the union's policy was olearly opposed. At the 
same time, it supported the two main composite motions on the Social 
Contract whioh, Jenkins argued, did not mention wage restraint and 
were consistent with ASTMS policy objectives (ECM, 7 September 1974; 
ASTMSR, 1975: 8). This degree of ambiguity became increasingly 
transparent over the course of the Social Contract Mark I as ASTHS 
representatives continually reiterated their opposition to wage 
restraint. The executive noted at its D~~~~ber meeting, tor 
instance, that wages were not the cause of inflation and 'that ASTMS 
would oontinue to deal with its members' olaims on their merits' 
(ASTMS ECM, 14 Deoember 1974). The annual oonferenoe was also 
clearly 'against voluntary, enforoed or statutory wage restraint. 
Nor will it [ASTMS] 'trade off' adequate salary increases for its 
members in exchange for legislation, which must be brought in anyway' 
(ASTMSJ, May-June 1975). While the General Secretary continued to 
maintain that the Sooial Contract was not about wage restraint, 
though emphasis had been plaoed on that aspect, he was also 
increasingly critical of the orientation of Government economio 
polioy (ASTMS AC, 1975). At the Labour Party Conference, Jenkins was 
vociferous in his criticisms of the November budget (LPen, 1974J 
ASTMSJ, November-December 1974). Thereafter, he oonsistently berated 
the Treasury for imposing its conservative priorities on tho 
Government (ASTMSJ, January-February 1975) and was privately oritioal 
of Healey for unilaterally rewriting the terms of the Sooial Contraot 
(ASTMS ECM, 11 January 1975). Moreover, Jenkins also attaoked the 
TUC's approach to the economy which he regarded as insuffioiently 
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critical of the Government's economic priorities (ASTMS AC, 1975). 
Indeed, in February 1975, the ASTMS executive acceded to Jenkins.s 
request that the union publish its own economic review (see ASIMS 
QER). Suoh a resource was available to only a limited number of' 
union leaders; it certainly facilitated the oppositional role which 
Jenkins played during his first years on the TUe General Council. 
The union's opposition did not necessarily translate into an 
enhanoed industrial militancy. Faced with motions oritioal of' the 
lack of executive support for disputes potentially in breach ot the 
Mark I guidelines from politically active divisIonal counoils suoh' 
as those in London, OXford and Essex, the NEe responded that it was 
not its policy to .. support any group regardless of circumstanoes' 
(ECM, 11 January 1975). There was certainly a feeling among many of 
the ASTMS members and activists interviewed in this study that the 
divisional councils and/or branohes moving this type of motion were 
among the least likely to carry it through industrially (Interviews, 
various dates). Certainly, the guidelines were flexible enough to 
'acoommodate most ASTMS claims and union negotiators treated it as a 
period of free collective bargaining. tbst signifioantly, in terms 
of TUC policy-making, the ASTMS leadership was alone among the sample 
unions in not attempting to mobilize downwards the TUC policy 
consensus. Indeed, Jenkins chose to play an oppositional role Which 
was consIstent with the union's previous polioy positions and to 
which there was no significant internal opposition from the 
executive, policy conference or offioials. 
, , , 
The other sample union leaderships in this study all transmitted 
messages of unqualified support for botn the new Government and its 
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Sooial Contraot. The FBU General Seoretary, for instanoe, pubUshed 
a letter of oongratulations to the Prime Minister and the union's 
leadership remained supportive of the Sooial Contraot (FBUJ, tilroh 
1974; Interviews, various dates). However, within the union's 
s!ngle-ohannel polioy struoture, discussion of politioal issues suoh 
as the Sooial Contract tended to be very much 5ubordina ted to the 
union's campaign to improve wages and reduce working hours during 
this period (see, i.e., FBU AC, 1915). Like the other two 5i08le-
ohannel unions in this study, the discussion of the Sooial Contract 
in NUPE _was oonsidered primarily in the contex~ Qf .the union's major 
industrial objeotives. In the s1ngle-ohannel unions, there appeared 
to be an inevitable intertwining of industrial and other polioy 
issues with industrial issues usually taking priority. In the case 
of ~PE, the predominant is issue was low pay. The NUPE General 
Seoretary, Alan Fisher, noted that his union would wish to monitor 
,the development of TUC polioy to be oertain that the low ... paid wero 
aocorded a sUffioient priority (NUPEJ, No.5, 1914). However, the 
union's executive agreed that the Government's first budget had gone 
~a long way towards meeting the requests put forward by the TUC as a 
basis for the Social Contraot' (NUPE ECM, 6-7 April 1974). NUPE's 
support for the Sooial Contraot was further oonfirmed with the 
inolusion 1n the Mark I guidelines of a low-pay target and the 
Government's eventual aooeptanoe of this target in the local 
authority and health servioe negotiations. NUPE leaders had, of 
course, repeatedly advooated suoh an approaoh and the aotual 1974 
wage settlement has continued to serve as a benohmark for oarnings 1n 
these sectors (see Fisher and Dix, 1974; Appendix D, Figure D.5). 
Not surprisingly, the other two sample unions, both of whose leaders 
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were major actors in the formulation of the SOcial Contraot and the 
construction of a leadership consensus on a possible Mark I polioy, 
strongly endorsed the development of the Social Contraot during this 
period. 
The GMWU executive stressed 'the need for the closest possible 
voluntary cooperation between the Government and the trade unions on 
sooial priorities' (GMWU ECM, 2 April 1974). David Basnett 
repeatedly emphasized the legislative and social achievements of the 
Social Contraot and .. the need to respond to the Government fS 
initiative and set collective bargaining objeotives compatible with· 
the achievement of the Labour Government's economic and sooial 
objectives' (FT, 3 April 1974; GMWU 1M, 2 April 1974). There was 
virtually no opposition to the SOcial Contract within either the GMWU 
executive or at the union's 1974 policy conferenoe (GMWU ECM, 7 May 
1974; Interviews, various dates; G~U ACA, 1974; GHolU AC, 1974; FT, 6 
June 1974). Indeed, to dramatize the signifioanoe of the Sooial 
Contract, both the TUC General Secretary and the Prime Minister spoke 
on this subject to the 1974 GMWU Congress. The GMWU also 
demonstrated a marked willingness to translate its polioy response to 
the Sooial Contract into detailed instruotions for negotiating 
officers and activists - to a degree that one national officer was 
concerned that members would be misled into thinking the union was 
actually supporting an incomes policy while other unions were 
bargaining freely (GMWU 1M, 2~ May and 11 July 1974). 
The steady move of the GM-lU towards internal reform during this 
period commanded considerable enthusiasm within tho union (OMWU AC, 
1974 and 1975; FT and MS, 5 June 1974; FT, 3 June 1975). Externally, 
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this translated into an active partioipation in the formulation at 
TOC policies, a strict adherence to TOC policy decisions, and the 
formulation of GMWU policies which were more in tune with the 
mainstream of the trade union movement. Unencumbered by manY 
internal limits on his policy disoretion and able to draw on 
considerable resources in the union's researoh department, Basnett 
consistently emphasized the importance of trade union' involvement in 
government economic strategy and attempted to push the Government to 
act on a range of economic polioy items, partioularly 'selective 
reflation' and other action to stimulate employment (see, i.e., 
GMWUJ, November 1974; GMWU ECM, 5 November and 10 December 1974 and 7 
January 1975; Gl-MU 1M, 6 January, 10 March and 18 April 1975). 
However, it was increasingly evident that the Government was not 
implementing the union's polioy prescriptions. Indeed, there were 
serious doubts whether it was really committed to the concept ot 
joint economic management - what Basnett had presented as the essence 
of . the Social Contraot (LPCR, 1974:285-286). This presented the 
union with a serious dilemma'. Basnett told the 1975 GMWU Congress 
'that no Government whioh uses unemployment as an instrument of 
economic policy will have the support of this union or this 'trade 
union movement' (GMWU AC, 1975). This stanoe was entirely in 
accordanoe with the union's economic and industrial strategy. Yet, 
did action really validate the rhetoric? A conflict arose between 
the language and practice of Labour Party loyalism and the apparent 
implications of the union's developing economic strategy. As will be 
developed further in Chapters 6 and 7, it became readily apparent 
that a union in which an unswerving and loyal commitment to the 
Labour Party had been a political touohstone could not so eas11y 
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withdraw its support for a Labour government, even if it was pursuing 
an economic policy deliberately premised on an inorease in 
unemployment. 
The TGWU General Secretary, Jack Jones, faced perhaps greater 
doubts about the collective bargaining implications of the Sooial 
Contract among some aotivists in his union than did David Basnett. 
There was, for instance, a strong "'left caucus t in the 'l'GWU 
executive, particularly in its Finance and General Purposes 
Committee. Although staunchly loyal to the General Seoretary, it was 
not·uncritioal (Interviews, 2 April, 4, 9, and "26 September 1980). 
The success of several Communist Party members in the 1973 exeoutive 
elections had also led to some speculation that Jones might faoe a 
greater challenge to his advooacy of the Sooial Contraot (.1!!.!. Times, 
18 January 1974). As opposed the oautious approach of the AUEW 
President, Hugh Soanlon, in the face of internal reservations, 
Jones's enthusiasm for the Sooial Contract did not appear in any way 
diminished in the face of possible doubts by leading aotivists in the 
t,mion. Perhaps beoause of his powerful advooaoy of the Sooia1 
Contraot, his real dominanoe over the exeoutive and tho genuine 
ambiguity of the left about the merits of the Sooial Contraot and itzs 
potentially restrictive implioations for oolleotive bargaining, there 
was in faot little substantive opposition to Jones's support of the 
Sooial.Contract within the TGWU executive. When it was reported to 
the executive that there was some branch-level oonfusion about the 
union's bargaining policy at the time, partioularly as regards 
acquiescence in the observance of Stage Three , members were reforred 
.to Jones's numerous appeals for 'wage realism' in the oontext of the 
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wider implementation of the Sooial Contraot programme: 'we do not 
apologize for urging unions to be realistic on wage olaims with a 
neoessary emphasis on keeping abreast of the oost or living. We are 
not advocating wage oontrol. We are advocating oommon sense' (TGWU' 
F&GPCM, 1 May 1974; Tribune, 26 April 1974; TGWUJ, May 1974; TGWU 
ECM, June 1974; FT, 16 April 1974). Jones experienoed no diffioulty 
in seouring union support for the Sooial Contraot Mark I guidelines 
(TGWU F&GPCM, 4 July 1974). Certainly, Jones remained the leading 
exponent of the Sooial Contract. As he told the September 1974 
meeting of the TGWU executive, 'all our erro!,_ts_ to maintain and 
improve conditions for all of the membership may be summed up in the 
logiC or our support for the Sooial Contract' (TGWU ECM, September 
1974). 
The evidence obtained from interviews with negotiators in this 
study suggests that the Sooial COntract Mark I guidelines ware 
sufficiently ambiguous and flexible to oontain most wage olaims. The 
ambiguity was linked to whether compensation for inoreases in the 
cost of living should be calculated forwards or baokwards. Tho 
flexibility arose from the special allowanoes ror low and equal pay 
as well as the laok or speoifio guidanoe on bonus and productivity 
schemes. Moreover, union negotiators stressed that it was 
effeotively a period of free collective bargaining. Thus, although 
most negotiators claimed that they were settling within the Mark I 
limits, there were few internal pressures about restriotions impo~ed 
by the guidelines. Indeed, many national negotiating offioers 
recalled that one of their main tasks was to antiCipate tho rapid 
inoreases in the rate of inflation 1n their settlements While seeking 
to portray their union as not being 1n flagrant breach of tho 
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guidelines. 
The application of the guidelines appeared to vary considerably 
from one union to another. the GMWU executive, fo~ instance, issued 
fairly detailed guidelines about the interpretation of the polioy and 
these were distributed with the authority of the regional 
secretaries, also prominent members of the executive, at looal level 
(see, i.e., GMWU ECM, 9 July 1974). '!he TGWU, on the other hand, 
generally gave its, negotiators a free hand and the results reflected 
the highly heterogenous composition of its membership (Interviews, 
various dates). The heavy engineering and vehicle industries, for 
instance, were probably affected more by the impact of the deepening 
recession than any wage guidelines (see Appendix D, Figure D.6). In 
the chemical and oil industries, however, the TGWU national secretary 
was reported to have said that voluntary wage restraint need not 
apply to companies making large profits: 'I do not think we should be 
so obsessed about the Social Contract that we forget what we are 1n 
business for as trade unions' (~Times, 9 July 1974J Interview, 14 
'August 1980). The rate of inflation was in faot rising so rapidly in 
the latter part of this period that many negotiators could do Uttlf) 
more than attempt to anticipate fUture changErS 1n the cost of living 
(see Appendix B, Figures B.1 and B.2). In this sense, employers' 
willingness to pay was ,a much greater obstaole than any voluntnry 
guidelines formulated by the TUe. The lll3jo~ sourco of internal 
instability' for union leaders seeking to defend the Sooial Contract 
was the persistent rumour that the impleme~ation of n wage freezo 
was imminent. This created internal pressures for inter1m wago 
increases in breach of the TUG's advocacy ot' a twelve-month interval 
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between wage settlements. Thus, union leaders such as Jones sought 
to 'cool the fever' by pointing to the categorioal assurances of 
Michael Foot that there would not be a wage freeze (see, 1.e., TOWUJ, 
November 1974; TGWU GSC, 15 October 1974; TGWU ECM, 2 December 1974 
and 6 March 1975; Interview, 16 May 1974). 
Thus, with the exception of ASTMS which followed an inoreasingly 
oppositional path, the leaders of the sample unions' were able to 
secure detailed policy support for the Social Contraot and the Mark I 
guidelines. As was demonstrated by the experience of the Sooial 
Contract Mark I, however, mat this meant ._i~ ,terms of aotual 
bargaining praotice was less evident. Union negotiators olaimed that 
they were bargaining within the guidelines. lbwever, the bargaining 
climate had become so volatile that, whatever the experionoe of 
individual unions or bargaining groups, the perception of the 
Government, many employers, the publio and some of the TUe staft was 
that the voluntary oounter-inflation policy had failed. 
Contraot for Growth or Contract for Crisis? 
By the spring of 1975, the disillusionment with the Sooinl 
Contract 1n a number of quarters did not augur well for its future. 
The level of wage inflation exceeded the level of prioe inflation and 
the efficaoy of the Social Contraot Hark I guidelines was, thus, 
widely questioned. Employer representatives, a substantial 
proportion of the Conservative Party and many of those who had 
espoused the social demooratio oonoeption of the Sooinl Contraot, 
particularly a number of Cabinet ministers, were pushing tor a muoh 
tighter wage polioy. TUC leaders were oertainly aware of the tailure 
of some affiliates to implement the voluntary guidelines. They wero 
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espeoially dispirited, however, about their relative laok of suooess 
in conveying what they felt were the real aOhievements of the Social 
Contraot: eoonomio and social progress, on the one hand, and tho 
degree of restraint demonstrated by many trade union negotiators, on' 
the other. A number of unions, however, were openly hostile to 
Government economio policy. !here was a distinct possibility of a 
revolt against the Social Contract within the TUe. While trade union 
leaders emphasized that the Social Contract was not exclusively about, 
pay and had delivered a broad legislative programme, those who had 
embraced the socialist oonoeption of the Social Contract complained 
of the dilution of Party Manifesto commitments on industrial and 
economio policy. 111e Government had, in faot, made substantial 
oonoessions to a sustained CBr campaign against the proposed Industry 
Bill (TUe ECD, 24 February and 12 March 1975). Indeed, the Prime 
Minister had portended the imminent removal of Tony Benn, the leading 
exponent of the socialist oonception of the Contraot within the PLP 
and the apparent nemesis of the CBI, from the Industry portfolio in 
,the Cabinet (Hatfield, 1978: 243). The oonflict between 'loft' and 
'right' within the Party was also inoreasingly apparent as tho 
opposing campaigns geared up for the EEC referendum (see Chapter 6). 
Thus, the relative unity displayed by the Labour Party during the 
two 1974 elections was eroding rap~dlY. finally, perhaps most 
significantly, the Government had altered radioally its eoonomia 
strategy. This section deals briefly with the chango in Government 
eoonomio strategy and its apparent political implioations. 
While the Maroh 1974 budget and July 1974 eoonomio statement wero 
mildly reflationary and consistent with TUC oconomio demands, tho 
November 1974 and April 1975 budgets were increasingly dorlat1onary 
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and moved progressively out of step with 'ruC budget proposals. Tho 
April budget met TUC 'requests in inoreasing funds for training and 
selective investment, promising to introduoe a child-benetit 
allowanoe, and dealing with tax avoidanoe and the problom of the 
'lump' 1n the construotion industry. However, the number of measures 
direotly antithetioal to roc requests was far greater: , inoreases in 
direct and indireot taxation with a consequent rise in the retail 
price index, cuts in food subsidies, inoreases in the price of public 
services, a positive rejeotion of import controls and, most 
10 
importantly, a prediotion that unemployment would rise rapidly. 
The Chanoellor maintained that higher unemployment was part of the 
price of high inflation. The failure to moderate wage inoreases, he 
argued, bad· inevitably led to higher taxes and inoreased 
unemployment. If wages continued to rise, he promised to curtail 
demand even fUrther (on the budget, see ~ Report 207, April 1975; 
Labour Research, April 1975). The implication that the unions were 
to blame was readily apparent (see, i.e., LCR, 21 April 1975, where 
the Chancellor complains that the Government had done everything it 
was committed to do, but wage increases were running at eight to nine 
per cent above the guidelines). The Government had clearly 
subordinated trade union demands for growth and inoreased public 
expenditure to CBI demands for aotion to ourb inflation and the 
maintenanoe of conditions favourable to profitability. Moreover, it 
had explioitly rejeoted a commitment to full omployment, tho 
veritable touchstone of post-war economio polioy, as long as wage 
rises remained high. This was the initial polioy response to wat 
the Chancellor regarded as the failure ot' tho &loial Contraot l-brk I 
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guidelines. 
The changes in economic strategy emphasized the weakness ot botn 
the Labour left and the socialist conception of the Sooial Contraot. 
within the Government. It also exposed problems in the sooial 
democratic conception. As was argued in Olapter 2, the apparent 
unity behind calls for closer links between the Labour Party and its 
affiliated unions masked a rundamental divergence between social 
democratic and socialist conceptions of a putative 'social contract'. 
There was, moreover, a crucial disjuncture between 'politioal' and 
'trade union t roles in the strategic formulation of the Social 
Contract inasmuch as the espousal by trade union leaders of oloser 
links with the Party leadership did not appear to be based on either 
of the political conoeptions of the Social Contract. It has been 
argued that the motive of the Party leadership in seeking closer 
links with the unions was grounded in a speoific 'social democratio' 
vision of the eoonomy. This held that a Labour government could 
simultaneously promote economic growth, a fairer distribution of 
income, increased publio expenditure and full employment, if it oould 
fl'timulate investment and maintain a low level of inflation. Counter-
inflation policy was perceived as the key variable in this equation .. 
one which required full trade union cooperation. The social 
democratic conoeption of the Sooial Contraot sought to address the 
predicted inflationary oonsequences of an nctivo government 
commitment to eoonomio expansion under conditions of full employment 
through an accord with the unions. Thus, throughout the Liaison 
Committee discussions, the PLP representatives sought an explioit TUC 
commitment on wage moderation (see Chapter 3). In return for their 
acceptance of economic, social and legislatIve prioritios as dor1nod 
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by the trade union representatives, they obtained an implioit, 
commitment. This chapter has attempted to indicate how this implioit 
oommitment was translated by the ruc leadership first into observanoe 
of Stage Three and then the formulation and implementation of, the 
Sooial Contraot Mark I guidelines. 
The sooialist conception of the Sooial Contraot envisaged a 
trans formative political programme centred on industrial polioy in 
order to challenge and redirect the power of private capital and 
achieve 'a fundamental and irreversible shift in the balance of power 
and wealth in favour of working people and their families' • This 
conception was in 1975 poorly anchored in either the Cabinet or the 
leadership of the ruC. Tony Benn, for instance, had submitted a 
paper to the Cabinet sub-committee on Economic Strategy in February 
1975 which argued against a conventional deflationary package 
involving cuts in living standards and inoreased unemployment as a 
solution to inflation and a balance of payments defioit. He argued 
instead for the preservation of jobs and industrial oapaoity through 
i?dustrial assistanoe, seleotive import controls, control at capital 
a downward float of sterling and various other measures 
11 ' 
outflows, 
(castle, 1980: 353). That this prefigurative alternative economio 
strategy was not discussed in rull cabinet until July 1976 (Fay and 
Young, 1978b) was no doubt indicative of its relative laok of weight 
within the Government. Otherwise, there was a weak protost from a 
number of Keynesian Ministers who argued that a straight deflationary 
package would not resolve the problems at hand but did not of tor any 
clear alternative vision (see, i.e., Castle, 1980: 351-354). Tho 
differential commitment of various union leaders to an altornat1ve 
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economic policy will be explored turther'below (see Chapter 6). 
However, despite their common opposition to the changing direction of 
Government economic policy, there were very few links between key 
trade union leaders and the left in the Labour Party. Indeed, one 
influential union official had warned that in the ,context of a 
growing split between right and left in the PLP any TUC rejection of 
the left risked 'abandonment of employment as a priority, 
postponement of any attempt to extend planning control and publio 
ownership, and conflict with a section and, utl1mately, the whole of 
the TUC' (GMWU 1M, 6 January 1975). In fact, the left of the Labour 
Party and the TUC only very gradually united over the rudiments of an 
alternative economic strategy (see Warde; 1982: 133). 
The union reaction to the change in government economic polioy 
was certainly critical. Jack Jones noted that it was 'not 
satisfaotory from a trade union point of view' (DT, 16 April 1975). 
Hugh Scanlon labelled the Chancellor's olaim that inoreased 
unemployment was the invevitable price of inflation 'absolute 
rubbish' (ibid.). David Basnett warned that 'budgets alter the 
conditions of the Social Contract' (castle, 1980: 372; LCR, 21 April 
1975). Yet, When these differenoes were aired at a subsequent 
Liaison Committee meeting, the TUe and Government representatives did 
little more than agree to disagree (ibid.). The TUe 'welcomed the 
Ministers' clear reaffirmation. • • that they rejected statutory 
controls on collective bargaining, and that the Social Contraot, 
broadly defined, remained at the centre of economio nnd aooinl 
policy' (TUCR, 1975: 271). However, there was a rising tide or union 
opposition to Government economic policy (see, i.e., tho sUocessrul 
motion at the 1975 Scottish TUC, STUe, 1975: 600-618). 
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The mounting eoonomio orisis made it inoreasingly diffioult to 
reoonoile the oompeting conoeptions of the Social Contraot. The 
sooial demooratic conception was clearly predominant. Its asoendanoy 
would be oonsolidated further with the defeat of the Labour left 1n 
the June 1975 EEC referendum (see Chapter 6). For the sooial 
democratio oonception, the Social Contract was predioated on the 
possibility of non-inflationary eoonomio growth. This was reflected 
in Liaison Committee statements, for instanoe, whioh identified the 
objeotive of the jOint TUC-Labour Party polioies as 'faster growth in 
botti national output and in output per man' (LC, 1973). Growth was, 
in essenoe, the elixir of Labour's eoonomic strategy. It oreated the 
possibility of mediating trade union demands for full employment and 
inoreases in living standards with employer demands for the 
maintenanoe of private aocumulation and market norms. This refleoted 
the basic historical compromise of most European social demooratio 
parties with private oapital (see, i.e., Przeworski, 1980b: 56). As 
has been argued above, the essential feature of the sooial demooratic 
'conception of the Sooial Contract was the achievement of this non-
inflationary growth through an accord with the unions. Conversely, 
the trade union representatives on the Liaison Committee had 
acknowledged that only a favourable economio olimate where real wages 
were not falling might influenoe the direotion of oolleotive 
bargaining (LCR, 25 September and 20 November 1972). This was to be 
the material basis of their consent to wage moderation. 
The significanoe of a recession 1n the politioal ohemistry ot 
Labour was that it limited the possibilities for mediation through 
economio growth. Reoession or lack of growth in the context of wago 
338 
and price inflation led·the Government to subordinate trade union 
economic demands in favour of conditions that favoured private 
accumulation. Trade union economic demands could be met to tho 
extent that they might be coordinated with conditions neoessary for 
economic growth and private acoumulation in a market ooonomy. To 
rework Przeworski's insight, this was beoause private aooumulation 
in a capitalist economy represented 'future universal interests' 
Whereas trade union interests were 'particularistio and hence 
inimioal to future developments' (Przeworski, 1980: 27). The SOoial 
Contract had seemingly been constructed on a notion of joint ooonomic 
management. This was possible in conditions of growth when it did 
not violate the sooial demooratic eoonomic equation. Indeed, trade 
union cooperation was essential to the implementation of tho formula. 
In conditions of stagflation, however, the operation of the Sooial 
Contraot was more problematio. Tho possibilities for Government 
mediation between sometimes conflicting demands were more limited. 
This also undermined, at least partially, the basis of trade union 
consent for voluntary wage restraint. Yet, the change in Government 
'economic policy did not imply any desire to refrain from exerting a 
downward pressure on wage settlements. Pressures for a more 
draconian wage policy continued to mount. The April budget wars 800n 
as but a temporary antidote to the inadequacy of the Scoial Contract 
Mark I guidelines. For most Government ministers, trado union 
oooperation in wage moderation was both politically nnd praotioally 
preferrable to the multiple problems of statutory controlD. It 
remained unclear whether a 'contraot· for growth, llO the Scoial 
Contract had been construoted, oould be transformed into a 'contraot 
for crisis' '1 
339 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to chart the development of the 
Sooial COntraot during the first sixteen months of the Labour 
Government in 1974-1975. More partioularly, it outlined 'the rise of 
the Sooial COntraot Mark I and its relative fall from grace. Thus, 
it detailed the tentative steps taken by the TOC towards the 
formulation of a voluntary pay policy, sorutinized the limits of TUC 
authority in this consensus-building prooess, and followed the 
implementation of the policy and how its relative failure led to a 
signifioant change in the direction of Government eoonomio 'polioy. 
By the spring of 1975, therefore, the materia.l basis of trade union 
participation in the Sooial Contraot had shifted radioally. It had 
originally been premised inter alia on the scope for increases 1n 
real wages. With the Social contract Mark It this was altered to no 
soope for real wage increases, but there remained at least the broad 
acceptance of TUC definitions for economio and Booial priorities. 
The prospeots for another shirt 1n terrain - an aotual deoline in 
real living standards and relatively, fow economio and sooial 
oonoessions - appeared imminent by the early summer of 1975. The 
chanoe of seouring trade union oooperation in suoh a shift did not 
appear likely, henoe the general, pessimism for the future of the 
Sooial Contraot. Chapter 6 examines how this olimate led to two 
years of trade union cooperation in a polioy of extremely rigid wage 
restraint. 
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WAGE RESTRAINT, CONSENT AND ACQUIESCENCE 1975-1977 
The previous chapter traced the attempt by the TUC to formulate 
and implement its Social Contract Mark I guidelines and looked at 
their implications for the sample unions. This chapter is centrally 
concerned with the analysis of TUC cooperation in the two years of 
tight wage restraint which followed the Social Contract Mark I 
policy. These two years will be known as the Social Contract Phase 
One and Phase Two policies. 
This chapter again features the process of consensus-building at 
leadership level within the TUC. The Phase One policy was agreed in 
the context of growing crisis when there was much less scope for 
patient consensus-building than was the case in the formulation of 
the Social Contract Mark I guidelines. General Council members were 
asked to lend their consent to the policies as presented. Failing 
consent, they were requested to acquiesce in the name of trade union 
solidarity. The terms of Phase Two were also agreed in the context of 
economic and political crisis. The remarkable feature of the 
policies was that they were generally very effective and commanded a 
high degree of acquiescence, if not consent. In this sense, they 
have been regarded as possibly the most effective of post-war incomes 
policy phases as measured by degree of trade union support and 
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relative compliance. However, the policies unleashed a chain of 
reaction which worked its way through many affiliates and eventually 
resulted in the withdrawal of their compliance for another period of 
wage restraint. This process which was highly differentiated between 
unions will be the subject of Chapter B. Chapter 7 will focus on the 
mobilization of consent for wage restraint within the sample unions. 
The chapter is divided into three main parts. The first part 
outlines how the pressures which were building towards a draconian 
shift in policy, as outlined in Chapter 5, culminated in a 'sterling 
crisis' and the formulation of the Phase One or 'six pound' policy. 
The second part of the chapter examines the industrial impact of the 
Phase one policy, anticipates the impact of Phase fro, and charts the 
renewal of TUC consent for the Phase Two policy. Finally, the third 
part of the chapter considers why the TUC General Council agreed to 
participate in these incomes policies and the implications of its 
acceptance for an understanding of trade union approaches to the 
Social Contract. 
PHASE ONE: THE SIX POUND POLIC! 
In Chapter 5, it was noted that by the spring of 1975 the 
Government, the TUC and the CBI all were engaged in the search for a 
policy to replace the Social Contract Mark I. With or without trade 
union support, a tighter pay policy seemed likely, but the Government 
was willing to allow the TUC until the end of July to come up with a 
voluntary solution. A number of key trade union leaders were 
prepared to participate in such an exercise, not least because the 
economic prospects and the fate of the Labour Government seemed grim. 
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The TUC leadership attempted to stress the positive aspects of trade 
union relations with the Government while preparing a series of 
policy alternatives for discussion on the General Council and 
eventual submission to the September Congress. ' However, the external 
pressures for a dramatic shift in Government economic policy 
continued to multiply culminating in a sterling crisis at the end of 
June which precipitated the final agreement on the six pound policy. 
It should be emphasized, however, that well before the sterling 
crisis the Government, the TUC and the CBI were engaged in intensive 
discussions about the shape of a future policy. Indeed, the TUC had 
by and large accepted the Government's projected target for price 
inflation and was near to an acceptance of the proposed ten per cent 
restriction on wage rises. It had also fixed on the principle of a 
simple flat-rate increase as the basis of a voluntary policy to be 
implemented by the TUC. Moreover, it had achieved a large measure of 
consensus on the General Council that this would be the basis on 
which TUC representatives would proceed in their negotiations with 
the Government. Although the TUC continued to advocate an 
alternative package of policies, it had, in fact, yielded almost 
entirely to the Government's economic analysis and priorities. Wage 
increases were broadly defined as the central, albeit temporary, 
problem. It is important to emphasize the extent to which the new 
policy was already developed by late June because it is too often 
believed that the TUC was panicked into the six pound policy in the 
heat of the sterling crisis. The sterling crisis certainly 
dramatized the Labour Government's economic problems and possibly 
precarious hold on power. Thus, it probably also facilitated the 
mobilization of consent for the six pound policy within the unions. 
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However, the trade union leadership conversion to the new policy had 
already taken place. 
The final part of the chapter will assess this conversion and 
its significance for the development of the Social Contract. This 
part of the chapter traces the development and formulation of the six 
pound policy. It first sketches the move to construct a Social 
Contract '*Mark III in the spring of 1975; then examines the sterling 
crisis and the subsequent negotiations; looks at the initially shaky 
attempt to build a consensus around the result of these negotiations 
at General Council level; outlines the details of the policy; and, 
finally, considers the efforts to generate consent for it within the 
TUC. 
Towards a Social Contract "Mark II' 
The April 1975 budget marked the end of the trial period for the 
Social Contract Mark I guidelines. From then onwards the Chancellor 
was pressed by a number of bodies to take further action to reduce 
the rate of wage inflation, while the Government and the TUC 
considered what kind of policy might replace the Social Contract Mark 
I. The OECD, the National Institute for Economic and Social 
Research, the CHI and the Treasury all were pushing for an incomes 
policy of some description (see The Economist, 5 April 1975; IDS 
Reports 208,210 and 211, May and June 1975; Haines, 1977: 4}0-48). 
The CBI Council advocated a three-year wage stabilization programme 
to reduce levels of inflation below five per cent and called for 
tripartite negotiations in order that such a policy might emerge out 
of a measure of consensus (CBI, 1975). There was also constant 
pressure from within the Treasury for a statutory policy which, it 
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was argued, was the only measure which could reassure international 
confidence on the prospects for the British economy. Joe Haines 
(1977: 44), then the Prime Minister's press secretary, suggested that 
because the Treasury systematically looked at and discarded every 
conceivable option except a statutory incomes policy, it thus emerged 
by default as a viable option. The Government, however, continued to 
assert publicly its commitment to a voluntary policy. It also made 
clear that it intended to replace the Mark I guidelines at the end of 
the wage round (IDS Re rt 209, May 1975). 
Thus, the Chancellor continually probed TUC representatives on 
what they were prepared to consider as regards the development of a 
new policy. At a meeting of the NEDC on 7 May, he confessed that he 
disliked cutting public expenditure and increasing unemployment, but 
with wages rising at a rate nine or ten per cent faster than prices, 
he had little 'freedom of action' (NEDC, 7 May 1975). Similarly, at 
a May Liaison Committee meeting purportedly about investment, he said 
that the main economic priority was the control of inflation and this 
would involve trimming public expenditure and the social wage. 
Increased investment could only come from reduced private consumption 
(LCR, 19 May 1975; Castle, 1980: 392-395). Significantly, this was 
the first time that the Chancellor breached the subject of real wage 
cuts. Again, only two days later in a meeting with representatives 
of the TUC Economic Committee, he comprehensively rejected the 
possibility of pursuing the TUC's preferred strategy of increased 
public expenditure and import controls to promote investment and 
protect employment levels. He maintained that Britain had already 
done more than its competitors to protect the level of employment and 
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further expansion in this direction was simply not possible. The 
Chancellor noted that 'overseas confidence in sterling was very 
fragile, and that given this fragility he had to know by the end of 
July that the TUC were prepared to do to curb inflation' (TUC ECD, 11 
June 1975). This seemed to provide both a timetable and the 
parameters for the ultimate development of an independent TUC policy. 
Indeed, the Cabinet decided at the end of May to delay any further 
economic initiatives until their place in a broader economic package, 
including an incomes policy, had been determined (Castle, 1980: 399- 
401). 
TUC staff had, of course, been contemplating the elements of a 
policy to replace the Mark I guidelines well before the Chancellor 
lay down any deadline for the development of a new policy. An 
internal document prepared shortly after the April budget for 
discussion by the Economic Committee was concerned to reaffirm the 
concept of the Social Contract as joint management of the economy. 
It accepted the need to shift resources from private consumption to 
investment and attached a special priority to the direction of 
investment through the proposed National Enterprise Board. These 
were the proposals that, subsequently, were rejected by the 
Chancellor, at least as long as the level of inflation remained high. 
On the question of pay guidelines, the document acknowledged that 
there had been gaps in observance. It suggested that the TUC must 
reaffirm its commitment to the Social Contract and, in particular, 
the principle of voluntary collective bargaining. It called for "a 
greater sense of commitment on the part of affiliated unions' to 
making Congress policy work and showing 'that the Social Contract 
[was] not- merely words on paper, but an active developing principle'. 
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Finally, it pointed to the need for the General Council to recapture 
the initiative by introducing a policy which injected 'new elements) 
(TUC ECD, 14 May 1975). 
Although the staff's proposals for a more formal wage. 
monitoring mechanism were rejected (Guardian, 15 May 1975), TUC 
leaders had clearly begun to focus on the development of a new 
policy. In fact, all of the themes enumerated in this May document 
were ultimately reproduced in The Development of the Social Contract, 
the basis of Phase One of the Social Contract incomes policies (TUC, 
1975). Indeed, only three days after this Economic Committee 
meeting, Jack Jones first publicly aired at a southern region 
conference of the TGWU the possible 'new element' in a future policy 
-a proposal for a flat-rate wage increase (see IDS Report 209, May 
1975; Crouch, 1977: 251; TGWU GSQR, 2 June 1975). Jones suggested 
that, as an alternative to government intervention in wage 
bargaining, a flat-rate general wage increase might be universally 
applied for a period of one year. Jones envisaged it as a way to 
break 'the fever' of inflation (Interview, 16 May 1980). 
Any proposal by Jones, given his seminal role in the development 
of the Social Contract, was bound to command attention. However, the 
disarming simplicity of the proposal evoked additional interest. The 
Chancellor and the Prime Minister were reported to be greatly 
interested, though their initial enthusiasm was apparently dimmed by 
Treasury scepticism about its viability (Guardian, 22 May 1975; 
Haines, 1977: 47). The proposal also received serious consideration 
at the 21 May meeting of the General Council. Not surprisingly, 
perhaps, the scheme received the immediate endorsement of the GMWU 
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(Interview, 10 September 1979). Both Jones and Basnett were intent 
on reviving the seemingly flagging fortunes of the Social Contract in 
which they had invested so much effort. They especially wished to 
avoid a statutory policy which risked the irrevocable erosion of 
trade union support for the Labour Government. However, the proposal 
commanded additional attention for general or other unions 
representing the less skilled and lower-paid segments of the labour 
market. As was suggested in Chapter 4, the bargaining policies of the 
GMWU and TGWU had historically sought to advance the case of general 
labour as opposed to craft. The defence of differentials, therefore, 
rarely figured in their organizational vocabularies. A flat-rate 
wage scheme, as opposed to percentage wage increases, would reduce, 
however marginally, the existing hierarchy in wage scales. Indeed, 
wary of the implications of such a proposal for differentials, the 
general secretary of another of the sample unions, Clive Jenkins of 
ASTMS, proposed instead a policy of normal collective bargaining 
supplemented by job evaluation and cost-of-living increases (ASTMS 
ECM, 14 June 1975; ASTMS GSC, 10 June 1975). Again, as was suggested 
in Chapter 41 ASTMS bargaining policy and aspirations for expansion 
were predicated on an aggressive defence of differentials for the 
skilled, white-collar employee. The General Council, in fact, 
forwarded both of the proposals for more detailed consideration by 
its Economic Committee (Guardian, 22 May 1975). It also issued a 
circular which urged negotiators to adhere to the Mark I guidelines 
until a new policy was submitted to the September Congress (TUC 
Circular, 21 May 1975). 
The pace towards a Social Contract Mark II accelerated rapidly 
after the 5 June referendum on Britain's continued membership in the 
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EEC. The defeat of the left in its opposition to EEC membership 
marked, in many senses, the symbolic defeat of the socialist 
conception of the Social Contract, even though, as indicated in 
Chapter 5, this conception was by then clearly subordinate In the 
determination of Government economic strategy. l This was partly 
because closer integration within the EEC was perceived by most 
proponents of the socialist conception of the Social- Contract as a 
distinct barrier to the pursuit of transformative economic policies 
(see Chapter 2; also Forester, 1978). It was also because the 
leading opponent of EEC membership in the Cabinet and the key 
exponent of a radical industrial strategy, the Secretary of State for 
Industry, Tony Benn, was removed from the portfolio immediately after 
the referendum (see Hatfield, 1978: 248-251; Clark et al., 1980: 33; 
Castle, 1980: 409-417). Thereafter, the left of the Labour Party 
felt increasingly distant from the direction and determination of 
Government policy. This was increasingly manifested in bitter 
criticisms by the left of what they saw as the failure to fulfill 
Party Manifesto commitments on the Social Contract (on the 
confrontation between Ian Mikardo and the Chancellor, i. e., at the 25 
June meeting of the Labour Party NEC, see Castle, 1980: 433). 
Ironically, at precisely the same time, a number of key trade union 
leaders, most notably Jack Jones, were increasingly prepared to 
accept many of what they viewed as the unpalatable economic 
priorities of the Treasury in order to "save the Labour Government'. 
Jones, for instance, urged both Benn and Foot not to resign during 
this period because of the catastrophic implications for the 
Government (Interview, 16 May 1980; see also Castle, 1980: 454). 
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Castle (1980: 438) memorably described Jones as having 'rounded on 
the Left' and 'thrown his hat over the windmill in an overt and 
unequivocal determination to save the Labour Government'. As the 
weight of the TUC moved behind the Government, the Left in the Labour 
Party became an increasingly isolated exponent of many of the 
alternative economic proposals which it, paradoxically, shared with 
the official policy prescriptions of the TUC. 
Although the TUC continued to insist that the Social Contract 
was a wider arrangement on the management of the economy, in 
practice, its own policy efforts were then focused on the development 
of a wages policy. This was because, as an internal document put it, 
the General Council accepted 'that the relationship between wage and 
price rises is the cause of considerable and real apprehension at the 
present time' (TUC ECD, 4 June 1975). Thus, whatever the explanation 
of the movement of pay increases over the period of the Social 
Contract Mark I, the TUC was by then in a position of identifying 
wage inflation as 'the problem' and seeking an effective solution. 
The June Economic Committee meeting considered the possibility of 
both flat-rate and percentage wage increases or even some combination 
thereof. The flat-rate proposal won qualified approval, though, ever 
mindful of the limits of their authority in this domain, TUC staff 
noted that the formula was, in some ways, less important 'than 
winning its acceptance by members and their negotiators' (ibid. ). 
The problems of building an internal consensus on this issue were 
highlighted by Hugh Scanlon's opposition to '*any change in the pay 
policy' (FT, 17 Jtjne 1975). These problems were further compounded 
when the 17 June AUEW National Conference voted, by a margin of 
thirty-nine to thirty, to reject the Social Contract (see Chapter 7; 
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also AUEW AC, 1975; MS and The Times, 18 June 1975). 
External pressures for the development of a new policy continued 
to mount. It had been thought that the result of the EEC referendum 
would provide sufficient breathing space for the development of a new . 
economic policy (Guardian, 7 June 1975; MS, 10 June 1975). However, 
the value of the pound slid by four per cent in the six weeks leading 
up to mid-June (Glyn and Harrison, 1980: 107). When the pound 
experienced particularly severe speculative attacks on 12 June, the 
Bank of England spent five hundred-million dollars protecting its 
value. The Chancellor felt that the economy was further imperilled 
by the imminent possibility of a railway strike (Castle, 1980: 417). 
These events heightened the urgency, in the Government's view, of 
implementing a new policy. A Cabinet subcommittee had already 
considered the TUC Economic Committee document on the possibilities 
for the development of a new policy and arranged to begin detailed 
negotiations with TUC representatives on the NEDC (ibid.: 130). The 
TUC and the CBI, moreover, had already commenced a series of talks 
designed to generate a measure of agreement. Although they found no 
basis for agreement on price control or industrial policy, they did 
agree on the necessity to fix price and wage targets to reduce the. 
level of inflation (CBI IM, 18 June 1975; also FT, 16 and 19 June 
1975; MS, 17 and 25 June 1975). The way for senior TUC 
representatives to negotiate with the Government was cleared on 25 
June when the TUC General Council approved by twenty votes to five to 
proceed on the basis of the Economic Committee document. Those 
voting against the document included representatives from the 
engineering and white-collar sections of the AUEW, the NUM, ASLEF and 
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ACTT (Scanlon, Gill, Daly, Buckton and Sapper according to CMS, 26 
June 1975). 
The respective negotiating stances in this set of three way, 
bipartite negotiations were as follows. The Government's target was 
to limit wage increases to ten per cent or what it originally judged. 
should be a five pound flat-rate increase. The problem was how to 
implement such a policy without antagonizing the unions. The 
solution, in its view, was to secure TUC agreement to the new policy. 
However, it was not prepared to consider any off-setting measures 
which would raise the level of public expenditure or further 
jeopardize international confidence in the value of the pound 
(Castle, 1980: 425-z30). The CBI aimed for a three-year policy. It 
was prepared to accept a ten per cent limit on wage increases, if 
compliance could be ensured, but, for tactical reasons, declined to 
voice any figure in public. It preferred that any policy should 
operate on the basis of a percentage so as not to disturb 
differentials, though that would not prevent flat-rate increases in 
bargaining units which opted for them (CBI IM, 5,13 and 18 June, 
1975). Finally, the TUC General Council had approved six points as 
the basis for any future policy: a specific price target to be 
achieved by the middle of 1976; a figure for pay based on the 
achievement of the price target and to be applied universally in the 
form of a flat-rate wage increase; limits on high incomes; action to 
limit price increases through the Price Code and subsidies, if 
necessary; a major reduction in the level of unemployment; and the 
maintenance of the Social Contract as the basis of relations between 
the unions and the Government (TUCR, 1975: 272). 
Thus, while both the Treasury and the CBI1 among others, 
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remained profoundly sceptical about the ability of the TUC to secure 
compliance with any voluntary policy, a substantial measure of 
agreement about the form of such a policy had, in fact, emerged by 
the end of June. The TUC was clearly prepared to engage in a period 
of much tighter wage restraint. The Government insisted on either a 
ten per cent figure or a flat-rate payment of five or six pounds 
weekly. Jack Jones was holding out for a flat-rate sum of eight 
pounds weekly (Castle, 1980: 439). However, it was increasingly 
apparent, despite TUC protestations, that there was not to be any 
quid ro quo on the part of the Government. Indeed, even though the 
policy implied real wage cuts, there would probably be further 
public expenditure cuts, no selective job-saving measures and no 
additional control on prices (GMWU IM, 23 June 1975). However, with 
rumours rife about the possible imminent formation of a coalition' 
government or, more ludicrously, a coup d'etat, a significant number 
of trade union leaders appeared willing to sacrifice their other 
economic priorities in order to deal with the 'problem' of wage 
inflation (Wilson was apparently obsessed with the possibility that a 
number of ministers on the right of the Cabinet were plotting to form 
a coalition government; see Castle, 1980: 432). The idea of the 
Social Contract as a quid pro quo had endured a strange twist. 
Rather than agreed measures in return for wage moderation, the TUC 
was now being offered the survival of the Labour Government itself. 
If wage restraint was the price of survival, then it appeared that 
key union leaders were willing to pay that price. As Jack Jones 
later told the TUC Congress when defending the policy, '7he lesson we 
have learnt [from the past] is that at all cost we have to keep a 
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Labour Government in office when it is there' (TUCR, 1975: k77). 
The Sterling Crisis 
The gradual construction of a voluntary pay policy was 
dramatically disturbed, and ultimately expedited, by a crisis in the 
value of the pound sterling. As was suggested in Chapter 5, the 
rapid increase in the public sector borrowing requirement over the 
previous year had largely been financed through recourse to short- 
term, external borrowing on the London money markets. These funds 
were readily available because of the surplus of 'petrodollars, then 
on the financial markets (see Milner, 1980: 234). . 
However, it also 
rendered the British economy particularly vulnerable to both currency 
speculation and the withdrawal of funds placed in sterling '(on the 
unusual volatility of the international financial markets at this 
time, see Mandel, 1978: 39; CISCDP, n. d.: 6). In fact, the strength 
of sterling and the financial role of the City of London had long 
played a crucial role in the determination of British economic policy 
(see, i. e., Carli, 1981; Longstreth, 1979; Minns, 1981; Tomlinson, 
1981a). The role* of the City of London as an international financial 
centre was traditionally seen to be contingent on the maintenance of 
the value of the pound. Even after the reserve role of sterling. 
declined, relative stability in the value of the pound continued to 
be an important element in the generation of foreign confidence. 
However, relatively poor domestic economic performance had 
contributed to periodic runs on the value of the pound in the post- 
war period. Thus, British governments, particularly Labour 
governments led by social democrats, have felt obliged to alter 
their economic policies in the expectation that such alterations 
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would bolster foreign confidence. These alterations, as suggested by 
the Treasury, have invariably involved some form of restraint on wage 
increases and public expenditure cuts (on the 1940a and 1960s 
experience, see Panitch, 1976; Allen, 1966: 46-55). In contrast, 
those on the left of the Labour Party have opposed such an 
accommodation with the market rationale of private capital. Very much 
in terms of the socialist conception of the Social Contract as 
outlined in Chapter 2, they have argued in favour of devaluation, 
greater control over the flow of capital and, if necessary, Import 
controls. Such an approach was not seriously contemplated by the 
Government. Rather, it sought to meet the minimum demands of 
%foreign confidence', primarily through a wage control programme 
designed to reduce the level of price inflation, while, if possible, 
maintaining some vestige of credibility in the Social Contract by 
avoiding statutory controls. 
On 30 June, the value of the pound declined by an unprecedented 
1.3 per cent in a single trading session. This left the pound at a 
value of 2.173 dollars - the precise level at which a number of the 
most important OPEC holders of sterling reserves had threatened to 
exchange sterling against other currencies. This sparked immediate 
panic in the Bank of England whose governor, Gordon Richardson, met 
the Prime Minister to warn that if emergency economic measures were 
not implemented then he risked the imminent collapse of the currency 
(Haines, 1977: 53; Wilson, 1979: 115). The Treasury proposed the 
immediate implementation of a statutory pay policy (ibid. ). It is 
open to speculation whether the 30 June currency crisis was a 'joint 
utsch' by the Treasury and the Bank of England on Government 
economic policy or whether it was simply fortuitous. Haines (1977: 
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59) appears convinced that it was a conspiracy. Certainly, it gave 
the Treasury an opportunity to "bounce' the Chancellor in the 
direction of a statutory pay policy when he had appeared to be 
gravitating towards a voluntary policy (see, i. e., Watkins, 1975). 
The Government was already committed to a change in economic 
policy and the negotiations with the TUC were well advanced. The 
gravity of the crisis, however, pushed the Government to take a much 
tougher line in the negotiations. Healey told the Cabinet that there 
could be no question of exceeding a ten per cent limit. The 
principal problem was how to ensure compliance with the policy. The 
Treasury was inclined to legislate sanctions on employers for any 
breach of the policy, but the Cabinet resolved, first, to pursue the 
attempt to construct the voluntary policy with the TUC (Castle, 1980: 
439-443). If no agreement was forthcoming, the Chancellor indicated 
that he would introduce legislation making compliance compulsory for 
employers (NEDC, 2 July 1975). 
The TUC response to this crisis was crucially dependent on the 
policy adopted by the TGWU. As was suggested in Chapter 5, the TUC's 
ability to construct a voluntary policy was, first, contingent on the 
degree of consensus that it could construct at leadership level and, 
then, on the consent that it could generate for the policy within 
affiliated unions. The AUEW National Conference had already 
indicated its opposition to any continuation of the Social Contract 
(AUEW AC, 1975). Quite coincidentally, on the same day as a crisis 
session of the cabinet discussed its policy options, the TGWU 
Biennial Delegate Conference debated its attitude to the Social 
Contract and any future wage guidelines. In Chapters 3 and 4, it was 
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indicated that the TGWU policy conference had been consistently 
opposed to wage restraint and incomes policies. If it took the same 
line on 1 July 1975, then any TUC efforts to construct a voluntary 
policy would be doomed in advance. In fact, the TGWU BDC, while 
endorsing neither incomes policies nor wage restraint, voted to 
support both the Social Contract and Jones's proposed flat-rate wage 
increase for a period of one year (TGWU BDCM, 1975). Jones's success 
in securing the consent of the TGWU policy conference will be central 
to the analysis of the mobilization of consent for pay policy within 
the sample unions in Chapter 7. Its external ramifications were 
immediately apparent. TUC leaders could still aspire to construct 
some kind of consensus around a voluntary flat-rate policy. 
Crisis Negotiations 
The immediate effect of the 30 June 1975 sterling crisis in 
combination with the decision of the TGWU's Biennial Delegate 
Conference to seek an agreement with the Government on a flat-rate 
pay policy was to precipitate a collapse of almost all the remaining 
resistance on the TUC Economic Committee to the Government's proposed 
policy. A special meeting of the TUC Economic Committee on 3 July 
considered the possibilities prior to meeting the Chancellor. The 
TUC could reject the Government policy, or endeavour to seek an 
agreement, or acquiesce in probable Government legislation. If the 
TUC did seek an agreement, there was also the question of "whether 
they would be able to "deliver" to the Government's satisfaction - of 
how far they could secure the support of the trade union movement as 
a whole' (TUC ECD, 3 July 1975). The Committee took the view that 
'rank and file trade unionists' felt the UK to be in a crisis and 
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were looking to the TUC to give a lead. 
In their meeting with the Chancellor, the Committee asked him 
why it was necessary to take such precipitous action when their 
previous negotiations were already well advanced? Healey explained 
it as a choice between regaining the confidence of foreign lenders 
through measures to bring the rate of inflation down to ten per cent 
or, ultimately, going to the International Monetary Fund for 
assistance. This latter option would almost certainly entail 
rigorous credit conditions bringing, in turn, deflation and higher 
unemployment. He, therefore, proposed a ten per cent pay policy. The 
flat-rate scheme probably stood the best chance of success in his 
view. In order to ensure compliance, he intended to use a range of 
measures including price code sanctions on employers and cash limits 
in the public sector. 2 There was no question, however, of 
implementing criminal sanctions on trade unionists. Michael Foot, 
the Secretary of State for Employment) added that a voluntary policy 
supported by the trade union movement could succeed. Failure to 
agree, however, would destroy the Government. The TUC was, thus, 
presented with a very limited set of options. The Government, 
moreover, held out little scope for tangible benefits in return for 
cooperation. The Chancellor warned that the short-term impact on 
employment would not be favourable, and noted that there could be no 
action on unemployment until the rate of inflation had been reduced. 
Similarly, the Prices Secretary, Shirley Williams, foresaw little 
possibility to tighten price controls because of the already 
precarious liquidity situation facing industry. The TUC 
representatives argued for a package of measures 'sufficient to 
persuade unions that the Government was taking their side of the 
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policy seriously'. The Government, however, conceded little other 
than an offer to delay cuts in food subsidies and to reduce proposed 
rent increases (TUC ECD, 3 July 1985). 
Appropriately, the word 'crisis' is derived from the Greek word, 
for 'decision'. The sterling crisis, in fact, forced an immediate 
decision. The TUC Economic Committee had defined three possible 
options. First, it could reject Government policy and abandon the 
Social Contract entirely. As will be explored further below, this 
was an unlikely possibility. Yet, secondly, to acquiesce in a 
statutory pay policy would not only cede the TUC's remaining role in 
policy formulation, it would also damn the Social Contract in the 
estimation of affiliated unions as little more than statutory wage 
control - precisely the image that TUC leaders had so persistently 
rejected. Thus, thirdly, the Economic Committee pursued what it 
perceived as its only viable political option, even if, as Geoffrey 
Drain, the NALGO general secretary, later described it, it was 
tantamount to having a pistol placed at their heads (TUCR, 1975: 
462). It indicated that the TUC was prepared to discuss 'the form in 
which the ten per cent might be applied' (TUC ECD, 3 July 1985). 
Clark et al. (1980: 34) aptly observed: 'as had occurred on previous 
occasions since 1945, the choice facing union leaders was not whether 
they wanted an incomes policy, but what kind of policy, and what role 
they were willing to accept in its implementation'. 
The TUC Economic Committee negotiated with the Government 
against a backdrop of growing crisis. However, it had signalled its 
intention to acquiesce in the policy whether or not some form of quid 
pro quo was forthcoming. This perhaps fatally undermined its 
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capacity to drive a harder bargain with the Government. Michael Foot 
was reported to have told Cabinet colleagues at the time that 
although the TUC was 'asking for certain set-offs' -a tougher line 
on prices and import controls and a target for the reduction of 
unemployment - 'the TUC was not insisting on these as conditions for 
accepting the figure of six pounds for wage increases' (Castle, 1980; 
448). 
A number of key union policy conference decisions facilitated 
the TUC's decision to cooperate with the Government's ultimatum. As 
was suggested above, Jack Jones's success in securing the consent of 
the 1975 TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference, as will be discussed in 
Chapter 7, was undoubtedly the most important component in the 
attempt to construct a new voluntary policy. With the support of the 
GMWU and a number of other unions also virtually assured, the TUC 
leadership enjoyed a sufficient margin of manoeuvre to undertake a 
final phase of negotiations with the Chancellor. The possibility of 
building some form of new leadership consensus was given an 
additional boost by the NUM policy conference. Following a plea by 
the Prime Minister to save the national economy and the Party, 
opponents of a voluntary pay policy narrowly failed in their bid to 
make a hundred pound minimum weekly wage the target of the next wage 
round (Wilson, 1979: 116-119). The interpretation that this decision 
was a victory for the future policy was reinforced only a few days 
later with the NUM executive's decision to recommend support for the 
Social Contract Phase One in a pit-head ballot. 
In the ensuing negotiations on 7 and 8 July, discussions 
centered on the technical details of the policy. Although the TUC 
raised a number of other items such as price controls, pensions, 
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import controls, and unemployment, the Government representatives 
refused to countenance anything which might increase public spending. 
The negotiations concentrated, instead, on the multitude of 
industrial relations problems which invariably confront any attempt 
to dictate a norm for settlements in British collective bargaining 
(on these problems, see Clegg, 1971). Indeed, the concept of a six 
pound flat-rate supplement with its connotation of 'rough justice' 
had been fixed upon in the first place in order to circumvent some of 
the thornier problems arising from incomes policy norms. There were 
outstanding issues, nonetheless, and the Chancellor made every 
attempt to minimize potential loopholes and breaches. The fragile 
character of the TUC leadership consensus was highlighted by the fact 
that the most contentious items divided the unions. among themselves 
as much as they did the Government and the TUC. As the Financial 
Times (8 July 1975) described the 7 July meeting, it 'almost ended in 
disarray at one stage when union leaders tried to grapple with this 
problem of detailed implementation of a pay limit. Instead of 
agreeing, however, they squabbled among themselves about how their 
own individual groups of members should be treated within a new 
policy'. 
Among the contentious items, there was, first, the question of 
existing commitments such as staged payments and their relation to 
the new limit. Unions which were waiting for the second or third 
stage of a previously negotiated agreement did not want those 
payments to be disallowed. Nor were they very keen to see them 
subtracted from the six pound limit in the following pay round. 
Secondly, the union representatives were divided on the question of 
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incremental scales. The white-collar unions stood to benefit if such 
scales were to be allowed outside the pay norm, while a number of the 
major manual unions argued that there should be no special cases. 
Indeed, the TUC representatives confessed their inability to arrive 
at a common view on this issue (TUC ECD, 7 July 1975). Finally, 
there was some disagreement on the cut-off point for wage increases 
in the following year. As opposed to the Chancellor's suggestion of 
ten thousand pounds, the TUC had, largely at the behest of Jack 
Jones, advanced a figure of seven thousand pounds, which would 
adversely affect the middle-management constituency of some of the 
white-collar unions. 
The Social Contract Mark I had not raised these kinds of 
problems because, as was argued in Chapter 5, the formula was 
sufficiently ambiguous so as not to translate into real industrial 
constraints. These were exactly the kinds of constraints that the 
six-pound policy was meant to bring about. Such an unpalatable 
prospect highlighted some of the very real industrial differences 
which defined various union constituencies and their respective 
bargaining policies. These differences impinged on the freedom of 
general secretaries to build the consensus which was so necessary for 
the formulation of effective TUC policies - particularly as many 
trade union leaders had had no opportunity to seek the prior consent 
of their own union executives. Thus, the relative consensus which 
had been achieved at the General Council meeting of 25 June when it 
was agreed to negotiate a flat-rate pay policy began to dissipate in 
the specific negotiations. The Chancellor, meanwhile, held that 
there could be no additional increases. 
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The General Council Vote 
The divisions over specific aspects of the proposed policy 
sparked off further doubts about its equity and viability both inside 
and outside of the TUC. When the TUC General Council held a special 
meeting on 9 July 1975 to ratify the negotiating efforts of the 
Economic Committee, it was hoped that there would be a majority in 
favour of the plan (on the attempt to secure a large majority, see 
FT, 9 July 1975). In fact, only nineteen General Council members 
voted for the policy, thirteen opposed, and another three, who had 
been expected to vote against the plan, absented themeselves from the 
proceedings before the actual vote took place. Those voting against 
the plan were Lord Allen (USDAW), John Boyd (AUEW), Ray Buckton 
(ASLEF), Lawrence Daly (NUM), Geoffrey Drain (NALGO), Len Edmondson 
(AUEW), Alan Fisher (NUPE), Ken Gill (TASS), Fred Jarvis (NUT), Clive 
Jenkins (ASTMS), Terry Parry (FBU), Audrey Prime (NALGO), and Alan 
Sapper (ACTT). Those who were expected to vote against the plan but 
left early included Les Buck (Sheetmetal workers), Hugh Scanlon 
(AUEW) and Jim Slater (NUS) (see Guardian and MS, 10 July 1975). 
Of the thirteen who voted against the Economic Committee 
recommendation, four (Buckton, Daly, Gill and Sapper) had in fact 
voted against the principles elaborated by the General Council on 25 
June. Three (Fisher, -Jenkins and Parry) were seen to be on the left 
of the General Council and their individual unions also opposed an 
incomes policy. A further two (Boyd and Edmondson) were specifically 
mandated by their unions to vote against any Social Contract Mark II. 
Finally, there was another group of four who did not oppose incomes 
policy in principle, but rejected specific aspects of the package 
as negotiated. This group included Lord Allen of USDAW, who believed 
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that too much government action on prices would be detrimental to his 
retail membership, and Geoffrey Drain and Audrey Prime of NALGO. and 
Fred Jarvis of the NUT who viewed with disquiet the effects of the 
proposed policy on both public sector and white collar employees. 
Regrouping the possible reasons for opposition among the thirteen who 
voted against the proposals, nine must have been influenced by the 
possible effects on differentials, seven were habitually seen to be 
on the left of the General Council, and seven must have been directly 
concerned about the future cuts in public expenditure. Indeed, the 
skill or differential factor combined with either the effect on 
public expenditure or the identification with the Left accounted for 
all but one of the opponents. This exception was Lord Allen whose 
fear of the effects of a possible price freeze on the shopworkers 
ultimately receded to the degree that he became one of the policy's 
strongest advocates. 
Thus, despite the fact that the TUC had only two weeks earlier 
agreed by a large majority to seek a voluntary incomes policy with 
the Government and although the TUC Economic Committee felt able to 
recommend the results of its negotiations with the Chancellor to the 
vote of the General Council, there was a very substantial minority 
who opposed the agreement in the General Council vote. Quite 
unusually, two members of the Economic Committee (Allen and Fisher) 
broke with an unwritten convention and voted against the agreement to 
which they had been party. This was clear evidence for whatever 
reason of the discomfort of a number of union leaders with the 
agreement. To some extent, the split vote was a protest at the way 
the negotiations had been conducted. 'there was little satisfaction 
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at the way the TUC had been panicked into the final agreement. 
Ironically, the Chancellor identified the speed with which the TUC 
had arrived at the voluntary agreement as one of the most impressive 
aspects of the whole process (The Times, 12 July 1975, cited in David 
Coates, 1980: 66). However, that very rush compromised what was* 
described in Chapter 5 as the usual careful 'chain of consensus- 
buildings which generally accompanied the framing of TUC policies. 
While members of the General Council were nominally elected by all 
the members of the TUC, they were, in practice, more frequently and 
directly accountable to their own unions, particularly their 
executive committees. 3 
Given the rush and panic which accompanied the negotiations, a 
number of individual trade union leaders were not in a position to 
mobilize consent within their own unions to the proposed policy. 
Even where they might have, been inclined to vote for the policy, 
their freedom of manoeuvre was in many cases constrained either by 
previous policy commitments or the possible risk of censure within 
their own unions. The split vote was also, at least in part, 
indicative of the likely industrial impact of the policy. The 
implications of a flat-rate payment as well as the proposed treatment 
of incremental scales swayed a number of white-collar and craft- 
oriented unions representatives against the policy. Public sector 
union leaders also feared both the impact of the guidelines on their 
members and their likely rigid enforcement through the new system of 
cash limits (see note 2 above). The narrow margin of the vote on the 
General Council and the seeming impossibility of rallying affiliates 
around a common policy of restraint again highlighted why TUC leaders 
had so consistently eschewed an overt commitment to an incomes policy 
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in all of their previous discussions with the Labour Party and the 
Labour Government on the Social Contract. 
The Policy 
The apparent lack of consensus within the TUC General Council on 
the new policy also heightened further the scepticism of opponents of 
the 'voluntary option'. Thus, the Chancellor and the Treasury pushed 
for the legislation of reserve powers of compulsion in the case that 
the guidelines were not being enforced. Such legislation, it was 
argued, was essential if the Government's White Paper on inflation 
(Phase One, 1975) was to carry 'conviction with our creditors' 
(Castle, 1980: 454; see also Haines, 1977: 65). However, the Cabinet 
narrowly came down in favour of Michael Foot's pleas that the 
legislation of reserve powers could provoke the defeat of the policy 
at the September TUC. He argued that it would not be possible to run 
incomes policy without the support of the trade union movement 
(Castle, 1980: 455). The CBI opposed both the principle of the flat- 
rate increase and the voluntary nature of the policy. It endorsed 
the objectives of the policy, but argued that since the TUC was 
incapable of ensuring compliance the Government should proceed with a 
statutory policy as quickly as possible. In particular, it objected 
to what it saw as the inflationary consequences of the six pound 
limit in many industries and the fact the burden of compulsion was 
placed almost uniquely on employers through price controls and 
contract sanctions (CBI IM, 2,49 25 and 28 July. 1975). These doubts 
about the viability of the voluntary policy may well have served to 
encourage TUC compliance. The Government was, at least, resisting 
strong internal and external pressures for a statutory policy (on 
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this point, see Panitch, 1979: 63). 
The results of the negotiations were set out in two documents: 
a Government White Paper, The Attack on Inflation (Phase One, 1975), 
and a TUC General Council statement to Congress, The Development of 
the Social Contract (TUC, 1975). These companion documents 
summarized the essence of the policy. The Government White Paper 
clearly sought to impress creditors and halt the run on the pound. 
Thus, the reduction of the rate of inflation to single digit figures 
by the end of 1976 became the central priority of all Government 
policy. To this end, and within the framework of the Social 
Contract, the Government had obtained the TUC's voluntary agreement 
to limit wage increases to a flat-rate maximum of six pounds per week 
with all non-wage benefits to be offset against this cash figure. A 
twelve-month interval between wage settlements was to continue to 
apply. The only possible exception to the maximum limit was for the 
attainment of equal pay. Further, there were to be no wage increases 
for those earning more than 8,500 pounds a year. The TUC document 
outlined substantially the same guidelines, though it made 
considerable efforts to present the new policy within the context of 
the social, economic and legislative achievements of the Social 
Contract. It acknowledged that there had been some 'undesirable 
gaps' in the observance of the Social Contract Mark I guidelines and 
that wage increases could not continue at their current level if 
inflation was to be reduced to single digit figures. It, therefore, 
recommended that union collective bargaining policies should be 
formulated in the light of the new guidelines. Other union 
objectives should be deferred until the end of this temporary period 
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of restraint when exigencies would permit them to be phased in. The 
TUC differed with the Government's guidelines in two respects. It 
maintained that there should be no increases for those earning 7,000 
pounds or more annually. It also held that the six pound increase 
should be universally applied as an entitlement, rather than a 
maximum. The Chancellor specifically rejected this view (LCR, 21 
July 1975; Castle 1980: 470). 
Compliance with the policy was to be enforced by'a combination 
of voluntary and compulsory measures. This is at the Guardian (12 
July 1975) referred to as 'squaring the incomes policy circle'. 
Hitherto, pay policies had generally been based on some notion of an 
equality of sanctions for employers and unions. The six-pound policy 
was to be enforced in a virtually compulsory fashion on employers 
through price code and contract sanctions in the private sector and 
through the introduction of cash limits An the public sector. For 
trade unionists, the policy was to remain voluntary. The TUC, 
however, was committed to monitoring settlements and opposing those 
that exceeded the limit (TUC, 1975). To this end, the TUC General 
Secretary requested that all affiliated organizations provide 
regular information on settlements and should seek the advice of the 
General Council when they encountered difficulties in applying the 
guidelines (TUC ECD, 13 August 1975; TUC Circular 189, August 1975; 
FT, 14 August 1975; Guardian, 19 August 1975). Although the Treasury 
had not succeeded in its attempt to publish its intended reserve 
enforcement powers, the Chancellor warned that any gaps or weakening 
in the policy would immediately lead to the introduction of reserve 
powers and possibly further public expenditure cuts. 
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Selling the Policy 
Once the General Council had approved the policy guidelines, 
there was an immediate attempt both to regenerate a degree of 
leadership consensus on the policy and to mobilize consent within 
individual affiliates. As one senior TUC official described it: 
all the positives were put on parade to sell the policy' (Interview, 
22 August 1980). Indeed, the Government set up a special Counter- 
Inflation Publicity Unit to sell the merits of the policy, especially 
to trade unionists. General Council approval seemed to remove the 
burden of opposition from many General Council members who might 
previously have feared signs of opposition within their own unions. 
Using the General Council decision as their mandate, they could more 
easily work to sway their own executive councils towards support of 
the policy. In quick succession, a number of key unions either added 
their consent to the policy or recommended such a course of action to 
their membership. Some of the staunchest supporters such as the 
TGWU, the GMWU and the NUB reaffirmed their support (10,22 and 16 
July). Other unions such as USDAW, NALGO and the NUT, which had 
opposed the agreement on the General Council, agreed to lend their 
support, albeit with some reservations (12 and 13 July). The NUM 
recommended acceptance of the policy in its decision to conduct a 
full ballot of the membership (11 July). The relative silence of 
such erstwhile opponents as Hugh Scanlon and John Boyd of the AUEW 
was also an important signal of declared acquiescence. Castle (1980: 
469) described Hugh Scanlon's 'mute presence"'at the July Liaison 
Committee meeting as "an eloquent testimony of the almost total 
collaboration we are now getting from the TUC with pay policy'. In 
fact, as will be discussed further in Chapter 7, the AUEW recalled 
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its National Committee in December 1975 in order to reverse its 
policy of opposition to the Social Contract (AUEW RNCR, 1975). 
Another of the sample unions, the FBÜ, continued to oppose the policy 
in principle. However, it suspended an industrial dispute on the' 
understanding that it would receive the full six pounds from. the 
employers at the time of its negotiations the following November 
(IDS Report 215, August 1975; FT, 14 August 1975). . There were a 
number of unions,. on the other hand, which reaffirmed their 
opposition to the policy. The executives of two of the sample unions, 
NUPE and ASTMS, for instance, registered their opposition to the 
voluntary pay policy. Similarly, TASS maintained that it would not 
be bound by it. 
By the time of the regular 23 July General Council meeting, 
there was what the Financial Times (24 July 1975) described as 
'broad-based support' for the new six pounds a week pay limit. TUC 
leaders had ensured that the policy would be endorsed 
overwhelmingly at the September Congress. They hoped that this 
endorsement would then be translated into pay negotiations. The 
publication of the preliminary agenda of the TUC in late July 
confirmed that although there would be substantial opposition from a 
number of unions, the TUC policy would likely be carried by a 
comfortable margin (The Times, 29 July 1975). Indeed, by the time 
of the September 1975 TUC, the policies were already in operation and 
receiving full TUC cooperation in terms of monitoring. There was 
little surprise, therefore, when the six pound policy was adopted by 
a two to one margin at the September Congress (6.945 to 3.375 million 
votes, TUCK, 1975: 480). The principal opponents included the AUEW 
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(all sections), ASTMS, NUPE, CPSA, SCS, the Sheetmetal Workers and a 
number of smaller unions such as the Tobacco Workers, Furniture 
Workers, ASLEF, FBU and ACTT. Among the sample unions opposing the 
policy, only ASTMS did not officially alter its policy of opposition 
in light of the TUC decision. The AUEW, NUPE and the FBU all 
acquiesced in the six pound policy (see Table 1.4). 
Thereafter, the Social Contract would become increasingly 
inseparable from a series of incomes policies from which the TUC 
withdrew its support in 1977 and which ultimately collapsed in the 
pay round of 1978-1979. The next part of this chapter charts the 
development of Phase Two. The final part of the chapter will analyze 
further how the TUC leadership was converted to support a more or 
less formal incomes policy and the significance of this change for an 
understanding of trade union approaches to the Social Contract. 
PHASE TWO 
The previous section outlined the context and negotiations which 
led the TUC to formulate and support the Phase One incomes policy. 
This section briefly considers the industrial impact of Phase One, 
anticipates the impact of Phase Two, and outlines the context and 
process of the renewal of TUC support for a Phase Two policy. The 
Phase one policy was, in most respects, seen to be remarkably 
successful as it coincided with a precipitous decline in the rate of 
increase of both earnings and price inflation. Economic problems, 
however, continued to mount throughout the period, particularly in 
terms of rising levels of unemployment and renewed pressure on the 
value of the pound. Apart from its policy of wage restraint, the 
Government response was aimed primarily at a reduction in the level 
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of public expenditure. There were growing tensions in TUC-Government 
relations as trade union leaders adopted an increasingly critical 
view of the Government's economic policy orientations. Against a 
backdrop of yet another sterling crisis, the TUC agreed to a Phase 
Two policy despite the achievement of very few concessions from 
Government during the negotiations. It, then, received overwhelming 
affiliate support for the continuation of the Social Contract incomes 
policies at a June 1976 Special Congress. However, there was already 
increasing evidence that the TUC was unlikely to endorse a further 
round of pay policy guidelines and the September 1976 Congress 
signalled its intention to return to voluntary collective bargaining 
at the end of the Phase Two policy. The rising tide of opposition to 
wage restraint within both the TUC and the sample unions is the 
subject of Chapter B. 
Since it is crucial to an understanding of the processes of 
consent and opposition to incomes policy within the sample unions, 
this section first considers the actual impact of the Phase One and 
Two policies. It then outlines the changing economic and political 
context during the Phase One period and its implications for' the 
development of TUC-Government relations. Finally, it examines the 
negotiations for Phase Two, the subsequent generation of consent 
for the new policy within the TUC, and the growing indications that 
the possibilities for further rounds of such policies would be 
extremely limited. 
The Industrial Impact of Incomes Policy 
Most negotiators interviewed in this study agreed that the six 
pound policy had the overwhelming merit of simplicity. Its 
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connotations of rough justice and relative equality in exceptional 
circumstances made it perhaps the most widely accepted pay policy 
phase in the post-war period. Like all centralized pay norms, it 
necessarily had a differential effect on the myriad variations of. 
British pay structure. However, these anomalies did not translate 
into any widespread opposition until. Phase Two. Despite the 
opposition of a few unions, often more symbolic than substantive, the 
guidelines commanded fairly wide support and adhesion throughout 
Phase One. The sample union responses to the Phase One and Two 
guidelines will be explored further in Chapter 7. This section 
briefly highlights the industrial impact of the Phase One guidelines 
and anticipates the impact of Phase Two. In particular, it outlines 
the degree of adhesion to and support for Phase One and identifies 
the specific areas where small anomalies risked provoking more 
vociferous reaction in subsequent phases of the Social Contract 
incomes policies. 
The six-pound limit was originally based on a target increase of 
ten per cent in earnings. The increase in earnings over the policy 
period was roughly thirteen per cent. The TUC argued, with some 
justification, that this difference was not the result of gaps in 
observance. Rather, it stemmed from the policy's provisions for 
equal pay, staged payments if they were arranged prior to the policy, 
some movement from lower to higher paid jobs and earnings drift 
associated with piecework and overtime, payments which, it was argued, 
was not inflationary because it represented increased output (TUC 
ECD, 26 April 1976). Certainly, the policy was, from the beginning, 
carefully scrutinized and widely acknowledged to have been 
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'universally' observed (see, i. e., TUC ECD, 12 November, 1975 and 14 
January 1976; TUCER, 1976: 12; CBI IM, 16 December 1975; IDS Report 
226, February 1976: 21). Indeed, in his study of West Midlands 
engineering industry wage data, Brown (1979: 54) remarked how closely 
an industry with such a high proportion of its employees on payment- 
by-results systems adhered to the limit. Similarly, in a study of 
British manufacturing industry, Daniel (1976: 110-111) found not only 
a high degree of compliance with the six-pound policy in 
manufacturing establishments but that negotiators experienced little 
difficulty in achieving that compliance. 
There were a number of reasons why the policy commanded such 
a high degree of adhesion. First, it was well designed. Reflecting 
on their original opposition to the design of the policy, CBI 
officials later noted that, with hindsight', the rough justice 
aspect of the policy 'facilitated entry into pay controls' (CBI IM, 
16 December, 1975). Similarly, an internal TUC document suggested 
that it was 
the right policy in the circumstances. It was clear and 
simple, focused increases on the low paid, precluded unduly 
large cash increases for the high paid, and out through the 
complication of separate provisions for particular groups 
which, because of comparability claims, had helped to weaken 
the previous policy (TUC ECD, 14 April 1976). 
Negotiators interviewed in this study, virtually without exception, 
agreed with this assessment. Its universality, simplicity and notion 
of "justice for all grades in exceptional circumstances' made the 
policy eminently marketable. This made for an exceptionally 'easy' 
pay round - 'like delivering a crate of tomatoes in a Rolls Royce' 
recalled one shop steward (see Brown, 1976b). 
Secondly, the operation of the policy was also helped by a 
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degree of `money illusion'. Thus, the policy was perceived is terms 
of past price and wage increases, rather than future price 
expectations. For many trade union members, six pounds was'the 
largest cash increase they had ever received. The implications for 
real wages were not immediately apparent even though union leaders 
did not disguise that a six pound increase would entail a out in 
living standards (see, i. e., GMWUJ, October 1975; also Interview, 30 
April 1980). Even then, however, the decline in real take-home pay 
was more readily associated with the Social Contract Mark I period 
or, later, with Phase Two. Real take-home pay during Phase One 
remained relatively stable (see Figure B. 2, Appendix B; on the impact 
of Phase One on real earnings of selected occupations covered by the 
sample unions, see Appendix D). 
Thirdly, the policy implementation was no doubt facilitated by 
the fact that it appeared to be working. The rate of annual increase 
in price inflation dropped from just under twenty-seven per cent 
when the policy started to roughly eighteen per cent when intensive 
negotiations for Phase Two were in progress to thirteen per cent at 
the beginning of Phase Two. The rate of increase in earnings 
experienced a similar decline (see-Appendix B, Figure B. 1). 
Fourth lye adherence to the policy was also aided by the 
apparent lack of exceptions and special cases which would have 
encouraged other comparative claims. Certainly, the success of this 
formula convinced TUC negotiators for Phase Two to adopt a similar 
ono exceptions' approach as opposed to the more complex formulations 
favoured by the Treasury (see below). During both Phases One and 
Two, the Department of Employment monitored mainly the largest 
settlements and made several requests that companies defer or cancel 
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payments that appeared to breach the limit (Interview, 15 October 
1980; see the case, i. e., of Standard Telephones and Cables in 
Northern Ireland, TUC ECD, 12 November 1975). The TUC received over 
five hundred requests for advice from affiliates during Phase One and 
a thousand during Phase Two. It dealt with most of these on an 
informal basis as well as holding more formal meetings with the CSEU 
and the steel and railway unions during Phase One and-the NUS, NUM, 
British Leyland Truck and Bus Division, ceramics industry and 
Merchant Navy Officers during Phase Two (TUCR, 1976: 300 and 1977: 
217). , TUC officials were particularly wary of giving the impression 
that they were operating machinery for 'special cases' (see, i. e., 
the case of the steel unions where the TUC refused their request for 
reference to arbitration as originally provided for in the policy 
guidelines in order not to create such an impression, TUC ECD, 11 
February 1975). Perhaps, most importantly, employers appeared 
relatively committed to the policy and, ultimately, if the policy was 
breached, it was the employer who had to sanction such a 
transgression. Although some union negotiators suggested that there 
was employer connivance in resolving particular problems, companies 
appeared to be prepared to abide by the guidelines (this contention- 
was further supported by a 1976 survey of managers in manufacturing, 
see Daniel, 1976: 111). Some union opponents of the policy confessed 
that although they might have been willing to take on their employer, 
they were not prepared to fight their company, the Government, the 
TUC and, often, even their own national union. 
Fifthly, observance of the policy was certainly eased by a 
deteriorating economic situation. The context of crisis and the 
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vertiginous rate of inflation no doubt convinced many of the need for 
such a policy. The rapid rise in unemployment and the decline in 
labour market pressures probably reduced employer concerns about 
their ability to attract and keep labour, though the imposition of a 
flat-rate limit caused problems in retaining the most highly skilled. 
Rising levels of unemployment and general recession also stiffened 
their resistance to aggressive wages claims. Daniel (1976: 56) 
reported a very strong association between levels of demand for a 
product and management's desire to avoid work stoppages. Falling 
levels of demand meant that the avoidance of work stoppages was a 
lower priority, whereas in situations of rising demand it was the top 
priority. The economic climate also, of course, undermined the 
willingness of union members to pursue such wage claims. Certainly, 
in keeping with their support for the voluntary pay policy, union 
executives were not inclined to lend material support to members 
pursuing claims in breach of the guidelines. The AUEW executive, for 
instance, instructed members at British Leyland to return to work 
during the latter part of Phase one (see below). The level of 
dispute benefits paid out by unions was generally at among the lowest 
levels in the decade. This was the case, for example, in the 
"r 
calendar year of 1976 for ASTMS, the AUEW, TGWU and GMWU - all sample 
unions which covered a large enough number of decentralized 
bargaining units that the level of benefits paid out was not uniquely 
a product of whether there was a dispute in a single industry or 
bargaining unit, such as would be the case with NUPE or the FBU (see 
ASTMSR, 1972-1979; AUEW NCR, 1972-1979; ' GMWU Accounts, 1972-1979; 
and TUWUR, 1972-1979). 4 This certainly reflected the fact that both 
the frequency and volume of industrial conflict declined to their 
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lowest levels in the 1970s during the Phase One period (Table E. 1, 
Appendix Ep compares industrial conflict on an August to August basis 
{ 
throughout the decade). Phase Two also experienced a very low volume. 
of industrial conflict (ibid. ). However, by the latter stages of. 
Phase Two, it became increasingly difficult for union executives from 
holding back industrial action by selected groups. 
Finally, policy implementation was also aided by the high degree 
of trade union consent. Support for the policy among trade union 
members was generally higher than among non-trade union members. 
Indeed, over half and often more than sixty per cent of trade 
unionists queried in Gallup Polls consistently saw Phase One as 'a 
good thing' as opposed to less than twenty per cent who viewed it as, 
a 'bad thing' (see Appendix C). This level of support was maintained 
through the early months of Phase Two before falling off markedly 
(ibid. ). The design and voluntary nature of the policies no doubt 
helped as did the appearance of their relative efficacy and the 
efforts of trade union leaders and the Government to sell their 
merits. 
Athough the degree of adherence to and support for the six pound 
policy remained at very high levels, Phase One did engender a number. 
of industrial relations problems that, once exacerbated during Phase 
Two, presaged the development of more substantial' opposition in later 
phases of the Social Contract incomes policies. These problems or 
'anomalies' were largely the result of shifts in pay relativities and 
differentials which disturbed 'customary' wage relationships between 
and within bargaining groups. Such relationships have been the 
subject of considerable investigation. Certainly, it is clear that 
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they have an enduring and resilient character (Routh, 1980). The 
most common basis for assessing the fairness of pay comparisons is 
custom and convention (Wootton, 1955; Brown and Sisson, 1975; Brown, 
1979b). Moreover, following on Runciman's work on relative 
deprivation (1966), major inequalities in incomes are not 
particularly salient in wage comparisons (see also Hyman and Brought 
1975). Rather, wage comparisons at the local level and with people 
doing broadly similar types of work appear considerably more 
important (Daniel, 1976: 119). Thus, Brown (1979b: 120) suggests 
that 'people are far more upset by the disruption of traditional pay 
differentials within their office or workshop than those between 
their own and other workplaces, and are even less perturbed by 
broader disturbances between industries, regions and social classes - 
so long as these do not affect their local pay position' (see also 
Hyman and Brough, 1975). Such is the complexity of wage structure 
and its various determinations. The significance of these findings 
for this study, of course, is in the impact of centralized wage 
guidelines on the differentials within plants and the relativities 
between them, particularly in local labour markets. If these are, 
indeed, the most salient types of wage comparisons, and the evidence 
indicates that this is the case, then the impact of pay policies on 
them is of particular relevance to any understanding of the processes 
of opposition and consent to such policies. 
Interview evidence in this study tends to confirm such an 
hypothesis. The Phase One policy projected an image of 'social 
justice' in difficult circumstances. As was suggested above, it 
commanded a high degree of adhesion for a number of reasons. 
However, overall 'social justice' at the macro-level resulted in a 
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multiplicity of yin justices' at micro-level. These feelings of 
injustice were not so much the product of any real wage effect, even 
though real wages were generally beginning to decline, experiencing a 
much sharper fall during Phase Two. Rather, they stemmed from the 
impact of the policy on the most salient forms of wage comparison - 
within workplaces and between workplaces within the local labour 
market. The complexity of British workplace wage structure and the 
multiplicity and relative fragmentation of bargaining units further 
exacerbated their effect. Thus, the Phase One policy generated many 
of the initial feelings of injustice and grievance around which 
opposition to the policies would ultimately coalesce. These were 
further accentuated during Phases Two and Three, particularly where 
the Government's guidelines for the latter were tightly enforced. 
What were some of these anomalies? 
First, the very imposition of a central policy with fixed terms 
of reference and specific cut-off dates meant that some groups were 
affected in a way that their customary comparators were not. This 
effect was further complicated by the varying interpretations given 
to the effect of pre-existing staged payments and whether or not 
these constituted a principal increase for the purpose of calculating 
a twelve-month interval between principal settlements. Were they to 
be discounted against the new policy and from what date did 
negotiators have the right to implement new settlements? The 
potential for confusion and the disturbance of relativities was 
considerable. The railway unions, for instance, met TUC Economic 
Committee representatives because of their concern that a staged 
payment resulting from the previous year's settlement, intended to 
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restore their parity with coalmining surface workers, would be 
discounted against the six pound limit and, thus, once again 
undermine their relativity with coalmining surface workers (TUC ECD, 
12 May 1976; on other examples, see IDS Report 228 and 231, March and 
April 1976). 
Secondly, the policy had a differential impact on various 
methods of payment. Some bargaining groups, therefore, had greater 
or lesser scope to circumvent the effects of the policy. White. 
collar workers on pre-existing incremental scales, for instance, 
could continue to benefit from movement up those scales subject to 
certain constraints on overall unit wage movements. However, if 
customary differentials or relativities between groups were settled 
on an ad hoc or informal basis, then the reassertion of such 
relationships had either to be accomplished within the six-pound 
limit or held in abeyance until a new policy or the restoration of 
free collective bargaining permitted it. This played particular 
havoc with the customary relationships between workers on time 
payments and those working on payment-by-results (PBR) systems. 
Table 6.1 shows the movement of real earnings in the engineering and 
motor vehicle industries between June 1974 and 1977. The latter two 
years coincide roughly with the period of Phases One and Two of the 
Social Contract incomes policies. The downward movement of real 
earnings of all the workers from 1974 to 1975 indicates the severe 
impact of the recession in the two industries. It would appear that 
the flat rate supplement in Phase One gave a clear boost to the 
earnings of time-rated workers as opposed to their counterparts on 
PBR. However, those on time rates experienced a sharper relative 
decline during Phase Two, especially in the motor vehicle industry. 
381 
TABLE 6.1: THE PERFORHANCE OF REAL EARNINGS UNDER DIFFERENT PAYMENT 
SYSTEMS IN THE ENGINEERING AND MOTOR VEHICLE INDUSTRIES DURING PHASES 
ONE AND TWO 
YEAR 
1974 1975 1976 1977 
INDUSTRY 
ENGINEERING 
All time workers 100 93.9 96.4 88.1 
All PBR workers 100 93.94.88. 
MOTOR VEHICLE 
Semi-skilled time 
workers 100 91.7 98.7 87.7 
Semi-skilled PBR 
workers 100 90.2' 93.6 90.1 
Source: Calculated from Department of Employment annual survey of 
earnings in the engineering and related industries (see DE Gazette, 
October, 1974-1977) and British Labour Statistics Yearbook (1974- 
1977). 
Notes: Average gross weekly earnings for June of each year expressed 
as a ratio of the Retail Price Index based on June 1974=100. 
While interview evidence with negotiators in those two industries 
certainly reflected a concern with the decline in real earnings 
during this period, it suggested as much concern about the 
disturbance in customary relationships between different groups of 
workers, particularly those on PBR and time-rated systems and their 
lack of flexibility to deal with these anomalies. The footwear 
industry provided another example of disturbed differentials as its 
national cost-of-living agreement was suspended in the spring of 1976 
- the result of which was a narrowing of customary differentials 
between those on PBR and those on timework (Interviews, 26 August, 30 
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September and 1 October 1980; see also IDS Reports 217 and 230, 
September 1975 and April 1976). 
Thirdly, the choice of a flat-rate as opposed to a percentage 
norm was, of course, bound to affect differentials. Table 6.2. 
shows the movement of differentials in the engineering industry 
between June 1974 and 1977. Again, the latter two years largely 
coincide with Phases One and Two of the Social Contract incomes 
policies. Table 6.2 indicates a discernible narrowing of 
differentials over the Phase One period from 1975 to 1976- when the 
earnings of both labourers and the semi-skilled moved up more than 
two percentage points on those of the skilled. This trend was, in 
fact, reversed over the Period of Phase Two. These findings are 
consistent with those of Brown (1979a) on the consequences of the- 
Phases One and Two for interoccupational pay differences in the West 
Midlands engineering industry. Certainly, the impact of Phase One on 
the differentials of skilled workers presaged a growing tide of 
opposition to the effects of the policy among the skilled. This was 
already evident in the' spring of 1976 with various workstoppages by 
skilled workers, particularly in the toolrooms, at British Leyland 
and other West Midlands engineering factories in an attempt to. gain. 
recognition of their claims for special bargaining rights (see IDS 
Reports 230 and 231, April 1976). The degree of disaffection with the 
pay policies among the skilled was further accentuated during Phase 
Two. The AUEW members whose claims were in breach of Phase One or 
Two were generally ordered to return to work by their union executive 
because of the union's official policy of support for Phases one and 
Two. The implications of such industrial revolts for the internal 
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TABLE 6.2; EARNINGS DIFFERENTIALS OF ENGINEERING WORKERS OVER PHASES 
ONE AND TWO 
YEAR 
1974 1975 1976 1977 
All Engineering 
Workers 
Semi-skilled as a 
per cent of skilled 91.3 91.93.7 91.8 
Labourers as a per 
cent of skilled 75.5 76.3 78.8 78.1 
Source: 
. 
Department of Employment survey of earnings in engineering 
and related industries. See DE Gazette (October, 1974-1977). 
Notes: The survey is taken in June of each year so the change from 
one year to the next can be very roughly associated with the 
comparable pay policy periods: 1974-1975 - Social Contract Mark I; 
1975-1976 - Phase One; and 1976-1977 - Phase Two. 
political process of the AUEW and other sample unions will be 
explored further in Chapters 7 and 8. 
Finally, the fact that the six pound limit was payable as an 
individual supplement and, therefore, not applicable for the 
calculation of overtime, shift differentials and various other 
payments caused numerous distortions of customary relationships in 
pay structures. This was clearly recognized by the Government, the 
CBI and the TUC, particularly during the Phase Two negotiations. 
However, it was estimated that the cost of consolidation nationally 
would be two per cent of the pay bill but distributed quite unevenly 
across industries (CBI IM, 16 December 1975; TUC ECM, 26 April 1976). 
Since the overall target for increases in earnings over Phase Two was 
five per cent, consolidation was, thus, politically unfeasable if the 
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norm was to be at all palatable for the majority of trade union 
members. Indeed, as is noted below, the Phase Two norm was also paid 
as an individual earnings supplement. This further accentuated the 
disturbance of customary wage relationships.. 
Thus, while Phase One commanded a high level of adhesion and 
support, its'legacy was one of disturbed differentials and 
relativities - the most salient of wage comparisons. It was 
dissatisfaction with these disturbances that created the basis. around 
which considerable dissatisfaction with the results of the policies 
would emerge in the policy processes of the sample unions. This is 
the subject of Chapter 8. 
The Path To Phase Two 
Perhaps paradoxically, Phase One commanded a high degree of 
support against a-background of rapidly rising unemployment, 
continued pressures on the pound and restrictive economic measures to 
mollify foreign creditors. This economic context and the changing 
direction in Government economic policy contributed to an increasing 
tension between the TUC and the Government during the course of Phase 
One. Consultations between the two continued on a regular basis, but 
the TUC was unable to persuade the Government to implement its 
economic recommendations. Although TUC leaders were increasingly 
unhappy with their inability -to influence the direction of economic 
policy, they were looked into a pattern of active support for the 
Government and the Social Contract. Their dilemma was that public 
criticism of the Government's economic policies risked undermining 
the credibility of the Social Contract in the eyes of their members 
on whose support the success of Phase One and, eventually, Phase Two 
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depended. Yet, failure to criticize the Government's policy 
orientations on unemployment, public expenditure and growth would 
both erode the credibility of TUC leaders vis-a-vis their members and 
remove the pressure on the Chancellor to alter economic policy in 
the direction advocated by the TUC. 
A withdrawal of TUC support for either the Government or the 
Social Contract was, however, unlikely. First, TUC leaders believed 
that Phase One was working. Secondly, they hoped that the reduced 
levels of inflation in the British economy along with an imminent 
economic upturn would, after a further year of restraint, lead to a 
more clement atmosphere in which to implement the policies as agreed 
under the aegis of the Social Contract. Finally, 'repudiation of 
any Phase. Two would have been difficult because, as will be discussed 
further below, they did not envisage any feasible political 
alternative to support for the Government and the Social Contract. A 
small consolation for union leaders was that the political survival 
of the Government appeared even more starkly dependent on its ability 
to secure trade union support for a Phase Two policy. This was 
dramatized by another run on the pound in the spring of 1976 which 
pushed the Government to expedite negotiations for Phase Two. The 
pressure on the pound, however, was also a 'clear reminder that, 
because of a large short-term debt, the Government was even more 
beholden to international creditors (on the problems of managing the 
external debt in 1976 and the particular leverage that this gave 
financial institutions over economic policy, see ' Tomlinson, 1981b; 
Ham, 1981; Fay and Young, 1978b). The Government's ability to 
maintain their confidence was apparently linked to both a continued 
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policy of wage restraint, for which it depended on TUC support, and 
the implementation of other restrictive economic measures which were 
almost diametrically opposed to the economic package sought by' the 
TUC in return for its continued support for wage restraint. 
This was the economic and political context of the Phase Two 
negotiations and, indeed, of Phase Two itself. The'sta lemate in'the 
protracted negotiations between TUC representatives and the 
Chancellor over Phase Two ultimately had to be resolved by the new 
Prime Minister, James Callaghan. 5 Although the deadlock was 
ostensibly about the details of the guidelines, it was more 
fundamentally concerned with the Government's unwillingness- to make 
any substantial concessions in other areas of economic policy. Once 
again in the context of crisis, and with apparent reluctance, the TUC 
negotiators settled for little more than promises that the Government 
would pursue more sympathetic economic policies when the nation's 
economic circumstances permitted. Ironically, TUC leaders were able 
to translate their reluctant advocacy of the new policy into 
overwhelming affiliate endorsement for Phase Two at a special 
Congress in June 1976. However, the signs were already apparent that 
support for a Phase Three was increasingly unlikely. - This section 
traces the background to Phase Two. ' The next section expands briefly 
on the negotiations for and endorsement of Phase Two. 
The TUC's primary preoccupation throughout the autumn and winter 
of 1975-1976 was the rapid rise in unemployment. The rate of male 
unemployment had climbed from 4.8 per cent in June, 1975 to 7.6 per 
cent in January 1976 (see Figure B. 1 , Appendix B). TUC leaders had 
presented the six pound policy to their members as a way of giving 
the Labour Government *a breathing space'. This would give it the 
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freedom to defend the social priorities agreed in the Liaison 
Committee, 'particularly on unemployment, on social services and on 
the development of a real industrial plan for Britain' (see, i. e., 
Basnett in GMWUJ, October and November 1975). Even if specific quid 
pro uos had not figured prominently in the Phase One negotiations, 
Government action to counteract the rapid rise in unemployment 
quickly became a critical issue for the credibility of both TUC 
leaders and the Social Contract. In successive meetings with the 
Government, TUC leaders emphasized that action to reduce the level of 
unemployment was essential to the success of the six pound policy and 
an integral part of The Development of the Social Contract (TUC ECD, 
10 December 1975 and 144 January 1976; LCR, 24 November 1975 and 26 
January and 23 February 1976; Castle, 1980: 558-559,630-631 and 657- 
660). The TUC urged Government action in four main areas: selective 
import controls, temporary employment and training measures, the 
implementation of the industrial strategy as decided in the Liaison 
Committee, and an overall economic stimulus to boost economic growth, 
enough to reduce the level of unemployment (see, i. e., TUCER, 1976). 
Government economic priorities, however, were, first, to reduce 
further the level of inflation through a Phase Two incomes policy 
and, secondly, to hold down the levels of public and private 
expenditure in order, it was argued, to leave scope for increased 
investment (see, i. e., Stewart, 1977: 228). The Government was, 
therefore, forthcoming on only two of the requested TUC priorities. 
It did launch a number of training and temporary employment 
initiatives through the auspices of the new Manpower Services 
Commission (TUCR, 1976: 300-307). However, these measures were 
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designed to mitigate the worst effects of the rapid increase in 
unemployment, not to effect any significant overall reduction in the 
rate of unemployment. The Government also proceeded with the 
implementation of its industrial strategy, albeit, many have argued, 
at a leisurely pace and in a much diluted form (see, i. e., Stewart, 
1977: 217; Castle, 1980: 669; NEDC, 5 November 1975; TUC ECD, 12 
November 1975). 
On what the TUC considered the critical items for the reduction 
of unemployment, import controls and reflation, the Government made 
virtually no concessions. Over the -autumn and winter of 1975-1976, 
the Chancellor repeatedly rejected the representations of the TUC on 
both the imposition of import controls and reflation. On import 
controls, the Chancellor and the majority of other senior ministers 
argued that they ran counter to Britain's international treaty 
obligations. Moreover, they emphasized that Britain was in fact a 
net exporter of manufactured goods. Import controls, therefore, 
risked sparking retaliatory measures which would further undermine 
the already precarious balance of payments (TUC ECD, 8 October and 12 
November 1975). On the question of stimulating economic growth, The 
TUC argued that unemployment would continue to grow unless the rate 
of growth in the UK economy could exceed three per cent annually. 
Since a substantial decrease in the rate of unemployment was integral 
to The Development of the Social Contract, ' then it urged the 
Chancellor to pursue measures designed to achieve this targeted 
growth rate. This would entail a moderate stimulation of overall 
demand and a more vigorous pursuit of the industrial strategy to 
stimulate exports (see TUC ECD, 10 December 1975 and 14 January 
1976). This analysis was repeated at separate Liaison Committee 
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discussions in January and February as well as constituting the 
central thrust of the TUC's budget proposals (LCR, 26 January and 23 
February 1976; TECER, 1976). In its April 1976 budget, the 
Government did respond to TUC requests with increases in pensions and 
child tax allowances and some tax. concessions subject to the 
successful introduction of a Phase Two pay policy.. Otherwise, it 
argued that the constraints on the balance of payments prevented it 
from pursuing further reflationary measures until the economic 
situation improved. Indeed, a January White Paper on public 
expenditure had, despite protestations from both the TUC and the left 
of the Labour Party, committed the Government to substantial future 
reductions in public spending (see Pliatzky, 1982: 141-147). 
Reduction in public expenditure at a time of rapidly rising 
unemployment particularly galled the TUC representatives who at a 
February Liaison Committee meeting privately emphasized that unless 
the Government was prepared to reconsider some of its policies, their 
position would be untenable (Castle, 1980: 657-660; LCR, 23 February 
. 
1976). Yet, with the Government facing a key by-election the 
following week, TUC leaders publicly emphasized their continued 
support for the Government (Guardian, 26 February 1976). 
A debate among senior Treasury officials about strategic options 
for the British economy was, in fact, in progress at this time. 
Unemployment was unlikely to decline. Economic recovery was much 
slower than anticipated. The balance of payments deficit and the 
public sector borrowing requirement both remained relatively large 
and pressures on the pound were, therefore, still intense. The 
Government was committed to the reduction of public expenditure and 
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levels of inflation in its engagements to international creditors. 
Yet, it was clear that the maintenance of voluntary wage restraint 
might be jeopardized if the Government chose to deflate further the 
level of economic activity in an effort to stabilize the balance of 
payments. Given these economic constraints, and probably In the 
light of the potential credibility problems for the Social Contract, 
the Treasury considered the merits of a controlled devaluation of the 
pound (on the economic situation and this debate, see Fay and Young, 
1978 a&b; Stewart, 1977; Ham, 1981). It was argued that, despite 
the risk of increasing the rate of inflation, devaluation would make 
the price of British goods more competitive and generate the 
possibility of an export-led recovery. It might also reduce the 
increasing import penetration of British markets without the risk of 
retaliation that a policy of import controls might entail. Despite 
the reported reluctance of the Bank of -England, the Treasury 
officials attempted to signal its preference for a downward movement 
in sterling to the international markets. This was, in retrospect, a 
risky endeavour for a vulnerable economy in the context of floating 
exchange rates. 
The attempt to achieve a slight devaluation precipitated another 
major collapse in confidence in the pound sterling which lasted 
through the spring and into the summer of 1976 as it fell through the 
two dollar barrier and then, progressively, to below 1.70 dollars 
(see ibid.; also, Wilson, 1979: 226-227; Glyn and Harrison, 1980: 
112). This led, first, to an emergency standby loan by foreign 
Central Banks in June 1976 and a new round of public expenditure cuts 
in July 1976 exacted as the price for continued international support 
for the pound (see Leiber, 1979). When the June loan expired, the 
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continued pressure on the pound ultimately led to the controversial- 
decision. to apply to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) for a new 
loan in the autumn of 1976. Despite prolonged ructions within the 
Cabinet and serious consideration of a form of import. surcharge as an 
alternative, the terms of the IMF loan involved, inter alia, yet 
further rounds of public expenditure, cuts (on the 1976 negotiations 
between' the Government and the IMF, see Fay and Young, 1978a & b). 6 
This crisis posed such a serious threat to the political survival of 
the Government that even the Tribune Group supported the deal in 
Parliament, albeit, to paraphrase one MP on the left, 'with our eyes 
closed and walking backwards into the lobby' (ibid). 
The Phase Two Negotiations 
Even though the crisis over sterling lasted through most of the 
latter nine months of 1976, the rapid decline in the value of the 
pound during March and April of 1976 again influenced the 
negotiations about a new pay policy. In his April budget speech, the 
Chancellor emphasized the urgency of concluding a new pay agreement 
in order to stabilize the value of the pound. He proposed that if 
the TUC would accept a three per cent limit on pay rises over the 
coming year, then he would make consequent reductions in personal 
taxation. Conversely, this implied a readiness to tax away large pay 
increases (Stewart, 1977: 229). When Foot objected within the 
Cabinet to the very low figure being offered and insisted on the. need 
for a figure which the TUC leadership could credibly recommend to its 
members, Callaghan warned that there would be grave economic problems 
if they could not get the three per cent figure (Castle, 1980: 717). 
Healey had floated the proposal of tax cuts in return for wage 
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restraint as early as February (FT, 14 February 1976). However, TUC 
representatives were reportedly miffed by Healey's budget target of a 
three per cent limit on wage increases which they believed was a 
deliberate attempt to limit the terms of the negotiations even before 
they began (TUC ECM, 14 April 1976; Observer, 11 April 1976). 
The TUC had refused to engage in any discussions of the possible 
form of a Phase Two until after the budget. Indeed, its March 
Economic Review was notable for its lack of specificity on any future 
pay policy (TUCER, 1976; also The Times, 2 March 1976). Economic 
Committee representatives suggested to the Chancellor in a March 
meeting that the views that were being formalized at trade union 
conferences through the spring of 1976 would be strongly influenced 
by the contents of the budget (TUC ECD, 14 April 1976). Indeed, the 
TUC Economic Committee initially envisaged holding a consultative 
conference in the early summer to determine what form a possible 
Phase Two might take (TUC ECM, 10 March 1976; also FT, 25 March 
1976). In an internal document which considered its strategy in the 
light of the budget, the Economic Committee was critical of the 
Government's targets for growth, unemployment and the pay limit. 
However, it did accept that if the rate of price increases was to be 
reduced to five per cent over the coming year, then the average pay 
increase would have to be roughly the same (TUC ECD, 14 April 1976). ' 
TUC leaders also bowed to intense Government pressure to expedite the 
negotiations and conclude an agreement in order to counter the run on 
sterling (FT, 24 April 1976). 
The main internal TUC debate concerned the form of a new pay 
limit. A significant number of unions had advocated, the need for a 
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percentage-based increase so As not to erode further wage 
differentials. Other unions complained of the encumbrances resulting 
from the non-consolidation of the six-pound limit (on these two 
points, see the discussion on the impact of the six-pound limit 
above; also see TUC ECD, 14 April 1976). Given the TUC's basic 
acceptance of an approximate five per cent limit on pay increases, 
the problem with a percentage approach to Phase Two was the very 
small increase that it would entail for the low-paid. The general 
union leaders were particularly adamant that this would be 
unacceptable to their members. Indeed, both Jones and Basnett 
remained staunch advocates of the flat-rate approach (Interview, 16 
May 1980; FT, 1 April 1976). Thus, TUC leaders began to explore the 
possibility of a compromise. This would entail some combination of a 
percentage figure and a minimal and maximal flat-rate limit. They 
also endeavoured to retain the essential simplicity of the Phase We 
policy which they considered its greatest merit. However, it was 
agreed that in their negotiations with the Government they would not 
finalize the form of the guidelines until they could first settle on 
an overall pay figure, ensure that the tax concessions would be 
forthcoming and get further action from the Government on 
unemployment, prices, industrial investment, growth and selected 
import controls (TUC ECM, 14 April 1976). In other words, the TUC 
leadership was particularly concerned to demonstrate that they were 
making progress on what they considered the wider aspects of the 
Social Contract and that the Social Contract was not simply a form of 
wage control (TUC ECD, 14 April 1976). However, the items on which 
the TUC sought progress were precisely the economic package which the 
Chancellor had already rejected. 
394 
In the subsequent negotiations, the Chancellor simply refused to 
countenance the TUC's major economic requests. Hugh Scanlon candidly 
summarized the TUC's lack of progress in the negotiations when he 
addressed the June Special TUC: 
we did not achieve what we wanted on any [point]. We 
managed to push up the wage level to what it is now, and we 
managed to get assurances that there would be no diminution 
of the tax concessions. We did something else - it might be 
small - which has gone unheralded: there will be no 
increases in the price of school meals ... Outside of 
that, we did not achieve much (TUC, 1976: 29). 
While the TUC representatives attempted to obtain specific 
commitments on the wider aspects of the Social Contract, the 
Government concentrated on the form and amount of the pay limit. Its 
apparent strategy of maintaining the link between the pay guidelines 
and possible tax concessions, probably to the detriment of extensive 
discussion of other items, was largely successful. The TUC 
representatives insisted on at least five per cent plus the tax 
concessions, while the Chancellor held to his three per cent figure 
and the negotiation of possible exceptions to rectify anomalies in 
pay structure. 
The result of the negotiations was basically the TUC formula, 
a higher percentage figure (five per cent), with af lat cash 
underpinning (2.50 pounds minimum) and a cash maximum (4.00 pounds 
maximum) resulting in a'Treasury estimated four and a half per cent 
average increase in earnings (IDS Report 233, May 1976; Phase Two, 
1976). As in the case of Phase One, the' limit would be applied as. an 
individual non-consolidated supplement and there were to be no 
exceptions other than the introduction ot`improvement of occupational 
pension schemes within specified limits (TUC ECM, 5 May 1976). The 
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tax- concessions as outlined in the Budget would be applied. The 
guidelines were exceptionally tightly specified in order to convince 
Treasury officials that the scope for earnings drift above the limits 
would be minimal (TUC ECM, 26 April 1976). Otherwise, the TUC made 
very little progress on the rest of its economic package. In a final 
marathon of late night negotiations at Ten Downing Street and with 
the TUC Economic Committee and General Council scheduled to approve a 
deal the next morning, the TUC representatives continued to push for 
further concessions in return for their compliance with a Phase Two. 
The Chancellor agreed to accept a slightly higher pay figure and 
conceded a fifty million pound increase in public expenditure to be 
allocated according to the priorities of the TUC. However, he 
refused to give any other specific economic commitments in return for 
TUC compliance, notably on prices, import controls and employment. 
Against this refusal, the `NEDC six' judged that they had obtained 
all the concessions that would be forthcoming and agreed to recommend 
the package to the Economic Committee. The significance of this TUC 
acquiescence will be discussed further in the next section. 
Despite the impact of * Phase One on living standards, 
differentials and wage relativities and the lack of substantive 
progress on its key economic priorities, renewal of TUC consent for 
Phase Two was in many respects less problematic than for Phase One. 
The consent of most affiliates for Phase One, belated or otherwise, 
meant that, there were fewer internal restrictions on leadership 
consensus-building for Phase Two than was the case with Phase One. 
The Economic Committee accepted the package, albeit with some 
reluctance, and on the understanding that it would expect action from 
the Government on other economic items (TUC ECM, 5 May 1976). This 
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expectation was clearly specified in the report to the Special 
Congress (TUC, 1976) and re-emphasized in subsequent Liaison 
Committee discussions (see below). The policy guidelines were 
endorsed at a special General Council meeting on 5 May. The vote in 
favour of the policy was twenty-five to five with the opposing votes 
emanating from the ASTMS, TASS, ACTT, and Tobacco Workers' 
representatives and Reg Birch, one of the AUEW(E) representatives 
(FT, 6 May 1976). As compared with the General Council's very uneven 
endorsement of the six pound policy in July 1975, this represented 
fairly broad-based leadership support for the new policy. 
This relative consensus at General Council level was quickly 
translated into individual affiliate support. The mobilization of 
consent within the sample unions will be treated more fully in 
Chapter 7. However, with the exception of ASTMS, one of the most 
vociferous opponents of the Social Contract incomes policies, the 
general secretaries of all the other sample unions secured the 
consent of their members for Phase Two though with varying degrees of 
difficulty. The GMWU executive approved the policy and showed 
little evidence of any resistance (GMWU ECM, 17 May, 1976; 
Interviews, various dates). More dissastisfaction was expressed at 
the union's annual conference, but the executive's recommendation was 
carried overwhelmingly (GMWU ACS 1976; MS, 10 June 1976). Despite 
Jack Jones's close personal association with the Social Contract, a 
significant body of opposition was evident in the TGWU executive. It 
voted by a margin of twenty-five to twelve to support the policy and 
a susbstantive motion was subsequently carried unanimously (TGWU ECM, 
10 May 1976; Guardian, 11 May 1976). In a typically complex series 
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of manoeuvres over the appropriate forum in which to debate its 
position, the AUEW engineering section's National Committee voted by 
twenty-nine to twenty-two to support Phase Two (AUEW NCR, 1976; MS, 
19 May 1976; Sunda Times, 23 May 1976). The margin of the FBU 
executive's decision was even narrower. In an unprecedented split 
between the General Secretary and the President, the executive voted 
eight to seven to recommend support of the Phase Two guidelines to 
its annual conference (Interviews, various dates). The union's 
annual conference subsequently endorsed the. executive's 
recommendation (FBU ACS 1976). Similarly, when the Economic 
Committee of NUPE's reorganized, executive considered the Phase Two 
guidelines on 8 May, it experienced some difficulty in reconciling 
its General Secretary's desire to support the policy with the general 
critique of Government economic policy that its research staff had 
developed over the previous year (see NUPE 1975a and 1976). A 
slightly schizophrenic compromise formula, subsequently adopted by 
the union's executive and put to the membership in a ballot vote, 
. supported 
the pay policy guidelines but expressed 'serious concern at 
the continued failure of the TUC General Council to secure a 
fundamental change in the Government's economic strategy' and the 
failure of the Government to take positive action on prices, 
unemployment, the defence of public expenditure, selective import 
controls and investment (Interviews, various dates; NUPE IM, 25 May 
1976). This executive statement was supported in a membership ballot 
by almost a three to one margin (73.7% to 26.3%; NUPE IMF 15 June 
1976). In contrast to the other sample unions, the ASTMS executive 
recommended that the union's annual conference oppose the Phase Two 
policy which it overwhelmingly did do (ASTMS ECM, 7 *May 1976; ASTMS 
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AC, 1976; FT, 10 May 1976). In keeping with the ASTMS tradition of 
opposition to incomes policy, there was only token resistance to the 
union's oppositional stance. 
It was increasingly apparent, therefore, that beyond Phase Two 
the TUC was unlikely to agree to a further round of restraint. 
Indeed, immediately after the General Council had approved the Phase 
Two guidelines, the TUC General Secretary emphasized that the TUC was 
not committed in any way to further developments in incomes policy 
beyond July 19771 (The Times, 6 May 1976). The important expression 
of opposition within a number of key TUC affiliates such as the TGWU, 
AUEW and, even, GMWU did not bode well for a continuation of the 
policy after Phase Two. The relative policy discretion available to 
the general secretaries of these unions would be critical for the 
construction of any TUC leadership consensus around a new policy. 
Even though the Special Congress endorsed the guidelines by a mammoth 
seventeen to one margin (9,262,000 to 531,000 votes), the 
contributions to the debate clearly indicated the reluctance with 
which most unions were embarking on a further round of wage restraint 
(TUC, 1976). Thus, the internal dynamics of incomes policy 
increasingly impinged on external TUC policy-making. 
If the Phase Two policy was to be successful, however, then 
the TUC still relied on the active support of its affiliates. The 
TUC leaderships therefore, attempted to defuse growing membership 
opposition to the Social Contract pay policies and reassert its 
understanding of the direction and meaning of the Social Contract as 
a relationship which involved much more than wage restraint. First, 
it clearly signalled its intention to return to free collective 
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bargaining at the end of the Phase Two policy. Even before the end. 
of Phase One, key union leaders such as Jones and Basnett talked of 
the need to prepare for 'an orderly return to normal collective 
bargaining' (TGWUJ, July 1976; Guardian, 11 August 1976). At the 
1976 Congress, in a very uncontentioüs debate where practically all 
of the main motions were passed, the main composite on pay and the 
Social Contract called on Congress to avoid a . wages free-for-all' . 
and prepare for 'a planned return to free collective bargaining' at 
the end of Phase Two (TUCR, 1976: 523). Secondly, through policy 
discussions in the Liaison Committee, the TUC leadership attempted to 
give a new impetus to the Social Contract as a wider understanding 
between the TUC and Government on economic and social priorities. 
The principal vehicle for this was a draft policy statement, The Next 
Three Years and The Problem of Priorities which it hoped would give 
the same impetus to the Social Contract as had the 1973 Liaison 
Committee statement, Economic Policy and the Cost of Living (LCR, 24 
May 1976; LC, 1976). This exercice, in fact, originated in a joint 
TGWU-AUEW-GMWU appeal for greater unity between left and right and 
industrial and political wings of the Labour movement (see below; 
also Clark et al., 1980: 41). Instead, as the external pressures on. 
Government economic policy mounted, it prompted further rifts between 
the left of the Labour Party on the NEC and Government Ministers with 
union leaders cast in the role of defending the Government (see, 
i. e., The Times, 27 July 1976). 
Thus, on the clear understanding that it would be the final year 
of wage restraint, Phase Two appeared to enjoy overwhelming 
acquiescence, if not consent. However, both internal revolts over 
the impact of a further year of wage restraint and continuing 
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pressures on the pound continued to generate opposition to the pay 
policies and undermine the credibility of the Social Contract as 
anything more than a policy of wage restraint. The gradual collapse 
of the Social Contract incomes policies is the subject of Chapter 8. 
The next chapter will examine the mobilization of consent within the 
sample unions. First, 'however, the final section of this chapter 
analyzes further the -basis of TUC consent to the Phase One and Two 
policies. 
WAGE RESTRAINT, CONSENT AND ACQUIESCENCE 
Phases One and Two were a period of extraordinary trade union 
compliance with a voluntary incomes policy.. As was emphasized above, 
the highly tentative and fragile character of the initial leadership 
consensus around the six pound policy was soon generalized and 
translated into a period of formal consent or, at least, acquiescence 
to a policy of rigid wage restraint; this was renewed for a second 
year in a slightly modified form. The degree of compliance with the 
policies generally exceeded the two previous such experiments 
between the TUC and a Labour government: from 1948 to 1950 and from 
1965 to 1967. This section briefly considers why the TUC agreed to 
participate in the 1975-1977 policies and the implications of its 
acceptance for an understanding of trade union approaches to the 
Social Contract. The first part addresses the question of TUC 
acceptance. The second part considers why the TUC did not push 
harder for trade-offs against its compliance with the policies and 
the implieions of the TUC leadership's conversion to formal incomes 
po liäy for the Social Contract as a trade union political strategy. 
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The Basis of TUC Consent 
Why did the TUC acquiesce in, indeed consent to, the Labour 
Government's much more formal incomes policy when it had previously 
so consistently rejected such an approach? Quite simply, in the 
context of crisis, there was a reflex among key union leaders to 
support the Labour Government. That impulse was strong enough, 
first, to construct a highly tentative consensus at General Council 
level; secondly to mobilize consent for the new policy approach 
among affiliated unions; and, finally, to renew consent for wage 
restraint for a further year. It is, therefore, important to 
consider briefly the nature of this leadership conversion, its 
significance in terms of the expression of trade union political 
strategies and how it was justified. This section looks at the 
rationale for TUC consent to the Social Contract incomes policies. 
In particular, it was argued in Chapter 3 that several distinct 
rationalities were interwoven in the political discourse of British 
trade union leaders. It was emphasized that these rationalities were 
generally fluid, more often pursued simultaneously than exclusively, 
as often in mutual contradiction as logically compatible. In 
examining the rationale of TUC consent to Phases One and Two, this 
section provides further scope for the analysis of "competing 
rationalities in trade union political practice. 
It is relatively difficult to distinguish with any preoision 
between the 'real' reasons for TUC leadership consent to the Social 
Contract incomes policies and those advanced post facto in order to 
mobilize consent for the policies. Interview evidence in this study 
would seem to suggest that they are generally comparable. The most 
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prominent factors in any explanation must be the link with the Labour 
Party and the depth of the crisis that generated the initial 
momentum. Once the policy shift was made, then it was a question of 
legitimizing it. 
Loyalty to the Party and, by extension, to the Government, what 
Tom Jackson of the UPW neatly termed 'loyalty to our Party in 
Government' (TUC, 1976: 15), was certainly critical'to TUC support 
for Phases One and Two. As has been suggested in earlier chapters, 
the loyalty and allegiance of the unions in times of crisis forms a 
rich vein in the history of the British Labour Party. Variants of a 
social democratic rationality certainly appeared to be the 
predominant strain in the political strategies of most British trade 
unions. This was accentuated in the case of Labour governments when 
social democratic and representational rationalities became virtually 
indistinguishable. Even those trade unionists who espoused some form 
of transformative political rationality generally envisaged its 
realization through a more radical Labour Party. This, of course, 
was the operative assumption of the socialist conception of the 
`Social Contract. 
The political survival of the Government was certainly seen to 
be under threat during both the Phase One and Phase Two negotiations. 
The question of loyalty to the Government and the Party was 
emphasized repeatedly in the presentation of the Phase One and Two 
policies. Jones emphasized, that the trade union movement could not 
afford the luxury of destroying a Labour Government: 'the lesson we 
have learnt [from the past) is that at all costs we have to keep a 
Labour Government in office when it is there' (TUCR, 1975: 461 and 
477). Similarly, Scanlon noted that the six NEDC representatives for 
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the TUC remained convinced that the alternative to no agreement on a 
Phase Two policy was a catastrophic run on the pound and a General 
Election in which, given the gravity of the crisis, the Labour 
Government would likely have been defeated (TUC, 1976: 29-30). 
Moreover, the Social Contract itself was predicated on the 
. existence of a 
Labour Government. Whatever the debate between 
proponents of the social democratic and socialist conceptions of the 
Social Contract as outlined in previous chapters, for trade union 
leaders the Social Contract was in many ways simply a pragmatic means 
of ensuring a Labour government commitment to certain policy goals. 
In this sense, the Social Contract encompassed in variable 
proportions representational, social democratic, instrumental and 
transformative political rationalities: representational because it 
would ensure fairly constant access to Government ministers for the 
articulation of the "trade union' view and because it implied actual 
trade union participation in economic decision-making; social 
democratic because it privileged the Labour Party and was predicated 
on the bipartite relationship between the TUC and the Party; 
instrumental because it was designed to secure the realization of 
certain key policy objectives as regards both the organizational 
security of trade unionism and the overall direction of economic 
policy; and transformative because it was hoped that its realization 
would somehow effect a permanent transformation of trade union 
state relations (on these political rationalities or strategies, see 
Chapter 3). This was certainly how Jack Jones had initially 
presented the notion of a Social Contract to his own members and 
approximately how many other union leaders had also sold its merits 
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(see Chapters 2,3 and 5). The continued emphasis on the 
accomplishments of the Social Contract in terms of the Government's 
legislative programme did not contradict this approach. 
This pragmatic trade union approach was not incompatible with 
the social democratic conception of the Social Contract which was 
contingent on trade union support for the pursuit of its economic 
objectives and whose proponents, notably the PLP leaders, were 
apparently willing to accept Jones's approach in return for that 
trade union support. The greatest inconsistency was, of course, over' 
the question of incomes policy itself which was the antithesis of 
union policy objectives. Neither was the trade, union approach 
incompatible with the socialist conception of the Social Contract and 
its proponents' desire for a kind of transformative programme. 
Indeed, many trade unionists on the left specifically espoused the 
transformative character of the Social Contract. Certainly, the 
differential commitment of trade union leaders to the notion of a 
Social Contract and the rather fluid character of its objectives was 
as compatible, if not more so, with the socialist conception of the 
Social Contract as with the social democratic. Thus, these different 
conceptions of the Social Contract continued to coexist through the 
first year of the Labour Government. However, as the political and 
economic crisis deepened and the social democratic conception of, the 
Social Contract was emphasized to the detriment of the socialist 
conception within the Government (see Chapter 5), the question of' 
trade union leaders ensuring the implementation of certain policy 
goals increasingly took a minimal rather than a maximal form. 
Transformative rationalities were largely subjugated to more 
instrumental concerns. Quite pragmatically, avoiding a statutory 
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policy or a Conservative government, with its attendant biases, or 
both became a greater instrumental priority than any commitment to a 
transformative strategy. Short-term sacrifices were thus presented 
as a precondition for the achievement of longer-term policy 
objectives. The implications of this shift in emphasis for an 
understanding of trade union political and economic strategies will 
be explored further in the next section. 
If the survival of the Social Contract was indistinguishable 
from the survival of the Government, and if the Government's 
political survival was not assured without trade union support for 
incomes policy, then a rejection of the incomes policy by the TUC 
also implied a rejection of both the Government and the Social 
Contract. On the other hand, acquiescence in or support for the 
Government's pay policy implied a continuing relationship with the 
Labour Government and possible further development of the Social 
Contract. Moreover, the Government would seemingly be beholden to 
the TUC for securing its political survival. Certainly, it appeared 
. to be in the intrinsic organizational interest of the holders of 
trade union power to exchange present cooperation in wage restraint 
for future access to policy-making and even power - in both a 
personal and an organizational sense. This was integral to the kind 
of representational rationality that appeared to predominate in the 
thinking of British trade union leaders. Indeed, TUC leaders had 
perhaps come close to concluding exactly this kind of deal with the 
Heath Government in 1972, though the kind of guarantees that they 
sought to extract in that case were much greater than with a Labour 
government (see Chapter 3). ' No social democratic rationality was 
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operative in the negotiations with Heath to soften 
the TUC's negotiating position and undermine the capacity to say 
'no'. Moreover, as regards the definition of membership interests in 
accepting a period of tight wage restraint from 1975 to 1977, only 
trade union leaders, from their position of organizational power, 
were realistically in a position to assess the temporal dimension of 
the trade-off between short-term sacrifice and longer-term gain (on 
the organizational dimensions of political exchange, see Pizzorno, 
1978). Thus, in a complex blend of social democratic, 
representational and minimal instrumental strategies, the survival of 
the Government and the Social Contract became inextricably linked 
with the maintenance and advancement of trade union interests which, 
in turn, entailed deferring short-term gains in exchange for future 
possibilities, even if this entailed the mobilization of trade union 
consent for an incomes policy. 
The depth of the crisis in 1975 and again during the TUC- 
Government negotiations in 1976 certainly precipitated TUC leadership 
readiness to consider, first, a change in policy and, then, its 
extension. The plans for a new policy had been laid through the late 
spring and early summer of 1975, before the occurrence of a sterling 
crisis. The sterling crisis, however, weakened outstanding 
resistance to a more formal pay policy, undermined TUC plans for a 
more elaborate series of trade-offs against compliance with a new pay 
limit, and generated an atmosphere that greatly facilitated the 
mobilization of consent. Basnett later suggested that 'economic 
problems determined the six pound policy and not the Social Contract' 
(Interview, 23 October 1979). Similarly, in explaining his own 
conversion to incomes policy, Scanlon told the trade union group of 
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Labour MPs that he 'had looked over the precipice ' and did not like 
what he saw (cited in Barnes and Reid, 1980: 206). Indeed, the 
seeming imminent collapse of the British economy appealed to trade 
unionists as citizens as well as Labour Party members concerned with 
the political survival of the Government. In a dramatic appeal to 
the NUM policy conference in July 1975, the Prime Minister called on 
Britain's miners to put the nation before self in the country's hour 
of crisis. ' Wilson could scarcely have better reflected Panitch's 
(1976: 1) portrayal of the Labour Party as 'a national party cast in 
the historical role of integrating the interests and demands of' the 
working class with those of the British nation as a whole'. Wilson 
(1979: 118) suggested to the NUM conference that it was not so much a 
question of saving the Labour Government as whether any social 
democratic government, committed to consensus and consent, could 
govern. Thus, he asked the miners for ýa Year for Britain'. This 
theme was reflected in the discourse of the TUC leadership. Len 
Murray spoke of dragging 'Britain back from the edge' at the 1975 
-Congress (TUCK, 1975: 461). Jack Jones emphasized that the TUC's 
decision on support for the pay policy would be 'in the interests of 
the people of Britain', that the TUC spoke 'for the whole of the 
nation' (ibid. ). 
There were, of course, also more pragmatic concerns. Trade 
union leaders were, after all, 'practical' men' accustomed to constant 
accommodation with employers and governments in their representative 
and intermediary roles on behalf of their members. The limits of 
these accommodations were determined by the membership's willingness 
to accept them. Such a willingness was the product of a union's 
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habitual industrial policy, its *internal political practice and its 
external political practice (see Chapter 4). The practical question 
was: could incomes policy be sold? The answer certainly appeared to 
be affirmative. There was what ' Jones referred to as "a basket of 
things to sell to our people' (Interview, 16 May 1980). This was 
primarily the legislative programme of the Social Contract, and it 
figured prominently in- the TUC presentations of the Phase. One and Two - 
policies (TUC, 1975 and 1976). Much emphasis was, of course, also 
placed on the parts of the Social Contract programme that still were 
to be achieved, such as the industrial strategy (see, i. e., TUCR, 
1975: 458). In this sense, support for Phases One and Two was not 
presented as a disjuncture, but rather a continuity between what had 
already been achieved and what was still to be accomplished in the 
developing relationship between the TUC and the Government. Indeed, 
the title of the TUC's 1975 document, The Development of the Social. 
Contract, symbolized precisely this continuity (TUC, 1975). 
Similarly, while there were clearly many doubts about what the TUC 
-representatives had failed to achieve in the negotiations on Phase 
Two, not least among the negotiators themselves, there appeared to be 
an inclination, in. Scanlon's words, in view of what had been 
achieved by the Government ... in view of everything else that it 
is proposing to do' to '4give the Government the benefit of the 
doubt' (TUC, 1976: 30). 
The readiness of trade union members also to give the Government 
the benefit of the doubt seemed, to be reflected in the opinion poll 
evidence of the period. Gallup Poll data from the period, summarized 
in Appendix C, indicates that support for the Government's prices 
and incomes policy remained very high throughout Phase One-and 
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through the early months of Phase Two before declining dramatically 
through the remainder of Phase Two (see Figures C. 1 and C. 2). 
Indeed, support for the policies during this period remained 
consistently higher among trade unionists than non-trade unionists. 
Conversely, opposition to the policies was higher among non-trade 
unionists. This was possibly a testimony to the success of union 
leaders as well as the Government's own propoganda efforts in 
mobilizing consent for the policies. It also supported, however, 
the TUC leadership's contention that 'rank and file trade' union 
members looked `to the TUC to give a lead' (TUC ECM) 3 July 1975). 
In contradistinction to the union activists who might oppose wage 
restraint, the TUC General Secretary reminded delegates to the 1975 
TUC that they were there to protect the interests of their members as 
best they could in circumstances as they existed (TUCR, 1975: 459). 
It is also important, however, not to overemphasize the degree. of 
membership support for the Phase One and Two incomes policies. It 
would otherwise be difficult to explain why the TUC did not 
eventually agree to a Phase Three limit. . Although the level of 
compliance with the policies was high, the opinion poll evidence 
suggests that there remained a constant core of opposition to the 
policies hovering around fifteen per cent of respondents through 
Phase One and the early months of Phase Two and rising sharply to 
between thirty and forty per cent of respondents in the latter stages 
of Phase Two (see Figure C. 2). Similarly, in his 1975-1976 survey of 
British manufacturing establishments, conducted during Phase One, 
Daniel (1976: 112-113) found that shop stewards at plant level did 
not endorse the notion of an incomes policy other than as pan 
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emergency measure in special circumstances'. Indeed, just under 
thirty-two per cent of his union respondents rejected incomes policy 
'even as a temporary expedient'. Certainly, there is ample evidence 
that TUC leaders were acutely aware throughout the period that it 
would be increasingly difficult to persuade their members of the 
merits of the pay policies. Thus, by the 1976 Congress, they were 
already committed to a return to free collective bargaining at the 
end of Phase Two. 
This leads to a final consideration in relation to TUC support 
for the policies. What was the alternative? As was suggested above, 
key union leaders clearly saw no alternative to compliance with 
incomes policy if the Labour Government and the Social Contract were 
to survive. This was repeatedly emphasized in contributions to the 
debates on the policies in 1975 and 1976 (TUCK, - 1975; TUC, 1976). 
Basnett noted quite simply: 'we do not believe that there is any 
alternative' (TUC, 1976: 40). Jones suggested to the 1975 Congress 
that the alternative was an increase in unemployment (TUCR, 1975: 
460). This would undermine the sectional interests of affected 
groups of trade unionists on the labour market. However, he argued 
that it would also undermine the basis of trade unionism itself, 
namely, solidarity. Phases One and Two, at least, had the merits of 
being framed either entirely or in part by the trade union movement 
and relying on the principles of 'rough justice' and 'equivalence of 
sacrifice'. A statutory policy and a period of prolonged high 
unemployment, administered by either a Labour or a Conservative 
government would have neither of these merits. Thus, the TUC 
negotiators presented Phases One and Two as the best that they could 
do in difficult circumstances and within the constraint of ensuring 
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the survival of the Government and the Social Contract. It 
represented a profoundly pragmatic and expedient vision of their 
relations with the Government and the possibilities of economic 
development in a time of economic and political crisis. As will be 
detailed further below, it also sharply differentiated them from the 
proponents of the Social Contract as a transformative strategy on the 
left. The next section turns to the assessment of the TUC's approach 
to economic policy and its significance for an understanding of the 
Social Contract as a trade union political strategy. 
The TUC and Economic Policy: The Ambiguities of the Social Contract 
The distance between the TUC's Phase One and Two willingness to 
defend, at least in the short-term, a government economic policy 
involving a decline in real wages, increased unemployment and cuts in 
public expenditure and its pre-crisis commitment to a very different, 
if not antithetical set of economic policy prescriptions was most 
remarkable. Why did the TUC not attempt to push its alternative view 
of necessary economic policy during this period? The simple answer 
was that it did, but unsuccessfully. In the July 1975 negotiations 
with the Government, as was indicated above, TUC representatives did 
seek certain concessions on price control and measures to combat 
unemployment. Those efforts met with little success. In the context 
of a sterling crisis and with the political survival of the Labour 
Government seemingly at risk, the TUC appears basically to have 
accepted the Government's ordering of economic priorities. However 
grudgingly, senior TUC leaders largely espoused the view that 
inflation was the priority and that the rate of wage increases had to 
be reduced if the inflationary spiral was to be broken. Indeed, Len 
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Murray told the 1975 TUC that the Chancellor could not reflate the 
economy and create the jobs that needed to be created until the rate 
of inflation had come down (TUCK, 1975: 479). This position could be. 
reconciled with the predominant trade union view, as outlined in 
Chapter 3, that inflationary wage bargaining was not the 'cause' of 
inflation since the rapid rise in British prices was: attributed to 
the dual impact of a rapid increase in world commodity prices and the 
decline in the value of the pound. The TUC, therefore, simply sought 
to lend its support to a policy that would mitigate the effects of 
this temporary adjustment in order to secure the Government's 
political future. Thus, acceptance of wage restraint did not imply 
any sudden TUC leadership conversion to the social democrat's vision 
of incomes policy as a permanent and central part of government 
economic strategy. Moreover, in. their regular discussions with the 
Government, particularly in the negotiations preceding Phase Two, TUC 
representatives repeatedly argued for action to reduce the rapidly 
rising level of unemployment. Again, in the context of severe 
pressures on the pound, the Government Argued that, apart from its 
support for training and temporary employment schemes, it was 
impossible to make any major changes in the direction of its economic 
policy until economic circumstances improved. 
For TUC leaders the solution to this sustained economic crisis 
lay in that proverbial elixir of Labour Party programmes, economic 
growth. As was argued in Chapter 5, the search for economic growth 
was at the very heart of the Social Contract. Whether it was through 
reflation from increased consumer demand, greater public expenditure, 
increased investment, changes in technology and improved working 
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practices or some combination of all of these, the solution to 
increasing levels of unemployment in the context of international 
recession was basically unproblematic. The implications of growth in 
a capitalist economy, neither its basis in the form of an accelerated 
or intensified accumulation of capital or the problems that this 
might pose for existing configurations of wage labour and capital.,, 
were the object of closer scrutiny. As suggested by Fine and Harris 
(1976: 14), cif working class ideology continues to see unemployment 
in Keynesian terms (and separate from the reorganization of capital) 
its response is easily limited to the demand for a "workers' 
solution" in the form merely of an early reflation of the economy'. 
In this sense, although they were increasingly concerned to promote 
industrial investments and restructuring, the authors and adherents 
of the TUC economic Weltanschauung remained profoundly attached to a 
Keynesian orthodoxy. As will be detailed further below, there were, 
in fact, important variations and differentiations in the approach of 
different trade union leaders to economic policy. Generally 
speaking, however, they did not accept all of the assumptions of the 
social democratic conception of the Social Contract as outlined in 
Chapters 2 and 5, particularly as regards the inflationary 
consequences of wage bargaining. Nor were they particularly vehement 
advocates of many of the precepts of the socialist conception of the 
Social Contract. Rather, as argued above, their advocacy. of the 
Social Contract increasingly appeared grounded in a profoundly 
pragmatic attachment to the political survival of the Labour 
Government and the opportunities that this represented in terms of 
the implementation of policies that were relatively sympathetic to 
the bargaining objectives of trade union organizations. 
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It is perhaps axiomatic that social democratic governments by 
some mixture of force of circumstances and force of conviction are 
prepared to manage the economy in a way that maintains the essential 
conditions for the private accumulation of capital in- an 
international economic system. It was argued in Chapter 5 that the 
April 1975 budget testified to the veracity of such an axiom. The 
negotiations for Phases One and Two and the attendant economic 
policies proved further verification. TUC leaders were certainly 
aware of the consequences of these policies. The Chancellor refused 
to countenance any substantial economic trade-offs in return for 
trade union acquiescence on the six pound policy. He further 
rejected TUC arguments for a change in economic policy prior to and 
during the Phase Two negotiations. Cripps and Morrell (1979) have 
argued that 'when the TUC acquiesced in the six pound wages policy, 
they handed over most, of their bargaining power and became powerless 
to prevent the framework of policies which made high unemployment 
inevitable'. They neglect, however, that the 'framework of policies' 
was already in 'place. Successive budgets had emphasized the 
predominance of the social democratic conception of the Social 
Contract within the Cabinet and the Government. Crucial silences and 
compromises on the part of TUC leaders had underlined the trade union 
vulnerability to changes in Government economic policy. Whether 
because of the nature of the trade union commitment, particularly its 
leaders, to the Labour Government and its electoral requirements, or 
because of tactical considerations on the strategic advantages of 
social democratic as opposed to other forms of government, or because 
of a genuine lack of conviction in the viability and or understanding 
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of TUC economic prescriptions, the TUC leadership was apparently 
ready to subjugate, at least temporarily, its economic policy 
prescriptions to those of the Government. Thus, social democratic 
and instrumental political rationalities were 'asserted over 
transformative rationalities. Oppositional strategies were confined 
to a small, but significant, minority on the left both within the 
General Council and within various unions. The weakness of the 
oppositional rationality during this period will be explored further 
in Chapter 7. 
This readiness of the TUC to accept the Government's ordering of 
economic priorities and mobilize the consent of its membership for 
Phases One and Two sharply differentiated it from the position of the 
left within the Labour Party which emphasized the transformative 
character of the Social Contract. As the direction of Government 
policy shifted during the latter stages of the Social Contract Mark 
I, relations between the left in the PLP and the Party leadership 
were increasingly strained. The Tribune Group of MPs was the source 
of some of the most vociferous opposition to the Government's 
policies. When the White Paper, The Attack on Inflation (Phase One, 
1975), was approved in. the House of Commons by a vote of 262 to 54, 
most of the opposing votes came from the left of the Party (the 
Conservative opposition abstained; FTC 23 July 1975). Similarly, the 
defeat of the Government's White Paper on public expenditure in March - 
1976 was due to the abstention of a group of Tribune MPs. This 
forced the Government to reestablish its authority through a 
confidence motion for which the Tribune MPs returned to the fold to 
maintain the Government's precarious majority. On each occasion 
where it was attacked by the left within the Party, the Government 
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could point to trade union support for its policies. Addressing the 
dissidents within his own Party, Wilson emphasized that in voting 
against the six pound policy, they would be 'flying in the face of 
TUC decisions' (FT, 23 July 1975). Similarly, after the March 1976 
vote on public expenditure, Jack Jones, Hugh Scanlon and David 
Basnett issued an exceptional joint appeal for Party, unity (Scotsman, 
16 March 1976). There were frequent bitter exchanges between key 
trade union leaders and the NEC representatives within the Liaison 
Committee, particularly between Ian Mikardo and Jack Jones (see, 
i. e., Castle, 1980: 471, on the July 1975 meeting). The distance 
between the left of the Labour Party and the leadership of the . 
TUC 
was dramatized in an electrifying public confrontation between Jones 
and Mikardo at the annual Tribune rally during the 1975 the Labour 
Party Conference. As Mikardo proceeded in a pre-circulated speech to 
criticize the TUC leadership for getting too few concessions in 
return for their compliance with the six pound policy, an incensed 
Jones lept from the audience to interrupt him in mid-stream (The 
Times, 2 October 1975; Castle, 1980: 511-512; Interview, 15 December 
1980). 
The irony of this turn of events for the left in the Labour 
Party was that the socialist conception of the Social Contract was 
itself predicated on the industrial and political strength of British 
trade unions, particularly the AUEW and TGWU as led by Jones and 
Scanlon (see Chapter 2). It was increasingly evident during this 
period, however, that as long as the Government could maintain the 
support of key union leaders, it could ignore the left within the 
Party. For example, with the support of the major unions, it secured 
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the support of the 1975 Party Conference on all the major economic 
policy items (see Minkin, 1978a: 348-349). This was also the case at 
the 1976 Party Conference except for a NUPE-sponsored resolution 
which was severely critical of the Government's public expenditure 
cuts (LPCR, 1976,: 161). Only as the support of the union leadership 
for the Government's macro-economic policy orientation waned through 
Phase Two, did the Party leadership also begin to suffer regular 
policy defeats at the Party Conference. It took much longer again 
for the left in the Party to convert the transformative possibilities 
of the former Social Contract, by then discredited in its usage, into 
a comparable approach loosely known as the 'Alternative Economic 
Strategy'. 
The conversion of key 'left-wing' trade union leaders, notably 
Jones and Scanlon, and their ability to translate their conversion 
into union policy support were certainly crucial to the TUC's 
endorsement of Phases One and Two. The position taken by Jones and 
Scanlon was especially significant because they were the two union 
leaders most associated with the move to devolve bargaining power 
away from centralized national negotiations to the local level (see" 
Chapter u). As one critic on the executive of the engineering union 
and on the TUC General Council suggested, the policy never would have 
been acceptable if it had not been for Jones and Scanlon who carried 
with them 'the mantle of leftism'. If they had been 'right-wingers', 
he continued, the policy never would have been acceptable (Interview, 
15 October 1980). Their conversion once again highlighted the 
ambiguities of the Social Contract as a trade union strategy for 
initiating political and economic change. There was certainly no 
conformity of views on whether the Social Contract was designed to 
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secure the election of a sympathetic social democratic government or 
whether it was, ultimately, intended to effect a transition to 
socialism. Was the Social Contract meant to be an extension, perhaps 
an intensification, of traditional bargaining and exchange relations 
between trade unions and the government, or was it to signify a 
dramatic shift in the mode of trade union input into government 
policy-making? And in dealing with Britain's recurrent economic 
crises, was the Social Contract to remedy problems of accumulation 
primarily in terms of distribution relations, or was it to seek a 
fundamental transformation in production relations? 
These, of course, were the questions that differentiated the 
social democratic and socialist conceptions of the Social Contract. 
However, there had been minimal discussion of the Social Contract as 
a longer-term trade union strategy in trade union circles. There 
were, therefore, few strategic goals to inform any medium-term 
strategy or even short-term tactics. Thus, there was little 
possibility of assessing the significance of consent to either Phase 
One or Two in terms of the longer-term goals of the Social Contract 
arrangement other than as a pragmatic means of assuring the survival 
of the Government. Similarly, Minkin (1979: 230) has observed that 
key left-wing leaders at this time seemed to have ono coherent 
strategy for relating their industrial militancy and their support 
for free collective bargaining to a transition to socialism in a 
period of deep economic crisis'. Thus, 'the pragmatism with which 
they viewed the relationship between political means and industrial 
ends was extended to wage restraint - the very issue that had most 
stimulated the militancy of their emergence'. Certainly, it 
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suggested no systematic theoretical or analytical approach to either 
the nature of the state or the possibilities and limits of a sooial 
democratic political strategy. 
The TUC did not embrace the 1975-1977 voluntary pay policies 
with any great enthusiasm. TUC leaders, after all, had spent much of 
their previous three years of discussions with PLP representatives 
attempting to avoid a commitment to precisely such policies. They 
were acutely aware of the limits of their authority in this area. 
Moreover, like many in the Labour Party, they did not share the 
Treasury's view that deflation, public expenditure cuts and a wages 
policy were the solution to the country's economic problems. Indeed, 
the TUC had made considerable efforts to elaborate an alternative 
view of the economy. Its March 1975 Economic Review (TUCER, 1975) 
was seen to be a major step forward in articulating an alternative 
trade union strategy for dealing with Britain's economic problems. 
Its 1976 Economic Review (TUCER, 1976) further developed this 
analysis. Indeed, they laid the basis for the TUC's later, espousal 
of what came to be known as an 'alternative economic strategy'. 
However, the Chancellor quite explicity rejected the TUC's proposed 
economic package in his April 1975 budget. By early July, in 
response to the sterling crisis, the Chancellor maintained that with 
or without TUC consent there would be a much tighter incomes policy. 
This was also the case in the spring of 1976 and in the summer 'of 
1977 (see Chapter 8). TUC leaders were, thus, faced with a choice. 
They could reject the Government's approach, continue to put the 
arguments for an alternative, and risk the political consequences 
including the possible destruction of the Social Contract and the 
defeat of the Government. Alternatively, they might recommend that 
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the TUC acquiesce before or, indeed, cooperate with the Government's 
change in policy and possibly attempt to sway the Chancellor in the 
direction of its economic priorities at a future date. That the TUC 
was not prepared to reject the Government's approach and incur' the 
political consequences made the weakness of its negotiating position 
readily apparent. The absence of any detailed political strategy for 
dealing with the Chancellor's rejection of their economic proposals, 
even if some individual unions might have advanced their own 
particular strategies, further accentuated the vulnerability of the 
TUC before the Government's apparent determination to pursue its 
economic policies. This vulnerability was apparent in both the Phase 
One and Phase Two negotiations. 
There was, moreover, a gap between the TUC's official economic 
policy prescriptions and the preparedness and ability of its most 
senior representatives to argue the case. In the negotiation of 
potential quid prro guos, the strength of the TUC case was certainly 
undermined by the readily apparent differences of approach among. its 
senior negotiators. As was suggested in the discussion in Chapter 3, 
the commitment of various union leaders to an alternative economic 
policy was sharply differentiated. Differences in approach to 
inflation, planning and the improvement of national economic 
performance were based in the sometimes contradictory positions and 
policies of individual trade union constituencies as well as the 
personal variations between individual union leaders. The readiness 
of particular TUC representatives to embrace a common TUC approach 
was a product of that complex blend of trade union bargaining 
policies and internal and external political practice as explored in 
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Chapters 4 and 5. While it was possible to maintain a broad veneer 
of unity, attempts to prioritize items for negotiations in terms 
other than 'more' naturally revealed the not so latent differences of 
opinion as regards detailed economic policy. This was particularly 
the case in pay policy negotiations where the prioritization of items 
to be involved in a potential "trade-off' was 'an extremely delicate 
matter. Senior TUC officials attempted to forge the basis of a 
consensus. This often involved educating key figures, senior union 
leaders, who had neither the time nor the resources to stay broadly 
conversant with the implications of one policy choice as opposed to 
another. One Economic Committee member confessed that, in general, 
trade union leaders were 'not great economic wizards'. The only 
economists, he said, were the senior TUC staff (Interview, 8 August 
1980). 
Among both NEDC and Economic Committee representatives within 
the TUC, there were divisions over such important policy items as 
the desirability of a price freeze, the merits of import controls, 
and the role of public expenditure in relation to the rest of the 
economy, not to mention incomes policy, state intervention in 
collective bargaining, and a preparedness to link wage bargaining 
with national economic performance. In the July 1975 negotiations, 
for instance, Lord Allen of USDAW opposed price controls because they 
might be detrimental to his members in the retail sector, while Jones 
and others argued the absolute necessity of a strict control of price 
increases. Similarly, public sector union leaders strenuously argued 
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the case for public expenditure. On the other hand, some private 
sector union leaders, particularly Scanlon, were prepared to 
countenance reductions in public expenditure if-these could be 
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diverted into private sector investment. In fact, as is indicated in 
Table B. 2 (Appendix B), levels of company investment were especially 
low during this period -a veritable 'investment strike' argued some. 
The Chancellor did maintain that money diverted from public 
expenditure would create greater scope for private sector activity. 
According to one leading participant, the battle within the TUC 
Economic Committee over the value of public expenditure continued 
thereafter with the proponents of public expenditure gaining complete 
ascendancy only several years later (Interview, 29 July 1980). In 
the interim, however, the Chancellor was able to exploit the apparent 
divisions among TUC representatives. This was also the case with the 
particular form of the Phase One and Two guidelines where the 
differences between the general unions and the craft and white-collar 
unions concerned with the protection of differentials were especially 
prevalent. A lack of agreement over or understanding of the 
industrial strategy also seemed to contribute to its relative 
dilution. As Forester (1978) observed, 'either because they were 
intimidated by the crisis atmosphere, felt that somehow it was an 
internal party or government row, had other pressing priorities, or 
genuinely regarded the policy as a less immediate, "longer term 
structural" matter, (the TUC leadership] did not make its abandonment 
a central issue in their negotiations with the Government'. 
These differences over economic policy only contributed further 
to a distinct lack of 'political punch' on the part of the TUC 
negotiators. As was argued above, this was in part due to the'lack 
of a longer-term political strategy as regards the Social Contract. 
It was compounded by the personal positions of the most senior 
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representatives. During the Phase one negotiations, Hugh Scanlon, 
whose union was specifically and categorically opposed to the 
implementation of a pay policy, could scarcely play a prominent role 
in the negotiation of trade-offs for such a policy. By the time of 
the Phase Two negotiations, he was increasingly isolated from his 
supporters in the left faction of the AUEW and almost totally reliant 
on the moderate faction for support of the policy. The other key 
figure, Jack Jones, appeared intent on getting an agreement on both 
Phases One and Two at almost any price. For Jones, and he was. quite 
explicit on this, the only matter of principle seemed to be support 
for the Labour Government. As he later acknowledged, we were not 
prepared to do anything which might threaten the Labour Government. 
We were almost more concerned to keep the Labour Government in power 
than was the Labour Government itself' (Jones, 1981: 121). As was 
argued in Chapter 5, the leader of the GMWU, David Basnett, was torn 
between the new direction in which he had personally pushed his 
union's economic policy prescriptions, which were in sharp 
contradiction with the Government's approach, and the language and 
practice of loyalism to the Labour Party. 
"r 
In the early stages of the Social Contract, the dominant trade 
union voices in the Liaison Committee were the leaders of the fight 
against the Industrial Relations Act, Jones and Scanlon. Indeed, it 
was the aura of the 'terrible twins', their industrial militancy and. 
their readiness to challenge governments on issues such as In Place 
of Strife that senior Labour Party politicians feared. Jones and 
Scanlon could rely on the support of Basnett who sought to bring the 
GMWU profile into the mainstream of TUC opinion (see Chapters u and 
5)" Moreover, the left within the Labour Party specifically relied 
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on the political strength of the new union leadership epitomized by 
Jones and Scanlon to advance the socialist conception of the Social 
Contract within the policy-making bodies of the Party (see Chapters 2 
and 3). The constellation of factors which combined to advance a 
more radical conception of the Social Contract, however, shifted 
through the 1975-1976 period. The left within the Liaison Committee 
and the Cabinet became increasingly isolated from both the Cabinet 
majority and the TUC leadership. With Scanlon's margin of manoeuvre 
sharply circumscribed by his union's internal political practice and 
Jones neutralized through his total commitment to the survival of the 
Government, there was little 'political punch' left on the trade 
union aide. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has traced in some depth the process by which the 
TUC consented to two years of tight wage restraint between 1975 and 
1977. The first part charted the development and formulation of a 
dramatic change in policy - the six pound wage guideline. The second 
part looked at the industrial impact of the new policy, its 
implications for the elaboration of further policies and the renewal 
of consent for a second year of wage restraint. Finally, the third 
part focused on the basis of TUC consent for the Phase One and Two 
policies. In particular, it highlighted the relatively fluid 
character of the Social Contract as a trade union political strategy 
and how this contributed to a distinct lack of 'political punch' in 
the TUC's negotiations with the Labour Government. 
'Political punch' or the lack thereof was, of course, an 
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ephemeral phenomenon. TUC leaders could only make compromises and 
concessions to the extent that their respective memberships would 
accept them. They could acquiesce to the extent that their members 
would not mobilize against them. The willingness of senior TUC 
leaders to agree to Phases One and Two was entirely contingent on 
their ability to mobilize and secure consent for the policies. They 
did this with particular effect in Phase One, and that paved the way 
for continued agreement to Phase Two. This downwards mediation in 
favour of voluntary wage restraint is the subject of the next 
chapter. 
The limits of trade union leaders' ability to secure consent in 
many ways determined the limits of the policy itself. However, the 
disjuncture between union bargaining practice and policy and internal 
political practice was particularly significant for the determination 
of these limits. Consent for incomes policy was in most of the 
sample unions secured in the policy-making channels of the union, but 
its effects were experienced in the realm of industrial practice. As 
the enthusiasm of senior TUC leaders for the Government's economic 
orientations waned, the industrial effects of wage restraint were 
also working their way into the policy process of the sample unions. 
Thus, the internal processes of opposition were already well engaged 
and they crystallized around the industrial effects of Phase Two. 
This mobilization of opposition is the subject of Chapter 8. 
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CHAPTER 7 
THE MOBILIZATION OF CONSENT 
The previous chapter charted the development of TUC-Government 
relations over the 1975-1977 period and, in particular, analyzed TUC 
consent for and acquiescence in the development and implementation of 
the Phase One and Two wage restraint policies. This chapter focuses 
on the organization and mobilization of consent for these two 
policies within the sample unions in this study. It therefore 
concerns the relative discretion available to the trade union leaders 
to organize and mobilize consent within their organizations to 
particular TUC policies; their relative dispositions to do so; the 
limits placed on leadership discretion in this process by the 
structure and culture of, their organizations; and, finally, some of 
the differences between the sample unions in this process. 
Several clarifications should be made about the interest and 
meaning of the term 'consent' as employed in this study. First, 
trade union policy agreement or "consent' to wage restraint was 
clearly an exceptional state, whatever the particular proclivities in 
bargaining policy of the sample unions. As such, this consent had to 
be organized and mobilized. In turn, this process engendered 
reaction and counter-reaction. The process of organizing and 
mobilizing consent within the sample unions, therefore, merits closer 
427 
scrutiny. 
Secondly, the term 'consent' is highly elastic in meaning and 
often ambiguous if not invested with greater precision. Burawoy 
(1979), for instance, focuses on the manufacturing of consent in the 
work process. He envisages it as a veritable cooperation by workers 
in the extraction of surplus value and legitimation thereof - not 
through force but through formal and informal participation in the 
production of the rules which govern workers' adaptation to the 
labour process. In contrast, Przeworski (1980a & b) looks at the 
material bases of consent whereby the subordinate and particularistic 
interests of labour are coordinated with the universal interests of 
capital through the production of surplus which serves as the basis 
for future shared gains (see also Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980). 
Similarly, other political and sociological theorists have linked 
consent to notions of consensus: systems of shared values from which 
consent or legitimation emerges, particularly as regards social or 
societal systems. The differential distribution of power within such 
systems is a source of continuing debate among theorists. The 
mobilization of consent in this study refers to neither abstract nor 
societal notions of consent and consensus. That is not to deny the 
importance of an understanding of relative subordination, the 
distribution of power, and its legitimation for an appreciation of 
the internal and external dynamics of trade unionism. however, the 
mobilization of consent in this chapter simply refers to the concrete 
and specific organization of union policy agreement to the TUC 
definitions of Phases One and Two. Thus, it is counter-posed to 
disagreement with or '*opposition' to the TUC support of Phases One 
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and Two. 
Finally, "'consent', as employed in this chapter, should be 
differentiated from the term 'compliance'. 'Compliance' with the 
wage guidelines was generally either the ultimate purpose or the 
by-product of the mobilization and organization of consent. Neither 
consent nor opposition, however, were necessarily accurate predictors 
of relative compliance. Consent in, the aggregate, at the level of 
TUC policy formulation, was presumably a necessary precondition for 
the operation of the voluntary policies. Detailed compliance was a 
more complex phenomenon where the union as an intermediary or 
secondary organization (see below) played a critical but not an 
exclusive role. Employers and the state, for instance, not to 
mention the national media, played an equally important role in the 
implementation of the policies and the achievement of relative 
compliance. Those who lent their consent to the pay policies in the 
policy-making process of their individual unions generally also 
complied with them, though there were important and, sometimes, quite 
ironic exceptions. Z Those who opposed the policies in the union's 
internal political process, however, did not necessarily challenge 
them in industrial practice - even when they commanded a majority at 
key decisional levels within their own unions. The evidence on the 
correlation between policy and industrial responses to the Phase One 
and Two policies is in fact highly differentiated by union and will 
be the subject of further scrutiny below. Certainly, the relatively 
successful implementation of the policies seemed to indicate that 
those who opposed union support for the policies generally complied 
with them. However, their expression of opposition ultimately served 
as a focus around which opposition was further mobilized. Generally 
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speaking, the political activists who first opposed the policies in 
1975 still opposed Phase Two in 1976 and a possible Phase Three in 
1977. As they attracted an increasing constituency for their 
advocacy of opposition, however, the organization of "consent' became 
increasingly problematic for those trade union leaders who sought to 
cultivate such an internal union policy response. The differential 
withdrawal of policy consent in- 1977-1978 made, as will be explored 
in Chapter 8, the achievement of compliance, voluntary or otherwise, 
increasingly difficult. 
The focus in this chapter, therefore, is on formal and informal 
trade union policy-making and its implementation. It can be argued 
that this embraces important aspects of the complexity of union 
organizational behaviour because such policy agreement or opposition 
was organized in, mediated by, and expressed through individual union 
structures, in relation to particular organizational cultures and 
within given distributions of power. As such, even the mobilization 
of formal policy consent or opposition necessarily highlighted the 
complex range of relationships characteristic of particular union 
organizations. That formal policy positions then had to be 
translated into specific industrial practices further necessitates an 
exploration of the internal dynamics of voluntary incomes policies. 
In this sense, the emphasis in both this chapter and Chapter 8 is on 
the social processes whereby both consent and opposition to the 
Social Contract incomes policies were either generated or thwarted 
(on the need to look at consent as a social process, see Gouldner, 
1954: 233). Such processes highlight the hierarchical and highly 
differentiated distribution of power within union organizations - an 
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understanding of which requires a multi-dimensional view of power 
(see Lukes, 19711). 
It has previously been argued that these social processes 
constitute the internal dynamics of voluntary incomes policies - an 
appreciation of which is essential for an understanding of the 
external dynamics of such policies in terms of their negotiation by 
governments and the TUC. A central tenet of this approach is that, 
in the case of voluntary incomes policies and the sample unions, the 
social processes of consent and opposition were mediated primarily 
through union organizations and, hence, the importance of focusing on 
the dynamics of their internal political practices. That is not to 
deny the importance of other forms of mediation in the ultimate 
acceptance and implementation of a state policy of wage restraint. 
These might include other economic mediations through the labour 
market and the actions of employers, legal mediations through the 
force of law, or political and ideological mediations through 
national or local political processes and the media. Nor should the 
importance of social processes outside of formal and informal union 
organizations in the mobilization of opposition to pay policy be 
denied. This research design is not well suited to assess such 
processes. It attempts to chart them inasmuch as they affect the 
internal political processes of the sample unions. This chapter 
focuses on the mobilization of consent as mediated by the sample 
union organizations and, therefore, focuses on the different levels 
at and channels in which this process occurred. It does so because, 
as will be explored further in Chapter 8, it was the mobilization of 
opposition to the policies through the sample union organizations, no 
doubt in part the reflection of other forms of mediation, that 
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inhibited the further development of TUC cooperation in such 
voluntary incomes policies. 
The initial mobilization of both consent and opposition within 
the sample unions to Phases One and Two appears to conform to a 
predominant common pattern of downwards mediation within the 
hierarchical structures of the unions. However, union organizations 
can best be characterized by their 'two-way system of control' - both 
downwards and upwards (see Hyman, 1975: 73). Within both the 
consenting and dissenting unions, there was equally an upwards 
process of mediation whereby industrial and political pressures were 
articulated and exerted at various levels within the unions. Thus, 
as was argued in Chapter 4, the specific internal political processes 
of the sample unions as well as their particular industrial and 
political traditions were central to both the expression of consent 
or opposition to the policies and their translation into actual 
industrial practice. It is at this point that the internal dynamics 
of incomes policies impinged on the external dynamics and vice versa. 
This interaction constitutes the central thrust of this study. 
The Phase One and Two policies were initiated at the level of 
the TUC General Council or, more typically, within its subcommittees 
or, indeed, among key union leaders and TUC staff within those 
subcommittees. The policies were generally responses to specific 
Government requests. They were largely developed in the context of 
high-level negotiations between a limited number of TUC leaders and 
staff and a handful of Cabinet Ministers and their chief civil 
servants. In Chapters 5 and 6, it was indicated how TUC leaders 
sought to establish and legitimize the direction of their 
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negotiations with the Government through regular interaction with 
both the Economic Committee and the General Council. It was also 
illustrated how the TUC leadership attempted to forge a rough 
consensus at the level of the entire General Council around the 
results of their negotiations with the Government. The critical aim 
in these negotiations was to generate a sufficient degree of 
leadership consensus around the policies so that it might be 
translated into actual affiliate industrial practice. This, of 
course, was largely contingent on the readiness of General Council 
members and, indeed, other union leaders to mobilize consent for the 
policies within their particular unions and then translate that 
policy consent into actual implementation of the -guidelines. In this 
sense, "consent' to the policies had to be mobilized and organized. 
It was neither spontaneous nor automatic. 
This was the essential link in voluntary incomes policies - what 
has so frequently highlighted the ascendancy of centrifugal forces 
within the TUC and the fragile character of policies of voluntary 
wage restraint agreed at a national level. Paradoxically, it was 
precisely the enduring and problematic character of decentralized 
British. trade union practice that made even the TUC's limited central 
powers an attractive vehicle for governments and other external 
agents to attempt to influence the direction and character of trade 
union industrial practice. As was suggested in Chapter 1, there were, 
of course, other mechanisms whereby governments could attempt to 
influence patterns of industrial behaviour in general and the rate of 
wage settlements in particular. Indeed, the Labour Government was 
from at least 1975 pursuing some of these simultaneously (see 
Chapters 5 and 6). The Chancellor had been quite explicit that as 
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long as the rate of wage settlements remained high, so too would the 
level of unemployment. Yet, a policy of voluntary wage moderation 
administered by union leaders, if it could be effective, had been 
identified as the preferred political option by the Labour Party 
leadership, not least because of the apparent deficiencies of other 
options. Certainly, it appeared easier to pursue a policy of wage 
restraint with TUC support than without it. In the context of 
growing crisis and in order to secure the political survival of the 
Labour Government and their Social Contract- political strategy, TUC 
leaders had acceded to the Government's pleas to implement a policy 
of temporary wage restraint. They, therefore,. attempted to forge a 
very rough consensus around the specific details of the policies, and 
then sought to garner as much practical support for the policies as 
possible within their own affiliates. Chapter 6 illustrated this 
process in the case of both Phases One and Two. This chapter is 
concerned with how this mobilization of consent functioned within the 
sample unions. 
In order to investigate this mobilization of consent, the 
chapter is organized in the following manner. The first section 
attempts to establish the importance of the internal political 
process of a union organization for an understanding of the 
mobilization of consent. It then identifies the key decisional 
instances in the internal political processes of the sample unions in 
which consent or opposition was formally secured. Once identified, 
then the following sections will assess in greater detail some of the 
variations between the unions. The second section considers the 
general pattern of response and focuses on the mobilization of 
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consent at the level of union executives. The third section turns to 
the forum of union policy conferences,, with particular emphasis on 
the crucial 1975 Biennial Delegate Conference of the TGWU. Finally, 
the fourth section briefly considers how formal consent or opposition 
was translated into industrial practice. This highlights a crucial 
division of labour within most of the sample unions between policy- 
making, on the one hand, and industrial practice, on the other. 
This chapter focuses on the mobilization of consent to the 
detriment of a clearer understanding of the mobilization of 
opposition to the policies. It is intended that this deficiency will 
be remedied in Chapter 8 where the central focus is on the genesis 
and mobilization of opposition to further rounds of wage restraint 
within the sample unions. Consent and opposition are, of course, 
inextricably interrelated. Consent for voluntary incomes policies was 
in most cases secured formally in policy-making channels of union 
decision-making. However, the actual policies were largely 
implemented and experienced in industrial channels of union decision- 
making and consultation. Thus, consent for the policies was not only 
ä prior step to their industrial implementation, but it was secured, 
at least initially, through a different political process. The 
highly differentiated interconnections between these two main 
channels of union decision-making assumed increasing importance in 
attempts to secure renewal of consent for wage restraint policies. 
By the same token, they exercised an important influence on the 
coalescence and mobilization of opposition to union consent to wage 
restraint. In this sense, the mobilization of consent, as treated in 
this chapter, highlights the hierarchical distribution of power and 
authority within the sample unions and the degree to which it 
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facilitated downwards mediation. The mobilization of opposition, on 
the other hand, focuses on the limits of leadership policy discretion 
as determined by an upwards mediation within the sample unions. 
Chapters 7 and 8, therefore, attempt to explore the nature of the 
interconnections between union industrial practice and policy-making 
as mediated by organizational structure and also between consent and 
opposition in union organizations. The contention is that an 
understanding of these internal dynamics of incomes policies is 
essential for any understanding of their external dynamics. 
THE INTERNAL POLICY PROCESS 
Consent to voluntary incomes policy in individual unions was 
mediated through a union's particular organizational structure. This 
section explores the nature of that organizational structure and its 
implications for the internal political practice of trade unions. It 
then seeks to identify the key organizational levels at which both 
consent and opposition for voluntary pay policies had to be organized 
and mobilized. First, two basic theoretical points about the nature 
of union organizations should be noted: they are 'intermediary' or 
'secondary' in character and they are simultaneously collective and 
democratic. 
First, unions operate as intermediary or secondary organizations 
(see Muller-Jentsch, 1981; Offe and Wiesenthal, 1980). Unions 
organize employees as individuals and in groups. The primary 
relationship for these employees, as employees, is generally directly 
with the employer through the contract of employment and in a given 
technological, organizational and market structure. The union is an 
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intermediary or secondary organization in this primary relationship. ' 
Moreover, the organizational morphology of trade unions is the story 
of how they have aggregated particular patterns of mediations over 
time. Thus, Turner (1962: 14) aptly described British unions as 
'historical deposits and repositories of history'. They maintain 
varying, often competing and overlapping, levels of occupational and 
organizational aggregation - the legacies of past organizational 
strategies and trajectories, of built-in sectionalism and of varying 
resolutions of conflicts between centralization and local autonomy. 
Since unions have come to be aggregated at national level and often 
organize in a wide variety of industries in relation to a multitude 
of employers, so too have union organizations come to be multi-tiered 
and often multi-faceted. 
Secondly, unions are democratic, collective organizations. As 
collective organizations, It is held that the power of the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts; that the power of the whole arises 
from a relative capacity to coordinate the labour power of the 
individuals within the organization. This highlights the need to 
exercise a degree of solidarity and discipline in order to maintain 
an effective organization; hence, the sustaining principles of trade. 
unionism such as unity and solidarity. The effective coordination of 
the individual members of union organization might be achieved, in 
part, through the creation of collective identities and, in part, 
through the effects of coercion and compulsion - thus, a contingent 
balance between force and consent (on the mutual conditioning of 
force and consent, see Anderson, 1977). Certainly, union leaders at 
various levels seek to command the adherence and loyalty of their 
members and mobilize bias in favour of the union organization. This 
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function assumes a particular importance because, as was suggested 
above, union organizations are by their nature secondary or 
intermediary in character. They have neither an automatic nor an 
exclusive claim to the loyalty of the employee as union member. 
Individuals can certainly maintain loyalties to both employer and 
union (see, i. e., Rose, 1952: 189). Indeed, it will-be argued 
further below that individual union members, and individuals in 
general, can maintain a multiplicity of loyalties or identities even 
though they might seem to be in conflict. The constant task for the 
union leader and activist is how to privilege particular trade union 
identities over other identities in a given context. Union 
solidarity might, of course, be achieved by mechanisms other than 
*ideological' appeals. Coercion or compulsion through both 
disciplinary powers and social customs is an equally important 
dimension in the maintenance of effective union organization (see, 
i. e., Olson, 1971). As succinctly argued by Hyman (1975: 65), it is 
only through the power over its members which is vested in the trade 
-union that it is able to exert power for them'. However, unions are 
also democratic, voluntary organizations in which the members 
nominally exercise some degree of control over the direction and 
methods of collective solidarity. This entails, in varying degrees, 
limits on the possibilities of coercive solidarity and places. a 
premium on the definition and articulation of collective identities. 
The pursuit of unity and solidarity in a union organization 
cannot permanently be pursued as an end in itself. It must be 
organized around specific policies, goals and bargains which do not 
emerge spontaneously. They must be defined and redefined, organized 
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and aggregated in some way if the union is to mediate with external 
agents. Thus, in the case of voluntary incomes policies, the 
solidarity of union members must be organized and aggregated'around 
consent to such policies if the union is to mediate effectively with 
the Government on this basis. This dynamic reflects the Webb's 
(1911: 58) characterization of the constitutional development of 
trade union democracy as the struggle 'to solve the problem of how to 
combine administrative. efficiency with popular control'. Similarly, 
Child et al. (1973) refer to the conflict between 'administrative' 
and 'representative' rationalities in union organizations and how the 
two rationalities lead in quite different directions as regards the 
distribution of power and authority in union hierarchies. This, in 
essence, is a potential contradiction in any democratic, collective 
organization. 
The Webb's argued that this contradiction was gradually 
resolved through the creation of representative institutions (1911: 
38). However, the role of participation and popular control in these 
representative institutions of trade union government has often 
appeared more problematic. Michels (1915) identified what he termed 
an 'iron law of oligarchy' operating in trade union voluntary 
organizations whereby full-time officials appeared to secure a 
monopoly of power in the ostensibly democratic, representative 
institutions of the organization. While acknowledging the apparent 
concentration of power at the leadership level of most trade union 
organizations, other authors have argued that Michels overstated the 
case. They point to the existence of a variety of "compulsive', 
democratic counter-tendencies to any inexorable oligarchic propensity 
within trade union organizations (see, i. e., Coleman, 1956; Clegg, 
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1976; Hemingway, ' 1978; and Hyman, . 
1971 and 1975). These counter- 
tendencies appear to centre on the possibilities of upwards and 
lateral mediations within the trade union organization 
decentralization, factionalism, formal and informal workplace 
autonomy, normative pressures towards democratic practice, the 
differentiation of levels within the organization and the existence 
of almost continuous intra-organizational bargaining over internal 
conflicts. Certainly, they highlight the existence of a complex 
internal political process in which union leaders must constantly 
seek to define, direct and aggregate the interests of their members 
in order to represent them. This process involves both upwards and 
downwards mediations and because of the historical development of 
union organizations, tends to be highly differentiated by level and' 
by union. Thus, in seeking to identify the concrete organization of 
consent for incomes policies within the sample unions, it is 
necessary to locate the key levels in the internal political process 
of the union. That unions are intermediary organizations and they 
are collective, democratic organizations both highlighted the need 
for a sensitivity to the processes of control, both upwards and 
downwards, in the complex internal organization of trade unions. 
This section, therefore, addresses these different levels of possible 
consent in the policy process. The following sections of this 
chapter will then-explore them in greater detail in the case of the 
sample unions. 
During the Phase One and Two policy periods, all of the sample 
union leaders were members of the TUC General Council and, therefore, 
party to its agreements with the Government on wage guidelines. As 
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was indicated in Chapter 6, not all of them initially supported the 
policies at General Council level, though all but Clive Jenkins of 
ASTMS eventually rallied behind the majority and acquiesced in, if 
not actively secured consent for, the policies (see Table 1.4). 
Indeed, even the ASTMS General Secretary appeared to moderate the 
vehemence of his opposition in the face of such an overwhelming TUC 
policy consensus on Phase Two. Thus, the focus for a'first level of 
consent must certainly be the individual union general secretary. 
Although some of the variations between general secretaries 
inevitably arise from purely personal predilection, as was argued in 
Chapter 5, the scope for the exercise of personal discretion was 
itself the result of a union's internal political process. TUC 
General Council members during this period were elected by the 
Congress as a whole and nominally accountable to that body. In fact, 
they were more directly accountable to their own union, though this 
potential ambiguity in the accountability of General Council members 
occasionally served to enhance their discretion. However, in terms of 
the formulation and articulation of TUC policies, the relationship 
between TUC General Council member and his or her own union was 
ultimately the primary direct link between central trade union body 
and its affiliates. Although there were various other points of 
contact between individual unions and the TUC, particularly through 
union delegations to the annual Congress, the most regular and 
effective point of contact was undoubtedly through the individual 
general secretary or other General Council members. In this sense, 
the general secretary or functional equivalent assumed a key 
intermediary role between the internal and external dynamics of a 
union - what might be compared to Gavanta's (1980: 259) 
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characterization of the multiple roles of local elites as 'brokers of 
political resources ..., as mediators of values and policies, and 
as "gatekeepers" of information between the "outside" and "inside" 
worlds'. 2 However, the nature of representative democracy within 
individual union organizations is subject to complex internal 
processes between different hierarchical levels, between different 
sectional and professional interests, and between different 
functional channels, primarily the functional division of labour 
between union policy-making and industrial practice. This complexity 
characterizes the interaction between union general secretary and 
various levels of decision-making in the internal political process 
of trade unions. 
Thus, to study the formal mobilization of consent for a 
particular policy within a TUC affiliate is to grapple with the 
complex interactions between these different structural, 
hierarchical, sectional and functional divisions. The mobilization 
of consent for the Phase One and Two policies provides considerable 
scope for the investigation of these interactions. Moreover, it 
would appear from the case of the only sample union that remained 
opposed to both of these policies, ASTMS, that the mobilization of 
opposition focused on the same relationships and interactions and 
followed similar processes of downwards mediation. Ironically, 
consent for the policies in that union, limited as it was, followed a 
similar pattern to the initial expression of opposition in the other 
unions where the mobilization of consent was the predominant internal 
process. The degree of both opposition and consent varied 
considerably between the sample unions. Both this chapter and 
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Chapter 8 identify some of these variations and advance possible 
explanations for them. 
A brief survey of the sample unions during this period reveals a 
number of key decisional levels. First and foremost, the union 
executive committee appeared to provide the primary direct link 
between individual union policy-making and TUC General Council policy 
formulation in all of the unions. When a general secretary sought 
the consent of his union to Phases One and Two, it was, first, to the 
executive that he turned. The union executive might act as an 
interpretor of existing union policy. It might simply endorse post 
facto leadership actions. It might also serve as a vehicle through 
which the general secretary could launch policy initiatives or make 
recommendations to policy conferences, thereby generally securing the 
effective agreement of the union conference. 
A second important level was the union policy conference. 
According to the rule books of all of the sample unions, union 
executive committees did not exercise a formal policy-making role. 
Rather, they administered, implemented and interpreted existing- 
'policies determined by union conferences. Thus, such conferences 
were a critical forum for the mobilization of consent. f 
Thirdly, there were a number of lower-level decisional bodies in 
many of the sample unions varying by industry and region: national 
trade group committees; industrial conferences; and regional, 
divisional or district committees and conferences. However, such 
industrial and regional bodies generally played a clearly subordinate 
policy-making role to that of a union conference or executive. 
Indeed, they were often represented either directly or indirectly on 
union executives or at union conferences. The nature of such 
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representation and the kind of links between these and subordinate 
policy and administrative bodies and union conferences and executives 
varied considerably between unions. These variations are significant 
in the relative mobilization of consent and opposition, particularly 
because, although generally subordinate in policy terms, they 
frequently enjoyed considerable autonomy in industrial and 
administrative matters. Consent to an incomes policy necessarily 
impinged on these normal functional divisions in the internal 
political processes of the sample unions because policy-level consent 
for wage guidelines limited the customary autonomy of lower-level 
decision-making bodies. As will be argued further in Chapter 8, this 
was particularly significant for the mobilization of opposition. 
Indeed, the mobilization of opposition was largely organized and 
aggregated around those lower-level bodies and then articulated at 
policy conferences and within executives. Thus, the articulations 
between executives and policy conferences, on the one hand, and 
lower-level geographical or industrial bodies, on the other, will 
assume a particular importance for the mobilization of opposition. 
Fourthly, albeit relatively infrequently, some trade union 
leaderships sought the consent of their members to Phases One and Two 
through a membership ballot. As has tended to be the case in the 
more frequent use of ballots for strike votes or the ratification of 
proposed collective agreements, methods of voting varied widely (on 
the wide variety of balloting in trade unions, see Undy and Martin, 
1984). Among the sample unions, only NUPE conducted a ballot of the 
membership on incomes policy. According to senior officials of the 
union, this was a somewhat chaotic, but successful, first attempt to 
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use the union's then new structures of consultation in a year when 
there was no union conference to determine policy. However, as will 
be explored further below and in common with some of the other unions- 
which sought to mobilize consent through a membership ballot, the 
real battle took place within the executive over whether or not to 
recommend membership acceptance for the policy. The compromise on 
this issue was to recommend acceptance of the Phase Two guidelines, 
but on the clear understanding that this did not entail any 
endorsement of the rest of the Government's economic strategy (see 
Chapter , 
6). 
. 
Once acceptance was recommended, it-was largely assumed. 
that the result of the branch ballot would be affirmative and this 
was, in fact, the case (Interviews, 15 August, 14 October and 14 
November 1980). Outside of the sample unions in this study, the NUM 
conducted individual pithead ballots on both Phases One and Two. 
Finally, formal policy consent was hardly synonymous with its 
actual implementation. As was suggested above, the interconnections 
between policy-making and industrial practice were highly 
differentiated by union. However, the particular configuration of 
interactions provides a further focus for the analysis of the 
mobilization of consent. Thus, the following three sections will 
highlight, in turn, the mobilization of consent for the Phase One and 
Two policies in the sample union executives, policy conferences and 
industrial practice. 
SECURING THE CONSENT OF UNION EXECUTIVES 
For most TUC General Council members, individual union 
executives were generally the primary point of contact between the 
formulation of TUC policies, on the one hand, and affiliate policy- 
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making and industrial practice, on the other. Moreover, they tended 
to be an accurate barometer of the prevailing character of relations 
between the trade union leader as assisted by other permanent head 
office staff and lay activists. The character of these relations was 
certainly critical in the initiation, formulation and implementation 
of union policy and, thus, also influenced the direction of TUC 
policy-making. The limits of consensus-building within the TUC 
General Council were in some senses determined by the general 
secretary - individual union executive relationship. By the same-, 
token, any attempt to translate even a modest degree of policy 
consensus at General Council level generally had, first, to be 
translated into executive council support. 
Thus, the individual union executive was a key intermediary in 
the organization and mobilization of consent for the Social Contract 
incomes policies: as an object in the organization of consent; as a 
vehicle for the articulation of particular individual union policy 
approaches, both internally and externally, on questions such as 
support for incomes policies; as an agency for the legitimate 
interpretation and administration of union policy; and, thereby, as 
a factor in the determination of relative degrees of leadership 
discretion. These diverse roles require further brief elaboration. 
First, 'most general secretaries regularly reviewed their 
activities in a report to their union executive meetings. This was an 
important aspect of leadership accountability in most unions. 
Without exception among the sample unions, a key part of this report 
concerned general economic and industrial developments. The 
deliberations of the TUC General Council or its subcommittees 
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frequently figured prominently in these reports. General secretaries 
certainly did not seek the endorsement of their union executives on 
all matters which came before TUC General Council. However, on 
issues such as pay policy, sere a TUC policy commitment was likely 
to have a direct impact on the industrial and political practice of 
the affiliate, they generally did. 
, 
Secondly, union executives tended to play a key role in the 
initiation of individual union policy approaches - often as the 
primary vehicle for the articulation of policies developed by 
permanent officials in research departments -or the general- 
secretary's office. The degree to which union executives were 
relatively passive arbiters, indeed sometimes simple recipients, of 
policy as opposed to active initiators of policy varied considerably 
and highlighted the particular policy discretion available to full- 
time, head office officials. However, this executive policy role 
assumed a particular importance because most union executives made 
recommendations to union policy conferences either in the form of 
, special motions, or recommendations 
to support or oppose particular 
motions on the conference agenda. As will be argued further below, 
such recommendations appeared-to carry substantial weight in the 
deliberations of union policy conferences because they were generally 
'endorsed. Special executive motions invested with the weight of 
leadership authority and often benefiting from greater procedural 
flexibility in terms of timing and formulation were rarely defeated. 
Thus, executive policy messages were a crucial channel in effecting 
a downward mediation of policy. In terms of articulating union 
policy, union executives, in concert with the general secretary, also 
formulated motions and amendments to be considered by TUC 
,- 
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conferences. This often involved the identification of particular 
external alliances with other unions for the achievement of key 
policy objectives. 
Thirdly, executive councils were also often in a position to 
effect the translation of policy consent to wage restraint into 
actual industrial practice: both through the publication of internal 
guidelines for officials and activists and through the endorsement of . 
industrial disputes and the payment of dispute benefit. Executives 
also tended to be the focus for motions submitted by lower level 
decisional bodies-within a union. - Outside of the regular conference 
policy-making process, regional and industrial groupings expressed 
their policy challenges and endorsements to the union executive which 
then determined the appropriate response in line with existing union 
policy. In this, way, the individual union executive often acted as a 
barometer of the impact of particular policies and, in the case of 
pay policy, the probability of continued policy support. 
Thus, the organization of consent at the level of the union 
-executive assumed a crucial importance for the mobilization of 
consent for the Phase One and Two pay policies affecting, in 
particular, the relative degree of leadership discretion on this 
issue. This section, examines this organization of consent at the 
level of the sample union executives. It considers the process of 
downward mediation of policy within the sample unions in the case of 
Phases One and Two and how it was affected by variations in the 
general secretary/executive relationship. 
Each of the sample unions had at least one TUC General Council 
representative during the Phase One and Two periods. ASTMS, NUPE 
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and the FBU were each represented by their general secretary. The 
TGWU had four representatives: its general and deputy general 
secretaries, the lay president and the full-time national women's 
officer. The GMWU was represented by its general secretary and two 
full-time officers who were both regional secretaries and executive 
members. Finally, the AUEW was represented by its president, the 
equivalent of the general secretary in most other unions (see note 2 
above), and two full-time, executive officers. Multiple 
representatives from the same union generally voted in the same way 
in_ General Council decisions; though the AUEW representatives, 
reflecting both their status as elected, full-time officers and the 
vagaries of the factional system of internal political organization, 
sometimes voted in different directions. Thus, to a greater or 
lesser extent, all of the sample unions were party to the process of 
policy formulation and consensus-building within the TUC leadership; 
though the relative integration of sample union leaders into the 
inner circles of TUC policy-making varied considerably. 
The sample union representatives were also, of course,, obliged 
to take a position in General Council deliberations. This was 
significant because they often did so before any detailed 
consultation with their executives. Rather, their position in key 
General Council policy votes were generally explained after the fact 
and, then, virtually always endorsed by their individual executives. 
The official union policy position was, then, articulated both 
internally through general secretary or executive circulars and the 
union journal and externally at TUC and, where appropriate, Labour- 
Party conferences and to the press. Occasionally, particularly in the 
case of incomes policies, internal policy or industrial practice were 
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altered in the light of external policy decisions - often on the 
basis of either inter-union or Party solidarity or of fear of' 
exclusion from or censure within the 'fraternity' or 'club'. The 
latter kinds of sanctions might be personal, reserved for the union 
leader who did not seek to translate ostensible TUC policy consensus 
into internal union consent. However, they also reflected 
substantive policy concerns on the part of many union leaders and 
activists who preferred to steer a course within the main stream of 
TUC opinion. It was clear, for instance, that in the case of the 
GMWU this was a very important preoccupation among both activists and 
officials who sought to alter the image of the union through the 
1970s (see also Chapter 1)" 
Thus, consent to TUC policy initiatives was far from spontaneous, 
even if most affiliates utfimately endorsed a particular policy. 
Rather, consent had to be organized and constantly reorganized and 
renewed. Some unions which were originally opposed to the Phase One 
policy, for instance, such as the FBU and NUPE, simply acquiesced in 
, 
the light of TUC and Government policy and opted to pursue the 
maximum six pound increase in their various negotiations. Others, 
auch as the AUEW, actually changed internal policy through a recall 
of policy conference in order to align internal policy with Congress 
decisions (see AUEW RNCR, 1975). This sequence or pattern of 
response was common in the organization of consent for Phases Orte and 
Two, in particular, and, more generally, in the interface between TUC 
and individual affiliate policy-making. Thus, in all of the sample 
unions, the executives were consulted after the initial General 
Council vote on both Phases One and Two, but before the union cast 
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its vote for the policies at the 1975 TUC and the June 1976 Special 
Congress. The organization of consent and opposition at the level of 
the sample union executives in these two key instances of union 
policy orientation merit further scrutiny. 
Phase One 
As was indicated in Table 1.4, the AUEW, ASTMS, NUPE and FBU 
representatives on the General Council opposed the six pound policy 
in the July 1975 General Council vote and maintained that opposition 
with the support of their executives and delegations at the September 
1975 TUC. This period coincided with particular developments in 
each of these unions which limited either the discretion or relative 
inclination of their leaders to participate, at least initially, in 
the somewhat tentative General Council policy consensus. 
The FBU, for instance, in possible breach of the TUC's twelve- 
month rule, had launched at its May 1975 conference a three-month 
work-to-rule campaign to secure an interim cost-of-living increase, a 
reduction in working hours from forty-eight to forty and a special 
payment for fire prevention duties (FBU AC, 1975; FBUJ, May 1975; IDS 
Report 209, May 1975). National negotiations broke down in early 
July just as the TUC and the Government were finalizing the details 
of the six pound policy. This led to a recalled annual conference 
to consider the direction of FBU bargaining strategy (FTC 5 July 
1975).. There was growing pressure in some of the metropolitan 
brigades to escalate the work-to-rule into selective strike action, 
particularly in Strathclyde which had already pursued unofficial 
strike action in 1973 (Interviews, 10 July, 23 September, 2 and 3 
October 1980; on the 1973 industrial action in Glasgow, see Chapter 
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4). A majority on the executive, however, were reluctant to 
contemplate strike action in an emergency service such as the fire 
service. Noting his opposition to the Phase One policy which he had 
opposed in the General Council vote only' two days earlier, the 
General Secretary, Terry Parry, recommended on behalf of the 
executive that in light of the changed circumstances the union 
negotiators should concentrate on the introduction of a productivity 
payment and further discussions on the forty-hour week (FBUJ, 
June/July 1975). The executive recommendation was endorsed by 16,889 
to 10,258 votes. This led the executive in August to settle for a 
six-pound increase effective from the next anniversary date in 
November and a Home Office enquiry into the feasibility of a forty- 
hour week (FBU GSC, 14 August 1975; FT, 14 August 1975; IDS Re ort 
215, August 1975). In the interim, however, it also prompted 
considerable internal ructions when members of the Strathclyde 
brigade committee were temporarily expelled from the union for their 
attempt to organize local industrial action in defiance of the 
executive and conference decisions (FBU GSC, 17 and 22 July, 27 and 
29 August 1975; Interviews, 29 August and 23 September 1980). The 
executive decision to settle, reportedly very much at the behest of 
the General Secretary who was particularly reluctant to initiate 
strike action, was significant' because it was the first major claim 
involving industrial action to be settled within the Phase. One 
guidelines (Interviews, 10 July and 22 September 1980). 
Regional challenges to national union bargaining policy, 
particularly over strike action, continued to be a significant 
dimension of FBU compliance with the Phase One and Two pay policies. 
As was noted in Chapter u, the predominant thrust in FBU bargaining 
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policy over the previous years had been the attempt to upgrade the 
national rates and reduce the working hours of the firefighter. In 
order to focus bargaining energies on the improvement of national 
rates, union policy was from 1974 committed to the banning of all 
overtime (FBUJ, November 1974). This certainly increased internal 
union pressures as overtime was the only significant addition to 
basic pay in the composition of firefighters' earnings (see Fallick 
and Elliot, 1981: 151). The 1975 work-to-rule campaign was intended 
to increase further the external pressures for improvement. However, 
the real progress towards the introduction of some form of 
productivity scheme for fire prevention and other duties was thwarted 
by the introduction of the Phase One and, subsequently, Phase Two 
policies. Dissatisfaction with the impact of these policies was 
inevitable. Firefighters, whose earnings were largely derived from 
basic rates of pay, felt an increasing sense of grievance about 
levels of relative earnings because those with other components in 
their earnings were better able to escape the full restrictive effect 
of the policies (on the impact of the policies on the average weekly 
earnings of firefighters, see Figure D. 3, Appendix D). As this 
dissatisfaction grew, a majority in favour of national strike action 
in the fire service was gradually constructed culminating in the 
Phase Three fire service dispute (see Chapter 8). 
In the summer of 1975, NUPE was in the process of inaugurating 
its new executive structure and system of subcommittees, part of the 
larger reorganization of the union (see Chapter 4). The first meeting 
of the new executive took place only a few days after Alan Fisher, 
the NUPE General Secretary, opposed the six pound , policy 
in the 9 
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July General Council vote (see Chapter 6). It endorsed the General 
Secretary's position (NUPE ECM, 12 and 13 July 1975). NUPE 
opposition to the proposed Phase One policy was three-fold. First, 
the NUPE conference in May had endorsed a bargaining target of a 
forty pound minimum which was equivalent to two-thirds of average 
weekly earnings (NUPE AC, 1975; Interview, 14 October 1980). This 
'two-thirds' target was first achieved the previous year as part of 
the Social Contract Mark One guidelines and was, moreover, part of 
the larger NUPE bargaining policy to focus on the achievement of . 
national minimum wage targets for its membership, statutory or 
otherwise. The six pound Phase One figure, however, fell four pounds 
short of the union's -declared target. Secondly, as was suggested in 
Chapter 1, despite their continuing search for methods to achieve 
'fair comparisons' in the determination of public sector wages, NUPE 
activists had generally been disappointed with the results of 
previous incomes policies. Finally, the NUPE leadership was 
increasingly critical of Government economic policies. 
The first meeting of the new Economic Committee adopted a paper 
prepared by the union's research staff, entitled Inflation Attack or 
Retreat, which argued the case for an alternative approach to the 
economy (NUPE EcCteeM, 2 August 1975). This paper was subsequently 
produced as an executive statement (NUPE, 1975a). The very existence 
of a separate executive subcommittee dealing with the economy 
highlighted the organizational priority attached to economic 
analysis and the relative importance of the research function within 
the union - what one senior official described as the 'organizational 
expression. of a different kind of philosophical attitude to 
negotiations' (Interview, 14 November 1980). . Certainly, it 
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reflected the union's campaigning tradition as well as its previous 
Attempts to locate its own bargaining strategy as a union covering 
the relatively low-paid in the public sector in the larger context of 
economic planning (see Chapter u). Indeed, the union's revamped 
structure was a conscious attempt to generate more membership 
involvement in the negotiating process and mobilize members beyond 
wage questions (Interviews, 14 October and 14 November 197D). The 
particular location of the economic committee was, moreover, the 
result of the special relationship between the General Secretary and 
the head of the union's research department, Bernard Dix, who was a 
prominent figure on the left of the Labour Party and a keen advocate 
of the socialist conception of the Social Contract. 
At the 1975 TUC Alan Fisher seconded the composite motion in 
opposition to the six-pound policy (TUCK, 1975). However, he had 
also indicated prior to the Congress that NUPE would abide by the 
majority decision though he would insist that NUPE members receive 
the full six pound increase (Guardian, 30 August 1975). This was the 
position subsequently adopted, first, by the union's Economic 
Committee and, then, the full Executive (NUPE EaCteeM, 6 September 
1975; NUPE ECM, 20 September 1975). As one official later explained 
NUPE compliance with the policy, the executive recognized that we 
were not going to break the six pound barrier and, therefore, we were 
not going to dissipate our energies fighting it' (Interview, 14 
November 1980). The constraints on an independent position were 
particularly great for NUPE because its negotiations were all 
conducted through multi-union negotiating panels on which some of the 
strongest supporters of the Social Contract, notably the TGWU and 
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GMWU, were the other main parties. Moreover, even though six pounds 
was less than the ten pound target increase, it still represented' a 
large cash increase in the eyes of many members. This membership 
ambiguity about the six pound policy was apparent in branch motions 
submitted to the executive during the first months of Phase One: 
three were against the new policy, three were in favour of it and 
another three requested that the union not settle for less than the 
full six pound increase (NUPE ECM and EcCteeM, various 1975). 
The AUEW executive was committed by the opposition of the 
union's -joint policy conference to any extensiön of wage. restraint 
and the AUEW delegation to the 1975 TUC voted against the Phase One 
policy (AUEW AC, 1975; TUCK, 1975). However, as a result of the 
Congress decision to support Phase One and the need to determine its 
own bargaining policy in the light of that decision, the executive 
agreed to recall its sectional policy conference, the National 
Committee (DT, 6 November 1975). This was significant because on the 
basis of factional balances there was a narrow majority of 
%moderates' in favour of supporting the Labour Government's policy on 
the 1975 National Committee. Indeed, the National Committee duly 
endorsed compliance with the Phase One Policy (AUEW RNCR, 1975; see 
also below). 
The AUEW executive consisted of seven full-time members elected 
on a regular basis by different geographical divisions. Their small 
number, full-time status and frequent meetings gave them much 
greater autonomy than was the case with the other sample union 
executives. They remained, however, at least partially dependent on 
factional organization though this, dependence probably tended to 
decrease with relative length of tenure in office. The President 
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chaired the weekly executive meetings and voted in the case of a tied 
vote. The Genera]. Secretary attended the meetings with the right to. 
speak but not to vote (see AUEW(E), 1975). The AUEW executive at 
this time was, in fact, almost evenly split on the question of 
whether to support the Phase One policy. The new General Secretary, 
John Boyd, was clearly in favour but had no vote, though he certainly 
exercised, his prerogative to editorialize in favour of the Social 
Contract in the union's journal, even though the union voted against 
the policy at the 1975 TUC (see, i. e., AUEWJ, August 1975). The 
composition of the seven regional members of the executive at this 
time was as follows: two from the moderate faction who were prepared 
to support the Phase One policy; three from the left faction who, 
though sometimes in disagreement, were opposed to wage restraint; 
one independent from the northeast who was inclined to oppose Phase 
One but, as a TUC General Council member, was prepared to have the 
National Committee, which he argued was the union's supreme policy- 
making body, reconsider the issue in the light of TUC policy; and 
one vacancy because John Boyd's position on the executive had yet to 
be filled after his election as general secretary (Interviews,. 14,18 
and 20 March and 15 October 1980). This balance within the executive 
meant that the position of the president, Hugh Scanlon, was 
particularly important. 
Scanlon had demonstrated considerable ambiguity on the concept 
of the Social Contract (see Chapter 5). Internal union political 
practice placed important limits on his relative discretion on the 
question of pay policy. Moreover, his own substantive approach to 
the question did not imply any favourable disposition to a national 
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agreement on wage guidelines. However, his intimate involvement in 
negotiations with the Government as well as the changing internal 
circumstances in the AUEW possibly pushed him from a position of 
previous ambiguity to unequivocal support for the Social Contract 
wage guidelines. Events during 1975 clearly marked this 
transformation. First, the internal factional balance within the 
AUEW was shifting. The moderate faction secured a majority on the 
executive in November 1975 with the election of Gavin Laird to 
replace John Boyd and the defeat of Bob Wright by the moderate, Terry 
Duffy who later succeeded Scanlon as president-(FT, 19 November 
1975). This shift on the executive coincided with a small moderate 
majority in favour of the Phase One policy on the National Committee. 
Secondly, Scanlon appeared to be increasingly distant from the left 
faction within his own union. One executive member remarked that 
that the Social Contract period highlighted how little control the 
left faction exercised over Scanlon (Interview, 15 October 1980). By 
this time, it appeared that Scanlon only sometimes attended the left 
caucus gatherings prior to the National Committee meetings and, then, 
recalled one left activist, 'only to tell us off' (Interview, 
September 1980). Another executive councillor suggested that Scanlon 
was free to alter his approach from the time he no longer faced the 
prospect of re-election to the presidency (Interview, 12 August 
1980). The legal problems encountered by the President over his 
casting of the deciding vote on a move from postal to branch ballots 
for the election of officers at the 1975 National Committee Rules 
Revision also appeared to be significant (AUEW NCR, 1975). When the 
legal challenge to this action was successful and two moderate 
members of the National Committee who were temporarily disqualified 
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were reinstated, the attempt by the left to abandon the postal ballot 
was effectively defeated (on the legal decision, see The Tim, 11 
June 1975; on the dispute over the postal ballot between factions 
within the AUEW, see Undy, 1979). Thereafter, Scanlon appeared much 
less concerned with the successful organization of the left faction 
and more concerned with TUC policy-making (Interview, 26 February 
1980). Finally, Scanlon surely encountered increasing pressures 
within the TUC for he was the only member of the 'N®C six' to, oppose 
the policy that they had in fact negotiated with the Government. His 
early departure from the General Council meeting which voted on the 
six pound policy was but one example of his obvious discomfit. With 
the easing of the internal constraints on his policy discretion and 
his own apparent conversion to the need for a policy of temporary 
wage restraint, he was increasingly able to attempt to translate that 
support into AUEW policy. 
Thus, with Scanlon's support, the executive, opted to reconsider 
its policy on Phase One through the vehicle of the Engineering 
Section's policy conference, where there was a moderate majority, 
rather than that of the amalgamated union which had determined the 
union's opposition to a Social Contract Mark Two pay policy in June, 
where there was a left majority. Moreover, at least one of the left 
executive members also felt that, regardless of the substantive 
policy result, the National Committee was the appropriate procedural 
forum to consider bargaining policy and not the National Conference. 
The decision of the recalled 1975 National Committee to support Phase 
one and the subsequent 1976 National Committee decision to support 
Phase Two will both be considered further below. 
'.., 
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The ASTMS General Secretary, executive and conference all had a 
long tradition of opposition to incomes policy and they maintained 
this opposition in the case of Phase One. Clive Jenkins, the ASTMS 
general secretary, played a particularly active, if unsuccessful, 
role in attempting to formulate an alternative to a TUC espousal of a 
flat-rate policy to succeed the Social Contract Mark. I (see Chapter 
5). Even before the conclusion of the Phase One agreement, the ASTMS 
executive reiterated its opposition to flat-rate policies, in 
particular, and wage restraint, more generally (ASTMS ECM, 14 
June 1975). With the publication of the Phase One policy, the 
General Secretary sought executive support for his opposition to the 
guidelines. Only four of the twenty-two executive members appeared 
inclined to support the Labour Government's policy and the executive 
adopted the General Secretary's proposed two oppositional motions for 
submission to the September TUC conference (ASTMS ECM, 12 July 1975; 
TUCK, 1975; also DT and FT, 14 July 1975). The General Secretary 
also articulated the union's policy of opposition issuing special 
circulars and convening a series of meetings on how best to 
circumvent the new wage guidelines (ASTMS GSC, 2,11,16,29 and 31 
July 1975). 
The relatively modest expression of opposition to the 
predominant downwards mediation of policy initiatives was generally 
characteristic of the ASTMS executive on which there appeared to be 
little 'coordinated opposition' to the persuasive, indeed sometimes 
charismatic, General Secretary (Interviews, various dates; see also 
Undy and Martin, 1984: 88).. Certainly interview evidence in this 
study from officers and activists alike suggests that opposition'to 
leadership policy initiatives in 'the union was more likely to be 
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expressed regularly by certain divisional councils and occasionally 
in a surprise conference defeat. The link between executive member 
and divisional council varied considerably from one division to 
another. However, it often tended to be weak which meant that the 
expression of divisional opposition on policy matters was not always 
articulated at executive level, except by way of motions submitted by 
divisional councils. Moreover, the representativeness of individual 
executive members was undermined by their extremely weak electoral 
base, Executive members from the divisions were often elected on 
much less than a ten per cent turn-out in executive elections 
(Interviews, 7 June, 15 July and 5 September, 1980). Given this 
structure of representation, the formidable persuasive powers of the 
General Secretary vis-a-vis his executive generally held sway 
(Interviews, 15 and 16 July and 5 September 1980). 
On the question of consent to 'wage restraint, however, there 
tended to be little internal controversy in ASTMS. The unions 
oppositional stance, as was argued in Chapter 4, was integral to its 
bargaining policy and continued search for membership expansion. It 
was probable that the comparatively frenetic level of reaotion"of the 
ASTMS leadership to the introduction of Phase One, as indicated by 
the sheer volume of General Secretary Circulars on the subject, was 
intended to repeat the union's very successful opposition to the 
1960s pay policies (Interviews, 11 August and 3 December 1980). 
Moreover, this leadership policy of opposition certainly commanded 
conference support and was also reflected in the divisional council 
motions submitted to the executive. Indeed, some divisional activists 
sought to secure, in advance, executive guarantees of support for 
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disputes in breach of the pay policy guidelines. The General 
Secretary and executive, however, reserved the right to consider each 
dispute on its merits (see, i. e., ASTMS ECM, 15 September 1975; also 
Plaut, 1978). 
Not surprisingly, perhaps, both the TGWU and GMWU 
representatives supported Phase One in the General Council vote and 
also secured executive endorsement to maintain that approach at the 
1975 TUC. Jack Jones and David Basnett were, of course, both 
intimately involved in the development of the Phase One policy and 
hää kept-their respective executives informed-of the progress of- 
negotiations. They had also successfully secured sufficient policy 
flexibility to ensure that any Phase One policy would not be 
inconsistent with their union policy. They did this by securing 
favourable executive recommendations to their union policy 
conferences which then endorsed the executive position. Union policy 
was then interpreted in the light of conference decisions by the 
executive. The tradition and mechanics of GMWU and TGWU conference 
"support for platform recommendations will be discussed further below. 
Certainly, both Jones and Basnett also commanded overwhelming 
support at executive level which facilitated the downwards mediation 
of policy initiatives. Neither executive demonstrated much 
factional activity. The structure, composition and tradition of the 
TGWU executive meant that at least some of its members were more 
inclined to occasional expressions of political activism than was the 
case with the GMWU executive. However, TGWU general secretaries such 
as Cousins and Jones were generally associated with the left of the 
labour movement. Thus, the expression of political activism within 
the executive in no way undermined the relative authority of the TGWU 
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general secretary. Indeed, many of the most politically active 
members of the executive tended to be elected on to the executive's 
inner cabinet or monthly Finance and General Purposes Committee 
(Interviews, 2 April and 4 September 1980). There was virtually no 
expression of opposition to the support of Phase One within either 
executive despite some quiet rumblings from some TGWU executive 
members. 
The GMWU annual conference preceded any detailed negotiations 
over what was to follow the Social Contract Mark I. The primary 
concern of the General Secretary appeared to be the avoidance of any 
internal policy commitments which would work against the mobilization 
of consent within the GMWU for the eventual Phase One deal. This 
presented some difficulties, however, since it was still far from 
clear what the eventual Phase One might entail. This question of 
flexibility centred around the debate over low pay. A London branch 
motion called for a forty pound minimum wage for. a thirty-five hour 
week, a target in fact identical to that already adopted by NUPE. 
There was also a series of more general motions calling for 
improvement of low pay as embodied in the Social Contract. ý Thus, 
Basnett secured executive support for a composite general motion on 
low pay and opposition to the specific target. He argued that this 
kind of target was 'old-fashioned'and overly restrictive when the 
TUC Economic Committee was still engaged in wider negotiations over 
social and economic priorities (GMWU AC, 1975: 433). The General 
Secretary's plea for flexibility on this issue prevailed, albeit only 
by 202 to 173 votes (ibid.: 437; also MS and Guardian, 5 June 1975). 
Subsequently, Basnett obtained the approval of his executive to 
463 
support the Jack Jones proposal for flat-rate increases. Such 
backing was, of course, readily forthcoming from a general union with 
a large low-paid membership and a policy predilection for voluntary 
incomes policies. This backing came at a regular executive meeting 
which was held after the idea had been adopted by the TUC Economic 
Committee but before it had been endorsed by the General Council 
(GMWU ECM, 17 June 1975; FT, 18 June 1975; see also Chapter 6). The - 
TUC-Government agreement was then endorsed by a special GMWU 
executive meeting (GMWU ECM, 22 July 1975). There appeared to be 
very_ strong support within the executive both for the design of the 
policy which was seen to favour the low-paid -a perennial objective 
of union bargaining policy - and as a form of support for the Labour 
Government. As David Basnett suggested to the GMWU conference, "We 
have a Labour Government, ... As much as anything, our job is to 
preserve that Labour Government' (GMWU AC, 1975: 508). However, the 
union's loyalty to the Labour Party differed from the past inasmuch 
as its leader did not ascribe economic difficulties to wage demands 
as some GMWU general secretaries had tended to do in the past (see 
Clegg, 1964: 198). Rather, Phase One was presented as the only way 
we could see to give the Government the freedom to act to defend its 
social priorities, social priorities that we had all agreed upon' 
(GMWUJ, October 1975). 
Similarly, Jack Jones obtained the support of the TGWU executive 
to pursue his flat-rate proposal within the TUC Economic Committee 
(TGWU ECM, 2 June 1975). However, the ' TGWU biennial policy 
conference had yet to be held (see below). Thus, Jones sought to 
construct a policy result from the BDC in early July which was 
consistent with his detailed policy initiatives within the TUC. He 
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successfully persuaded his executive to recommend motions which he 
felt would be consistent with the future direction of TUC policy. 
These recommendations were then accepted by the TGWU conference in a 
keynote debate (TGWU BDCM, 1975; see also below). Jones then 
presented the detailed results of the TUC-Government negotiations to 
the TGWU executive's finance and general purposes committee, noting 
how the proposed Phase One policy was consistent with union policy as 
decided by its Biennial Delegate Conference. The TGWU F&GPC, thus, 
endorsed the actions of the General Secretary (TGWU F&GPCM, 10 July 
1975). This F&GPC interpretation was subsequently endorsed by the 
regular meeting of the full executive in September (TGWU ECM, 15 
September 1975). The TGWU F&GPC was, in fact, challenged by the 
London region committee which, after a prolonged internal debate and 
against the advice of the Regional Secretary, submitted a resolution 
to the executive requesting that it withdraw its support of the 
Social Contract because the Government was no longer fulfilling its 
obligations (TGWU London Region Committee, July 1975; also MS, 31 
July 1975). Although this resolution was rejected as being 
inconsistent with union policy, the London Region Committee continued 
to lead the opposition to the Social Contract pay policies. 
Phases 
Among the sample unions, ASTMS, alone, was opposed to Phase Two, 
Despite the formal support of all the other sample unions for Phase 
'F 
Two on both the TUC General Council and at the special Congress in 
June 1976, leadership policy discretion in the organization of 
consent for this policy within the sample union executives was 
subject to much stronger resistance than was the case with earlier 
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phases of the Social Contract incomes policies. Indeed, one of the 
AUEW full-time executive officers, Reg Birch, broke with'the majority 
view on his union executive and opposed the Phase Two guidelines in 
the May 1976 General Council vote. As in the case of Phase One,. all 
of the sample union executives effectively endorsed the position 
taken by their leaders in the General Council vote. ' However, such 
consent was achieved in the face of considerably greater opposition 
than was the case the previous year. This was particularly evident 
in NUPE, the FBU and the TGWU. 
The support of the NUPE General Secretary for the Phase Two 
guidelines was strongly contested within the Economic Committee of 
the NUPE executive by both key lay activists and senior research and 
policy staff. In the autumn of 1975, the central thrust of 
discussions within the union's new economic committee concerned the 
development of an appropriate response to cuts in public expenditure 
(NUPE EcCteeM, 18 October and 29 November 1975; NUPE IM, 10 November 
1975). When the Government announced major public spending cuts in 
January 1976, the NUPE executive adopted a policy statement 
prepared by its research staff, entitled Time To Change Course. This 
was extremely critical of the direction of Government economic policy 
and set out the basis of an alternative economic strategy along the 
lines of the socialist conception of the Social Contract (NUPE, 1976; 
also MS, 22 March 1976). This effectively marked the beginning of 
NUPE's public campaign against Government public expenditure outs 
(Interview, 7 August 1980). This bouts campaign' grew to involve 
numerous other public sector unions but remained outside the ambit of 
official TUC activity as the three largest TUC affiliates remained 
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opposed to its public criticism of Government economic policy. The 
campaign culminated in a large public demonstration against 
Government public expenditure cuts in November 1976 which, much to 
the discomfit of many Cabinet ministers, was supported by the 
National Executive of the Labour Party (see Labour WeekLI, 21 May 
1976; The Times, 9 July 1976; FT, 18 November 1976). Thus, NUPE took 
an increasingly active role in its criticism of both Government and 
TUC economic policy. 
When the union discussed the TUC-Government proposals for Phase 
Two, - --opponents of the guidelines within the-NUPE executive and- 
head office staff pointed to the apparent contradiction between the 
General Secretary's support for the proposed policy within the TUC 
General Council and its Economic Committee and NUPE's advocacy of an 
alternative set of economic policies. Indeed, a NUPE spokesperson had 
earlier suggested that the Government's public expenditure cuts could 
jeopardize the prospects for any Phase Two (DT, 21 February 1976). 
After prolonged discussion within the Economic Committee, they 
, arrived at a compromise 
formula. This entailed maintaining, the 
union's criticism of overall: Government economic policy while 
supporting the specific Phase Two guidelines. Because there was no 
union policy conference that year and because it provided an 
opportunity to exercise the union's new consultative machinery, it 
was decided that this executive recommendation would be put to a 
branch ballot (Interviews, 14 October and 14 November, 1980; NUPE 
GSC, 24 May 1976). The compromise formula was duly endorsed by the 
full executive though a number of individuals, other than those 
critics on the Economic Committee already silenced by the principle 
of committee solidarity, voted against supporting the Phase Two 
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policy. The executive statement was supported by roughly a three to 
one margin (80 per cent of the 46 per cent of branches which voted 
representing almost 74 per cent of the members in those branches; see 
NUPE IM, 15 June 1976). However, the initial challenge to the NUPE 
General Secretary's support for Phase Two, even if a minority 
challenge, represented a new assertiveness by the re-organized lay 
executive vis-a-vis the General Secretary. This assertiveness was 
clearly encouraged by a number of key head office officials. It also 
explains the apparent contradiction of the NUPE contribution to the 
1976 Special Congress debate which ostensibly argued in support of 
the General Council report but in enumerating a long list of 
criticims of Government economic policy distanced the union's policy 
from the TUC analysis of the economy (TUC, 1976). 
Similarly, the support of the FBU General Secretary for Phase 
Two prompted a major raucus within the FBU executive. In an almost 
unprecedented split between the FBU's two senior officers, the 
General Secretary, who was a member of the TUC General Council, 
argued in favour of the TUC guidelines while the President, who was 
not, argued against. By the slim margin of eight to seven, the 
executive agreed to recommend that its union policy conference lend 
its support to the TUC policy (FBU ECM, 10 May 1976; Interviews, 10 
and 18 July, 29 August and 22 September 1980). The executive 
recommendation was subsequently endorsed by the FBU conference and 
the FBU delegates to the June Special TUC, thus, supported the Phase 
Two guidelines (FBU AC, 1976; FBUJ, August 1976). 
Despite his crucial role in the formulation of the Social 
Contract pay policies, the TGWU general secretary, Jack Jones, also 
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experienced increasing indications of internal opposition to wage 
restraint at executive level. This was evident both in a core of 
opposition within the executive and also in the expression of motions 
from regional and industrial committees to the executive. The 
authority of the General Secretary was never in question but the 
apparent dissatisfaction with some aspects of the industrial impact 
of the policies at the workplace was increasingly aligned with the 
opposition to the policies among the more politically active members 
of the executive, particularly the small core of Communist Party 
members and activists on the left. of the Labour -Party. On the basis 
of a 1978 survey in which thirty-five of the thirty-nine TGWU lay 
executive members participated, England (1981) reported that thirty- 
one of the thirty-five were either convenors or shop stewards. This 
meant that a growing dissatisfaction with the multiple relativities 
problems at the workplace associated with the impact of the Phase One 
policy (see Chapter 6) was bound to find expression within the TGWU 
executive. 
After a long debate in an executive meeting convened especially 
for that purpose, the TGWU executive voted by twenty-five to twelve 
to endorse the position of the General Secretary (TGWU ECM, 10 May 
1976). However, the strength of feeling within the executive about a 
further continuation of any policy was reportedly strong enough that 
the General Secretary also undertook to secure a return to free 
collective bargaining at the end of the Phase Two policy (Interviews, 
4,9 and 26 September 1980). Even in a union with a tradition of 
preeminent general secretary authority, this was a clear indication 
that leadership discretion on this crucial question of bargaining 
policy was subject to certain internal limitations at executive 
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level. This, of course, was to be dramatically underscored at the 
1977 Biennial Delegate Conference (see Chapter 8). 
In contrast, the organization of consent for Phase Two at 
executive level within the GMWU was unproblematic. The General 
Secretary, in common with a number of other union leaders at this 
time, had initiated a series of economic reviews which he circulated 
to executive members along with copies of various TUC statements 
(GMWU ECM, various 1975-1976). The six pound policy appeared to be 
well received within the union as there was only a relatively modest 
expression of opposition to the policy in motions to the annual 
conference and also in the reports of the newly inaugurated national 
industrial conferences (Interviews, various). Indeed, some branch 
motions to the GMWU conference in 1976 called for a continuation of 
the flat-rate wage policy (GMWU ACA, 1976; FT, 1 April 1976). The 
executive, moreover, appeared to give David Basnett a relatively free 
hand in initiating and formulating policy recommendations. Thus, 
when it approved the terms of a special executive motion to the 1976 
GMWU Congress, it also authorized the General Secretary to amend the 
motion if necessary (GMWU ECM, 6 April 1976). Such a proviso 
reflected the fact that the TUC General Council had yet to conclude 
its negotiations with the Government over the terms of Phase Two. 
The executive subsequently endorsed the Phase Two guidelines (GMWU 
ECM, 17 May 1976). Unlike most of the other sample unions, there was 
virtually no indication of dissent to such an approach. The terms 
of Phase Two, in fact, received overwhelming support at the 
conference (GMWU AC, 1976; MS, 10 June 1976). A few speakers at the 
1976 conference were critical of some of the details of the Special 
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Executive Motion, but there was little expression of substantive 
opposition to Phase Two. Rather, most of the opposition was directed 
at the Chairman over the procedural mechanisms governing the debate. 
Indeed, this frustration over procedure tended to be a feature of the 
expression of opposition to the platform at GMWU conferences (see 
below). 
The GMWU executives support of Phase Two was consistent with 
the union's continuing advocacy of the merits of voluntary incomes 
policies and its tradition of staunch support for Labour governments. 
However, it also reflected the relative lack- of opposition to the 
General. Secretary on the executive. This was generally the case 
with the GMWU executive which featured an unusual mixture of ten 
full-time regional secretaries and twenty lay activists - two from 
each region. The lay activists tended to include fewer stewards and 
convenors and more full-time branch officials. This reduced the 
direct expression of industrial tensions within the executive (see, 
i. e., England, 1981: 23). The reorganization of the executive into a 
single tier in 1976 also appeared to make little difference to this 
relative leadership consensus. There was virtually no factional 
activity within the executive. Indeed, one leading lay activist 
confessed that he would not wish to sit on the executive because he 
would then have been 'muzzled' (Interview, 5 September 1979). The 
executive had decided, for instance, that an executive member could 
not move a motion in opposition to a platform recommendation at 
conference (GMWU ECM, 17 May 1976). Regional secretaries appeared to 
play a key role in the transmission and mobilization of policy 
consent into'the regions. They convened the annual regional council; 
led the deliberations of the regional committee; seemed to exert an 
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important influence over the lay executive members from their region 
who were generally also a member of the regional committee; and led 
the regional delegation to the annual conference at which most issues 
were voted on the basis of a regional mandate decided in a delegation 
meeting. 
However, there were signs of some ferment in the regions and in 
particular industries over the impact of pay policy. The Liverpool 
regional committee, for instance, only narrowly opted to support 
Phase 'wo (Interviews, 4,6 and 7 September 1979). The new national 
and regional industrial conferences also served as a natural forum 
for the expression of industrial grievances even though there was no 
formal mechanism to translate such grievances into the official 
policy channel of union decision-making. A new generation of full- 
time officials, led by the example of the General Secretary, also 
appeared to be more concerned with responsiveness and accountability 
to lay activists. This encouraged an increasing assertiveness on the 
part of some regional and industrial bodies and, as will be argued 
further in Chapter 8, appeared to be stimulated by the restrictive 
impact of wage restraint. During Phases One and Two, however, the 
expression of opposition to pay policy remained extremely muted at 
the level of both the union executive and the annual conference where 
opposition was generally concealed within the system of regional 
mandating. As such, in terms of both its substantive policy 
orientation and its internal political practice, the GMWU General 
Secretary enjoyed a high degree of leadership discretion to organize 
and mobilize consent for incomes policies. 
Policy support for Phase Two in the AUEW was primarily a 
472 
function of factional alliances within the policy conference, the 
National Committee. This will be explored in greater detail below. 
However, the executive was subject to the same factional alliances, 
As a result of the executive elections the previous year, the 
moderate faction, which was inclined to support the Labour 
Government's pay policies, enjoyed a majority on the executive. 
Moreover, with Scanlon's conversion to the necessity of such 
policies, there was clearly a majority in favour of the Phase Two 
policy on the AUEW executive. 
Finally, the ASTMS general secretary, Clive Jenkins, experienced 
little difficulty in organizing the consent of his executive to his 
opposition to the Phase Two guidelines. The General Council vote on 
Phase Two in which the ASTMS General Secretary was one of the few to 
oppose was held just prior to the ASTMS annual conference. Jenkins 
issued a circular advising members of his opposition and that he 
would seek immediate executive support for an emergency motion to 
conference (ASTMS GSC, 6 May 1976). Indeed, executive support was 
'forthcoming, though four members of the executive were unsuccessful 
in their attempt to make the special motion slightly more critical of 
the Phase Two policy. They wanted the motion to reject outright 
Phase Two, rather than simply be. "critical of' the policy (ASTMS ECM, 
7 May 1976). Only two of the twenty-two executive members expressed 
support for Phase Two. The executive motion was then endorsed by 
conference, though the attempt to pass a more critical motion of the 
Phase Two policy was defeated by a margin of only 380 to 321 
votes (ASTMS AC, 1976). Thus, the ASTMS delegation to the June 
Special TUC cast its votes against the Phase Two policy. This, of 
course, was entirely. consistent with that union's opposition to 
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policies of wage restraint (see Chapter 4). However, the internal 
debate within the unidn over how critical it should be of TUC policy 
highlighted an increasing reluctance on the part of the ASTMS General 
Secretary to reject outright General Council policy initiatives. 
Many ASTMS activists expressed the view that too much overt criticism 
of TUC policy consensus implied possible exclusion of the General 
Secretary from the inner policy circles to which he aspired 
(Interviews, 15 and 16 July and 5 September 1980). 
Thus, all of the sample union executives agreed to recommend the 
policy approach taken by their leader to their respective policy 
conferences. Consent or opposition were, therefore, successfully 
organized and mobilized at the level of national union executives 
within the sample unions and then articulated to policy conferences 
where such an approach was generally further endorsed. The 
organization of consent and opposition at union conferences is the 
subject of the, next section. Consent to Phase Two, however, was 
organized in the face of increasing industrial and political 
. pressures. These were clearly manifest in both various union 
executives and policy conferences. In the case of union executives, 
the expression of such pressures was shaped by the particular form of 
the general secretary/executive relationship which, in turn, was 
shaped, at least in part, by the structure of the executive as well 
as the culture or prevailing ethos of the organization. These 
variations within and between the sample union executives and their 
implications for relative leadership discretion in the pursuit of the 
mobilization of consent and opposition for TUC policy will be the 
subject of further scrutiny in Chapter 8 which focuses on the. 
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processes of opposition to pay policy within the sample unions. 
POLICY CONFERENCES% THE ORGANIZATION AND DISCOURSE OF CONSENT 
A second key level for the mobilization of policy consent within 
the sample unions was that of the policy conference. As was 
illustrated above, the general secretaries of each of the sample 
unions first sought the support of their, executives for their 
respective positions. However, the scope for executive support was 
both formally and practically limited by the requirement that they 
interpret-conference policy. Thus, the framing-and direction_ of 
conference' policy decisions assumed a particular significance: 
sometimes before the sample union leader took any policy initiative 
from the TUC General Council to the union executive, sometimes when 
the union leader sought prior approval for imminent policy 
developments, and often in terms of. the post facto legitimation of 
policy developments as in the case of Phase Two. Thus, the direction 
and precise phrasing of conference-policy could have an important 
influence on the degree of policy discretion available to both the 
union executive and its top leaders. Policy conference support for 
leadership. positions also served a legitimating role; thus 
facilitating the translation of policy into actual industrial 
practice. Union conference decisions were generally the most 
extensive form of popular consultation. None of the sample union 
leaderships other than in the case of the NUPE branch ballot for 
Phase Two sought approval for the union's policy position on 
particular pay policy phases from lower organizational' levels than 
the executive or the union conference. Thus, the 'conference 
symbolized the expression of popular support and opposition. 
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This was certainly true for activists, if not the entire 
membership. The effective implementation of voluntary incomes 
policies on the union side was ultimately dependent on the 
acquiescence, if not the cooperation, of local union officials and 
activists. Even if full-time officials did not favour a policy of 
voluntary wage restraint, general secretary or executive directives 
to abide by such a policy, especially when endorsed by a union's 
policy conference, represented the authority of their employer and 
were difficult to ignore. Such policy decisions were also likely to. 
have a -significant impact on lay officials-and äctivists. As was- 
argued above, union activists must constantly pursue the creation and 
recreation of a collective identity for a union organization. This 
is its ultimate source of strength as an intermediary organization. 
Activists and local leaders constantly have to mobilize bias in 
favour of the traditions of organizational solidarity and unity which 
might sustain the principle of collective action when required (on 
the mobilization of bias in favour of union organizations at the 
workplace, see, i. e., Batstone et al., 1977; also Willman, 1980). In 
other words, it can be argued that there was generally a normative 
bias in favour of the observance of collective organizational 
decisions among key activists. 
Local activists were, therefore, poorly placed simply to reject 
the authority of collective decisions at national level. On the 
contrary, collective decision-making, particularly at the conference 
which was formally a union's supreme governing body, assumed a new 
importance. For both opponents and supporters of the Social Contract 
incomes policies, the best vehicle to consolidate their position 
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within the organization was an unambiguous conference decision. 
Moreover, the structure and mechanics of conference decision-making 
with its formal process of compositing different motions on the same 
subject was sometimes more amenable to inter-regional and inter- 
industry organizing than was often the case with union executives 
which were more often directly under the sway of the general 
secretary of their union. The actual conference, debates also 
sometimes assumed a more 'political' or oppositional character than 
was the case in many union executives because of the greater scope 
for the intervention of various political groups and the construction 
of political alliances. Some general secretaries also argued that 
their union conference was more 'representative' of membership 
sentiments than the executive because of the sometimes narrower basis 
on which the executive members were elected. Faced with a rising tide 
of opposition to the impact of Phase Zwo, Jack Jones, for instance, 
successfully argued before his executive in 1977 that any decision on 
the future of the Social Contract pay policies should be left to the 
union's BDC the following month and not be pre-empted by the 
executive (Interviews, 26 September and 16 December 1980; TGWU ECM, 
30 May -2 June, 1977). In terms of the mobilization of both consent 
for and opposition to incomes policies, for both upwards and 
downwards mediation within the union, policy conferences were a key 
forum. 
Union policy conferences vary considerably in structure, 
procedure and substance. These variations determine greater and 
lesser degrees of policy discretion available at leadership level. 
The internal dimension of the structure of union policy conferences 
might include any of the following aspects of its organization: its 
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relative size, duration and frequency; the basis of representation 
and provenance of the delegates; whether such delegates are in any 
way mandated; whether the delegates are grouped in any way such as 
by region or industry; the relative importance of the role of the 
executive, full-time officials and the general secretary or. other 
principal leaders at the conference; and the complex formal and 
informal networks linking these different groups and bodies. The 
external dimension of conference structure involves its place and 
relative powers within the overall structure of the union's 
organization. Procedural variations concern the rules and customs 
governing the actual mechanics of policy debates. These include the 
submission of motions by branches, regional and industrial committees 
and union executives; the amendment of such motions and the process 
whereby they are composited; and the structuring of debates 
including the relative positioning of motions, the mechanics 
governing contributions, and the relative amount of time allowed to 
speakers in the debates. The influence of and flexibility available 
to the 'platform' are particularly important as they highlight the 
relative ability of union leaderships to structure debates and 
influence their outcomes. - Finally, the substantive variations relate 
to past and present policy decisions as well as the influence of 
organizational culture on the readiness of delegates to embrace some 
policies, yet not others. 
Structural and procedural variations crucially influenced the 
organization and mobilization of consent for incomes policies within 
the sample unions. For instance, the general secretary of the GMWU 
enjoyed a high degree of policy discretion due, in part, to the 
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structure and mechanics of both executive and conference decision- 
making. The AUEW president, on the other hand, was subject to much 
greater policy constraints through both the formal organizational 
limitations on his power as specified in the union's rulebook and the 
informal operation of the system of factional organization within the 
union (see Chapters 4 and 5). Yet, it is implausible that the 
policy differences between these two unions on the question of. 
incomes policies was simply the result of structural and procedural 
variations between the two unions. Rather, as was explored in 
Chapter 14, there were significant substantive variations between the 
two -unions' in their approach to pay policy. It was argued that 
these variations reflected a range of factors, particularly 
membership composition and industrial location, collective bargaining 
policy, and internal and external political practices. Structural 
and procedural variations significantly affected the form of the 
mobilization of consent and also the degree of leadership discretion 
available in particular circumstances. They did not determine the 
direction of policy, with the possible exception of where the balance 
of internal forces on a particular policy question was roughly 
equivalent. In this sense, leadership discretion was never absolute. 
It was always subject to the complex contingencies of internal 
political practice of which conference decision-making was one of the 
most significant aspects. However, as has been argued in previous 
chapters, the relative degree of leadership discretion crucially 
influenced the extent to which TUG General Council members 
transmitted messages of support or opposition for the Phase One and 
Two policies within their own unions. 
This section explores in greater detail the variations. between 
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union policy conferences and their implications for the mobilization 
of consent within the sample unions. It focuses on the case of the 
1975 TGWU Biennial Delegate Conference, the key union policy 
conference during this period. The TGWU was the largest TUC 
affiliate and it had a particular history of antipathy to wages 
policies. Thus, its decision to support a voluntary incomes policy 
provided an exemplary illustration of the mobilization of consent for 
such a policy in a union's internal political process. The final 
part of this section briefly highlights some of the variations 
between -the policy-making conferences of the other sample unions in -, 
the organization and mobilization of consent. 
The TGWU Biennial Delegate Conferenos 
The" economic debate of the 1975 TGWU Biennial Delegate 
Conference was significant for a number of reasons. First, in terms 
of its timing, it quite fortuitously coincided with the 'crisis' 
Cabinet meeting which formulated the Government's response to the 
collapse in the value of the pound at the end of June (see Chapter 
6. ). Secondly, through dint of personal commitment, relative 
leadership discretion and the preeminent strategic role of his union, 
Jack Jones, the TGWU general secretary, had been the key protagonist 
in the development of the Social Contract and TUC relations with the 
Government during this period. If his own union did not endorse the 
emergent Phase One policy, then it would effectively undermine the 
credibility of any TUC-sponsored voluntary wage restraint plan. 
Thirdly, of the various policy dispositions of key affiliates within 
the TUC, the TGWU policy decision was likely to determine the fate of 
the TUC's emerging policy. A negative decision would have made it 
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virtually impossible to construct a viable TUC consensus around 
support for wage restraint. However, unlike the other general union, 
the GMWU, the TGWU delegate conference had over the previous two 
decades demonstrated a quite consistent hostility to any form of 
interference in collective bargaining. Through the late spring and 
early summer of 1975, Jones played a vital role in bringing the TUC 
General Council to a rough consensus on the need for a form of 
voluntary incomes policy involving a system of flat-rate wage 
increases to succeed the Social Contract Mark I policy. He had also 
- secured the consent of his union executive to sch- a proposal and its - 
qualified commendation of the principle to the union's biennial 
conference. Given the apparent lack of enthusiasm for a further round 
of Social Contract wage guidelines within a number of key TUC 
affiliates, notably the AUEW, the support of the TGWU conference was 
clearly essential for the further development of the policy. The 
coincidence of the sterling crisis further heightened the drama and 
importance of the debate. Finally, the debate was also a good 
representation of the kinds of arguments- that were being deployed for 
and against a voluntary incomes policy at this time in the other 
sample unions. The TGWU debate consisted of more than thirty 
contributions with an approximate equivalence in expression of 
support for and opposition to the Social Contract (TGWU BDC, 1975). 
The success of the TGWU general secretary in obtaining an 
overwhelming mandate from the conference to pursue his policy 
proposals was comparable to the successful downwards mediation of the 
TUC policy initiative in some of the other sample unions. 
The TGWU conference decision to support Phase One, therefore, 
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merits closer scrutiny. This section considers the organization 
and discourse of consent for incomes policy at the 1975 BDC of the 
TGWU. It, first, looks at the organization of consent in terms of 
the structure and procedural mechanisms of the conference. It then 
turns to the discourse of consent with particular attention to the 
deployment of systems of argument for and against union policy 
support for a Phase One policy and their relative -consonance or 
dissonance with the union's political practice - what, in C. Wright 
Mills's terms, might be called "vocabularies of motive' (1963a; see 
also Batstone et al., 1977: 7)" Finally, in anticipation of the 
subsequent mobilization of opposition, this section attempts to 
decipher some of the patterns of support and opposition for the 
policies within the conference and how these reflected lower-level 
decisional instances within the TGWU. 
The TGWU policy conference or BDC meets every two years. It is 
composed of more than a thousand delegates nominated and elected by 
both local branches and regional trade groups. The delegates sit in 
regional delegations at the conference but, unlike. some of the other 
sample unions, there tends to be little official mandating either by , 
branch, trade group or region. Arguably, this practice enhances the 
sway of the platform at conference. Apart from the senior full-time 
executive officers such as the general and deputy general secretaries 
and the lay chairperson, the union executive is represented by only 
three of its thirty-nine members. Thus, the articulation between 
the executive and conference tends to be weaker than in many unions 
except through the persons of the general and deputy general 
secretary who' maintain a very strong presence throughout the 
conference. In this sense, -the recommendations of the executive as 
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proposed and interpreted by the general secretary assume a singular 
importance and tend to be inseparable from the personality of the 
general secretary. ' This is further accentuated by the lack of full- 
time officer presence at policy conference. Regional and national 
trade group secretaries attend in order to present their respective 
reports to conference. Other local officers might attend only once 
during their entire career as an official. 
As regards the external structure of the policy conference, like 
most of the other sample unions, the government of the TGWU and the 
determination of its policies were formally invested in the BDC (see 
TGWU, 1979b). Although the executive and general secretary were 
obliged to direct union industrial and political practice in 
conformity with the general guidelines determined by the conference, 
in practice, they exercised wide-ranging administrative and 
interpretative powers. Their degree of policy discretion was 
enhanced by the fact that the BDC was biennial rather than annual. 
Thus, there was much greater scope for executive interpretation in 
years when there was no conference and the previous yearts policy 
resolutions had possibly been superceded by events (see also Hinkin, 
1978a: 119). For instance, there was no formal mention of the Social 
Contract at the 1973 BDC. The nearest conference resolutions 
expressed opposition to 'statutory control of wages or interference 
with collective bargaining' in one case and, in others, called for 
joint TUC-Labour Party action on a high national minimum wage and the 
implementation of a policy to tackle inflation through price and rent 
controls (TGWU BDCM, 10 July 1973). These resolutions constituted a 
sufficient basis in 1974 for the executive to support the Social 
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Contract Mark I guidelines as consistent with union, policy (TGWU ECM, 
3 June 1974; see also Chapter 5)" Support for any Social Contract 
'Mark II' guidelines, however, required a more specific conference 
mandate as the Social Contract was certain to be on the agenda of the 
1975 BDC. Thus, in terms of both the mechanics and substance of the 
debate, the relative position and actual wording of the contending 
motions became extremely important. For the mobilization of consent 
for any future policy, particularly given his intimate involvement in 
its development, Jones required endorsement of general guidelines' 
which would give him sufficient lee way to negotiate the Phase One 
policy. 
The substantive requirements of the TGWU internal political 
process undoubtedly influenced the decision by Jones to pursue his 
flat-rate wage proposal. As was explored in Chapter 49 the general 
development of TGWU collective bargaining policy was hardly 
consistent with a policy of rigid wage restraint. Moreover, the 
tenor of the motions submitted to the 1975 BDC did not presage any 
significant shift in. union bargaining policy. Indeed, a senior TGWU 
official recalled that the General Secretary was worried about the 
number of motions on the conference agenda which specifically_ called 
for free collective bargaining (Interview, 24 October 1980). 
Including the executive's motion, only four of the twenty-one motions 
on the 1975 BDC agenda on the Social Contract could be construed as 
in any way supportive of the Social Contract Mark I guidelines and 
their further development. Indeed, sixteen of the motions were 
opposed to either the Social Contract or any form of incomes policy 
(TGWU BDCA, 1975)" Moreover, this agenda was finalized well before 
the Government's April 1975 budget had revealed, the changing 
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direction of economic policy (see Chapter 6). Despite the 
executive's endorsement of the Mark I policy, there were definite 
undercurrents of disillusionment with the Social Contract. Thus, the 
organization of consent for any new policy had to contend with this 
expression of opposition as it filtered upwards from branches and 
district, regional and trade group committees. 7h e industrial and 
regional patterns of this opposition will be explored further below. 
The conference agenda, however, also featured a range of 
motions calling for action on low pay, the reduction of 
differentials, the introduction of cost-of-living scales and the - 
pursuit of a policy of across-the-board flat-rate increases (ibid. ). 
Many of them were, in fact, aimed at very specific multi-union 
bargaining contexts, but they either spawned or provided the vehicle 
for the General Secretary's advocacy of a special one year policy of 
flat-rate wage increases in 1975. Perhaps not surprisingly in a 
general union servicing a large, low-paid membership, the idea of, 
flat-rate wage increases was not without antecedents in TGWU 
bargaining policy. The notion had particular advantages in a multi- 
union context where craft-based and white-collar unions were making 
quite different sets of arguments for the maintenance of 
differentials. There was partioularly strong support for the 
principle of flat-rate increases among TGWU members at the Ford Motor 
Company, but it was also manifested in 'second to none' types of TGWU 
bargaining policies that had gained prominence in the Midlands 
(Interviews, 29 February, 5 March and 4 September 1980). Indeed, it 
has been argued that it was precisely this type of bargaining posture 
that had resulted in a progressive narrowing of differentials - both 
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historically and through the 1970s in particular (see Turner, 1952; 
Brown, 1976). Whatever its implications for 'sophisticated reward 
systems', this type of bargaining policy struck a responsive chord 
within TGWU policy-making and industrial practice. Jones personally 
favoured the principle of flat-rate increases, TGWU officials 
generally received flat-rate increases in pay (Interviews, 30 July 
and 14 August, 1980), and such an approach had also. been formally 
incorporated into union bargaining policy. A 1971 MC resolution 
recommended a minimum wage target and "the principle of flat-rate 
increases as a reasonable and effective way to improve the position 
of the lower-paid' in the context of inflation (TGWU BDCM, 1971: no. 
30). Senior negotiators had always advised against setting too rigid 
a centralized bargaining policy in an industrially heterogeneous 
union such as the TGWU. Indeed, motions on bargaining policy to the 
BDC were often forwarded directly to the appropriate national trade 
group committee and not debated at conference because a policy that 
might seem tenable for one trade group or industry. might be 
completely inappropriate for others. However, on the principle of 
flat-rate wage increases there seemed to be a considerable depth of 
support among the union's large, low-paid membership. i 
In proposing the principle of a flat-rate wage policy to the 
TUC, Jones could be reasonably certain that it would be consistent 
with the industrial and political requirements of his own union. 
Jones argued that such a scheme had the twin advantages of simplicity 
and social justice (TGWU Vehicle Building and Automobile Group, 
1975). Quite apart from its real substantive merits as a policy, 
there can be little doubt that the scheme was deliberately angled to 
gain the support of a union conference which, otherwise, viewed any 
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outside interference in collective bargaining with disfavour. 
As was suggested in Chapter 6, it was hardly surprising.. 
moreover ' that the proposal should find almost immediate favour with 
the GMWU and disfavour with unions whose industrial policy was 
strongly inclined to support a reward for skill and responsibility 
such as the AUEW and ASTMS. Jones was also able to secure the 
support of his own executive for the proposal and take that 
recommendation to the BDC (TGWU ECM, 2 June 1975; also, see above). 
The executive, moreover, had given its unqualified support to the 
Social Contract suggesting that '4a11 our efforts to maintain and 
improve conditions for all of the membership may be summed up in the 
logic of our support for the social contract' (TGWUR, 1974: 10). In 
order to translate this message into actual conference support, it 
remained to frame the exact terms of the conference debate and put 
the arguments to the delegates. This further raises both procedural 
and substantive considerations. 
The Standing Orders Committee (SOC) is charged with the 
Compositing of motions at most union conferences. The SOC at the 
1975 BDC was the focus of considerable activity as opponents, and 
proponents of the Social Contract attempted to composite. their 
diverse motions. Inasmuch as the SOC was charged with simplifying 
the debate through the coropositing of diverse motions, it could also 
profoundly influence the direction of the debate. Thus, according to 
the Finanical Times (1 July 1975), 'the drive to'limit attacks' on 
the Social Contract at the 1975 BDC was at least partially successful 
as a number of 'strongly anti-contract motions' were, in effect, 
'removed from the agenda through the clever formulation of composite 
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motions'. One opponent of the Social Contract at that time who was 
effectively silenced by his presence on the union's executive 
recalled that the opposition to the platform was poorly organized in 
the compositing process as too many people wanted to move their own 
motions (Interview, 2 April 1980). They ultimately opted for the 
simplest of common denominators: 'That this Conference rejects wage 
regulations and reaffirms its policy of free collective bargaining'. 
If the General Secretary opposed such a motion, which he did in 
fact do, then it would underline to what degree his position on 
incomes policy had changed. There was also another opposition motion 
which simply rejected the Social Contract. However, this motion 
revealed an important split between those on the Labour left and 
those with CP or other left political party links. Thus, the 
different strands of opposition could not agree on a clear 
alternative to the Social Contract They could only unite against any 
form of interference in wage bargaining. The executive-sponsored 
motion also tread carefully on the question of outside interference 
in wage bargaining. Expressing support for the Social Contract, it 
emphasized that the Social Contract was "in total opposition to any 
form of statutory wage control and [sought] to sustain the principle. 
of free collective bargaining'. It also indicated that continued 
union support for the Social Contract was conditional on the 
fulfillment of the main Manifesto commitments (TGWU BDCM, 1975: No. 
20). The outright opposition to statutory wage control was 
reportedly included at the last minute in order to make support for 
the Social Contract more palatable to waverers on the conference 
floor' (FT, 2 July 1975). Otherwise, the motion was studiously 
ambiguous on other forms of wage restraint, only seeking 'to sustain 
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the principle of free collective bargaining'. In combination with an 
entirely separate motion on the principle of flat-rate increases for 
a twelve-month period which was included in the same debate, this was. 
the potential basis for the General Secretary's advocacy of the 
putative Phase One policy. Moreover, delegates were given a clear 
choice: they could either support the recommendations of the General 
Secretary and executive or reject them. 
Given, on the one hand, such a stark choice between support and 
opposition for the General Secretary and, on the other, the TGWU 
- tradition- of a preeminent general secretary who could command -the --- 
absolute loyalty of the union's policy conference, it is perhaps not 
surprising that the executive-sponsored motions received overwhelming 
support. The TGWU general secretary had not suffered a significant 
policy defeat on a political issue at the BDC in the post-war period 
(Minkin, 1980: 95). Indeed, he had been defeated only twice on any 
issue (in 1953 and 1957, see Undy, 1978). Typically, at the 1975 
BDC, thirty-five composite motions were debated. The thirty-three of 
those which had executive support were passed. The two that did not 
were defeated (TGWU GSC, 15 July 1975). As was suggested above, the 
General Secretary commanded a high level of support from the 
executive, but also from lay activists and the majority of the . 
officer corps. The platform clearly also enjoyed various structural 
and procedural advantages. 
Yet, in the context of these same advantages and on the same 
issue at the 1977 BDC, the General Secretary's recommendation was 
defeated. Thus, it is perhaps useful to scrutinize further the 
substantive arguments deployed for and against a potential Social 
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Contract incomes policy at the 1975 BDC and their relative consonance 
or dissonance with the different internal contexts in 1975 and 1977. 
It can be argued that there was a veritable discourse of consent for 
wage restraint within the TGWU and, indeed, within the other sample 
unions as well. It is possible, moreover, to attempt to decipher 
these 'dispositions of mind' or 'institutional bases' of the 
mobilization of consent within the union (on the need to link 
language'a nd ideas in this way, see C. Wright Mills, 1963b: 474). 
The different strands of argument for and against support of the 
Social Contract incomes policies were highly 
_ 
interdependent, 
virtually inseparable in many cases. They might, nonetheless, be 
categorized, albeit schematically, into different arguments for 
support and opposition. 
The case for supporting the Social Contract can be split into 
six approximate categories of unequal weight. First, as epitomized 
by the Social Contract, there was the need for unity'in the wider 
Labour movement. Thus, it was imperative to support a Labour 
Government. Secondly, there was the positive record of the Labour 
Government, including the repeal of the Industrial Relations Act, 
pension increases, health and safety legislation, not to mention the 
promise of future advantageous measures. Thirdly, there was the 
question of social justice. The low-paid and the unemployed were 
always the most vulnerable in a period of crisis and high inflation. 
A scheme which demanded 'equality of sacrifice' or a 'fair-for all' 
as opposed to a 'free -for-all', as Jones phrased it, was therefore 
preferable. Fourthly and vitally, there was the organizational 
imperative. Externally, this required solidarity with the wider 
trade union movement and, particularly, the lead given by the TUC 
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General Council. Internally, this translated into respect and 
loyalty to collective decisions and the lead given by the General 
Secretary. That the internal and external leads were identical 
highlighted the pivotal role of the TGWU General Secretary and, in 
this case, reinforced his authority. Certainly, the General 
Secretary maintained an extraordinary degree of both organizational 
authority and personal charisma. In terms of organizational 
authority, it was noted above that the TGWU general secretary 
commanded near universal loyalty at conference. Moreover, Jack Jones, 
like~Cousins, Deakin and Bevin before him also enjoyed the attributes 
of personal charisma. Certainly, the charismatic factor was integral 
to the myth of the TGWU general secretary (see Chapter u), but it was 
also conceivable that the requisite leadership qualities were part of 
its self-recruiting ordinance. One grudging admirer, an opponent of 
the Social Contract on the TGWU executive, noted that Jack Jones was 
at the peak of his leadership at the 1975 BDC. He had real 
credibility and 'the lads had a lot of faith that he would do the 
trick' (Interview, 9 September 1980). Fifthly, there was a "national 
interest' argument which suggested that the trade union movement had 
wider responsibilities than the narrow pursuit of collective 
bargaining. A variation on this theme involved the idea that the 
union should opt for what the majority of working people were 
prepared to accept in relation to their families, rather than be 
swayed by the political militants. Finally, there was a range of 
pragmatic arguments. Consent or a voluntary policy was preferable 
to the inevitable alternative, a statutory policy. The alternative 
to the present Labour Government was not a government further to the 
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left, but a 'reactionary' Conservative government. While the union 
was normally against any interference in bargaining, the policy was 
aimed to alleviate the crisis, and was only for a year, not forever. 
Thus, it was argued that there was no alternative; it was a question 
of pragmatism. 
In a powerful concluding speech, Jack Jones covered the range 
of arguments in favour of the Social Contract. Alluding to the 
Cabinet's emergency meeting, he noted that the depth of the crisis 
could not be overstated. '4I think you will see that within a very 
short space of time' (TGWU BDC, 1975). This imposed two interlinking 
obligations: defence of the Labour Government and defence of trade 
union members, especially the weakest sections in the labour market. 
I do not believe in wage restraint as a normal policy. You 
know that... I do believe, however, in a tabour Government 
and we would be fools or pygmies to let this Government 
collapse. In all history there have been times to advance 
and times to stand still, even retreat a-little in order to 
advance later on. That time is now. The dangers are very 
great indeed (ibid. ). 
In the context of massive unemployment, Jones argued, there was no 
such thing as free collective bargaining. Thus, he concluded that in 
"'this period of set-back our stand must be equality of sacrifice, not 
destruction of the Labour Government' (ibid. ). 
The arguments in favour of supporting the Social Contract and 
the General Secretary's policy initiatives within the TUC General 
Council proved a powerfully persuasive case. Although deployed in 
different mixtures and with dissimilar emphasis by the various 
supporters of the platform's position, the six strands of appeal for 
consent might be summarized as six principles: unity, 
instrumentality, social justice, solidarity and loyalty or community, 
national interest and priority. This was the discourse of consent.. 
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It might be thought of as a complex series of 'ideological 
interpellations' or identities which were directed towards the 
mobilization of consent among the delegates at conference. ' The 
notion of an ideological interpellation or identity springs from the 
view that ideologies are 'ongoing social processes' which constantly 
address or interpellate us, and unceasingly constitute and 
reconstitute the image of who and what we are (see Therborn, 1980: 
78). A single human being may act as an almost unlimited number of 
subjects. In the course of any one day, a large number of 
subjectivities or identities are, -in fact, acted-out: as employee or. 
employer; as father, mother, son or daughter; as trade unionist; as 
citizen; as colleague or comrade; and, so on. These identities or 
subjectivities co-exist and compete in complex psychic structures 
which, far from monolithic, are fields of conflicting forces. 
Therborn (ibid. ) continues: 
Ideologies differ, compete and clash not only in what they 
say about the world we inhabit, but also in telling-us who 
we are, in the kind of subject they interpellate. And these 
different interpellations of what exists are usually 
connected with different interpellations of what is right 
and what is possible for a subject. 
In other words, ideologies call up different identities in us which 
can suggest possible courses of action and differentiate the realm of 
the possible from the realm of the impossible. Of particular 
importance are the organizational structures in and from which 
individuals call up different identities. 
Therborn's use of this concept is perhaps unnecessarily obtuse, 
but the insight is extremely useful. In terms of the TGWU BDC, 
particularly in such a clear organizational setting, consent for the 
platform's policy initiatives was consciously and unconsciously 
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organized around certain types of identities and issues. When 
speakers called on delegates to support the position of the general 
secretary, for example, they consciously-or unconsciously called up 
various images and identities pertaining to organizational unity- and 
individual loyalty. Similarly, when a contributor to the debate 
referred to particular regional or industrial experiences, they 
necessarily privileged some kinds of identities over others - 
national interest or social justice, for instance,, as opposed to 
instrumentality. In - this sense, a complex series of 
'interpellations' were directed at the delegates through " -the - 
discourses of both opposition and consent. There was no single 
coherent discourse of consent. Rather, there was a series of 
complex, competing and even conflicting appeals to a heterogeneous 
constituency. Each identity evoked a variety of traditions and 
experiences within the individual, the union and the trade union 
movement. Unity called up the long history of 'labourism' and 
support for the Labour Party. Instrumentality pointed the way 
towards the political benefits that might accrue through cooperation 
in a wage restraint programme. Social justice was one of the 
predominant, normative aims of the trade union movement. Solidarity 
and loyalty, as discussed above, were the guiding principles of trade 
union action. National interest appealed to the trade unionist as 
citizen, perhaps particularly those who understood their citizenship 
separately from their union activism. Priority evoked the 'here and 
now'; it suggested the path of 'least worst' alternatives -a kind of 
minimal instrumentality (see Chapter 3). Each of these strands 
interacted with particular identities in their diverse organizational 
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settings and, necessarily, in a highly differentiated way. 
Perhaps underscoring the relative power of the platform and the 
general secretary's traditional capacity to mobilize conference 
support for his positions, the opponents of the Social Contracts, in 
contrast to its supporters, seemed obliged to operate from a more 
defensive or reactive stance. They had to refute the case advanced 
by the platform and its supporters. Their arguments, therefore, can 
be roughly counterposed to those which favoured the Social Contract. 
Once again, their order of exposition is not a guide to their 
relative importance. 
First, it was argued that appeals to unity and loyalty to the 
Labour Party should not be allowed to impair rational judgement of 
the facts. Unity should be the basis on which trade union objectives 
can be achieved, not a reason for suppressing those objectives. 
Secondly, opponents argued that the Labour Government had failed to 
fulfil its Manifesto commitments. They maintained that there was 
widespread disillusionment at the Government's failure to implement 
more 'socialist measures'. Thirdly, it was suggested that wage 
restraint would not help the low-paid and the unemployed. Trade 
unions had a duty to defend living standards. The best way to do 
this was through free collective bargaining. The wage increases 
foregone in the strongest bargaining units would not be transferred 
to the weakest. Fourthly, opponents emphasized that the integrity of 
the General Secretary was not in question, nor was solidarity with 
the wider trade union movement. Everyone in the union was bound by 
the collective decisions of the organization. It was precisely such 
a decision that was the topic of debate. The union had a duty to 
carry out its normal bargaining functions in order to protect and 
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advance the living standards of its members. Shop steward autonomy 
was the proper basis for the pursuit of these functions and the 
defence of living standards. Moreover, the TGWU would not be 
isolated by a decision to oppose the Social Contract as the AUEW had 
already opted to pursue free collective bargaining. Fifthly, it was 
argued that Britain's economic problems were the result of a 'crisis 
of capitalism'. Trade unionists should, therefore, resist arguments 
that working people were the cause of the problem or that they should 
seek to solve these problems min the national interest'. 'As long as 
capitalism prevailed, it was argued, there wöüld be injustice 'and' 
economic crises as they were inherent to the system. The union,, 
therefore, should not fall prey to the propaganda directed at working 
people and intended to make them endure the sacrifices needed to 
rectify capital's immediate economic problems. Finally, asserting 
the socialist conception of the Social Contract, it was held that 
there were socialist alternatives to the kinds of package being 
explored by the TUC and the Government, but they were not being 
pursued. 
The discourse of opposition is less easily categorized into 
defining principles. As is characteristic of the nature of 
opposition, it had to counter the position of the platform in favour 
of a renewed Social Contract involving a flat-rate pay policy. 
Opponents had the unenviable task of attempting to refute the 
specific appeals to unity, solidarity and loyalty, while not 
challenging their validity as guiding principles for trade union 
action. The language of opposition had also to demonstrate that the 
promises of the Labour Government had not been fulfilled and that 
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social justice would not prevail in a capitalist system, while not 
challenging the dominant ethos of 'labourism' or the support of the 
union for the Labour Party in government. 
Opponents of the executive and General Secretary recommendations, 
therefore, organized their dissent around two basic ideological 
counter-appeals. First, there was the appeal to the pursuit of 
trade union objectives and the defence of living standards through 
the mechanisms of free collective bargaining and industrial autonomy 
at the level of the workplace or trade group - which had, after all, 
been the essence of leadership-sponsored reform in the union-over the 
previous two decades (see Chapter 4). Secondly, there was the appeal 
to' the existence of socialist alternatives to the crisis of 
capitalism. In the first case, there was a very strong appeal in 
many trade groups and regions, but the implications of reduced 
bargaining autonomy were not immediately apparent. As was presaged in 
the discussion of the industrial impact of Phases One and Two in the 
preceding chapter, this first appeal would prove much more powerful 
in the mobilization of opposition by the time of the 1977 BDC. In 
the second case, even the acceptance of the idea of a" 'crisis of 
capitalism' entailed neither an immediate willingness to distance the 
union from the leadership of the tabour Government nor the existence 
of any systematic vision or organization of a socialist alternative. 
The prospects for the immediate articulation of a viable 
alternative must have seemed remote. Certainly, as was explored in 
Chapter 6, this. highlighted both the weakness of unions as primarily 
reactive organizations and of their leaderships' lack of longer-term 
strategy. Moreover, although there was no specific requirement for 
internal consistency between the different strands in the discourses 
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of opposition and consent, an appeal to the maintenance of the market 
price mechanism - free collective bargaining - might conceivably have 
seemed anomalous when coupled with an appeal for socialist 
alternatives to the Government's policies, particularly when the 
primary vehicle of such alternatives was to be the Labour Party. 
Certainly, it appeared difficult to organize a larger mobilization of 
delegate opinion around such an oppositional political strategy, 
particularly in the face of platform opposition and given the 
prevalence of competing political strategies (see Chapter 3). 
The language of consent and opposition both reflected and 
directed its appeals to the subjectivities of atomized individual, 
patriotic citizen, brother or sister trade unionist, loyal Labour 
Party member, or 'comrade socialist', to name but a few.. It also 
communicated with the subjectivities or identities associated with 
particular regional and trade group membership. Delegates to the BDC 
were, after all, representatives of their workplace, branches, trade 
groups and regions - both accountable to and products of these units. 
Events and experience were aggregated and often interpreted or given 
a -collective meaning at these levels. Indeed, appeals could be 
directed to these particular meanings. These organizational 
divisions were important collective repositories of different 
material interests, historical developments and traditions and 
varying attitudes within the union. 
Occupational, workplace, branch, industrial and regional 
differences all structure, inform and colour attitudes to political 
and industrial policies, not least of which, pay policies. However, 
the way that they do so is necessarily complex. The experience of the 
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hospital cleaner in Wales was, of course, not necessarily that of the 
London docker - yet both were members of the same union organization 
and present at the same policy conference. Attitudes can be the 
reflection or the refraction of different material interests both in 
relation to the deeper composition and development of capital and to 
more immediate forms of pay determination. They are also 
significantly influenced by variations in collective tradition by 
region, by industry and by occupation. Nor can. they be divorced from 
different degrees and types of consciousness which are, in turn, the 
products of past experience and material interests - both individual 
and collective. The link between consciousness and social action, 
both in relation to trade unionism and more generally, is especially 
problematic. 
This study can, at best, attempt to identify certain key 
relationships in the mobilization of consent and opposition to wage 
restraint. As such, it can tap some dimensions of activist and 
officer consciousness, since they were the primary sample for 
interview data, without further examining the mechanisms and 
operation of such consciousness. It does not, therefore, grapple 
with the full complexity of the ideological dimensions of both 
consent and opposition. On the basis of the interview and 
documentary evidence, this study contends that certain relationships 
are more salient in the mobilization of consent and opposition, 
particularly in terms of different organizational settings. However, 
the level of analysis is confined to the identification of certain 
patterns of association. The research design does not, for example, 
tackle other important ideological dimensions, such as the impact of 
relative levels of political activism, in the preparedness of 
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conference delegates to embrace voluntary pay policies or not. Nor 
can it adequately gauge the impact of particular technological and 
economic constraints on relative dispositions to pay policy, whether 
they be payment systems or relative levels of profitability and 
demand in particular work settings. It is at this point that the 
exploration of relatively fluid political strategies and their 
attendant understandings of state and economy, as explored in Chapter 
3, must be placed in the context of particular material and 
organizational settings. This study suggests that certain kinds of 
strategies, regardless of union, are more likely to be associated 
with certain organizational settings. It is not, however, designed 
to offer other than conjectoral explanations as to why. A rigorous 
explanation would require a more sensitive micro-level research 
design. 
In most of the sample unions, the most important intra- 
organizational differences for the mobilization of both consent and 
opposition were either regional or industrial. As has been argued 
above, union executives and policy conferences were the key levels at 
which formal consent was achieved. Such bodies, however, 
] were 
generally composed of either regional or industrial representatives 
or both. In the TGWU, for example, given its large size, extensive 
industrial coverage, and structure of government, both regional and 
industrial groupings provided a focus for the aggregation and 
articulation of policy. Particular branches or districts or 
companies might, of course, be the vehicle for the expression of 
opposition or support. This opposition or support, however, would 
then have to be aggregated at regional or industrial level. While 
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such divisions are not the exclusive intermediaries in the 
implementation of union consent and opposition for voluntary incomes 
policies, they are undoubtedly central to this process, as both 
formally and informally they to some degree must reflect the 
essential internal dynamic between policy-making and industrial 
practice. In terms of both organizational culture and the actual 
impact of pay policies, the response to Phases One and Two within the 
sample unions appeared to, be highly differentiated. It iss 
therefore, interesting to look at the patterns of association between 
opposition and support for incomes policies, on the one hand, and 
regional and industrial groupings, on the other. 
Short of large-scale survey evidence, it is difficult to 
establish such patterns with any certainty. Chapter 8, in 
particular, will attempt to chart some of the specific expressions of 
opposition to the Phase One and Two policies, especially as they were 
manifested in industrial and/or regional terms. Before these policies 
had had any impact, however, it is interesting to chart apparent 
predispositions to such policies in terms of particular 
organizational divisions. One possible indication of such 
dispositions can be obtained from the delegate contributions in BDC- 
pay policy debates. While such contributions are obviously biased 
towards the most politically active lay members of the union, they do 
provide a measure of support or opposition for the general 
secretary's recommendations on pay guidelines. In the TGWU, 
moreover, it is possible to identify the industrial and regional 
provenance of each of the speakers in the debates. Contributions to a 
debate are initially self-selected, but then subject to the 
discretion of the chairperson before they are allowed to speak. 
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However, the BD C Chairman purportedly seeks to obtain some regional 
balance in contributions to major debates (Interview, 4 September 
1980). Moreover, because of the selection procedure, delegates from 
each region to the TGWU BDC generally reflect the industrial 
composition of that region (Interview, 16 December, 1980). Thus, 
from an analysis of the the key pay policy debates at TGWU delegate 
conferences, it is possible to gain a fairly reliable picture' of 
whether or not particular regions or trade groups are over- or under- 
represented. 
Table 7.1 illustrates these variations in terms of over- and 
under-representation in consent and opposition to platform 
recommendations in favour of an understanding on discussions about 
pay guidelines. In order to identify better the trends, Table 7.1 is 
based on the larger sample of both the 1973 and 1975 debates. They 
were roughly comparable in their structure. Of a total of thirty. - 
three speakers in the 1975 debate, seventeen spoke in favour of the 
platform recommendation to support the Social Contract and the 
principle of a flat-rate pay policy for a limited period and sixteen 
spoke against. The 1973 debate concerned whether or not the union. 
should continue to engage in talks with the Heath Government about 
economic policy. Thirteen lay contributors supported the platform 
recommendation to continue such talks, while fifteen speakers 
opposed. It should be emphasized that in each debate the platform 
recommendations were overwhelmingly endorsed. The virtually equal 
division of the participants into categories of consent and 
opposition did not, therefore,. reflect the ultimate voting patterns. 
Rather, the identification of the participants provides a means of 
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locating potentially active pockets of consent and resistance on the 
basis of different organizational divisions within the union. This 
will be further supplemented below in reference to challenges to or 
support for Phases One and Two by either regional or national trade 
group committees within the TGWU. These two dimensions are then 
combined to arrive at a composite profile in terms of. consent and 
opposition to pay policy. 'The implicit assumption is that a trade 
group or region should probably be evenly represented in terms of 
opposition and support at a level approaching the proportional weight 
of its percentage of total membership within the union. Thus, it is 
assumed that there will be more contributions both for and against 
pay policy from the larger regions and trade groups than the smaller 
ones. Variations from this norm suggest a propensity in one 
direction or another. If a region was strongly under-represented in 
terms of its contributions to support a pay policy and over- 
represented in its opposition to such an approach, as was the case in 
the London region of the union, then it would result in a fairly 
clear oppositional profile. On the other hand, if a region or trade 
group was either under- or over-represented in terms of both consent 
and opposition, then the signs would tend to cancel each other, out. 
resulting in a not particularly clear profile. 
The tentative nature of the results must be emphasized, 
particularly in the light of the relatively small sample size. 
(Table 8.1' follows an identical procedure for the 1977 BDC but on the 
basis of a larger sample size. ) However, even in considering only 
the largest composite variations, Table 7.1 does suggest certain 
trends in terms of regional and industrial patterns of consent and 
opposition. It appears, for instance, that delegates from the docks, 
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TABLE 7.1 
TRADE GROUP AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN CONSENT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO 
PAY POLICY AT THE 1973 AND 1975 TGWU BIENNIAL DELEGATE, CONFERENCES: 
Relative Over-and Under-Representation in Speaker 
Contributions to the Main Pay Policy Debates. 
Number of Over-and Under- 
Speakers Representation 
TRADE GROUP I FOR I 
I 
AGAINST I 
i 
CONSENT I 
1 
OPPOSITION 
Automotive 
II 
I4 
I 
6I 
I 
+3.9 I +10 
Building 3I 03! +5.5 1 +5.2 
Chemical I2I 2I -O. 4 I -0.6 
Clerical 121 1I -0.2 -3.7 Commercial I2I 4 -4.2 1 +2. 
Docks I0I 5 -2.6 I +13.5 
Food I 2I 3I -4.4 I -1.4 
General I4I 0I +0.6 I -12.7 
Passenger I 2I 2I -0.5 ( -0.7 
Power I4I 3I -0.5 I -4.1 Public Services I2I 2I -3.7 1 -3.9 
Total I 27 I 31 
REGION 
1. London I5I 9 I. -9.2 I +3.1 2. Southern I0I 1 -5.1 I -1.9 
3. Southwest I4( 2 +6.1 I -0.7 
4. Wales I4I 1 I +7.6 I -2.5 
5. Midlands I5I 5 I -1.1 I -1.7 6. Northwest 10I 7 I -11.8 I +10.8 
7. Scotland (4 4 ( +4.5 I +4.1 8. Northern (1I 0 -1.1 I -4.4 
9. Yorkshire I5I 1 I +12. I -1.5 
10. Humberside I1I 0 I +0.3 I -3. 
11. Ireland I11 0 1 -1.7 I -5. 
Total 1 30 I 30 I1 
Source: TGWU BDC 1973 and 1975; and TGWU BDCM, 1973 and 1975. 
Composite Profil 
(+ : consent 
= opposition) 
-6.1 
+0.3 
-0.2 
+3.5 
-6.2 
-16.1 
-3.0 
+13.3 
+0.2 
+3.6 
+0.2 
-12.3 
-3.2 
+5. u 
+10.1 
+0.6 
-22.6 
" +0.4 
+3.3 
+13.5 
+3.3 
+3.3 
Notes: Proportional over- and under-representation is measured as the 
difference between the percentage of speakers contributing to the consent 
and opposition positions and a particular trade group or region's 
relative percentage of membership within the entire union. The composite 
profile is the sum of the consent and opposition percentages where one of 
the signs is reversed in order to calculate the total. 
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commercial services and automotive industrial groups demonstrated a 
discernible propensity to speak against the platform recommendation 
in favour of pay policy. Delegates from the general workers group, 
on the other hand, spoke in favour of consent. Similarly, there was 
a definite tendency for speakers who opposed the platform to come 
from either the London area or the Northwest. Delegates from the 
Southwest, Wales and Yorkshire, on the other hand, showed a marked 
tendency to lend their consent to the platform recommendations in 
favour of the Social Contract. Interview evidence given by TGWU 
activists and officials confirmed these patterns. They corresponded 
to the prevailing political "folk wisdom' or 'common sense' within 
the TGWU. London and Liverpool, for instance, had a particular 
history of challenges to the platform at conference or headquarters 
within the union more generally. On the other hand, the general 
secretary could almost invariably count on the support of regions 
such as the Southwest, Northeast, Yorkshire and Wales as well as the 
majority of others. Similarly, opposition to pay policy tended to be 
particularly strong in the docks, automobile, engineering and road 
transport industries. In contrast, relatively low-paid workers in 
the public services and general workers trade groups were less 
inclined to be vociferous opponents of pay policy (Interviews, 
various dates). 
The executive recommendations were in fact overwhelmingly 
approved at the 1975 BDC. The Financial Times (2 July 1975) reported 
that fewer than one hundred of the thousand delegates present voted 
against the platform. The support of the policy conference of the 
TUC's largest affiliate virtually assured TUC approval for the 
results of impending negotiations with the Government on the. Phase 
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One pay guidelines. Moreover, the TGWU had significantly, albeit 
temporarily, reversed its policy on the priority to be accorded to 
free collective bargaining. 
In conclusion, - it is clear that the position of the General 
Secretary carried the day. However, as was suggested above, this is 
not a sufficient explanation because the General Secretary did not 
successfully organize formal policy consent at the 1977 BDC. Yet, it 
is difficult to distinguish precisely on what basis the 1975 decision 
was made. The interpellations for support were received in a 
complex setting in which the appeals to unity, instrumentality, 
social justice, solidarity and loyalty, national interest, and 
priority would have different and varied effects. In organizational 
terms, the platform had numerous resources at its disposal to ensure 
support. Such resources included the appeal to regional loyalties in 
support of the platform, the influence of the General Secretary on 
the officer corps and their influence on the delegates, greater 
access to information, greater procedural flexibility including the 
influence of the Standing Orders Committee on the favourable 
definition of the debate, and, of course, the overwhelming tradition 
of leadership authority within the union. To this latter factor must 
be added Jones's exceptional reputation and the loyalty and 
credibility that this commanded among activists. Moreover, in 
industrial terms, the substantive aspects of a flat-rate wages policy 
were potentially highly acceptable to the union's large, lower-paid 
membership. In terms of sectional bargaining and inter-union claims, 
a flat-rate approach favoured the general union vis-a-vis craft and 
white-collar unions. The actual implications for workplace 
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bargaining autonomy had not yet been experienced. The bifurcation of 
policy-making and industrial bargaining meant that conference 
delegates were voting for the policy outside of their particular 
industrial settings. In a sense, they expressed that classic 
disjuncture between universalistic and particularistic: wage 
restraint for all, though not necessarily for themselves. Nor, given 
the state of flux in the negotiations at that point, were the wage 
restraint implications as yet entirely clear. Indeed, it was widely 
rumoured-at the conference that the flat-rate sum might be as much as 
eight or ten pounds (Interviews, various dates). Certainly, there 
was also considerable apprehension about the continued consequences 
of such high and volatile rates of inflation. In the six months 
immediately prior to the BDC, real weekly take-home pay had 
experienced a precipitous decline, larger than any other quarterly 
decline during the Social Contract period (see Figure B. 2, Appendix 
B). Finally, in substantive political terms, there was a strong 
ethos in favour of both the Labour Party and the Social Contract. No 
doubt, Jones's and the Government's marketing efforts had had some 
impact. One full-time official, a Communist Party member opposed to 
the Social Contract pay policies recalled that after the 1975 BDC 
decision he had expected some kind of hostile membership response, 
but Jones, he said, had effectively 'read the "popular mood"' 
(Interview, 14 March 1980). While there were a few isolated 
challenges to the executive's July decision to support the Phase One 
guidelines, such as that of the London region committee (see above), 
consent and/or acquiescence appeared to be the predominant reaction 
within the union. 
507 
1 
Conferences in Other Union 
Although some of the sample union policy conferences took 
different positions to that of the TGWU during the Phase One and Two 
period, they generally followed a comparable pattern. First, 
discussion of incomes policy and/or the Social Contract was a central 
feature of their deliberations in both 1975 and 1976. All of the 
sample unions held policy conferences in 1975 and only'the FBU annual 
policy conference and recalled conference did not have a substantive 
debate on the Social Contract. Instead, it focused on the union's 
work-to-rule campaign (see above). Neither NUPE or the TGWU held 
policy conferences in 1976. Otherwise, all of the other - sample 
unions determined their position on Phase Two at their 1976 policy 
conference. Secondly, all of the sample union policy conferences 
adopted the policy position recommended by their executive. This was 
less clearly the case with the AUEW executive, particularly in 1975, 
when the factional divisions within the executive were such that any 
policy messages were either highly ambiguous or completely 
contradictory. However, by the spring of 1976, the AUEW executive 
was unambiguously in favour of the Social Contract pay policies and 
this approach was also reflected in the union's National Committee'. 
Thus, with the possible exception of the AUEW in 1975, in the case of 
both support and opposition for pay policy, union policy conferences 
were supporting the messages transmitted downwards by union 
leaderships. 
Most of the union policy conferences in 1975 took place prior 
to any detailed TUC-Government negotiations over the substance of a 
possible Phase One. Only the TGWU BDC in early July debated the 
Jones proposal for a period of flat-rate wage increases in any 
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detail. Most of the other union leaders concentrated their efforts 
on securing a degree of policy flexibility from their union 
conferences and ensuring the defeat of outright opposition to the 
principle of a Social Contract. The NUPE executive, for instance, 
successfully recommended the rejection of an anti-Contract composite 
motion. At the same time, in what the TUC General Secretary himself 
hinted to the NUPE conference was out of line with the spirit of the 
Social Contract, it supported a high minimum wage target for the next 
bargaining round (NUPE AC, 1975; also DT and MS, 21 May 1975). 
Similarly, the GMWU executive endorsed a pro-Contract composite, but 
also ensured, albeit narrowly, the defeat of a motion seeking the 
same minimum wage target as that which had been endorsed by the NUPE 
conference (GMWU AC, 1975). David Basnett specifically argued the 
need to maintain a high degree of policy flexibility in the light of 
the impending TUC-Government negotiations (ibid.: 433-434+). The 
unusually close vote in favour of the platform recommendation, 202 to 
173, was more an indication of the depth of substantive support for 
the low-paid in the union than it was a desire to limit GMWU 
leadership discretion. 
i 
Even the ASTMS leadership which appeared most vehemently opposed 
to any possibility of wage restraint sought to maintain a degree of 
policy flexibility, what Clive Jenkins referred to as 'the freedom to 
defend our members'. Thus, on the recommendation of the executive, 
the delegates to the ASTMS conference voted to refer two anti- 
Contract motions to the executive even though the sponsor of one of 
those motions was vehemently opposed to such a procedure (ASTMS AC, 
1975). Describing himself as a man of 'the extreme centre', Jenkins 
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remained adamantly opposed to wage guidelines but he still appeared 
reluctant to repudiate the principle of a Social Contract. 
The AUEW provided atypically more complex scenario in which its 
policy process was the subject of vicissitudinous factional strife. 
The Engineering Section's National Committee narrowly voted, twenty- 
six to twenty-five with one abstention, not to debate the Social 
Contract referring it instead to the joint policy conference of the 
four amalgamated sections of the National Conference (AUEW NCR, 1975; 
FT, 23 April 1975). This was tantamount to a rejection of the Social 
Contract as the National Conference, dominated by the left faction, 
indeed repudiated the Social Contract by a thirty-nine to twenty-nine 
margin. It did so despite the President's somewhat ambiguous message 
in favour of retaining the status quo on the Social Contract Mark One 
- neither in favour of rejecting it nor of formulating a Social 
Contract Mark Two to succeed it (AUEW AC, 1975; also AUEWJ, July 
1975; MS, 18 June 1975). The decision to refer the debate about the 
Social. Contract to the National Conference was regarded by the 
moderate faction as a tactical blunder on the part of its adherents 
on, the Standing Orders Committee as it would, in fact, have been able 
to muster a pro-Contract majority on the National Committee 
(Interview, 26 February 1980). Thus, when the AUEW executive 
recalled the National Committee in December to reconsider its policy 
in the light of TUC support for Phase One, the Engineering Section 
policy conference endorsed the six pound policy in a thirty-two to 
twenty vote (AUEW RNCR, 1975; FT, 19 December 1975). The 
unexpectedly large margin of support indicated that all of the 
'floating' voters and even one or two of the Labour supporters not 
normally aligned with the moderate faction had opted to support 
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Phase One. 
All of the sample union policy conferences endorsed their 
leadership recommendations on Phase Two. The GMWU, FBU and ASTMS 
executives each submitted special motions to their respective 
conferences which, though subject to some critical debate, were 
approved by large margins. The GMWU and FBU. executives recommended 
support of Phase Two (GMWU AC, 1976; FBU AC, 1976). Mo ASZMS 
executive submitted a motion which was 'critical of' the Phase Two 
deal. A number of delegates to the ASTMS conference attempted to 
secure outright 'rejection' of the TUC-Government agreement, but the 
platform prevailed by a margin of 380 to 321 votes in its request 
that the more critical motion be referred to the executive (ASTMS ACS 
1976). The AUEW executive did not submit any special motion to its 
1975 National Committee. However, both the President and the 
moderate majority on the executive were in favour of observing Phase 
Two and articulated this approach at the union's policy conferences. 
Indeed, the President suggested that he would no longer be able to 
participate in the discussions of the NE DC Six if the support of the 
union for Phase Two was not forthcoming (Guardian, 18 May 1976;. 
Interview, 30 April 1980). The moderate faction also held -a majority 
on the 1976 National Committee; though it only narrowly secured a 
Standing Orders Committee decision to debate the Phase Two policy at '± 
the level of the engineering section conference as opposed to the 
National Conference (Guardian, 18 May 1976). Indeed, there were 
strong signs of disaffection on both the right and left about the 
impact of Phase One on engineering industry differentials, 
particularly in the bastions of moderate support in the West Midlands 
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where there had been a number of differentials disputes in the 
toolrooms of different companies (Interviews, 14 and 28 March 1980; 
on the dispute at SU Carburettor, for instance, see Sunday Times 26 
March 1976). However, the moderate faction duly opted to cast its 
%reluctant support' for the Phase Two policy and it was passed by a 
twenty-nine to twenty-two vote with one abstention (AUEW NCR, 1976; 
MS, 19 May 1976). It then made the controversial decision to 
mandate the fifty-two engineering section delegates to the. . National 
Conference of the four amalgamated sections. Since the National 
Conference had a total of only sixty-nine delegates, this decision, 
supported by the President and the great majority of executive 
members, effectively pre-empted any joint policy-making role on the 
Social Contract at National Conference. To register their protest at 
this new invention in the labyrinth of AUEW politics, a number of the 
delegates to the National Conference simply refused to participate in 
the voting. Thus, Phase Two was supported at the AUEW National 
Conference by a margin of thirty-six to nil with two abstentions and 
twenty-one other no votes (AUEW AC, 1976; The Times, 25 and 27 May 
1976). 
The sample . union leaderships were 
to varying degrees able to 
organize and mobilize consent for their recommended policy positions 
at the key level of the policy conference. However, the relative 
facility with which they did so or the limits imposed on leadership 
discretion in the mobilization of consent for leadership policy 
recommendations at union policy conferences requires further brief 
analysis of some of the structural, procedural and substantive 
variations in the conference policy-making of the sample unions. 
The union policy conferences varied significantly in size, 
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frequency and duration. The conference of a small industrial union 
such as the FBU consisted of approximately two hundred and fifty 
delegates meeting annually for a period of three or four days. it 
considered union negotiating strategy and objectives in some detail 
and was subject to relatively frequent recall in order to assess the 
progress of particular claims. "The AUEW National committee was 
somewhat similar in format, but, remarkably in the case of one of the 
largest of British unions, was much smaller in size. It consisted of 
just fifty-two delegates plus the executive and met annually for at 
least two weeks. The same delegates also attended the amalgamated 
union's joint policy conference. As in the case of the FBU, the AUEW 
National Committee was also subject to periodic recall to consider 
particular issues of bargaining policy. In keeping with its 
attempts to sponsor a more participative mode of union decision- 
making, NUPE moved from a biennial to annual conference format in 
1977. It considered some detailed industrial questions at its annual 
conference, but its public sector membership was sufficiently 
dispersed in various bargaining units that it had developed separate 
mechanisms to deal with particular wage claims. Its conference 
tended to break into different sectional groupings to consider 
detailed sectional policies. Otherwise, the conference took the form 
of very large plenary sessions. The sample unions with multi-seotoral 
membership such as the TGWU, GMWU and ASTMS had much larger policy 
conferences: over a thousand delegates in the case of the TGWU and 
more than five hundred in the other two unions. These conferences 
focused on general policy orientations leaving detailed bargaining 
policy to trade groups, industrial conferences or industrial advisory 
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committees. The GMWU Congress convened annually for five days. The 
ASTMS conference also met annually, but for only three days. The 
TGWU BDC met for five days every other year. All of these unions had 
provisions in their rulebooks to recall their policy conferences. In 
practice, however, such recalls only rarely, if ever, occurred. It 
would appear that the relative policy discretion of union leaderships 
or the platform at conference was favoured by less frequents larger 
and shorter conferences. Thus, the AUEW leadership was at least in 
theory bound by the long and detailed debates of its small policy 
committee. The policy initiatives of the general union leaderships, 
on the other hand, were only rarely reversed and the executives of 
these unions were left to consider in detail a whole range of issues 
which there was little time to debate at conference or, in the case 
of biennial conferences, on which policy had been supereeded by 
events. 
The delegate selection process, their relative accountability 
and the various methods of structuring their policy choices also 
exercised a crucial influence on the organization of consent and 
opposition to leadership policy preferences at union conferences. 
Delegates to the ASTMS, NUPE and FBU conferences, for instance, were 
present as representatives of particular branches or, in the case of 
the FBU, brigades (ASTMS, 1979; NUPE, 1978; FBU, 1978). They, 
therefore, tended to reflect, if not be bound by, particular branch 
policy preferences where such preferences were clear. However, the 
final terms of a debate often gave much greater discretion to the 
individual delegate and other forms of influence thus assumed a 
greater importance. Delegates to the AUEW National Committee were 
elected by their particular divisional committee and were clearly 
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identified by division in all National Committee votes. They, 
therefore, were subject to a very close divisional accountability 
exacerbated, as will be discussed below, by the effects of the 
union's system of factional organizations. TGWU and GMWU conference 
delegates, on the other hand, were nominated by particular branches 
but elected within the region and, in the case of the TGWU, regional 
trade group (TGWU, 1979b; GMWU, 1979; also Harrison, 1960: 1h9-150). 
Thus, their lines of accountability tended to be rather weaker than 
in the case of delegates representing a single branch or brigade. 
They were possibly more open to the substantive argumentation of the 
platform. However, both in the case of the two general unions and 
the other unions with branch or brigade representation, conference 
delegates were also subject to a variety of other kinds of influence 
on their policy proclivities, quite apart from the actual procedure 
and terms of the debate. These other methods could be both formal 
and informal: the subtle and not so subtle influence of full-time 
officers on the selection and policy processes; the operation of 
particular networks such as political parties, factions, and 
oppositional groups; or more formal systems of mandating such as 
regional delegation meetings or the policy position of particular' 
industrial or territorial committees. Such forms of influence were 
probably among the most important determinants of conference delegate 
behaviour. 
The outcome of GMWU conference policy-making, for instance, was 
almost invariably in support of the platform. This consistency of 
support reflected much about the ethos of the union, but the 
mechanism that ensured such a consistent expression of support for 
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leadership policy recommendations was the system of regional 
mandating. Delegates attended the conference as part of a regional. 
delegation. Indeed, it was clearly indicated that delegates did not 
represent any particular branch and could not be mandated by a branch 
(GMWU ACA, various). Rather, the regional delegation traditionally 
met prior to the beginning of conference and determined its attitude 
to various motions under debate. Delegations were then mandated and 
voted on block as a region. Such a system generally worked in 
support of the platform. The most influential members of the 
regional delegation, namely the regional secretary and key lay 
members on the regional committee, were also members of the union 
executive. Thus, they were party to the recommendations of the 
platform. They were able to work within the regional delegation in 
support of executive recommendations making the arguments in favour 
of particular policies, using their real influence within the region 
to this end and discouraging the articulation of oppositional motions 
or alternative approaches. They could, therefore, secure a regional 
mandate for the executive approach well before the issue had been 
debated on the conference floor. If support'did not appear to be 
assured, the executive might tailor its response accordingly. 
Oppositional voices within each region were thus obliged to vote for 
executive policies. If some did speak against them, as in the case of 
the opponents of the Social Contract, then they indicated that they 
spoke without the support of their region (see, i. e., GMWU AC, 1975 
and 1976). Delegates had periodically protested at the operation of 
this system and, in 1974, actually opposed a platform recommendation 
in narrowly supporting a motion which favoured free votes on issues 
of principle or motions coming from other regions (GMWU ACS 1974; FT 
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and MS, 5 June 197+). However, the system of regional mandating at 
GMWU conferences appeared to be largely operative during conference 
debates on the Social Contract incomes policies (Interviews, 5,6 and 
7 September 1979 and 4 September and 2 October 1980). Indeed, as 
protest over the impact of the policies gathered, it became possible, 
despite the predominant downwards mediation of executive policy 
recommendations within the discussions of regional delegations, for 
opponents of the pay policies to capture a majority within certain 
regional delegations, such as in Liverpool and London, and mandate 
that delegation against the platform recommendation (Interviews, 4,5 
and 6 September 1979 and 2 October 1980; see also Chapter 8). Thus, 
one of the principal mechanisms in the mobilization of consent at 
GMWU Congress could also, in changing circumstances, be used for the 
organization of opposition within the policy conference. 
AUEW policy conferences tended to be altogether more volatile. 
This volatility resulted from both the operation of factional 
political organizations within the union and the relative numerical 
balance between the factions. Thus, policy outcomes were largely 
structured by factional organization. As was suggested in Chapter 5, 
the procedural and substantive variations in the organization of AUEW' 
conferences only appeared to be important in the case of a relative 
equality between the moderate and left factions. Then, all of each 
faction's resources might be deployed in an effort to sway the 
handful of floating delegates who were attached to neither factional 
organization. Factional organization, of course, worked primarily 
towards the selection of delegates within the divisional committees. 
Thus, considerable organizing efforts were made in the autumn of each 
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year in an attempt to swing the balance in key branches, then in key 
district committees and, finally, at the level of the divisional 
committees (Interviews, various dates). 
Table 7.2 illustrates to what degree divisional delegates to 
AUEW policy conferences were subject to factional loyalty. It 
summarizes sixty-eight selected National Committee and Conference 
votes held in the period under investigation in this study on the 
basis of the percentage of times the two delegates from each division 
have voted with the left faction. Thus, very high percentages 
indicate an attachment to the left faction and very low percentages 
indicate an adhesion to the moderate faction. The results have 
further been divided between votes on pay policy issues and other 
political and economic issues. What emerges is the very strong 
factional propensity associated with certain divisions. In the 
sample of twenty-eight votes on pay policy between 1973 and 1979, six 
of the twenty-six divisions voted with the left faction one hundred 
per cent of the time and another five divisions voted with the left 
at least seventy-five per cent of the time. Similarly, five 
divisions voted with the left less than ten per cent of the time and 
another seven divisions voted with the left less-than twenty-five per, 
cent of the time. 
The significance of some of the regional attachments to the left 
or right factions will be considered in the context of broader 
regional patterns within the sample unions (see Tables 8.2 and 8.3). 
Most significant in these regional patterns for the internal 
political process of the AUEW was that only three divisions, two in 
the northeast and the Lincoln/Hull/Grimsby division, were somewhere 
in between the strong factional alignments. In. fact, the two 
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TABE 7.3 FACTIONAL VARIATIONS BY DIVISION IN AUEW(E) NATIONAL COMMITTEE AND 
NATIONAL CONFERENCE VOTES ON PAY POLICY AND OTHER SELECTED ECONOMIC AND 
POLITICAL ISSUES 1973 - 1979 
DIVISION PROPENSITY TO SUPPORT THE I 
NO. & ab 
AREA PAY OTHER POLITICAL 
POLICT and ECONOMIC 
(n, 28) ISSUES (n=40) 
1. Ireland 
2. Dundee 
3. Edinburgh 
4. Glasgow 
5. Renfrewshire 
6. Tyne & Wear 
7. Teeside 
8. Preston, Lancs. 
9. Yorks (Leeds & 
Bradford) 
10. Bolton 
11. Salford & 
Manchester 
12. Lincoln, Hull 
& Grimsby 
13. Sheffield 
14. Derby 
15. Liverpool 
16. Birmingham 
17. Coventry 
18. Cardiff 
19. Bristol 
20. Luton, Oxford 
& Northampton 
21. Colchester 
22. Plymouth 
23. Portsmouth 
24. Kent 
25. N. London 
26. S. London 
AVERAGE 
LS Left 
DEFT FACTION: FACTIONAL 
a+b POLICY 
ALL. PROFILE 
(n: 68) 
S 
25 55 42.7 F/M 
100 100 100 L 
7.1 20 14.7 H 
100 97.5 98.5 L 
7.1 20 11.7 M 
42.9 45 44.1 F 
46.4 37.5 41.2 F 
75 50 60.3 F/L 
21.4 35 29.4 M 
100 100 100 L 
100 100 100 L 
60.7 75 69.1 F 
75 87.5 82.4 L 
10.7 20 16.2 M 
82.1 87.5 85.3 L 
7.1 5 5.9 H 
7.1 5 5.9 H 
10.7 22.2 17.5 M 
14.3 27.5 22.1 M 
17.9 30.8 25.4 H 
85.7 90 88.2 L 
10.7 30 22.1 M 
92.9 100 97.1 L 
7 30 20.6. M 
100 100 100 L 
100 100 100 L 
50.3 56.7 54.1 
M: Moderate F:. Floating or Mixed 
Sources: AUEW AC, AUEW NCR, AUEW RNCR: 1973 - 1979. 
Notes: AUEW(E) policy-making is conducted on a factional basis. This table 
summarizes the results of 68 selected National Committee and Conference 
policy votes between 1973 and 1979 in terms of the percentage of times the 
two delegates from each division voted with the Left faction. 'Pay policy' 
votes are the main debates over the Social Contract. Other political and 
economic issues include nationalization, economic and industrial policy, and 
a 'real socialist' programme for the Labour Party. 
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northeastern divisions deliberately maintained an independent 
tradition during the period in question (Interviews, 2 June, 24 July, 
12 August and 29 September 1980). Thus, when the two factions 
approached equivalent strength, the National Committee delegates from 
the northeast regularly cast the decisive vote in conference debates. 
This tradition of independence was attributed to a variety of 
factors particular to the northeast: a strong regional identity, the 
strength of Catholicism, strong craft traditions, relative isolation, 
the legacy of the Independent Labour Party, Labour loyalism, to name. 
but some of the possibilities mentioned. Whatever its ultimate 
explanation, and it is an excellent illustration of the strength of 
regional and community political traditions in internal union 
politics, the 'Geordie independentist line' remained crucial for the 
outcome of AUEW policy wrangles as long as there remained an 
approximate numerical balance between the two main factions in the 
3 
AUEW. One key activist in the moderate faction, for instance, 
confessed that they often supported the policy resolutions from the 
Northeast, even though they might not have been exactly what they 
wanted, in order to enlist the support of the northeastern delegates 
for their own policy preferences and frustrate the adoption of. 
motions favoured by the left faction (Interview, 17 March 1980). The 
left faction', of course, adopted similar and equally complex 
strategies. 
To underscore the astonishing degree of factional balance on 
the pay policy issue, Table 7.2 indicates that the average propensity 
to vote with the left during the entire 1973 to 1979 period was 
50.3%. It is not surprising in this sense both that the factional 
organizations directed their principal resources towards wooing the 
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floating voters and that the actual policy outcomes were highly 
volatile. Thus, AUEW leadership initiatives and policy stances on 
the Social Contract pay policies were largely dependent on the 
vagaries of factional organization within the union. This explains 
the highly volatile AUEW policy position throughout the period and 
the frequent equivocation displayed by Hugh Scanlon in TUC policy- 
making. 
None of the other sample unions had quite such elaborate 
mechanisms as the AUEW's factional organization and the GMWU's system 
of regional mandating to structure the policy proclivities of 
conference delegates. TGWU custom discouraged mandating. However, 
regional delegation meetings did take place at the BDC. These were 
generally of a non-mandatory, but sometimes highly influential, 
character. As in the GMWU, the full-time regional secretaries in the 
TGWU, even though they were not party to platform recommendations as 
they were not members of the executive, appeared to play a role in 
delivering the vote in some regions (Interviews, 2 and 3 October 
. 1980). There was little formal factional activity at the TGWU BDC to 
structure delegate preferences. FBU conference outcomes were 
apparently the result of a highly differentiated pattern of brigade 
committee preferences. There tended to be networks of varying 
strength between some of the brigades, particularly in terms of 
opposition to the platform. Particular brigades such as Liverpool, 
Strathclyde and Essex often took an oppositional position to that of 
the platform and this type of approach was often reflected in the 
attitude of the region's executive member. 
ASTMS conference delegates were elected as representatives of 
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their branch, but they sat at the conference as part of a divisional 
delegation in which the divisional chairmen and secretaries had the 
right to speak but not to vote (ASTMS, 1979). Individual delegates 
were not mandated by their divisions but there was greater or lesser, 
divisional coherence depending on the particular division. Divisional 
councils tended to be the focus of most regional political activity 
in the union and this was generally translated into conference policy 
behaviour as well. Thus, the London divisions, for instance, 
consistently moved the most "political' and oppositional motions. 
There were informal contacts between some divisions, particularly 
through the divisional chairmen, but this fell far short of what 
might be called factional activity. The entire executive attended 
conference. Some divisional executive members appeared to maintain 
very close relations with their particular divisional committees 
while others remained either independent or distant. In the 1976 
debate over Phase Two, for instance, the attempt to commit the union 
to outright rejection of the terms of the Phase Two agreement, rather 
than the 'criticism' favoured by Jenkins was first advanced within 
the executive and then repeated in identical terms in the conference 
debate (ASTMS AC, 1976). The General Secretary's preference 
prevailed in both forums. Thus, while ASTMS platform recommendations 
were generally endorsed, there were not necessarily very strong 
mechanisms for the organization of policy consent. Rather, the 
platform relied on the charisma of the General Secretary, who 
reportedly excelled at conference (Interviews,, various dates). As a 
result, platform recommendations were sometimes overturned in the 
most unpredictable of manners. 
The NUPE conference played a less important role during this 
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period for the simple reason that it was held too early to discuss 
any details of Phase One and there was no policy conference in 1976. 
However, at the 1977 Conference, it did accede to executive 
recommendations and grant it considerable policy flexibility on a 
potential Phase Three (see NUPE AC, 1977). Apart from the 
traditional influence of full-time officials in the union, there were 
not particularly strong mechanisms to deliver policy support at 
conference. This was perhaps because it was forthcoming in any 
event. Delegates were selected and voted on behalf of particular 
branches. They did not meet with each other in advance to structure 
either regional or sectional preferences. Nor was there much 
factional activity. In the absence of other control mechanisms, 
platform recommendations appeared to exer cise an important influence 
on delegate choices. Indeed, delegates were sometimes even asked to 
debate and vote for a series of overlapping motions which resulted in 
no clear indication of policy. Thus, it was left to the union's 
leadership to interpret policy. Conference results usually 
reaffirmed this long tradition of the NUPE leadership `leading from 
the front' (Interviews, 15 August and 14 November, 1980). 
Apart from the different methods of structuring delegatO 
preference as enumerated above, procedural mechanisms were also an 
important method of securing consent for leadership policy 
recommendations at the sample union conferences. These concerned the 
rules and customs governing the mechanics of policy conference 
debates. The sample union executives, for instance, all had the 
right to submit special executive motions to their respective policy 
conferences. Apart from the cases of NUPE where there was less 
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substantive debate on this issue during Phases One and Two and the 
AUEW fiere the requirements of factional political organization 
dictated a more low-key approach on the part of the executive, all of 
the other union executives drafted special or emergency motions on 
Phase Two. This was partly as a result of timing since branch 
motions were placed on the agenda long before the Phase Two 
negotiations were completed. However, these very' mechanics of 
policy-making highlighted the degree of flexibility available to the 
platform that was not available to branch delegates. . Moreover, 
special executive motions were often not subject to amendment which 
meant that delegates either had to accept or reject them (on the use 
of special executive motions, see Harrison, 1960: 151-152). 
Special or emergency motions had to be accepted by the Standing 
Orders Committee (SOC) which was charged with organizing the actual 
order of the debate and convincing sponsors of similar motions to 
merge them into larger composites in order to expedite the 
transaction of conference business. SOC decisions often determined 
the actual terms of a debate. For instance, a decision to place some 
motions and not others in the same debate as a special executive 
motion often meant that those motions would be in opposition toj the 
executive recommendation. Indeed, the GMWU chairman ruled that if 
the executive motion on Phase Two was passed then the other motions 
in the debate would simply fall, even though the sponsors of those 
motions maintained that their motions were not intended to be in 
opposition to that of the platform (GMWU ACS 1976). The Standing 
Orders Committee of the AUEW National Committee was the site of 
particularly intense factional battles for control of the order and 
place of debate. As was suggested above, an SOC decision to debate 
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the Social Contract at National-Conference in 1975 rather than at 
National Committee virtually assured its rejection whereas an 
opposite decision would have resulted in policy support for the 
Social Contract. In other unions most SOC decisions did not produce 
nearly such dramatic results, but they did exert a significant 
influence on the actual terms of conference debates. Moreover, 
general secretaries and executives often seemed able to secure 
relatively sympathetic terms for key policy debates from their 
respective standing orders committees. Indeed, in a number of the 
sample unions, national officers who were obviously close to the 
executive played a leading role in the deliberations of the SOC 
(i. e., the case of Ian Mikardo, a prominent executive member and MP, 
at the 1976 ASTMS conference; the FBU where the SOC of six included 
two members of the executive, see FBU, 1978, and FBUJ, April 1977; or 
NUPE where the Chairman of the SOC was a member of the executive, see 
NUPE AC, 1975 and 1977). 
The chairperson of the debates could also be an important 
Qlvment in the platform's relative ability to secure conference 
support for policy initiatives. 'The chair often determined the 
direction of the debate. In the case of the GMWU Congress in both 
1975 and 1976, for instance, the Chairman was continually engaged in 
procedural wrangles with the opponents of union support for pay 
policy (GMWU AC, 1975 and 1976). Most general secretaries also 
benefited from the right to intervene, or respond to each debate on 
behalf of the platform. The chair at union debates would rarely 
intervene to limit the length of such interventions. 
The platforms at the sample union conference also scheduled key 
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outside speakers just prior to important policy debates (on Lord 
Carron's use of outside speakers to influence key policy debates at 
the AUEW National Committee in the 1960x, see'Minkin, 1980: 197). At 
the NUPE conference in 1975, for instance, Len Murray made a powerful 
speech in support of the Social Contract. The next item on the 
agenda was a motion condemning the Social. Contract. It was hardly 
surprising that that motion was defeated. Indeed, the lay sponsor of 
the motion confessed the difficulty he would have in garnering 
support for his motion after an intervention of such high quality 
(NUPE AC, 1975: 223-224). Senior TUC leaders and/or Government 
ministers frequently addressed union policy conferences on the 
benefits and necessity of the Social Contract pay policies during 
this period. The platform, of course, also enjoyed the benefits of 
access to information which stemmed from both contact with Government 
ministers and from access to research services and other professional 
assistance. Full-time officials were, of course, experienced at 
mobilizing and motivating members through speeches to conferences and 
other trade union meetings. This gave them an additional advantage in 
the process of internal policy debates and their ability to mobilize 
and organize consent for particular policy options at union 
conferences (on the influence of professionalism in trade union 
politics, see Lane, 197L). The point is not that any of the sample 
union leaderships sought to conceal the intent of their policy 
recommendations through some form of procedural deceit. Rather, in 
terms of the structure and mechanisms of conference debate, there 
existed a range of procedural advantages that facilitated the passage 
of leadership recommendations. , 
Finally, actual substantive policy orientations were also liable 
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to influence conference outcomes. It was often easier to maintain 
continuity with past policy traditions than it was to negotiate 
significant reversals in union policy approaches. The hierarchical 
distribution of power within union organizations meant that policy 
initiatives ultimately rested with union leaderships and, in the 
absence of opposition, were adopted by default. As was suggested by 
one caustic opponent of the Social Contract pay policies, a national 
official in the engineering union, 'passive acquiescence is always 
easier to secure than obduracy and rejection. To reject requires an 
effort of mind. Acquiescence is negative' (Interview, 15 October 
1980). Equally, policy continuity simply facilitated the 
organization of consent. The GMWU's long tradition of support for pay 
policies, for instance, ensured that support for the actual details 
of Phases One or Two would be relatively unproblematic. By the same 
token, the apparent shift in TGWU bargaining policy towards support 
for a voluntary pay policy was, in part, secured on the basis of 
policy continuity, i. e., previous support for the principle of flat- 
rate wage increases. Thus, even discontinuities could be presented 
in terms of continuity. Moreover, as was suggested in the case of 
the TGWU, particular policy approaches and the systems of argument 
that supported them were bound to have a real consonance with 
different membership perceptions and definitions of interest. 
Arguments in favour of a reward for skill and responsibility that 
were deployed in opposition to the flat-rate policy in Phase One 
evoked identities or interpellated skilled AUEW members and ASTMS 
supervisory staff in a way that would no doubt be dissonant with the 
particular perceptions of most TGWU, GMWU and NUPE activists. Many 
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of the sample union leaders also pointed to a certain disjuncture 
between the political activists at union conferences and what. the 
'ordinary' trade union member thought. As was suggested in Chapter 6 
and illustrated in Figures C. 1 and C. 2, opinion poll evidence 
suggested that during Phase One and the early stages of Phase Two 
union member support for the Labour Government's pay policies was 
generally high and, in fact, ran ahead of the views of the rest of 
the population. Moreover, as was acknowledged by a number of AUEW 
activists when the National Committee met in December 1975 to 
reconsider its opposition to the six-pound policy, local negotiators 
were actually abiding by the policy and many were "happy' with that 
level of increase (Interviews, various dates). 
The sample union leaderships, therefore, enjoyed a powerful 
range of mechanisms with which they could initiate and achieve the 
downwards mediation of policy objectives.. This was apparent in the 
large degree to which platform or executive recommendations were 
adopted by the sample union policy conferences. There were also, 
however, very distinct limitations on the policy discretion of union 
leaderships. These were structural, procedural and substantive in 
nature and varied considerably between unions. As the industrial. 
impact of the pay restraint policies worked its way into the internal 
policy processes of the different sample unions, the differential 
limits of leadership policy discretion would become increasingly 
manifest. This latter process is the subject of Chapter 8. 
FROM POLICY TO PRACTICE 
The mobilization of formal policy consent for Phases one and Two 
in union conferences and executive committees was a necessary but 
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insufficient condition for the actual implementation of the voluntary 
policies. It secured the approval of TUC leadership policy 
recommendations at Congress and special conferences but did not 
ensure observance of the policies. Moreover, as has been previously 
emphasized, the powers of the TUC over the wage bargaining behaviour 
of its affiliates were extremely limited. At the insistence of the' 
Government, Congress House reluctantly undertook a monitoring role in 
Phases One and Two, and TUC leaders did in certain circumstances 
attempt to ensure affiliate compliance with the policies (see Chapter 
6). However, given the struture of British trade unionism, the onus 
on compliance lay within the individual union. Once again, the 
individual union leader played a key role in effecting the downwards 
mediation of the policy. This section considers how formal policy 
support or opposition on Phases One and Two was translated into 
industrial practice in the sample unions. 
The question of actual observance of the Social Contract pay 
policies highlights the link between policy-making and industrial 
practice within trade unions; what has been argued is at the very 
heart of an understanding of the operation of voluntary incomes 
policies. Phases One and Two were certainly remarkable for the high 
degree of compliance that they commanded. The interview data in this 
study covered a large number of negotiating officers and activists 
(see Table 1.6). It tends to confirm that the policies were 
generally observed and that most union leaders, officials and 
activists were reluctant to engage in any open challenge to Phases 
one and Two. Individual employers also appeared to play a critical 
role. Subject to possible government sanctions for breaches of the 
policy as well as CBI appeals to effect the implementation of the 
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policies, they generally complied, only occasionally circumventing 
the pay limits in order to mitigate particular dissatisfactions. 
This research was not designed to investigate the detailed 
mechanisms of compliance at workplace level, especially in the large 
multi-sectoral, decentralized unions involved in a multitude of 
collective agreements. In a study focusing on particular workplaces 
during this period, for instance, Willman (1982: 142-143) was able to 
identify the importance of steward leadership on the shopfloor in 
delivering compliance with the Social Contract incomes policies. 
Interview evidence in this study certainly confirms such a finding. 
However, this study is more directly concerned with the downwards and 
upwards articulation of policy support and opposition between 
different levels of union organizations. Thus, it focuses on how 
official policy positions were translated into the formulation and 
pursuit of bargaining policy and, in turn, how industrial pressures 
were translated into policy-making. Were unions, for instance, the 
active or passive agents of policy implementation in the case of 
Phases One and Two? The patterns of detailed policy implementation 
highlight the importance of both union policy structure änd 
bargaining structure. How, for instance, were policy messages of 
support or opposition transmitted between different levels as wel l"as 
between different channels of union decision-making transmitted? In 
particular, in the case of dual-channel unions, how were policy 
messages communicated, if at all, from the 'political' channel of 
union decision-making to wage bargainers often located in a separate 
channel of activity? 
The sample unions, regardless of their particular policy 
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position, appear to provide a common pattern.. Once consent or 
opposition became formal policy, implementation was usually left to 
the discretion of the union's leadership. Formal union policy 
positions were approved either at union conferences or by. the 
executive and, then, interpreted by the executive or one of its 
subcommittees. In practice, this organizational division of labour 
bestowed a high degree of discretion on the individual union leader 
who was authorized by the executive to transmit policy and oversee 
its implementation. Indeed, the executive committee often gave only 
its post facto approval to various measures taken by its leader in 
pursuit of a policy. 
The first task was usually to sell the merits of the union's 
policy to its members. Union journals, the media and direct contact 
were the most common forms of communicating union policy. All of the 
sample unions had monthly journals, and all of the sample union 
leaders wrote regularly about the Social Contract pay policies in 
these journals. Union leaders and key regional officers also made 
considerable efforts to attend industrial, regional and local' 
meetings of their unions in order to explain and promote their policy 
position, particularly during the early stages of Phase One. 
The degree of detailed industrial guidance appeared to be 
largely a function of bargaining structure and of previous bargaining 
policy. Unions with highly centralized bargaining arrangements such 
as NUPE and the FBU were less inclined to issue detailed bargaining 
instructions because the union's leadership was directly involved in 
most significant bargaining activity. The circulation of information 
to the membership was, therefore, confined to explanation of policies 
(see FBUJ and NUPEJ, 1975-1977; NUPE GSC and FBU GSC, various dates). 
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Unions with more decentralized bargaining arrangements were more 
likely to issue detailed instructions for negotiators, but the extent 
to which they did so reflected their different approaches to 
bargaining (see Chapter 4). ' The GMWU and ASTMS, for instance, 
circulated much detailed information whereas the AUEW and TGWU 
appeared to leave much of the burden of interpretation to local 
officials and activists. After the initial internal dissemination of 
the policy, only exceptional cases came to the attention of national 
union leaderships. Otherwise, in all of the unions, the main burden 
of industrial implementation rested with national, regional and local 
industrial officers as well as lay activists. 
In the TGWU, Jack Jones called a meeting of all full-time 
officials to explain the six pound policy (Interview, 23 March 1980). 
The union also responded to the TUC request to monitor its pay 
settlements and issued press statements to convince the public that 
the policy was being observed (TGWU GSC, 18 September 1975). Once the 
high degree of compliance with the policy became apparent, however, 
the system of informal monitoring appeared to fall into disuse 
(Interviews, 1 May and 30 July 1980). 
1 
Reflecting its traditions of both full-time officer dominance 
and its loyalty to Labour governments, the GMWU was undoubtedly the 
most active of the sample unions in communicating its support for the 
Phase One and Two policies. David Basnett held a meeting of all 
regional secretaries in the union who, in turn, were to disseminate 
the policy message to regional officers. He also offered to meet 
with any regional executives and councils to explain the Phase One 
policy (GMWU GSC) 29 July 1975). The General Secretary also issued 
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particularly detailed guidelines on observance of the policies. As 
in the TGWU, officials were requested to report details of all pay 
settlements to the central office (GMWU GSC, 8 October 1975). Unlike 
the TGWU, this system of reporting appeared to remain operational 
into Phase Two. The GMWU executive also stated quite categorically 
in the cases of both Phases One and Two that it had endorsed these 
guidelines, as had the TUC, and would snot support action to breach 
them' (GMWU GSC, August 1975 and July 1976; GMWUJ, September 1975). 
The main emphasis during Phase One was to encourage officials to 
treat the six pound limit as an entitlement and ensure that they went 
for the full amount (FT, 23 July 1975). During Phase Two, the 
General Secretrary repeatedly issued detailed advice on items such as 
equal and sick pay, maternity, redundancy and new work provisions and 
'fair wages' claims that were allowed in addition to the monetary 
limits (GMWU GSC, 10 May, 28 June, 12 and 13 July, 10 and 20 August, 
10 November and 9 December 1976). Internal union communications and 
requests to the TUC for advice also provid much evidence of detailed 
attempts to observe the guidelines (GMWU IMF 5 and 20 August, 2 
September, 13914,15,18,19 and 26 October and 21 December 1976). 
Interview evidence with GMWU officials largely confirmed this pattern 
of active compliance. 
In stark contrast with the example of the GMWU, - Clive Jenkins 
of ASTMS played an even more active role in advising ASTMS officers 
and activists of the union's opposition to the Phase One policy. 
Modelling its response on its previous success in challenging the 
application of statutory incomes policies (see Chapter 4)' Jenkins 
convened a series of meetings and prepared to launch a veritable war 
of manoeuvre in opposition to the industrial application of the 
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policy. In the month of July alone, the General Secretary issued 
five separate circulars on the union's opposition to the policy and 
how it might implement its policy of opposition (ASTMS GSC, 2,11, 
16,29 and 31 July 1975). No other union leader in this study was as 
prolific in this domain! Regional officials were also encouraged to 
meet and forward detailed suggestions on possible loopholes in the 
guidelines. ASTMS regularly published the reports of its divisional 
officers. During the pay policy periods, they were asked to report 
their success in securing increases above the limits. In order not 
to attract the scrutiny of the Department of Employment, they were 
requested not to refer to these cases by name. Department of 
Employment officials and other union officials greeted many of these 
claims with some scepticism (Interviews, 22 August and 7 and 15 
October 1980). Indeed, ASTMS officials recalled that the system 
encouraged inflated reporting. None of this was, of course, 
detrimental to the pursuit of either publicity or new membership. 
ASTMS was certainly alone among the sample unions in actively. 
encouraging breaches of the Phase One and Two policies. However, 
such breaches were to be discrete rather than direct challenges. 
During Phase Two, for instance, negotiators were encouraged to make 
claims which would be payable upon the expiry of Phase Two (ASTMS 
GSC, 29 December 1976; FT, 10 August 1976). ASTMS officials, - 
particularly in the West Midlands, were also very active in the use 
of Fair Wages claims to obtain increases greater than those allowed 
under the Social Contract pay policies (Interviews, various dates; 
also Michael Jones, 1980). However, in common with the other sample 
unions, dispute benefits paid out by ASTMS were at a very low level 
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during this period (see Note u, Chapter 6). 
The AUEW was initially ambiguous on Phase One because of a 
division within the executive about the interpetation of the union's 
policy. The initial problem concerned national engineering 
negotiations. The union attempted to obtain clarification first from 
the TUC and later from ACAS on the scope for national as opposed to 
domestic increases under the Phase One policy (Guardian, 10 September- 
and 12 December 1975; AUEW GSC, 23 December 1975). In the meantime, 
the union's policy-making body endorsed Phase One and local wage 
settlements continued to undermine the potential for any national 
wage increase in the engineering industry. There was ultimately no 
national engineering agreement in either Phase One or Phase Two (AUEW 
GSC, 13 October 1976). Instead, as in the large dual-channel unions, 
most negotiations were conducted at company or local level. In a 
union with such strong traditions of district bargaining autonomy, 
apart from general statements of support for the Social Contract, 
there were few detailed indications from central office on how to 
approach the new bargaining climate. However, it became readily 
apparent that the executive would not support any disputes in breach 
of the guidelines (Interviews, 26 February, 28 March and 24 July 
1980). The AUEW maintained this position throughout Phases One and 
Two despite mounting unrest and unofficial action by some skilled 
bargaining groups over the erosion of differentials (see Chapter 8). 
The key role in the translation of union policy into industrial 
practice was certainly played by full-time officials and leading 
activists. Negotiating officers, lay or full-time, held a dual 
accountability: to the members on whose behalf they sought to secure 
agreements and to the various union committees and officials which 
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oversaw their work. The full-time officer played a key educational 
role in the detailed dissemination of union policy and in the 
formation of expectations and the formulation of detailed bargaining 
policy. Such a role was evident, for instance, in the trade group 
structure of the TGWU and the system of industrial conferences in the 
GMWU where bargaining strategy was the main item for discussion.. 
District and national officials in the AUEW were also obliged to 
carry the message of the union's support for pay policy. Industrial 
officers who were not in agreement with union policy could do little 
more than acquiesce in opposition to the policies, if such opposition 
was forthcoming, or seek to persuade members of the consequences of 
wage restraint. However, as one AUEW official noted in the case of 
Phase One, you would have to be crazy if you tried to persuade 
members not to accept the largest increase they had ever had' 
(Interview, 11 August 1980). Thus, detailed compliance appeared to 
be secured largely through the efforts of officials and activists in 
the industrial sphere of union decision-making; though most actors 
agreed that the external environment had also exerted a critical 
influence in securing such a measure of compliance. However, 
industrial channels of decision-making also became important forums 
for the expression of opposition to the impact of the polioies, 
particularly as industrial tensions over the differential impact of 
the policies and the problems that they brought in terms of 
relativities and differentials increased. In these circumstances, 
many activists and officers became much less enthusiastic advocates 
of wage restraint as they were caught between their accountability to 
official policy, on the one hand, and their accountability to the 
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members on whose behalf they negotiated, on the other. The 
expression of this dissatisfaction and its articulation is the 
central theme of the next chapter. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has attempted to trace the organization and 
mobilization of consent for Phases One and Two of the Social Contract 
incomes policies in the sample unions in this study. It identified 
the key decision-making bodies in this process and charted the 
downwards mobilization of the TUC policy initiatives on pay policy in 
union executives and policy conferences. More specifically, it 
highlighted some of the mechanisms of control in such a process. 
Finally, it looked at how policy positions were then translated into 
industrial practice. 
While the organization of consent for these, policies was 
generally translated into detailed compliance, there emerged growing 
resistance in both industrial and policy channels of the unions to a 
further policy of wage restraint. These internal dynamics of incomes 
policy consent increasingly limited the ability of TUC leaders to 
construct any kind of agreement with a Government intent on securing 
further rounds of wage restraint. Chapter 8 looks at the 
mobilization of opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies 
within the sample unions and its implications for both TUC and 
Government policy-making in Phases Three and Four of the Social 
Contract incomes policies. 
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CHAPTER 8 
THE MOBILIZATION OF OPPOSITION AND COLLAPSE OF THE POLICIES 
This chapter completes the account of the- trade union'role in 
the cycle of Social Contract incomes policies. It focuses on the 
organization and mobilization of opposition to wage restraint within 
the sample unions, the implications of these internal union 
developments for TUC policy-making and the culmination of these 
developments in the breakdown of the policies in the winter of 1978- 
1979, a period which came to be labelled as the 'winter of 
discontent'. 
It was argued in Chapter 7 that consent for the Social Contract 
incomes policies was organized from above and mediated downwards by 
trade union leaders who sought to translate a TUC General Counai l 
policy consensus first into policy agreement and then into actual 
industrial practice. The degree of opposition to this predominant 
downwards thrust of policy was highly differentiated varying by union 
in relation to previous policy approaches and prevailing mechanisms 
of internal political control. In most of the sample unions, 
opposition was initially confined to political activists who were 
opposed to the principle of wage restraint. However, the detailed 
impact of the policies gave rise to a growing and much wider sense of 
grievance. This was expressed informally in particular occupational 
538 
and industrial tensions and disputes. It was also reflected in 
industrial policy forums such as industrial committees and 
conferences which articulated their dissatisfaction to other policy 
forums such as regional committees, national executives and policy 
conferences. This blending of industrial and ideological expression 
into a common oppositional thrust to the policies would appear to 
confirm Roderick Martin's (1978: 104) suggestion that the major bases 
of group formation in the internal political processes of trade 
unions are occupational interests and ideology. The Social Contract 
incomes policies appeared to stimulate the construction of loose 
coalitions of industrial and ideological interests, often quite 
different in each union, which articulated their opposition to any 
further period of voluntary wage restraint in the particular policy 
structures of the sample unions. 
Thus, opposition to the Social Contract policies within the 
sample unions coalesced or was aggregated at many different levels of 
internal union structure and in a highly differentiated manner. In 
the face of increasing hostility to the impact of Phase One and Two 
on differentials, the AUEW, for example, witnessed the almost total 
collapse of support in its moderate faction for a continuation of the 
policies. Similarly, the formal support of the FBU for Phase Two"was, 
in sharp contrast with the growth of local industrial pressures which 
built rapidly towards unprecedented, national industrial action in 
Phase Three. In the. context of its continued critique of Government 
economic policy, the NUPE leadership particularly contested the 
impact of the policies on the low-paid. Thus, it laid the 
foundations of a campaign to improve the wages of the low-paid which 
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culminated in a major public sector confrontation in Phase Four. 
ASTMS experienced few internal pressures since it was, from the 
beginning, committed to opposing and, where possible, circumventing 
the Social Contract incomes policies. The TGWU and GMWU, however, 
both displayed increasing signs of opposition in. their complex, 
bifurcated structures. With its strong loyalist tradition and 
powerful mechanisms of internal control, these were more easily 
contained in the GMWU. Despite increasing volatility in its internal 
political processes, the GMWU policy conference was prepared to 
contemplate a Phase Three policy. By the time of Phase Four, even 
the GMWU leadership was alienated by the Labour Government's 
determination to impose unilaterally a five per cent limit on wage 
increases. The TGWU once again proved to be the most significant, 
site for the forces of opposition and consent to the Social Contract 
pay po 1icies. Just as its * 1975 conference had ensured TUC support 
for the Phase One policy, its July 1977 conference decision to reject 
a possible Phase Three swung the balance firmly away from any TUC 
leadership attempt to construct a consensus around a Phase Three wage 
norm and made the possibility of any future pay agreements much less 
likely. It also represented an unprecedented defeat for the 
authority of the TGWU general secretary, in itself an indication of 
the internal political and industrial forces released by the Soeial- 
Contract incomes policies. The major part of this chapter focuses on 
these internal dynamics of incomes policy. It traces the 
predominantly upwards mediation of policy in opposition to wage 
restraint as industrial pressures were translated into union policy_ 
making and increasingly limited the scope for individual union 
leadership participation in further TUC policy initiatives on incomes 
° 540 
policy. 
As was suggested above, these internal processes were 
particularly significant for the determination of TUC policy. 
Although the TUC was formally committed to 'an orderly return to 
voluntary collective bargaining' after Phase Two, TUC leaders 
signalled to the Government that they were nonetheless willing to 
consider pay questions in the context of a strategy to tackle 
unemployment and inflation (TUC Circular, 16 December 1976; TUC ECD, 
9 March 1977; GMWU IM, 26 January 1977). However, anxious to secure 
much more significant concessions on economic policy than the 
Government had hitherto been willing to offer and also sensitive to 
criticisms that the early conclusion of the Phase Two negotiations in 
1976 had effectively by-passed the policy-making role of many 
individual union conferences, they decided to sound out membership 
opinion suggesting that, in the interim, both the confidence of trade 
union members in the Social Contract and the cooperation of the TUC 
in future policies were contingent on more positive measures on the 
part of the Government (FT, 13 and 21 January 1977; TUC ECD, 9 March 
1977; TUC ECM, 16 July 1976 and 13 April. 1977; Guardian, 10 May' 
1977)" Thus, the internal dynamics of incomes policy, the apparent 
limits of internal union cohesion, emerged as a major constraint on 
the external dynamics of the policy, particularly as the balance of 
opinion appeared to swing irrevocably away from further formal policy 
support for wage restraint during this period. This chapter, 
therefore, also considers the implications of these internal 
dynamics, first, for the discussions between the TUC and the 
Government on Phase Three and, secondly, for the collapse of the 
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policies in Phase Four. 
The chapter is divided into two main parts. The first part 
focuses on union industrial practice and policy-making. It outlines 
the industrial pressures associated with the impact of the Social 
Contract incomes policies, their specific manifestations in the 
industrial structures of the sample unions and their translation into 
union policy-making on further possible phases of wage restraint. It 
also attempts to decipher common patterns of opposition and support 
for the pay policies across the sample unions and considers their 
implications for the internal dynamics of leadership discretion in 
union approaches to incomes policies. The second part of the 
chapter explores briefly the implications of these internal union 
dynamics, particularly the variations in and sources of internal 
leadership discretion, for external or TUC policy-making at the 
level of the TUC General Council and in the TUC's relations with the 
state. It focuses on both the TUC decision not to endorse a Phase 
Three policy and the collapse of the Social Contract pay policies in 
the winter of 1978-1979. 
INTERNAL POLICY-MAKING 
This part of the chapter focuses on the translation of the 
industrial pressures associated with the Social Contract incomes'. 
policies into sample union policy-making. The first section 
outlines the general industrial tensions of the period and their 
impact on both wage bargaining and the political acceptability of the 
policies. The second section considers how these industrial 
pressures were organized both formally and informally in the 
industrial and policy structures of the sample unions and their 
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particular impact on union policy decisions to support or oppose 
further phases of the Social Contract incomes policies. - Subsequent 
sections examine internal policy-making in each of the sample unions. 
This discussion is particularly concerned with the differential 
impact of the policies and how particular industrial responses were 
mediated by different union policy structures. The final section 
attempts to identify patterns of opposition and support for the 
policies across the sample unions with a particular focus on the 
regional bases from which majority policy coalitions were 
constructed. 
Industrial Tensions and Their Political Consequences 
The viability of the Social Contract incomes policies was 
increasingly undermined in both relative and absolute terms over the 
course of Phases Two and Three. In relative terms, it was suggested 
in Chapter 6 that while Phase One was particularly well received and 
Phase Two continued to command a high degree of compliance, the 
combined effect of the two policies created considerable scope for 
differentials and relativities problems which, it was argued, were 
the most salient form of wage comparison. The'imposition of a 
centralized norm, whatever its design, was bound to have a 
differentiated impact on different industrial settings and, thus,, 
alter some customary wage relationships., As these perceived 
anomalies persisted, industrial tensions mounted. The definition of 
a flat-rate norm in Phase One and an upper limit on the five per cent 
figure allowed in Phase Two, for instance, entailed a narrowing of 
wage or earnings differentials in many workplaces. By the latter 
stages of Phase Two, sectional revolts of skilled engineers became 
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commonplace in many West Midlands factories and created particular 
internal problems for the AUEW which was committed to support the 
policy. Such problems were often compounded by the differential 
impact of the policies on different payment systems. Those who 
worked on payment-by-results systems or benefited from incremental 
salary scales appeared to have much greater leeway to circumvent the 
most restrictive effects of the policies, again creating both 
workplace problems and internal union tensions (on payment-by-results 
as opposed to time-rated systems, see Table 6.1). The fact that the 
Phase One and Two settlements were payable as supplements also meant 
those whose earnings were greatly affected by the calculation of 
overtime, shift differentials or other sundry payments felt doubly 
aggrieved, especially when it affected particular relativities. 
Moreover, there was little official scope to rectify many of these 
grievances because of the operation of the twelve-month rule for 
principal wage increases. Thus, many tensions were directed 
internally at local lay activists or union officials who, in turn, 
articulated these grievances in industrial policy forums where such a 
possibility existed or, exceptionally, felt sufficiently aggrieved to 
pursue some form of industrial action. 
Employers played a key mediating role in determining the_ 
impact of these external guidelines on internal wage structures. As 
suggested by one national union official, 'you cannot enforce incomes 
policy any more than you can enforce the speed limit' (Interview, 28 
July 1980). The highly informal vetting process of the Department of 
Employment relied, largely on media reports of wage settlements 
(Interviews, 15 October 1980). This highlighted the difficulty of 
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enforcement. Certainly, almost every negotiating officer 
interviewed agreed that it was possible to circumvent some aspect of 
the guidelines when employers felt it was necessary to do so. Both 
Government and TUC officials were naturally concerned that the 
policy appeared to be universal. This was a key element in 
maintaining a degree of compliance. Therefore, any publicity about 
alleged breaches of the policies generally prompted some action on 
the part of the TUC or the Department of Employment. Where increases 
over and above the guidelines were kept secret, however, employers 
and union officials were able to mitigate the impact of the policies 
and reduce the level of internal tensions in both the bargaining unit 
and the union. Where employers did not or could not take such 
action, any frustration was often vented internally in union policy 
processes, especially when other groups appeared able to escape the 
worst effects of the policies through mechanisms such as pre-existing 
productivity bonus schemes or payment-by-results systems. This 
highly differentiated impact of the pay policies on wage 
differentials and relativities contributed to a growing sense of 
grievance about the impact of the policies and fuelled Specific 
claims to rectify perceived anomalies. Union leaderships advocating 
continued restraint frequently had to contend with particular groups 
of members intent on pursuing sectional claims and the pressures.. 
within those unions built to a degree that it was no longer 
practicable to recommend further commitment to wage restraint. This 
was apparent in the rise in the frequency and volume of dispute 
activity over Phases Two and Three (see Table E. 1). The 
manifestations of particular tensions in the internal policy 
processes of the sample unions will be further scrutinized below. 
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In absolute terms, changes in the external economic 
environment, primarily the continued slide in the value of the pound 
sterling on international markets during the latter stages of Phase 
One and the early months of Phase Two, contributed to a sudden rise 
in the rate of price inflation (see IDS Report 250, February 1977; 
TUC ECD, 7 July 1977). The level of both prices and earnings 
increases had declined steadily through Phase One. The rate of 
increase in earnings continued to decline during Phase Two. The 
rate of price increases, however, rose steadily (see Figure B. 1, 
Appendix B). While Phases One and Two had been designed to achieve 
a decline in real earnings, the actual decline was much more 
precipitous than had been anticipated (see Figure B. 2. and Table 
B. 1). Virtually all of the major occupational and industrial groups 
in the sample unions experienced a particularly sharp decline in real 
earnings over the course of Phase Two (see Appendix D). This loss of 
earnings power appeared to translate into a sharp decline in the 
popularity of the policies among trade unionists. Opinion poll 
evidence indicated a high level of support among trade unionists for 
the Government's prices and incomes policy during Phase One and the 
first weeks of Phase Two. The dramatic drop in the level of support 
during much of the remainder of Phase Two suggests a certain loss of,, - 
confidence in the relative efficacy of the policy and at least some 
association with the changing economic environment (see Figure C. 1P 
Appendix C). 1 Though the relativities and differentials problems 
might have been a contributing factor, it seems implausible that the 
highly incremental effect of the policies on differentials and 
relativities could account for such a sharp and sudden, decline in 
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support for the Social Contract incomes policies. 
The hypothesis that a sharp decline in support for the Phase Two 
policy was strongly associated with a similarly precipitous decline 
in real earnings is supported by subsequent movements in the earnings 
and polling data. The trend lines in prices and earnings were 
actually reversed over the course of Phase Three as the rate of 
increase in earnings rose steadily while the level of price increases 
declined (see Figure B. 1).. The level of support among trade 
unionists for the policy also recovered sharply (see Figure C. 1). By 
then, however, the drift away from the policy appeared almost 
irreversible as many of the most pressing relativites problems 
remained unresolved. Moreover, the success of some private sector 
bargaining groups in rectifying their perceived anomalies, especially 
through productivity agreements as allowed under the Phase Three 
guidelines, sparked yet further competitive claims in the private 
sector. It also contributed to a growing sense of injustice among 
public sector bargaining groups which were held more rigidly to the 
ten per cent limit specified in Phase Three and enjoyed less scope 
for the negotiation of productivity agreements. By the end of Phase 
Three, feelings of injustice in many public sector bargaining groups 
were running extremely high and most of the unions which had complied 
with the Phase Three guidelines were committed to reversing the- 
decline in their relativities during the next bargaining round. 
The Government's attempt to enforce a five per cent limit on 
wage increases in Phase Four further exacerbated these tensions. The 
level of public support for the policy declined sharply while the 
level of opposition mounted (see Figures C. 1 and C. 2). Even the most 
loyal Labour Party affiliates such as the GMWU opposed the new policy 
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describing it as 'counter-productive and unnecessary' (GMWUJ, October 
1978). Thus, the five per cent limit led inexorably to major 
confrontations first in the private sector where the Government's 
powers of enforcement were successfully challenged in Parliament and, 
then, with its own employees in the public sector where the policy 
finally collapsed. Phases Three and Four were essentially a phased 
re-entry to free collective bargaining with a particularly marked 
increase in the volume of industrial conflict and the rhetoric that 
accompanied it (on the patterns of industrial conflict, see Table 
E. 1, Appendix E). There were numerous efforts to repair the damaged 
relations between the TUC and the Government, first, with a tentative 
agreement which failed to secure the consent of the TUC General 
Council in the autumn of 1978 and, then, with the negotiation of a 
new agreement in February 1979 (TUC GCM, 11 November 1978; TUC, 1979a 
and b). However, the Labour Party's 1974 election promise to offer a 
more consensual form of state-trade union relations through the 
medium of the Social Contract (see Chapter 3) commanded little 
credibility in the months preceding the May 1979 General Election. 
{ 
The Labour Government and its badly battered Social Contract were 
thus defeated by a Conservative Party pledged to pursue trade union 
reform (on the Conservative Party's approach to trade unions, see,: 
Conservative Party, 1979) 2 
Industrial Pressures and Union Policy-Making 
While there continued to be a high degree of union compliance 
with the Phase One and Two policies as well as with much of Phase 
Three, the detailed impact of the Social Contract incomes policies 
led to industrial tensions and a growing sense of grievance. This 
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section is concerned with how this sense of grievance about the 
industrial impact of the policies was organized and articulated into 
the industrial and policy channels of the sample unions. 
Consent for the Social Contract was organized from above and 
generally mediated downwards by trade union leaders who sought to 
translate a TUC General Council policy consensus first into policy 
agreement and then into actual industrial practice. Opposition to 
this predominant downwards thrust of policy was expressed in varying 
degrees in all of the five sample unions which either supported or 
acquiesced in the implementation of Phases One and Two. Opposition 
was especially strong in the left faction of the AUEW, parts of the 
NUPE leadership and a small core of activists in the TGWU. In the 
sixth sample union, ASTMS, the leadership contested the TUC General 
Council policy consensus and communicated this dissent downwards in 
the major union policy forums. Since there was little active 
expression of consent for wage restraint within the union, the. 
debates over incomes policy were largely uncontentious. 
The opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies in both 
the supporting and dissenting unions was, at least initially, 
primarily ideological or political in character. The opponents were 
almost exclusively on the left of the political spectrum and rejected, 
state interference in collective bargaining under a capitalistic 
system of market allocation (on trade union approaches to incomes 
policies and state intervention in wage bargaining, see Chapter J4). 
However, such opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies 
remained a minority position in the decisions to support Phases One 
and Two. TUC support for Phase Two, for instance, was endorsed by a 
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very large margin at the Special Congress in June 1976, even though 
there was more opposition within a number of the sample unions than 
the vote might have indicated (see Chapter 7). More widespread 
opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies within the unions 
under investigation was only gradually organized around the 
grievances about the impact of the policies. As Gavanta (1980: 
257) has suggested, the powerless must undergo a process of 
mobilization upon them. That is they must develop their own 
resources for challenge - organization, information, sustaining 
values - to counter the prevailing mobilization of bias'. While the 
Appalachian poor to which Gavanta refers might not be an exact 
parallel, the notion of mobilizing resources and values against a 
prevailing downwards mediation of policy is. If union policy was to 
be altered, then the sense of grievance about the impact of the pay 
policies had to be organized and expressed collectively within the 
union whether formally or informally. Thus, industrial opposition 
became allied with the political opponents of the policies either to 
limit relative leadership policy discretion on this question or 
change actual policy orientations. This process was central, to 
,. 
the 
mobilization of opposition and the upwards mediation of policy 
messages within the unions. 
The organization of union policy-making, industrial or 
otherwise, thus becomes a key variable in the analysis of internal 
union opposition to wage restraint and the determination of the 
relative degree of leadership discretion in the policy process of 
individual unions. The differential impact of the Social Contract 
incomes policies on different unions and their responses as mediated 
by the particular cultures, structures and policy predispositions of 
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those organizations implied quite different material and ideological 
bases of consent for and opposition to the policies. A particular 
economic impact' did not automatically lead to a given form of 
collective social behaviour. The squeezing of differentials, for 
instance, did not necessarily lead to unofficial work stoppages, 
internal union revolts or demands for separate bargaining status. 
Rather, the economic impact was organized and articulated in terms of 
particular industrial settings and union structures. In this sense, 
organizational structure, membership composition and policy 
predispositions are all key variables for an explanation of different 
types of union response to incomes policies. 
The industrial or single-channel unions such as the FBU and 
AUEW, for instance, experienced a very rapid translation of 
industrial pressures into formal union policy-making. Wage 
bargaining policy and other political issues were considered in the 
same policy forums. Industrial pressures were also relatively 
uniform: the skilled in the case of the AUEW and the largely 
homogeneous membership of the FBU. Both of these unions supported 
both Phases One and Two. However, the sheer force of internal 
tension prompted the leadership of the FBU to reject any possible 
support of a Phase Three policy. The AUEW president attempted toý- 
maintain some degree of policy flexibility for a possible 
construction of a Phase Three. However, internal industrial 
pressures were sufficient to defeat such an approach at the union's 
1977 policy conference. Internal pressures in NUPE were not nearly 
so intense and the leadership did maintain a degree of policy 
flexibility for external policy initiatives at the level of the TUC. 
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However, the degree of internal dissatisfaction. had grown 
dramatically by the latter stages of Phase Three when it appgared 
that the private sector had successfully pursued free collective 
bargaining while public sector bargaining groups would continue to be 
f 
bound by the Government's pay limits. The NUPE leadership seized the 
initiative in this case and embarked on a major low-pay campaign 
which culminated in the collapse of Phase Four. 
The large, dual-channel unions such as ASTMS, the GMWU and TGWU 
experienced comparatively less -direct pressure. Their wide 
membership coverage meant that the actual effects of the policies 
were highly differentiated by bargaining group. Indeed, some of the 
general union bargaining groups felt comparatively advantaged by the 
impact of the policies and indicated a reservoir of support for 
further policies of this kind. Signs of consent for and opposition 
to the policies were, therefore, likely to be differentiated by 
particular occupational or industrial groups or localities. The 
upwards mediation of opposition to wage restraint involved the 
aggregation of particular dissatisfactions with the local industrial 
effects of the policies to higher policy-making levels within the 
unions. Since ASTMS opposed the imposition of the policies and its 
officers were encouraged to circumvent the pay norms where possible, 
the internal manifestations of opposition to wage restraint were very- 
limited. Some political activists complained about what they saw as 
the lack of leadership enthusiasm to challenge openly the guidelines. 
Technicians in the public sector also expressed increasing 
dissatisfaction with their inability to maintain relativities with 
their private sector counterparts. In the TGWU and GMWU, however, 
despite strong leadership commitment to the policies, there were 
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multiple signs of industrial tensions in- their trade group and 
industrial conference structures. These generally were handled by 
local or national industrial officers who were obliged to defend 
their union's policy of support for Phases One and Two. 
Occasionally, such pressures translated into isolated industrial or 
political challenges to the union's leadership. However, in the 
TGWU, where the trade group industrial structure articulated very 
directly into regional committee, executive and conference policy 
deliberations, these industrial tensions became an increasingly 
important component of political opposition to the Social Contract 
incomes policies. Coalitions between political opponents and 
industrial grievances were gradually constructed at local, regional 
and trade group level. This upwards mediation of policy ultimately 
led to the unprecedented defeat of a TGWU leadership recommendation 
on pay policy at the 1977 BDC. The GMWU leadership, on the other 
hand, maintained a degree of flexibility for the pursuit of external 
policy initiatives in Phases Three and Four. 
The following sections deal with some of the principal 
f 
variations between the sample unions in terms of the industrial 
impact of the Social Contract pay policies and the expression of 
opposition in their industrial and policy structures. The firnt: 
three look at the experience of the unions with basically single- 
channel policy structures: the FBU, AUEW and NUPE. The subsequent 
three consider the case of the dual-channel or bifurcated union 
structures: ASTMS, the GMWU and the TGWU. 
FBU 
. The case of the FBU provides an excellent example of the 
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impact of wage restraint on an industrial union. It experienced 
particularly severe internal pressures over the course of Phases One 
to Three. These pressures were manifested in increasingly frequent 
local industrial action and challenges to national union policy and 
the national executive. They culminated in an eight-week national 
dispute from November 1977 to January 1978, the union's first ever 
such conflict, which was initiated against executive advice by a 
recalled annual conference (FBU GSC, 2 and 7 November 1977). Indeed, 
this dispute proved the most significant challenge to the 
Government's attempt to maintain a ten per cent Phase Three wage 
ceiling without the explicit agreement of the TUC. The delay in 
reaching a settlement utfimately had more to do with finding a 
formula which would preserve the integrity of the Government's wage 
guidelines than with any reluctance on the part of, local authority 
employers to improve the wages of firefighters. 
The particular severity of the internal pressures within the FBU 
was the result of several factors: the structure of bargaining and 
industrial location, the composition of firefighters' earnings, union 
bargaining strategy and union structure. First, the FBU engaged in 
one set of national negotiations with a joint panel of local 
authority employers. Their location in the public sector meant that 
the Government insisted on a strict application of its pay policy 
guidelines. The composition of the employer side of the negotiating 
table, different local authority representatives organized along both 
%party political' lines and according to whether they were 
metropolitan or shire counties, ensured that negotiations were very 
much a political process with all the attendant difficulties of 
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decentralized employer authority and multilateral bargaining (on the 
latter, see Kochau, 1979). Moreover, the national character of the 
negotiations exposed the union leadership to particular pressures 
from regional and sectional claims, especially as a sense of 
grievance about the impact of the Social Contract incomes policies 
grew. 
Secondly, this sense of grievance was fuelled specifically by 
the composition of firefighters' earnings. As was noted in Chapter 
4, firefighters were distinguished by the high degree to which basic 
rates accounted for total earnings. This meant that they had 
virtually no scope for earnings drift and were stringently affected 
by any pay norm based on wage rates, doubly so because of their 
location in the public sector. Indeed, this had long been a source 
of FEU complaint about the inequitable impact of incomes policies 
(see Chapter 4). Earnings data certainly supports the basis of the 
union's complaints. Relative to other occupational groups in the 
sample unions, firefighters appeared to experience a sharper decline 
in real earnings. The real average weekly earnings of firefighters 
declined by as much as fifteen per cent over the course of Phases One 
and Two (see Appendix D, especially Figure D. 3). 
Thirdly, the scope for mitigating the restrictive impact of the 
Social Contract incomes policies was reduced further by the union's' 
own bargaining strategy. The union had long campaigned for a 
reduction in working hours but it had, in the past, agreed to 
increase the length of working hours, a form of productivity 
increase, in order to attain an increase greater than what was 
permitted by the Labour Government's incomes policies in the 1960s. 
When the union did succeed in achieving some reduction in working 
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hours in 1974, it simultaneously introduced a ban on all overtime 
work (see Chapter u). This was a deliberate attempt to accentuate 
the pressures on national negotiations and, thereby, improve basic 
rates. However, it reduced the scope for alleviating the impact of 
Phases One and Two and was the object of increasing regional 
challenges. 
Finally, the industrial structure of the union meant that 
industrial pressures were rapidly articulated in union policy-making 
forums. There was no separation between policy-makers and industrial 
negotiators. Moreover, local brigades did not have the authority to 
settle local disputes. Thus, when employers refused to accede to 
local demands, these industrial pressures were expressed within the 
union with all the consequent political repercussions. One regional 
committee, for instance, noted in a motion to the executive that it 
no longer supported the Social Contract and linked this to their 
employers' readiness to take advantage of the union's reluctance to 
initiate strike action (FBU GSC, 25 October 1976). As the level of 
local tensions increased with the impact of pay policies, the union, 
as vividly portrayed by one leading official, was like '*a building 
which was smouldering in the basement. If you add paraffin and wood 
chips, there will be an explosion; and this is what happened in. the, 
Fire Service' (Interview, 22 September 1980). 
Some of these pressures were already apparent in the split 
within the FBU in the summer of 1975 over whether'to end its campaign 
of industrial action and settle for six pounds (see Chapter 7). They 
became increasingly manifest during Phases One and Two asp counter 
to national union policy, local industrial actions in pursuit of 
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special payments proliferated in various regions, often'in opposition 
to specific executive instructions to cease such actions. In March 
1976 leading officials of the South Yorkshire Brigade were suspended 
from office for pre-arranging a system of overtime work and refusing 
to comply with the executive request to conform with the union ban on 
overtime work (FBU GSC, 17 March and 2 April 1976). During the 
summer of 1976, a work-to-rule campaign in London led to the creation 
of a special ACAS inquiry (FBU GSC, 29 June 1976; FTC 13 July 1976; 
The Times, 14 July 1976; ACAS, 1977). There was also continuing 
tension between the executive member from Scotland and Strathclyde 
officials who wished to organize local action against cuts in service 
(Scotsman, 24 June 1976). In October 1976, against union advice and 
in opposition to its own regional committee, an unofficial 'local 
action committee' in Northern Ireland led a campaign to secure an 
'extra responsibility' payment (FBU GSC, 8 October 1976). Given the 
special circumstances in Northern Ireland, the executive urged 
members to return to work but endeavoured to obtain clearance for the 
introduction of a special payment from the Government and the TUC 
(FBU ECM, 7 and 26 October 1976; FBU GSC, 12 November 1976). This 
led to the creation of a special arbitration tribunal and the 
eventual introduction of the extra responsibility allowance (FBU GSC, 
24 November and 14 December 1976 and 3 February 1977; FBUJ, February/ 
March 1977; IDS Report 254, April 1977). There were further local 
actions in March and May of 1977 in the Cleveland and Essex Brigades. 
Again, the executive either instructed members to return to work or 
not take any action on the basis that any claims and actions should 
be national and not local (FBU GSC, 4 and 15 March and 4 and 5 May 
1977). All of these Phase One and Two disputes were unoffical and, 
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in each ease, the executive agreed that grievances should be 
channelled through national claims only (Interview, 4 September 
1980). 
The level of internal pressures was sufficiently intense to 
convince the General Secretary, who had previously argued in support 
of the Social Contract pay policies, that "it would not be possible 
for the union to voluntarily accept a further phase of limiting pay 
policy'. Rather, the executive all agreed that the union must be. free 
to pursue the improvement of firefighters' earnings (FBU ECM, 14 
April 1977). This position was endorsed by the union's annual 
conference in the face of only very limited brigade support for the 
Social Contract (FBU AC, 1977; FBU GSC, 10 and 19 May 1977). The 
executive initiated a campaign to achieve a re-evaluation of the 
fireman's job? and agreed with the national employers' side to the 
establishment of an independent working party to undertake this task 
(Evening News, 6 July 1977; MS, 14 July 1977; FTC 27 July 1977). 
However, the executive was divided over what to do if the Government 
in an attempt to maintain its Phase Three guidelines would not 
implement the recommendations of the working party. The majority 
of executive members appeared opposed to full-scale strike action. 
However, the actual balance of forces was far more complex as some 
executive members later admitted that they were promoting a militant 
line in their own regions while following a moderate line on the 
executive (Interviews, 10 July, 29 August, and 3 and 22 September 
1980). 
The signs of membership frustration and industrial restiveness 
continued to multiply. The Strathclyde Brigade sought a recalled 
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annual conference and there were large demonstrations of firefighters 
in the West Midlands, Manchester and Newcastle (MS, 29 August, 2 and. 
24 September and 19 October 1977; Guardian, 8 September 1977). The 
Avon Brigade initiated a work-to-rule in late October (FT, 27 October 
1977). A West Midlands official recalled that they were constantly 
discouraging action in individual fire stations (Interview, 18 July 
1980). Many officials attributed this new militancy in the fire 
service to a generational factor. A younger generation of 
firefighters had replaced their post-war predecessors and appeared 
ready to undertake industrial action in order to improve earnings 
(Interviews, 10 July, 29 August and 3 September, 1980). The design of 
Phase Three proved a further stimulus. Its allowance for productivity 
agreements in addition to the ten per cent ceiling appeared to give 
little scope for additional increases to firefighters while private 
sector negotiators seemed to be securing increases well above the 
norm (Interviews, 10 July and 4 September 1980). 
The industrial pressures manifested in the FBU during this 
period were part of a process in which, despite the reluctance of 
many in the national leadership, the commitment of a majority of 
brigades in the union to a campaign of national industrial action was 
gradually achieved. This was clear at a recalled annual conference 
on 7 November which, contrary to the executive recommendation to' 
continue negotiations, voted by a two to one margin to take immediate 
strike action (FBU GSC, 2 and 7 November 1977; The Times, 8 November 
1977; Interviews, various dates). Most of the complex internal' 
ramifications of the dispute - the political and social organization 
of the conflict - must remain outside the scope of this study. The 
external implications were, however, important for the larger 
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development of the Social Contract. The dispute quickly became a 
test of the Government's determination to maintain the Phase Three 
guidelines. It. also exposed the unwillingness of TUC leaders to 
engage in a major confrontation with the Government over its 
application of Phase Three despite the TUC commitment to a policy of 
free collective bargaining. These external implications will be 
discussed further in the final part of this chapter. Certainly, the 
industrial tensions exhibited within the FBU during this. period were 
an excellent illustration of how the internal dynamics of incomes 
policies, especially in the case of an industrial union, impinged on 
its external dynamics. By the spring of 1977, despite expressions of 
loyalty to the positions of the TUC and the Labour Government, there 
was simply no question of FBU leadership support for a Phase Three of 
the Social Contract pay policies. By the autumn of 1977, the union 
was locked in a major confrontation with the Labour Government and, 
despite the TUC's opposition to the Phase Three guidelines, TUC 
leaders were clearly reluctant to promote a major confrontation over 
the implementation of Phase Three (see below). 
q 
AUEW 
The AUEW's policy of support for Phases One and Two was also 
the object of increasing internal dissent. The-Social Contract, 
incomes policies had a much more diverse impact on the AUEW's widely 
dispersed membership and largely decentralized negotiating activity 
than was the case with the FBU. However, the question of wage and 
earnings differentials emerged as the most contentious issue for the 
union. The narrowing of wage differentials in the engineering 
industry was, in fact, a longer-term phenomenon arising from the 
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reform of payment systems, the impact of previous incomes policies 
and the predominance of the semi-skilled in many bargaining units 
(see Brown, 1979b; Fox, 1977; Turner, 1952; Interviews, 26 February, 
28 March and 2 June 1980). However, the relative decline of craft 
status during this period was increasingly identified with the 
restrictive effects of the Phase One and Two policies. Discontent 
over differentials led to numerous local revolts, particularly in the 
toolrooms of the West Midlands engineering industry. During Phase 
One, there were a few minor rumblings over the implementation of the 
flat-rate policy; for instance, at the Canley works of British 
Leyland, at SU Carburettor and in the shipyards of the Northeast 
(Interviews, 14 March and 24 July 1980; see also Chapter 7). Signs 
of local discontent multiplied rapidly during Phase Two despite the 
AUEW's continued support for the pay policies. Unofficial disputes 
at Rubery Owen, Chrysler, British Leyland, Heathrow Airport and 
Lucas Aerospace, to name but a few, centred on either eraftworkers& 
wages or their claims for separate negotiating status and sometimes 
both (see IDS Report 248, January 1977; Glasgow Herald, 9 March 1977; 
Observer, 13 March 1977; Guardian, 13 and 14 April 1977; The Sunday 
Times, 24 April 1977; TGWU Civil Air Transport Section Committee, 
1977; FTC 24 August and 9 September 1977; Interviews, various dates)... 
Many of these were dealt with at district level. In the large. 
disputes which came to the attention of the executive, unless their 
claim was compatible with observance of Phase Two, members were 
denied official backing and urged to return to work (Interview, 24 
July 1980). 
The most bitter internal dispute was undoubtedly that of the 
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British Leyland toolroomworkers. Their month long strike in 
February and March of 1977 in pursuit of separate bargaining rights 
led to repeated acrimonious confrontations between the union's 
executive, which insisted on observance of Phase Two, and an 
unofficial toolroom committee led by Roy Fraser, a Cowley toolmaker. 
its This dispute was a clear challenge to the union's leadership and 
support for Phase Two. As the then executive officer for the West 
Midlands, Terry Duffy, observed, 'It is ... the toolmakers against 
the union, not just the toolmakers against the company, (Observer, 13 
March 1977). While the dispute was in many ways symptomatic of the 
multiple problems of British Leyland at the time, it dramatically 
illustrated the depth of feeling over the relative decline in craft 
workers' differentials. Moreover, it highlighted the degree to which 
local and national officials were obliged to bear the brunt of 
discontent over the impact of the policies. As one official noted, 
`We are accessible, not the Prime Minister. We take the stick' 
(Interview, 14 March 1980). 
' These revolts of important groups of skilled members were 
bound to have a significant impact on the internal political 
processes of the AUEW since most of the officer and activist corps 
in the union were counted as skilled or 'Section One' members (see 
Chapter 4). As in the FBU, local industrial pressures were 
translated very directly into union policy-making because of the 
union's single-channel policy structure. Local district committees 
and the elected district secretary usually dealt with local disputes. 
These same committees also formulated policy motions which were 
processed by divisional committees for debate at the union's policy 
conference. Similarly, at national level, even though the 
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negotiations on the National Engineering Agreement were abandoned in 
favour of local negotiations during Phases One. and Two (FT, 11 
February 1977), the National Committee discussed industry wages 
strategy as well as general economic and political. motions. Thus, 
support for further policies of wage restraint was inseparable from 
their industrial implications. 
The translation of industrial pressures into policy-making was 
further complicated by the system of factional political organization 
in the AUEW. Since the left faction was from the beginning opposed 
to any form of wage restraint, the political repercussions of the 
union's support for the pay policies were felt most intensely by the 
moderate'- faction. It experienced increasing difficulties to 
maintain majority support for the policy of restraint at local level. 
Despite its narrow majority on most issues at the union's 1977 
National Committee meeting, a majority of the engineering section's 
twenty-six divisions had tabled motions opposing a further round of 
pay policy. Indeed, no motion on the agenda gave unqualified support 
. 
to the Social Contract and only one gave qualified support (AUEW NCR, 
1977; FT, 2 May 1977; Guardian, 21 April 1977; MS, 21 February' 1977). 
Moreover, the joint northeastern Divisional Committees, the key 
divisions in terms of relative independence from the principal. 
factions, had specifically mandated their delegates to vote for a 
return to free collective bargaining (Interview, 2 June 1980; 
t 
Guardian, 4 May 1977; The Times, 5 May 1977). This ensured a 
majority for the anti-wage restraint forces and precipitated a 
complete collapse of the moderate faction's support for any form of 
Phase Three, even one that took account of problems involving 
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differentials. The National Committee voted fifty to two for 
.a 
return to free collective bargaining at the end of Phase Two. The 
only. delegates to oppose were those from the southwestern division 
which had also been the only division to submit a motion in qualified 
support of the Social Contract (AUEW NCR, 1977)" 
Thus, despite Scanlon's pleas to give him the flexibility to 
negotiate a Phase Three policy which would allow additional increases 
for the restoration of differentials, the resolution of anomalies and 
the implementation of new incentives schemes, internal industrial 
pressures pushed AUEW policy-makers away from any support for a 
possible Phase Three policy (on Scanlon's approach, see AUEW, NCR, 
1977: 194-196). As one national officer, a supporter of the Social 
Contract, suggested, 'If we had opted for another phase of pay 
policy, on the other hand, we could have been in real trouble ... 
we would have had a hell of a job to sell any deal to our members' 
(Interview, 2 June 1980). 
NUPE 
In comparison with the experience of the other single-channel 
unions, the FBU and the AUEW, internal pressures in NUPE were much 
less in tense during Phases One and Two. Most NUPE members had 
benefited from an unusually large increase during the Social Contract 
Mark I period and the six pound policy was also seen as relatively 
advantageous to the low-paid groups covered by NUPE (see Figure D. 5, 
Appendix D). Despite the union's initial opposition to the six-pound 
policy, most officers and activists agreed that there was no 
particular pressure against it. Moreover, the occupational groups 
with any tradition of militancy in the union, such as the dustmen and 
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road maintenance workers, had also been among the first local 
authority groups to negotiate bonus schemes. -Thus, they were 
cushioned against some 'of the most restrictive effects of the 
policies. Figure D. 5, for instance, indicates that the real earnings 
of dustmen did not experience as great a decline over Phases Two and 
Three as did those of many of the other public sector manual groups 
covered by NUPE (see Appendix D; also Interview, 8 August-1980). 
However, as real earnings began to decline, the non-consolidation of 
the Phase One and Two policies became an increasing irritant because 
many low-paid NUPE members depended on the systematic use of overtime 
work to supplement their earnings (Interview, 6 October 1980). 
Nonetheless, there was little overt expression of industrial 
discontent over compliance-with the Phase One and Two norms 
(Interviews, various dates). 
This comparative lack of industrial pressure was reflected in 
union policy-making. In contrast to the vehement opposition to any 
possibility of further wage restraint in most of the sample unions at 
this time, NUPE's national policy conference in 1977 voted by a two 
to one margin to reject a motion calling for an immediate return to' 
normal collective bargaining 'irrespective of what the TUC decides' 
(NUPE AC, 1977). Alan Fisher, the union's general secretary, was 
clearly aiming to maintain a degree of flexibility for external 
policy initiatives at the level of the TUC. As was indicated in 
Chapter 7, in contrast with others in the NUPE leadership, he was not 
personally opposed to incomes policies. Moreover, as a member of the 
TUC Economic Committee, he was of course party to the TUC's 
discussions with the Government on the possibility of a Phase Three 
policy. He specifically requested that the NUPE Conference not leave 
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NUPE 'neutered at the bargaining table ... and outside the'vital 
decisions that will be going on between the Government and the TUC' 
(NUPE AC, 1977: 119-120). The NUPE leadership, particularly the 
executive's Economic Committee, continued to strike a fairly critical 
stance vis-a-vis the economic policies of the Labour Government and 
the Social Contract and mobilize members in opposition to public 
expenditure cuts (NUPE, 1976; NUPE EcCteeM, 26 February 1977; NUPE 
GSC, various dates). However, this did not translate into direct 
opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies at this stage. 
This ambiguity was more than a reflection of the lack of internal 
industrial pressure. As was argued in Chapter 4, NUPE had 
traditionally demonstrated some ambiguity on wages policies. This 
was due to both its location in the public sector and the relatively 
low pay of most of its members. NUPE was perhaps the union to 
develop the most conscious link between its broader economic policy 
and its wage negotiations. This linkage was certainly enhanced by 
its single-channel policy structure in which bargaining strategy and 
macro-economic policy orientations were discussed in the same forums 
and, often, in the same debates (see, i. e., NUPE AC, 1977 and 1978; 
also NUPE EeCteeM, 1975-1979). None of the other sample union 
leaderships appeared to address this link quite so consciously or 
consistently as did NUPE's. 
As private sector wage settlements began to outdistance those 
in the public sector over the course of Phase Three, however, 
substantial discontent with the policies was readily apparent. 
Compliance with the Phase Three norms was reluctantly agreed by most 
NUPE bargaining groups, albeit on a second ballot. Possibly 
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influenced by the failure of the FBU to breach the policy, there did 
not appear to be any impetus for industrial action from either the 
executive or the membership (Interview, 14 October 1980). However, 
dissatisfaction with the lack of progress on low pay was the 
predominant message transmitted by area committee resolutions in the 
consultative ballot on the final Phase Three settlement (Interviews, 
8 and 15 August and 14 November 1980). There was certainly no 
indication of any support within the union for the continuation of 
incomes policies (MSS 21 April 1978). 
The NUPE leadership, therefore, consciously shifted the focus 
of its activities from the campaign against public expenditure cuts 
to a national campaign against low pay, particularly in the public 
sector (Interview, 7 August 1980; EcCteeM, 1978). The executive 
presented a special statement to the 1978 policy conference and a 
National Wages Campaign Committee was set up to coordinate the 
union's actions internally and with other unions (NUPE, 1978b; NUPE 
AC, 1978). ' As the campaign gathered momentum, the Government 
announced its intention to hold wage increases to a maximum of five 
per cent over the. 1978-1979 pay round. NUPE leaders emphasized that 
such a limit was incompatible with the union's wage objectives and 
they continued to multiply their rallies and appeals to the public, on 
their pay campaign. They also planned selective industrial action to 
apply further pressure (NUPE EcCteeM, 9 September 1978; NUPE IM, 11 
October 1978; MS and Guardian, 8 October 1978). Indeed, much to the 
consternation of the other major unions involved in the joint public 
sector claim, some NUPE areas initiated sporadic industrial action 
during this period (DT, 15 December 1978). 
A confrontation between the public sector unions' attempt to 
567 
restore relativities and the Government's attempt to enforce the 
Phase Four policy seemed inevitable. The failed attempt by TUC 
leaders in November 1978 to secure General Council consent for a new 
agreement on pay with the Government only added further impetus to 
the campaign. Indeed, the NUPE General Secretary was one of the 
General Council members to reject the proposed agreement (NUPE GSC, 
20 November 1978). Already in September 1978, Alan Fisher had warned 
of the possibility of %a serious winter of discontent' (The Times, 18 
September 1978). As will be discussed further below, NUPE's campaign 
culminated in the major public sector disputes in January and 
February 1979. Thus, while the internal dynamics of the Social 
Contract incomes policies in NUPE did not really constrain a possible 
Phase Three agreement at the level of the TUC, they in fact 
precipitated the collapse of Phase Four. 
ASTMS 
The consistent opposition of ASTMS to pay policies in general 
and the Social Contract pay policies in particular has been 
documented in previous chapters. The continuation of this opposition 
meant that it experienced little internal pressure over the impact of 
the policies. ASTMS members certainly felt many of the same 
frustrations about the erosion of differentials and relativities. 
However, union policy-making did not provide any focus for the 
expression of such frustrations. ASTMS was unequivocally opposed to 
both Phases Three and Four and continued to advise members to 
circumvent the policies where possible, advising caution only on the 
TUC's commitment to the twelve-month rule which ASTMS had 
unsuccessfully opposed at the 1977 TUC (ASTMS AC, 1977 and 1978; 
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ASTMS GSC, 1 April, 21 July and 7 November 1977, and 10 February and 
24 June 1978; ASTMS ECM, various dates). The ASTMS General Secretary 
was also an outspoken critic of TUC acquiescence in Phase Three 
(ASTMSJ, January /February 1978). There continued to be complaints 
from some activists and divisional councils that the executive was 
unwilling to support industrial challenges to the guidelines. The 
ASTMS leadership maintained, however, that it reserved the right to 
assess its support for disputes on the basis of their chances of 
success. Jenkins specifically ruled out the possibility of what he 
described as 'kamikaze actions', especially major strikes in the 
public sector (ASTMS AC, 1978; ASTMS IM, 19 January 1978; Interview, 
21 August 1980). The public sector was, in fact, seen as the major 
incomes policy problem for the union. As opposed to the experience 
of most of its private sector membership in Phase Three, public 
sector technicians and many other ASTMS members in nationalized 
industries remained tightly constrained by the guidelines 
(Interviews, 8 June, 19 July, 20 and 21 August 1980). Their demands 
for substantial progress on their wage claims certainly pushed the 
General Secretary to look for some form of political initiative at 
the level of the TUC (ASTMS ECM, 11-12 November 1978; ASTMS GSC, 16 
November 1978). The universities and health service wage claims 
ultimately became entangled with the other Phase Four public sector, 
disputes and were also referred to the newly created Comparability 
Commission (see Clegg, 1980). Otherwise, internal ASTMS policy- 
making did not appear to reflect any substantial industrial 
pressures. Nor did it constrain the policy discretion of the General 
Secretary in TUC policy-making. 
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While most unions were moving away from any support of pay 
policies during this period, many ASTMS activists and officers 
considered that their General Secretary was actually moving in the 
opposite direction. Jenkins, it was argued, still did not support 
pay policies, but he was much less confrontational than had hitherto 
been the case. This change in emphasis was widely attributed to the 
General Secretary's election to the TUC General Council and his 
increasingly important role within key TUC committees (Interviews, 
various dates). The union had previously played somewhat of a 
maverick' role within the TUC. One officer noted that, in the light 
of both ASTMS's Increased size and its leader's newly active role in 
policy-making at the TUC leadership level, the union's policies 
increasingly had to be 'dove-tailed' with those of the TUC 
(Interview, 28 July 1980). Another suggested that, once 'enmeshed in 
the system', there were more pressures to tread a moderate line 
because the General Secretary had more to lose (Interview, 11 August 
1980). 
The increasing participation of Jenkins in TUC consensus. 
building was evident in both of the Phase Four attempts to 
reconstruct the tattered relations between the TUC and the 
Government. Whereas ASTMS had previously opposed or abstained on all 
of the TUC pay policy initiatives during the Social Contract period 
(see Tables 1.4 and 1.5), Jenkins supported both the November 1978 
tentative agreement with the Government and the Concordat in February 
1979. The former case prompted a number of executive and divisional 
challenges to this alleged change in emphasis. The General Secretary 
responded that his actions were not inconsistent with the union's 
opposition to pay policy and that there was also a need for a 
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political initiative on public sector pay (ASTMS GSC, 15 and 16 
November 1978; ASTMS ECM, 11-12 November and 9 December 1978). The 
apparent influence of TUC leadership positions on ASTMS internal 
policy-making has, in fact, continued to grow. ' In contrast to what 
has previously been argued was the fragile character of TUC 
leadership policy-making, the case of ASTMS serves as a good 
illustration of the enduring qualities of this same policy process. 
GMWU 
Despite growing' industrial pressures over the impact of the 
Social Contract incomes policies, the GMWU leadership was able to 
maintain a high degree of policy discretion on the possibility of 
further union commitments to wage restraint. This was an excellent 
illustration of a union leadership which placed a considerable 
priority on its loyalty to a Labour Government. The GMWU was not 
alone, however, in its attempt to maintain the Social Contract 
incomes policies in place. Both the AUEW and TGWU leaderships 
attempted to secure a degree of policy flexibility in an attempt to 
construct a possible Phase Three policy. They were rebuffed by their 
respective union conferences. The GMWU leadership was not. The GMWU 
and NUPE were the only sample unions to permit a degree of leadership 
flexibility on a possible Phase Three in the spring and early summer 
of 1977. Moreover, the GMWU was the only sample union not to reject 
outright the possibility of some agreement on a Phase Four, though it 
too ultimately rejected the Government's five per cent wage 
guideline. Indeed, as was illustrated in Tables 1.4,1.5 and 4.2, 
the GMWU was the sample union most likely to support incomes policy 
during both the Social Contract and the entire post-war period. 
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This relatively greater policy discretion available to the GMWU 
leadership was no doubt linked to both the composition of the GMWU 
membership and its history of support for pay policies (see Chapter 
4). However, it also represented a greater degree of leadership 
control over policy outcomes which was both unique to the pattern of 
power in the GMWU (see Chapter 7) and characteristic of the dual- 
channel unions. This was particularly true of GMWU conference 
policy-making which, because it did not permit much scope for the 
articulation and organization of industrial grievances about incomes 
policy, tended to limit the mobilization of opposition to the Social 
Contract pay policies. In common with all of the sample unions, 
there were increasing industrial pressures within the GMWU during 
this period. Nor were GMWU conferences immune to the expression of 
political opposition to Phases Two and Three, though such opposition 
appeared less vociferous and less organized than in most other 
unions. Whereas there had been little opposition to the Phase One 
and Two policies, there was increasing pressure at the 1977 and 1978 
policy conferences to limit the flexibility of the GMWU leadership on 
external policy initiatives which might constrain bargaining freedom 
(GMWU AC, 1977 and 1978). However, the platform prevailed over all 
such opposition during the Social Contract incomes policy period. 
Ironically, it was only after the demise of the Social Contract pay 
policies, at the May 1979 conference, that a leadership 
recommendation on an opposition motion was rejected (GMWU AC, 1979). 
Thus, in contrast with the critical reversals of TGWU and AUEW 
leadership recommendations in. 1977, the GMWU leadership suffered a 
comparatively minor incomes policy defeat and a full two years later. 
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By this time, such internal constraints were no longer of any 
consequence for the determination of external policy initiatives. 
Given the GMWU's wide dispersion of membership, the industrial 
effects of Phases One to Three were differentiated by industry and 4 
occupation. It was generally acknowledged by industrial officers 
that the flat-rate bias of the Phase One and Two policies was easy to 
sell to the comparatively low-paid membership of the GHWU 
(Interviews, various dates). Indeed, motions in favour of flat-rate 
increases and cost-of-living allowances were common in GMWU 
bargaining policy forums. In sharp contrast with union negotiators 
in the AUEW and ASTMS who viewed with alarm the erosion of 
differentials over the course of Phases One and Two, GMWU members 
viewed this as a positive development. Indeed, at the very time that 
AUEW negotiators were pushing for the 'restoration' of differentials, 
the GMWU engineering industry conference opposed any widening of 
differentials between the unskilled and skilled (GMWU Engineering 
Conference, 6/7 April 1978). However, some bargaining groups were far 
from enamoured with the effects of the Phase Two policy and the 
differential application of the Phase Three guidelinesrsparked 
particular discontent among those who were rigidly tied to the ten 
per cent limit and had little scope for the negotiation of 
productivity agreements. 
In contrast with the almost unanimous endorsement of the six 
pound policy at the 1975 National Industrial Conference of the 
Electricity Supply Industry, various delegates to the 1976 Conference 
complained about how they were 'bulldozed into the Social Contract' 
(GMWU Electricity Supply Conference, 16 December 1975 and 16 November 
1976). By the autumn of 1977, a Yorkshire shop stewards committee 
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felt so aggrieved about the effects of pay policy that they initiated 
unofficial industrial action in apparent breach of the union's 
commitment to -observe the twelve-month rule in Phase Three 
(Interview, 23 August 1979; GMWU AC, 1977: ` 330; The Times, 2 
September 1977). They were persuaded to return to work and their 
eventual Phase Three settlement certainly exceeded the relatively 
tight application of the ten per cent limit which was common 
throughout the rest of the public sector. Even then, however, the 
Phase Three agreement was ratified by the slender margin of 550 votes 
in a poll of more than 80,000 trade unionists in the industry (GMWU 
Electricity Supply Conference, 29 March 1978; Interview, 21 August 
1979; also TGWU Power and Engineering National Trade Group Committee, 
21 July 1978). 
The apparent and growing private sector hostility to the impact 
of the Social Contract pay policies generally dissipated where they 
were able to secure Phase Three productivity agreements. This was 
common, for instance, in the chemical, glass and engineering 
industries (Interviews, 9 August, $ and 5 September 1979). 
Industrial officers in the gas industry suggested that they did not 
experience the strong industrial pressures common in so many other 
nationalized industries because a major productivity and. 
restructuring agreement came into effect shortly before the 
implementation of Phase One. This alleviated at least some of the 
restrictive effects of the Social Contract incomes policies on 
earnings in the industry (Interviews, 22 and 31 August and 3 
September 1979). 
Much of the rest of the GMWU's large public sector membership 
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felt increasingly constrained by the union's commitment to the 
policies and the Government's rigid application of them. This was 
particularly the case in the water industry and among local authority 
manual workers and hospital ancillary staffs. Whereas only two of 
twenty-nine delegates to the NHS Hospital Ancillary Staffs Conference 
opposed the Phase One policy, seven of twenty-eight voted against 
complying with the Phase Two guidelines and by 1978 the discussion 
centred on the possibility of alternatives to industrial action (NHS 
Hospital Ancillary Staffs Conference, 28 August 1975,15 September 
1976 and 14 September 1978). Like the NHS ancillary staffs, many GMWU 
members in the local authority sector identified two particular 
sources of grievance: first, the non-consolidation of the Phase One 
and Two supplements which adversely affected their overtime earnings; 
secondly, the apparent ability of many private sector bargaining 
groups. to escape the full impact of the Phase Three restrictions 
through the implementation, of 'bogus' productivity agreements. Only 
one of nineteen lay speakers at the local authority manual workers' 
industrial conference opposed the six pound policy in 1975. By the 
time of the 1978 conference, activist frustration with the impact of 
% 
the pay policies was evident. In a newly displayed assertiveness in 
what had previously been a fairly quiescent bargaining group, 
seventeen of forty-seven delegates present voted against their 
national officer's recommendation to coordinate their claim through 
the TUC (Interviews, 21,23 and 30 August and 7 September 1979; GMWU 
Local Authority Manual Workers Conference, 21 August 1975,24 August' 
1977 and 31 August 1978). The assertion of activist, discontent was 
reported to be especially vehement in the water industry where 
members increasingly argued that their earnings should be comparable 
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to those in other public sector utilities rather than local authority 
manual workers (Interviews, ' 9 and. 30 August 1979). Such industrial 
pressures may have been less acute than in some of the other sample 
unions, but they did represent a considerable dffervescence for the 
GMWU. Indeed, many lay activists and full-time officers agreed that 
the frustrations of the period, in the words of one activist, 
'helped to ventilate the union' (Interviews, various dates). 
Why then, in the face of industrial pressures similar to those 
experienced in unions such as NUPE and the TGWU, was the mobilization 
of policy opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies in the 
GMWU so comparatively mild and delayed? Union policy structure 
appeared to play an important role. The weak articulation in the 
structure of GMWU policy-making between industrial decision-making 
and other policy-making meant that the GMWU provided less scope for 
the coalescence and aggregation of industrial and occupational 
grievances about the impact of the pay policies within union policy 
forums. In contrast, in the other major bifurcated union in this 
study, the TGWU, which also covered general workers, similar 
industrial pressures were translated very directly in executive and 
conference policy-making. The Social Contract incomes policies 
provided a dramatic impetus for the operation. of the new industrial 
advisory bodies within the GMWU - the national and regional, 
industrial conferences. However, the new activism in these bodies 
did not entail any formal policy limitations on the GMWU's external 
leadership role. They were bound to influence the leadership's 
judgment of what type of pay limits might be politically and 
industrially feasible. They also ensured that many national and 
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regional officials were much more cautious in the defence of pay 
limits than they had been in the past. 
The national and regional industrial conferences were a natural 
forum for the expression of grievances about the impact of the pay 
f 
policies. As dissatisfaction with the impact of the policies grew, 
especially after the rigid application of Phase Three in a number of 
industries, some of the I industrial conferences became increasingly 
assertive. However, unlike the TGWU, these industrial policy bodies 
did not communicate directly with any larger policy body. Gas 
industry members were reminded ät their 1977 industrial conference, 
for instance, that the executive was considering the union's attitude 
to the Social' Contract and 'comments on general pay policy should be 
submitted through the normal channels', i. e., the branch (GMWU Gas 
Conference, 15 March 1977). As will be explored further below, this 
contrasted directly with practice in the TGWU where trade group 
oommittees. forwarded motions directly to both' the executive and the 
biennial policy conference. Many GMWU branches were organized on'a 
territorial rather than an industrial basis. Their often 
heterogeneous composition and lower levels of participation made them 
less conducive than the industrial conference for the articulation of 
specific industrial grievances. Moreover, policy positions at 
conference were articulated exclusively through regional delegations. 
Indeed, delegates to the annual policy conference were specifically 
reminded that they were elected as representatives of their regions 
and could not be mandated by any branch (see Chapter 7). Thus, the 
structure of GMWU policy-making tended to give less formal scope for 
the expression of specific industrial policy positions. 
The scope for platform policy initiatives was, however, 
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increasingly circumscribed during this period by the presence of 
opponents of a union commitment to wage restraint. Moreover, the 
question of opposition to wage restraint became inextricably linked 
with the exercise of greater lay autonomy and participation in union 
policy-making and industrial practice. This was manifested in 
repeated challenges to two of the major mechanisms of platform 
control at GMWU policy conferences: the regional block vote and the 
unmitigated procedural control exercised by the "'Chair' on behalf of 
the platform. 
As opposition to wage restraint grew within the union,, an 
increasing number of regional delegates insisted on a free vote on 
pay policy issues, as opposed to the previous system of regional 
mandating. The most vocal opponents of the platform at the 
conference were consistently the same individuals. However, their 
ability to sway delegates disenchanted with the impact of the pay 
policies was contingent on the existenee'of free regional votes. 
Otherwise, delegates were often committed to support the platform 
before the plenary economic debate had even taken place. Since there 
did not appear to be much regional mandating against the platform, a 
free vote was in many ways a proxy for opposition without undue 
embarrassment for the regional secretary or other executive members 
who had not delivered the support of the delegation to the position 
of the platform. The new generation of regional secretaries also, 
appeared more amenable to the move away from regional mandating, 
though often on condition that the region retained the right to 
mandate on motions sponsored from that particular region (Interviews, 
30 August, 5 and 6 September and 2 October 1979 and 4 September 
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1980). Delegates from the Lancashire, Liverpool, London and 
Scottish regions increasingly opted for free votes on pay policy 
issues despite the presence of a special executive motion in the, 
1977,1978 and 1979 conference debates (GMWU AC, 1977-1979). 
Activists from these regions noted that the right to differ was 
initially hard won but reflected the generally positive move towards 
greater participation and consultation within the union (Interviews, 
4,5,6 and 7 September 1979). 
Opposition to pay policy also prompted increasing frustration 
with the exercise of procedural controls by the 'Chair' in conference 
debates. GMWU pay policy debates were invariably marked by major 
procedural controversies which seemed to arise from the close 
identification of the "Chair' with the position of the executive. 
This was perhaps not surprising because the 'Chair' was a member of 
the GMWU executive but the identification with the positions of the 
platform seemed to be exceptionally strong in the case of GMWU 
chairmen of this period. In particular, the 'Chair' and the SOC 
tended to group together all motions that were not withdrawn in 
favour of the Special Executive motion and rule that if the Executive 
motion was passed then these other motions would fall. As a result, 
some opposition motions were not even moved. This type of procedural 
ruling gave rise to increasing dissatisfaction about the structuring 
of the debate and major procedural wrangles ensued. When such a 
ruling was challenged in the 1977 debate, the challenge gained 
majority support. However, it was ruled that such a challenge 
required a two-thirds majority which it did not attain (GMWU AC, 
1977). An almost identical issue affected the 1978 debate over pay 
policy. The 'Chair' was again challenged. The challenge received 
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majority support, but it was ruled that it had not received the 
necessary two-thirds majority. However, the Vice-Chairman's 'two- 
thirds' ruling was this time also challenged and defeated on a simple 
majority. Therefore, the conference voted separately on both the 
executive motion and what the executive maintained was an opposition 
motion. The Executive motion was easily carried. The alleged 
oppositional motion, which its promoters argued was not. in 
contradiction with the position of the platform, fell by the narrow 
margin of 204 to 199. The real issue in the-debate was the degree of 
latitude to be allowed the General Secretary to explore the 
possibility of a Phase Four agreement (GMWU AC, 1978). 
Thus, the effects of disenchantment with wage restraint, the 
erosion of the regional block vote and its impact on voting 
patterns, and the increasing challenges to overt procedural 
manipulation combined to narrow, albeit very slightly, the scope of 
leadership policy discretion in the GMWU. The GMWU executive 
continued. to be characterized by its lack of opposition to the policy 
initiatives of the General Secretary. Indeed, most GMWU activists 
appeared genuinely encouraged by, the progress towards a more 
participative and consultative form of internal union organization 
during the Barnett era. However, of all the union leaders in this- 
study, the GMWU General Secretary's scope to pursue external policy 
initiatives was most unencumbered by internal policy constraints. 
From the failure of TUC efforts to agree with the Government on a 
formula for Phase Three onwards, David Basnett repeatedly sought to 
achieve some kind of reconciliation between the Government and the 
TUC. One senior GMWU official noted that there was always a danger 
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that Basnett behaved more as member of the TUC negotiating team than 
as General Secretary of the GMWU: 'there was nothing in the 
industrial sector which justified that action ... [it] stemmed from 
a longer-term commitment to the Labour Party' (Interview, 24 July 
1979). Even when the union was officially opposed to pay policy, it 
refrained from direct confrontations with the Government over the 
Phase Three guidelines and, in Phase Four, still did not vote against 
the Government at the 1978 Labour Party Conference, abstaining 
instead (Interview, 29 September 1980). 
'Bdth'national industrial officials and the General Secretary 
were also concerned not to be caught out of step with the union's 
main industrial competitors, particularly the more oppositional 
approach adopted by NUPE in the public sector and the TGWU in both 
private and public sectors. The union's leadership clearly indicated 
that the union was opposed to the Phase Four policy which the 
executive labelled as 'unnecessary and counter-productive' (G MWUJ, 
August 1978). It was also a reluctant activist in the public sector 
disputes of January and February 1979, GMWU leaders, however, 
remained consistently open to incomes policy initiatives of a kind 
other than the five per cent Phase Four ceiling. This was no doubt 
related to its tradition of policy loyalism. It also reflected the 
reality of its bargaining practice. It was obliged to contend with 
all of the contradictions of free collective bargaining for its 
predominantly low-paid membership, particularly in the public sector. 
Thus, Basnett played the key role in attempting to construct a way 
out of the impasse over the Phase Four policy in the autumn of 1978. 
As will be discussed below, this solution proved impractical at that 
time in the bargaining round because most other union leaders'either 
581 
remained profoundly sceptical of any new TUC agreement with the 
Government or were subject to much greater internal constraints than 
was the leader of the GMWU. The February reconciliation of the TUC 
and the Government, therefore, had to await the complete collapse of 
the Phase Four policy when the imperatives of union political 
practice dictated the need for some new agreement and internal union 
policy pressures were, in any case, much reduced. 
TGWU 
As opposed to the case of the GMWU whose leadership largely. 
maintained its scope for external policy initiatives in the face of 
growing internal opposition to continued wage restraint, the 
expression of opposition within the TGWU was much stronger and more 
clearly articulated. As a result, when the General Secretary, Jack 
Jones, attempted to maintain a degree of internal policy flexibility 
for possible external developments on the definition of a less rigid 
form of pay guidelines for Phase Three, he was defeated at the 
union's 1977 Biennial Delegate Conference. This union policy 
decision was doubly important. First, it shifted the balance within 
the TUC away from any possible adherence to a Phase Three guideline. 
Secondly, it marked an unprecedented policy defeat for a leader of 
the TGWU (see Chapters 4 and 7). The previous chapter explored ins. 
some detail the case of the 1975 BDC of the TGWU and the mechanisms 
and processes of consent for leadership policy positions within that 
union conference. 
Why then was the General Secretary's policy recommendation 
overturned in 1977? Although the membership composition of the TGWU 
was in some respects different from that of-the 0 MWU, it was not that 
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different. The TGWU also had a history of recent opposition to 
incomes policies, but its tradition of support for leadership policy 
initiatives was certainly as strong as that of the GMWU. The major 
difference between the two unions was in their z'espeetive structures 
of policy-making. Whereas it has been argued that industrial policy 
and practice were relatively poorly articulated with other union 
policy-making in the GMWU, they were very closely linked in the case 
of the TGWU. Thus, the industrial grievances about the impact of the 
Phase__ One and Two policies became increasingly enmeshed with the 
expression of political opposition to the Social Contract incomes 
policies. at trade group, regional, national executive and, finally, 
conference levels. It proved impossible for Jones to sway this 
coalition of oppositional. forces towards greater leadership 
flexibility in the interests of a TUC effort to construct a Phase 
Three policy. Thus, the internal limits of leadership discretion 
determined the scope for external policy-making at the level of TUC- 
Government relations. This section briefly explores this process in 
the case of the TGWU. It first looks at the industrial impact of the 
policies on the TGWU, then looks at the expression of opposition in 
industrial, regional, executive and 'conference channels of policy- 
making. 
Its enormous size, heterogenous composition of membership, 
diffuse structure and devolutionary bargaining policy ensured that 
the industrial impact of the Social Contract incomes policies was 
highly differentiated in the case of the TGWU. In common with the 
other sample unions, the union experienced increasing dissatisfaction 
with. the impact of the policies on real earnings and on relativities 
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and differntials. The flat-rate bias 'of the Phase One and Two 
policies was often perceived as something of a TGWU bargaining coup 
vis-a-vis white-collar and craft-oriented unions within the TUC. 
However, the changes in intra- and inter-workplace differentials and 
relativities associated with the policies also engendered frustration 
and feelings of injustice among TGWU members. 'The disturbance of 
traditional relationships between workers on different forms of 
payment systems, the non-consolidation of the supplements and its 
implications for the calculation of overtime and shift premiums, and, 
--in--Phase -Three, the apparent differentiäl- application of the 
guidelines in the public and private sectors stoked particular 
feelings of grievance in various TGWU bargaining groups. Moreover, 
the very fact that the union was committed to any form of wage 
guideline was the subject of some consternation. The union's 
previous commitment to a devolutionary bargaining policy had, after 
all, become synonymous with both shop steward or workplace power and 
a commitment to the practice of unfettered free collective bargaining 
(see Chapter 4). Most activists emphasized the difficulties 
experienced by shop stewards and convenors because of the constraints 
placed on local bargaining autonomy by the policies. From Phase Two 
onwards, there were increasing signs of internal tensions. Unlike 
the AUEW or FBU, these generally did not erupt into unofficial 
industrial action. Rather, they were manifested at various levels 
within the union's policy-making structure. 
The TGWU was in essence a blend of regional and industrial 
groupings (see Chapter 4). Every TGWU member was part of both a 
trade group structure and a district or regional structure. Thus, 
branch activists might choose to participate in district or regional 
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committees and possibly even seek election as a territorical 
representative on the executive. Alternatively, they might focus 
their activities on regional or national trade group committees and 
conferences and perhaps seek election to the national executive as a 
trade group representative. Both of these channels of union 
decision-making articulated with the deliberations of the national 
executive and the union's biennial policy conference. This complex 
structure created a varied potential for the expression of opposition 
to pay policies. Most groups appeared either to support or acquiesce 
in the application of the Phase One and Two policies, but there 
emerged a patchwork pattern of opposition to the policies with 
occasional eruptions of frustration or policy challenges in both 
industrial and regional channels of union policy activity. 
Like the industrial conference structure of the GMWU, the 
trade group structure in the TGWU provided a logical forum in which 
to express grievances about the impact of the pay policies in a 
particular industry. However, unlike the. GMWU, the TGWU trade groups 
had a long organizational history and were well integrated into the 
overall structure of the union. Thus, trade group committees that 
were in disagreement with union policy could submit motions to the 
union+s policy conference. They could also express their disagreement 
directly to the executive. - Even though much of the internal 
opposition to the. union's support of the Social Contract pay policies 
remained at the level of rhetoric, selected trade group committee 
minutes and interview data suggest that some national and regional 
trade group committees were more oppositional than others, 3 
Many of the. national trade group committees appeared to be 
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primarily concerned with the application of the incomes policy 
guidelines. Thus, their deliberations concerned the detailed 
problems of application. These problems naturally also led to some 
consideration of the overall direction of the policies. In the 
General Workers Trade Group National Committee, for instance, there 
was little overt expression of opposition to the union's support of 
the Social Contract. However, prior to the conclusion of the Phase 
Two guidelines, concern was conveyed to the executive that the 
Chancellor's proposed three per cent limit would not be acceptable to 
the general workers trade group. Similarly, during Phase Two, it was 
indicated that any future pay policy deal would have to contain a 
greater element of flexibility (TGWU General Workers National Trade 
Group Committee, especially 23 April and September 1976). There was 
also relatively little opposition to the policies in another trade 
group committee covering relatively low-paid members, the Public 
Services Committee. When a Scottish branch submitted a motion 
critical of the Social Contract, for instance, the national secretary 
simply noted that this was a question for BDC policy-making and. not 
the national committee (TGWU Public Services National Trade Group 
Committee, 15 January 1976). 
In marked contrast to the relative quiescence of the general 
workers and public service committees during the tight phases of pay. p 
policy, the power and engineering, vehicle building and automotive, 
and civil air transport national trade group committees expressed 
either their opposition or concern on numerous occasions. The power 
and engineering committee received a number of motions hostile to the 
Social Contract pay policies from regional trade group committees, 
particularly the London and Northern Ireland regions. Such direct 
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challenges to union policy caused some controversy within the 
national trade group committee. Both the London and Northern Ireland 
Region power and engineering group committees, for instance, 
challenged the union's support of Phase One'(TGWU London Region 
Power and Engineering Group Committee, 2 October 1975 and TGWU Power 
and Engineering National Trade Group Committee, 18 October 1975). 
When the National Committee received yet further motions in 
opposition to the pay policy, the National Trade Group Secretary 
attempted to dissuade the committee from discussing motions which 
were obviously in conflict with union policy. However, the Committee 
voted both to discuss the motions and to forward them with its 
support for the consideration of the executive (ibid., 15 January 
1976). The power and engineering trade group remit was duly rejected 
by the executive (TGWU ECM, 2 March 1976). This created a stalemate 
within the committee about further scope for the expression of 
opposition (TGWU Power and Engineering National Trade Group 
Committee, 9 April 1976). The committee, for instance, did not 
challenge the executive on its support for Phase Two but its 
dissatisfaction with the policy was abundantly clear (ibid., 9 July 
1976). When the Northern Ireland Trade Group, Committee again 
submitted a motion critical of the Social Contract pay policies_ 
during Phase Two, once again with the support of the London trade 
group committee, it was resolved 'on a very narrow vote' that the 
motion not be supported (ibid., 15 October 1976). This confirmed the 
pattern of acquiescence, though there continued to be ruotions within 
the national committee on this issue (see, i. e., the complaints by 
the committee member from Northern Ireland that the trade group's 
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executive representative had not conveyed sufficiently the strength 
of feeling against the pay policies within the trade group, 14 
January 1977). However, as the national secretary made clear to the 
London Region trade group, the question of union support for pay 
policy would be debated by the 1977 BDC and the trade group would 
send delegates and could also submit appropriate motions (TGWU London 
Region Power and Engineering Trade Group Committee, 30 September 
1976). 
Such an approach was also adopted by the Civil Air Transport 
Section Committee. Members were initially cöntent to note that union 
policy committed them to the observance of Phase Two (TGWU Civil Air 
Transport Section Committee, 23 June 1976). However, as internal 
industrial pressures mounted,, the committee became increasingly 
confrontational. Thus, the committee later extended its 
congratulations to the members of the union's executive who voted 
against the Phase Two policy and expressed its opposition to any 
further period of wage restraint in a motion to the 1977 BDC (ibid., 
22 September and 15 December 1976). The eruption of differentials 
disputes at Heathrow Airport was indicative of a highly volatile 
industrial climate. Civil Air Transport Committee members indicated 
that they were under extreme pressure for some form of action. 
Despite the opposition of the national officer, the Committees 
condemned the decision of the union's Finance and General Purposes' 
Committee to observe the twelve-month rule between pay settlemnts 
during Phase Three (ibid., 7 September 1977). 
The Vehicle Building and Automotive National Trade Group 
Committee was somewhat less confrontational, but its policy 
conclusions were eventually similar. Its in fact, indicated its 
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support for the 'Phase One policy but requested that the executive 
consult with the trade group committees before the conclusion of any 
Phase Two Deal (TGWU Vehicle Building and Automotive National Trade 
Group Committee, 16 January 1976). It also supported the executive 
decision to support Phase Two, even though it protested the lack of 
consultation with trade group committees on this question (ibid., 20 
May 1976). However, when it was proposed that a similarly moderate 
resolution be forwarded for the agenda of the 1977 BDC, this was 
defeated in favour of a motion which stipul. ated_that "no_useful 
purpose' would be served by a further round of wage restraint iibid., 
21 January 1977). 
This differential organization of opposition to the policies was 
also reflected in the regional challenges to union support for pay 
policy. Such challenges came most consistently from the London, 
Scottish and Northern Ireland Regions. The London Region committee 
was clearly the most oppositional. This was possibly linked to its 
highly centralized trade group structure. It was the major region in 
the union which had not adopted the district committee structure in 
place of the regional trade group structure as was pioneered in the 
West Midlands. As a result, most industrial matters were the 
prerogative of the regional trade group committees and the regional.. 
committee became a forum for policy/political activity. The London 
Region Committee vociferously challenged the union's support of Phase 
One. It was also opposed to Phase Two and bitterly contested the, 
executive decision to observe the twelve-month rule in Phase Three 
TGWU F&GPCM, 11 August 1977). Moreover, the London Region 
representatives on the executive tended to take an oppositional 
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position (Interviews, various dates). This basis of London activism 
was also clearly reflected in the motions against pay policy at the 
1977 BDC where of the fourteen regional trade group or district 
committees opposing pay policy six were from the London Region (TGWU 
BDCA, 1977). Scotland also played an oppositional role. Most 
significantly, in the period preceding the 1977 BDC, delegates to the 
April 1977 Scottish TUC ignored the General Secretary's pleas for an 
orderly return to free collective bargaining and opted for an. 
immediate return (Interview, 26 September 1980; Scotsman and Glas ow 
Herald, 19 April 1977). While the West Midlands and Northwest 
regional committees were perhaps less vociferous in their opposition 
to pay policy, these regions had the highest proportion of branch 
motions against pay policy relative to their size (calculated from 
TGWU BDCA and TGWUR, 1977). 
In contrast, some of the regions were clearly identified as 
supportive of the union's position on pay policy and supportive of 
the union's leadership more generally. The Southern Region 
Committee, for instance, was the only regional committee associated 
with the executive recommendation in favour of an orderly return to 
free collective bargaining at the 1977 BDC (TGWU BDCM, 1977: 15). 
Wales and the Northeast were also generally regarded as in support of 
the executive position. For instance, in direct contrast to what 
happened at the Scottish TUC, the TGWU delegation to the Wales TUC 
supported Jones's recommendations on an orderly return to free 
collective bargaining (Interviews, 25 February and 2 and 3 October 
1980). 
The burgeoning internal opposition clearly had an impact on the 
union's executive. Members recalled being increasingly uneasy about 
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the impact of the policies, but also being faced with the question. of 
loyalty to a General Secretary who was committed wholeheartedly to 
the pursuit of the Social Contract. Opposition to Phase Two w`. thin 
the executive had apparently played an important'role in secur! -° the 
General Secretary's unequivocal commitment to a return to free 
collective bargaining at the end of Phase Two '(see Chapter 7). 
Despite some suspicions that he was seeking to construct some kind of 
Phase Three, Jones successfully obtained an executive recommendation 
to the 1977 BDC in favour of an orderly return to voluntary 
collective bargaining and managed to maintain that executive position 
in the face of growing internal pressures prior to the BDC (TGWU ECM, 
1 December 1976 and 28 February 1977; Interviews, various dates). 
However, reportedly at the insistence of a number of executive 
members, this fairly moderate position on pay was combined with a 
series of increasingly direct attacks on Government economic policy 
(TGWU ECM, 1 December 1976 and 30 May 1977; Interview, 26 September 
1980; The Times, 7 December 1976). Indeed, it was suggested that 
executive support for an orderly return to normal collective 
bargaining was based on the understanding that the Government would 
make some dramatic moves against price increases (Interview, 6 March 
1980; Wintour, 1977). The rising tide of regional and industrial 
opposition to wage restraint was certainly evident within the 
executive, although mitigated by a strong loyalty and susceptibility 
to the direct appeals of the General Secretary. 
These industrial and political pressures culminated at the 
union's 1977 BDC. The overwhelming majority of motions on the agenda 
were against any further pay policy (TGWU BDCA, 1977). The real 
591 
debate concerned whether the return to free collective bargaining was 
to be 'orderly' or "immediate'. It was most significant that Jones 
was unsuccessful in his attempt to rally most of the agenda motions 
around the platform's endorsement of pan orderly return to voluntary 
collective bargaining', a positioh which was, of course, also 
consistent with the position adopted by the TUC at its 1976 Congress. 
As opposed to the long composite motion enumerating various 
priorities for a return to voluntary collective bargaining suggested 
by the platform, the opponents of the Social Contract, including a 
number of prominent executive members, were successful in drafting a 
straightforward endorsement of a return to 'unfettered collective 
bargaining' at the end of Phase Two. ' The success of the pay policy 
opponents in drafting this motion was reportedly linked to better 
organization than at the 1975 BDC including a change in the 
composition of the SOC (Interviews, various dates). Moreover, Jones 
was unable to allay suspicions that an orderly return to voluntary 
collective bargaining would be tantamount to support for a Phase 
Three policy. The association of branches and various committees 
with the contending motions was most revealing. Only the Southern 
Regional Committee and three branches were associated with the motion 
supported by the platform. In contrast, the opposition. motion was 
supported by the London Regional Committee and five of its regional 
trade group committees, one national trade group committee (Civil Air 
Transport), at least five district committees and fifty-one different 
branches (TGWU BDCM, 1977). 
The arguments over pay policy were by this time well rehearsed. 
Indeed, they were not markedly different from the debate at the 1975 
BDC (see Chapter 7). Most of the same types of appeals to different 
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identities were deployed by the General Secretary and the supporters 
of his position. Jones spoke of the need to maintain the 
solidarity' of Phases One and Two in the return to normal collective 
bargaining (see also TGWU Vehicle Building and Automotive Group 
Conference, 1 July 1977). He argued that the union could not afford 
to lose its previous gains in a wage explosion, that it was necessary 
to preserve the unity of the trade union movement and, of course, 
that it was vital to support the Labour Government, particularly when 
face-d. 
-with, 
a Conservative alternative. -His -supporters also referred 
to the need for membership loyalty to the position of the General 
Secretary. Opponents argued that their level of sacrifice had been 
high with little to show in return. They argued that the Government 
had not fufilled its part of the bargain and, instead, had placed 'an 
undue emphasis ... upon wage levels as being a major source of 
inflationary pressure'. With price increases outrunning wage 
increases, levels of unemployment still high, and the degree of 
dissatisfaction with the Government's pay policies at a new peak, the 
opponents no doubt had a more powerful set of arguments than in 1975. 
1. 
Most significantly, they could appeal to the whole range of 
industrial grievances that had worked their way from the industrial 
channel of the union to the policy channel. 
The regional and industrial patterns of opposition and support 
for pay policy were also evident in the contributions of the speakers 
in the debate. Table 8.1 charts the regional and trade group 
variations in consent for and opposition to pay policy in terms of 
speaker contributions to BDC policy debates. In order to draw on a 
larger sample base to assess these variations, it adds the results of 
593 
TABLE 8.1 
TRADE GROUP AND REGIONAL VARIATIONS IN CONSENT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO 
PAY POLICY AT THE 1973,1975 AND 1977 TGWU BIENNIAL DELEGATE CONFERENCES: 
Relative Over-and Under-Representation in Speaker 
Contributions to the Main Pay Policy Debates. 
Number of Over-and Under- Composite Pro 
Speakers Representation (+ = consen 
(- oppositi 
TRADE GROUP 
1 
FOR 1 AGAINST 
1 
CONSENT 1 OPPOSITION I 
Automotive 
Building---_ 
Chemical I 
Clerical 
Commerical 
Docks 
Food 
General 
Passenger 
Power 
Public Services 
Total 
REGION 
1. London 
2. Southern 
3. Southwest 
I. ' Wales 
5. Midlands 
6. Northwest 
7. Scotland 
8. Northern 
9. Yorkshire 
10. Humberside 
11. Ireland 
Total 
5I 13 
4I ? 
4 3 
21 3 
51 6 
1I 6 
21 5 
51 u 
2I 6 
51 6 
61 5 
41 1 64 
6I 17 
1I 3 
81 3 
61 3 
6I 11 
1I 10 
5I 8 
31 1 
61 4 
1I 3 
1I 3 
44 I 66 
+2. 
+4.6_- 
+2. 
-2.3 
+0.5 
-0.3 
-6.5 
-1.3 
-2.6 
-2.4 
+3.2 
+10. 
+6. 
-2.6 
-2.4 
-1.9 
+6.4 
-3.6 
-6.7 
+1.8 
-4.8 
-2. g 
-12.3, -0.5 
-2.8 I -0.6 
+11. I -2.7 
+7.9 I -1.2 
-4.2 ! -1.4 
-9.5 I +3.1 
+2.6 I +3.1 
+2.4 I -2.9 
+8.9 1 +1.3 
-0.7 I +1.5 
-2.7 I -0.5 
-8. 
-1.4 
+4.6 
+0.1 
+2.4 
-6.7 
-2.9 
+5.4 
-4.4 +2. u 
+6.1 
-11.8 
-2.2 
+13.7 
+9.1 
-2.8 
-12.6 
-0.5 
+5.3 
+7.6 
-2.2 
-2.2 
Source: TGWU BDC 1973,1975 and 1977; and TGWU BDCM, 1973,1975 and 1977. 
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the 1977 pay policy debates to those of the 1973 and 1975 debates 
previously examined in Table 7.1. Of the fifty delegates called from 
the floor in the 1977 policy debate, thirty-six spoke against the 
platform and fourteen spoke for it. In terms of industrial 
I 
pressures, the automotive and docks trade groups were clearly 
oppositional, whereas the public service and general workers trade 
groups were among the most supportive of the platform's 
recommendations. The regional patterns also correlated with other 
indications of regional support and opposition. Thus, in terms of 
speaker contributions to the debates, the' Northwest' and London were 
clearly oppositional in their profiles. The Southwest, Wales, 
Yorkshire and the Northern regions, on the other hand, were all 
relatively supportive. The interview evidence certainly confirms 
this pattern. It was argued that the opposition motion at the 1977 
BDC was strongly supported by London, the West Midlands, the 
Northwest, Scotland, Humberside and Ireland. The Southwestern, Welsh 
and Northern regions, on the other hand, largely supported the 
platform (Interviews, various dates). Since the largest regions were 
those in opposition to a continuation to pay policy, it is hardly 
surprising that the opposition motion was passed by a large margin on 
a simple show of hands (Guardian, 7 July 1977). 
Thus, multiple internal pressures pushed the TGWU conference 
away from the recommendations of its General Secretary. These 
pressures were not manifest at the 1975 BDC, even though many of them 
were predictable. In the interim, however, discontent with the 
impact of the policies had been organized around a multitude of 
possible pressure points in the industrial and regional structures of 
the union. These combined to ensure the defeat of any further 
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commitment to wage restraint and alter the direction of external 
policy-making. 
The General Secretary still possessed a degree of policy 
discretion. He had, after all, received a standing ovation after his 
defeat at the 1977 BDC. Despite some very vehement challenges from 
the London Regional Committee and a couple of trade group committees,. 
he successfully persuaded the F&GPC and the executive that while the 
union was opposed to a twelve-month gap between principal wage 
settlements - the-remaining vestige of a TUC=constructed Phase Three 
policy - and would vote against it at the 1977 Congress, it would be 
obliged to observe it if such a position was adopted by the TUC 
(TGWU F&GPCM, 14 July and 11 August 1977; TGWU ECM, 19 September 
1977). Internal constraints were sufficiently great not to go any 
further. Indeed, thereafter, under the leadership of the new general 
secretary, Moss Evans, the Executive was unequivocal in its total 
opposition to wage restraint. It gave complete backing to the 
industrial civil service dispute in the latter stages of Phase Three 
and played a major role in the Ford, commercial transport and local 
authority disputes which precipitated the collapse of Phase Four 
(see, i. e., TGWU ECM, 5 June, 18 September, 4 and 5 December 1978; 
TGWU GSC, 15 January 1979). 
Patterns and Processes of Acquiescence and Opposition 
While many of the grievances about the impact of the Social 
Contract incomes policies were specifically industrial in nature, 
formal opposition to the policies was articulated on a regional basis 
in all of the sample unions. Both single- and dual-channel unions 
were divided for administrative and representational purposes into 
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various geographical or regional units. Each of these units had some 
officer presence and representative structure at local level. 
Whatever their particular industrial composition, they generally 
elected representatives to the national executi'/e. They also elected 
delegates to attend union policy conferences and these delegates 
generally attended the conference as a group. In some unions such as 
the GNWU, they also voted as a group. Thus, the regional or 
geographical unit was a key variable in the organization of union 
policy-making. Union leaders attempted to_ anticipate particular 
regional positions in order to determine the overall pattern of union 
support for or opposition to a particular policy. Effective 
opposition to policies often depended on the ability to build inter- 
regional alliances. Moreover, quite apart from the substantive 
merits of particular policies, it appears that some regional units 
were generally more supportive or oppositional vis-a-vis the union 
leadership than others, particularly with regard to the platform at, 
policy conferences. This section explores briefly the patterns of 
regional support and opposition to the Social Contract incomes 
policies in the sample unions. 
4 
Tables 8.2 and 8.3 identify patterns of regional support for and 
opposition to incomes policy in the sample unions. The 'Notes and, 
Sources for Table 8.21 recounts the methodology used in constructing 
them. To compare geographical variations within and between the 
unions it was necessary to create roughly comparable geographical 
units. The number of administrative regional units in the unions 
varied from ten in the GMWU to twenty-six in the case of the AUEW 
Engineering Section. However, it was possible to identify basically 
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TABLE8.2 
REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO INCOMES POLICT 
IN THE SAMPLE UNIONS1976-1977 
----------------------- 
UNION I 
------- 
ASTMS 
------- 
I NUPE 
-------- 
I TGWU I 
------ 
GMWU 
----------- 
I AUEW(E) I 
------ 
FBU 
-------- 
(TOTALS 
COMPARATIVE -I II I I4 I 1 BY 
REGIONAL 1976 11976 11977 1 1977 I 1976 1 1976 IREGION 
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I 
I 
II 
I 
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II 
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- -- 
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I 
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S/0 
I 
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SI 
I I 
__rr__ 
01 
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S 
I_---_--r- 
ISI 0 1413 
----- ----------------- EAST MIDLANDS ------- ------ IS ------ 
I 
SI ------ 
I --------- ISI S ------- 1510 
---------------------- ------ ------ I S ---_---_ 
Ir1 
_wrr__ 
I 
------- 
HUMBERSIDE (I 0I I S/0 I S Iu13 
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I - 
I 
1 
I0I S I S/0 I S Iu13 
---------- ------------ 
MANCHESTER/LANCASHIRE I 
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S/O 
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I S/0 I 
------ 
0 
--------- 
I 
I01 
---rrr 
S 
I 
------- 
1315 
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Notes and Sources for Table 8.2 
NOTES: N= 90 observations on 80 different regional cells, 5 of the 
possible 80 cells had no observation. One FBU regional cell was 
split with an observation on only one brigade in the region. 
Some cells have split observations in order to indicate that 
different union policy units within the comparative regional unit 
took a different position on support for inbomes policy. Other 
cells are double-counted because they cover more than one of the 
comparative regional units or subdivisions therein. Therefore, 
the totals by region do not equate with the totals by union. The 
totals by region include some double-counting of observations 
whereas the totals by union do not. 
The period of observation in each union was selected in relation 
to the best indication of positions for and against incomes 
policy in that particular union towards the end of either Phase 
One or Phase Two. In the TGWU and the GMWU, for instance, there 
were substantial debates at their respective conferences on 
support for the Government's incomes policy (TGWU BDC, 1977; 
GMWUAC, 1977; Interviews, various dates). The union totals in 
each case are a fairly good indication of the relative balance of 
forces at that time. The TGWU General Secretary was defeated in 
his attempt to secure continued conference support for incomes 
policy. The GMWU General Secretary was given greater latitude by 
his union conference to continue negotiations on a possible 
policy. In the other sample unions, 1976 was chosen as an 
observation date because there was no substantive debate in 1977. 
Opposition to a continuation of voluntary wage restraint was 
clearly predominant in 1977. The debates in 1976 in these 
unions, however, provide a good indication of the different 
regional profiles for inter-union comparisons. The AUEW(E) 
observation is based on the debate at the 1976 National Committee 
(AUEW NCR, 1976; Interviews, various dates). The FBU observation 
is based on the debate within the union's executive and the 
annual conference debate (Interviews, various dates; FBUAC, 
1976). The NUPE observation is based on the results of a ballot 
of the membership (NUPE IM, 15 June 1976; Interviews, `various 
dates). Finally, the ASTMS observation is based less on 
expressed support for incomes policy and more on whether or not 
the union was taking an active enough line against the policy. 
This proxy of support and opposition for the Government's incomes,. 
policies was again used for purposes of inter-union regional 
comparison. The ASTMS observation relates to its 1976 policy 
conference (ASTMSAC, 1976; Interviews, various dates). The' 
greater number of observations in support of incomes policy ors 
in the case of ASTMS, the platform position reflects the bias of 
the 1976 observation date. In conformity with the general 
movement against the policies, a 1977 observation date in all 
unions would indicate many more opposition observations by region 
and by union. 
SOURCES: Interview data, press reports, and internal union documents 
relating to policy conference decisions or membership ballots 
in 1976 and 1977. 
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TABLE 8.3 
PATTERNS OF REGIONAL SUPPORT FOR AND OPPOSITION TO 
INCOMES POLICY IN THE SAMPLE UNIONS,, 1976-1977 
(Summary of Table 8.2)' 
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common regions in most of the unions and then indicate any necessary 
subdivisions or aggregations of those particular units in the case of 
each union. The observations on particular regional positions are 
based primarily on conference policy-making on incomes policy in 
either 1976 or 1977 and they are drawn from a wide variety of source 
and interview materials (see Notes and Sources for Table 8.2). There 
are important limitations in comparing regional positions in 
different unions in different years whether on Phase Two or on a 
possible Phase Three depending on the union. However, it was 
-- estimated that a genuine debate over the merits- of - pay policy-was a 
better indicator of significant regional variations in consent for 
and opposition to pay policy than was a largely formal debate with 
little indication of policy variations. 
Table 8.2 gives detailed observations for each region in all of 
the unions. Table 8.3 summarizes the regional positions. They 
suggest that, irrespective of the dominant policy approach in the 
individual union, some regions tend to exhibit a, strong correlation 
with positions either in favour of or in opposition to pay policy. 
A number of regions demonstrate the mixed profile that would be 
anticipated in unions with different policy approaches to incomes 
policies. However, other regions indicate a marked propensity in one 
direction or another.. For instance, the East Midlands region was 
associated with relative support for pay policy in all of the five 
unions where an observation was available. Similarly, the 
Southeastern and Southern, Southwestern, Welsh and Northern regions 
of different unions were all identified with support for the Social 
Contract pay policies in most of the available observations. In 
contrast, East Anglia, London, the Northwest, Northern Ireland, and 
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the west coast of Scotland were more strongly associated with 
opposition to the policies. 
These variations suggest, important implications for an 
understanding of both patterns of union support for and opposition to 
pay policy and the process of union policy-making itself. First, the 
strong regional correlations point to the existence of factors 
external to unions which exercise an important influence on a given 
region's particular profile on incomes policy. Irrespective of 
particular industrial identities and union cultures, regional and 
community political traditions appear to exert an important influence 
on union policy-makingrat local level. This is perhaps not 
surprising, but it is an important reminder of the very pronounced 
regional and/or local character of union political and industrial 
practice. In particular, it highlights the need for an understanding 
of the particular organizational and cultural mechanisms for 
propagating particular local traditions. A micro-level explanation 
of union attitudes to incomes policies might, therefore, focus on the 
formal and informal mechanisms for inter-branch and inter-union 
contacts at regional level as well as prevailing community and 
industrial traditions. The role of trades councils, informal 
networks of political activists and local political parties, for 
instance, merit particular scrutiny. This finding also suggests that 
any adequate theorization of trade unionism must account for its 
pronounced regional character. 
Secondly, the regional character of support for and opposition 
to pay policies highlights the need for an understanding of how 
particular regional positions are aggregated at national level to 
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determine union support for or opposition to a particular pay policy 
phase. In other words, how do patterns of support and opposition on 
pay policy condition internal policy-making processes and vice versa? 
The process whereby particular local positions are aggregated appears 
to be highly differentiated by union. The identification of strong 
regional policy profiles on pay policy suggests, for instance, that 
union leaderships might seek to promote their policy preferences 
differently according to regional profiles. They might also seek to 
construct regional alliances on key policy issues on the basis of 
these profiles. Moreover, the regions with mixed profiles such as 
the West. Midlands, Humberside, Yorkshire and the east coast of 
Scotland might serve as a special focus of attention in the 
mobilization of consent and opposition. 
The differences in the structure of union policy-making also 
exercise an important influence on this process. First, the 
expression of particular industrial tensions was more sharply focused 
in the single-channel unions such as the FBU and the AUEW than in the 
dual-channel policy structures of the TGWU and GMWU. Secondly, the 
existence of particular control mechanisms such as factional 
alliances or regional mandating obviously exerted an important 
influence on the relative discretion of various union leaderships. 
Leadership discretion was very much a product of leaders' ability 
either to construct or anticipate various regional patterns. Indeed, 
union general secretaries certainly communicated with key regional 
officials to determine regional pre-dispositions on key policy 
issues. 
Some TGWU officials have argued, for instance, that a number 
of TGWU regional secretaries simply misread the voting intentions of 
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delegates in their regions and Jack Jones was, therefore, unable to 
anticipate the extent of the likely defeat at the 1977 BDC 
(Interviews, 2 and 3 October 1980). David Barnett, on the other 
hand, was able to count on the ability of GMWU'regional secretaries 
to deliver the vote for the platform at GMWU conferences. The 
President of the AUEW actually had little policy discretion in this 
sense. AUEW policy on wage restraint was largely the product of 
factional dominance. However, the close balance between the factions 
meant that key regions such as the Northeast played a preponderant 
role in the determination of AUEW policy-making. The FBU executive 
representation was closely linked with regional divisions within the 
union, though the strength of downwards mediations in the union was 
limited by both a high degree of brigade policy autonomy and the 
existence of different 'political' groupings on the executive. The 
NUPE conference policy process tended to be highly disaggregated and, 
therefore, exhibited less pronounced regional patterns. Individual 
branch delegates remained largely autonomous. Indeed, the leadership 
had consciously sought to foster greater inter-branch contact in the 
regions through the creation of area committees. However, these were 
not very active until Phases Three and Four when discontent with the 
Social Contract pay policies was much stronger. Finally, the ASTMS 
divisional councils tended to reflect a very distinct regional 
flavour. The Divisional chairperson, a lay activist, led the 
delegation to the policy conference. The link between individual 
executive representation and divisional policy-making was often weak 
which meant that the platform was limited in its ability to influence 
regional policy positions. Although not significant on pay policy, 
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this has been an important factor in limiting relative leadership 
discretion in ASTMS on issues such as industrial democracy and 
nationalization of the finance sector (see ASTMS AC, 1977 and 1978). 
However, because the union's approach to pay policy was largely 
uncontentious, the lack of downwards control from the executive into 
the divisions was not an important factor in the union's role in the 
Social Contract pay policies. 
This chapter has, thusfar, focused on the internal dynamics of 
the Social Contract incomes policies. In particular, it has 
attempted to illustrate how the industrial pressures associated with 
the impact of the policies were increasingly manifested in the 
internal policy-making of the sample unions. This process was highly 
differentiated by union in terms of its structure and prevailing 
mechanisms for downwards mediation of policy messages. However, 
policy opposition tended to be expressed on a regional basis in all 
of the unions. Indeed, regardless of the individual union's policy 
position, many of these 'regional units demonstrated a common 
propensity either for or against pay policy. Despite the 
organizational and cultural peculiarities of each of the unions, the 
mobilization of opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies 
generally had a common effect on the sample union leaders. It 
increasingly limited both their discretion and inclination to 
participate in the construction of any TUC-level consenus on future 
pay policies. The final part of the chapter looks at the 
implications of these internal union dynamics for external policy- 
making. 
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EXTERNAL POLICY-HARING 
The demise of the Social Contract incomes policies was phased 
over two pay policy periods. In the first, Phase Three, the TUC did 
not endorse the Government's proposed wage guideline, but most 
affiliates appeared to acquiesce in the implementation of the policy. 
Private sector acquiescence was facilitated by the inclusion of 
productivity agreements under the terms of the guidelines. Public 
sector bargaining groups, however, remained tightly bound by the 
Phase Three wage norm, thus exacerbating the build-up of industrial 
tensions in the public sector. When the Government attempted to 
enforce a five per cent pay limit in Phase Four, it encountered major 
obstacles in both the private and public sectors. These precipitated 
the collaspe of the policy and, ultimately, the Government itself. 
Since this period has been the object of much scrutiny in the 
literature, this section does not attempt to give a full account of 
macro-level developments (see Panitch, 1979; David Coates, 1980; 
Minkin, 1980; Barnett, 1982; Dorfman) 1983; Rodgers, 1984). Rather, 
it explores briefly the implications of internal union policy-making 
for TUC policy-making and TUC relations with the Government. The 
first part focuses on the TUC decision not to endorse a Phase Three 
policy and its continued acquiescence in the Social Contract incomes 
policies, nonetheless. The second charts the successive TUC attempts 
to prevent the collapse of the Social Contract in 1978 and 1979. 
The Withdrawal of TUC Support 
From the autumn of 1976 to the summer of 1977, TUC loaders 
repeatedly sought to broaden any debate on future wages policy to a 
consideration of the Government's economic strategy. This was 
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certainly a familiar refrain as they had consistently argued for a 
change in strategy since the implementation of Phase One (see Chapter 
6). The fact that the Government's projections for price increases 
were so desperately wrong over the course of Phase Two only added 
further to their conviction that the Government's economic approach 
was wrong. The TUC was already committed to a 'planned return to free 
collective bargaining' (TUCR, 1976: 523). TUC leaders argued that an 
orderly return to'collective bargaining must beset in the context of 
a strategy to tackle both unemployment and inflation. It was simply 
not acceptable, however, that the Government should try to gain 
compliance for future policies on the basis of trade-offs on taxation 
policy (TUC ECD, 13 October, 10 November and 8 December 1976; TUC 
Circular, 16 December 1976). 
The credibility of Government economic policy was especially 
critical because of its highly precarious position in parliament 
(LCM, 21 March 1977; Mitchie and Hoggart, 1978: 21). 4 As in the 
previous year, the Chancellor had hoped that a Phase Three deal might 
be worked out in pre-budget consultations (FT, 13 January 1977). 
Despite both the TUC commitment to return to free collective 
bargaining and a waning enthusiasm for Government economic policies, 
key TUC representatives, particularly the 'NEDC six', did seem 
disposed towards some flexible form of Phase Three (GMWU IM, 26 
January 1977; TGWU ECM, 1 December 1976; MS, 10 January 1977; FT, 21 
January and 8 February 1977; Guardian, 1 April 1977). They had 
invested much of their own credibility in the success of the Social 
Contract incomes policies. Moreover, the experience of the 1974-1975 
incomes policy re-entry phase highlighted the economic and political 
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dangers of an uncontrolled return to free collective bargaining. 
However, as during Phase One, TUC leaders refused to give any 
indication of their position on pay until they had had a chance to 
assess the broader package of economic measures in the spring budget 
(TUC ECD, 9 March 1977; FT, 8 February 1977; Guardian, 10 February 
1977). Jack Jones, for instance, made a particular push for dramatic 
action to halt price increases (TGWU F&GPCM, 31 March 1977; 
Interview, 6 March 1980; Guardian, 4 March 1977;. FTC 10 March 1977; 
The Times, 2 April 1977). 
When the Chancellor did table his budget, the TUC once again 
expressed its lack of enthusiasm (TUC ECM, 13 April 1977). The 
Chancellor could only express his optimism that prices increases were 
bound to decline over the course of the coming year and that trade 
union cooperation was fundamental to the achievement of this 
objective. The TUC, meanwhile, re-emphasized the importance of new 
measures to tackle unemployment, control prices and promote economic 
growth. It appeared that the relationship between the NEDC Six and 
key economic ministers was increasingly coloured by trade union 
disillusionment. Despite its continuing policy work, the Liaison 
Committee provided little scope for fresh impetus in TUC-Government 
relations. The NEC and PLP or Cabinet representatives were by then 
engaged in continual conflict and the Committee provided one of the 
few opportunities for at least some of the NEC members to confront 
directly Government ministers on their policy orientations. Unlike 
the previous years, there was no immediate economic crisis to 
precipitate an incomes policy agreement. In these circumstances, many 
of the sample union leaders noted that they were given very little to 
'sell' to their members (Interviews, 23 October 1979 and 30 April and 
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16 May 1980). Yet, if the'TUC was to embark on any Phase Three 
agreement, that was precisely what key union leaders had to do. 
Internal union pressures necessitated a more consultative build- 
up to a possible Phase Three policy. As various union conferences 
assembled to determine their policy positions on further rounds of 
wage restraint, it was increasingly clear that the the major division 
between the advocates and opponents of pay policy was between the 
TUC's delcared preference for an 'orderly' return to 'voluntary' 
collective bargaining and an 'immediate' return. to 'free' collective 
bargaining. These were, of course, codewords to distinguish between 
those who were willing to contemplate some form of Phase Three 
restraint, albeit with much greater flexibility, and those who were 
hostile to any further period of restraint, whatever its design. 
Senior TUC leaders preferred an orderly return because they feared 
the political and economic consequences of a 'disorderly' return. 
Such an approach also offered potentially greater political returns 
in terms of future cooperation and 'policy dividends' from the 
Government. Key trade union leaders appeared to gauge their political 
strategies in terms of access to governments, particularly Labour 
governments, and the potential that such access offered to influence 
policy orientations, Continued cooperation in wage bargaining, 
albeit in a much modified form, seemed to offer greater possibilities 
for such access. However, the ability of the TUC'leadership to sell 
such an approach was largely contingent on the policy positions of 
individual affiliates. These internal dynamics of incomes policies 
r 
determined both the scope for leadership policy discretion on this 
issue and the potential to construct a fragile consensus at 
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leadership level around some form of Phase Three policy. As the 
balance of policy positions shifted towards an immediate return to 
free collective bargaining, however, the discretion available to 
construct such a policy increasingly narrowed. Unions such as the 
AUEW, ASTMS and FBU were clearly opposed to any further wage 
restraint. NUPE and the GMWU, however, gave 'their respective 
leaderships much greater scope to explore the possibilities of a 
negotiated settlement. The opposition of both the TGWU and the NUM 
July conferences to any wage restraint shifted the balance 
irrevocably away from a formal TUC commitment to a Phase Three. 
Indeed, the TUC was unable to offer any formal cooperation in such a 
policy other than the commitment that it had already made to continue 
to observe the twelve-month interval between principal wage increases 
(TUC ECM, 14 June 1977; TUC ECD, 13 July 1977; TUC Circular, 23 June 
1977). As the TUC representatives told the Chancellor in a 12 July 
meeting, 'pressures on unions were now such that any attempt to 
suggest a norm or ceiling on the part of the TUC would be repudiated 
by the membership and could cause severe problems for individual' 
unions' (TUC ECD, 10 August 1977). { 
This was certainly the Government's reading of the situation. 
Whereas it had previously hinted at a range of possible concessions 
in return for TUC cooperation, Treasury ministers were increasingly 
unwilling to reveal the extent or nature of concessions on offer 
unless the TUC would name some level of wage settlements %4hioh it 
would be prepared to endorse (Observer, 17 July 1977). Given the 
disparity of views within the TUC General Council, TUC leaders were 
both unable and unwilling to do so. TUC representatives noted in a 13 
July meeting with the Prime Minister that they were receptive to his 
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arguments, but 'there was a great deal of scepticism from the 
membership' (TUC ECD, 10 August 1977). They indicated their desire 
to avoid any damaging confrontations which might undermine the 
success of the previous two years of sacrifice and, therefore, 
emphasized the importance of a flexible approach on the part of the 
Government. Thus, the TUC announced its inability to come to any 
agreement with the Government on a Phase Three norm. Significantly, 
although it did not endorse the ten per cent guideline (see Phase 
Three, 1977), it did not condemn it either. _. It also reaffirmed 
its 
intention, contingent on the support of Congress, to observe the 
twelve-month rule. With their scope to construct and implement an 
internal consensus on a Phase Three thus limited by the internal 
dynamics of incomes policy, TUC leaders could at most- practise an 
implicit policy of acquiescence (TUC ECM, 19 July 1977; TUC Circular, 
27 July 1977). 
The twelve-month rule, however, still proved problematic for the 
TUC. Many opponents of wage restraint suspected that it represented. '' 
the thin edge of more elaborate further restraint. Both the TGWU and 
the AUEW leaderships experienced vehement reactions to their 
positions on the twelve-month rule. Jack Jones, for instance, 
persuaded the TGWU F&GPC of the importance of supporting this limited 
concession in effecting an orderly return to free collective 
bargaining (TGWU F&GPCM, 14 July 1977). However, faced with a 
strong challenge from the leading opponent of wages policy within the 
union, the London Region Committee, the General Secretary was obliged 
at the next F&GPC meeting to clarify that the TGWU would vote against 
the twelve-month rule at the TUC and support it only if it was 
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adopted as official TUC policy (ibid. and TGWU GSC, 11 August 1977). 
The readiness of the AUEW executive to support the twelve-month rule, 
despite the National Committee's opposition to further wage 
restraint, ensured that the twelve-month rule wag actually adopted by 
the TUC (TUCR, 1977). The AUEW executive was able to support the 
twelve-month rule and subsequently have its contoversial 
interpretation endorsed by a recalled National, Committee because of 
the discretion made available by the factional system of political 
organization (AUEW RNCR, 1977; Fenton, 197?; Interviews, various 
dates). TUC credibility was in this case judged to be an overriding 
priority and the dominance of the moderate faction in both the 
executive and the national committee ensured both that this was 
judged as a political priority and that internal union policy could 
subsequently be clarified in that direction. GMWU policy was clearly 
conducive to the adoption of the twelve-month rule. ASTMS was 
opposed, but largely acquiesced in its impftaentation. Nor did the 
twelve-month rule prove a particular problem for the public sector 
membership of NUPE and the FBU since they generally negotiated on an 
annual basis in any case. c 
The Phase Three policy did provide sufficient flexibility in the 
private sector to release many of the most pressing demands. Real 
take home pay, for instance, rose steadily throughout the period (see 
Table B. 1, Appendix B). Many private sector groups negotiated 
substantial productivity payments in addition to the ten per cent 
limit and the Department of Employment did not investigate the 
authenticity of these payments with any particular vigour. Indeed, 
in a few cases such as at Ford Motors and the West Midlands Road 
Haulage Association, the employer did not even seek to dissimulate 
612 
that the pay increase breached the limits (on the latter case, see 
Corfield, 1982: 66). However,. the public sector claims proved much 
more contentious. - Many public sector groups simply acquiesced as in 
the case of the local authority and hospital ancillary workers. TYris. 
meant that any industrial pressures were accentuated and the 
grievances continued to build up for the next wage round. Some of 
the nationalized industry bargaining groups such as electricity 
supply had experienced so many internal pressures that the Government 
simply turned a blind eye to any breaches. . 
The major confrontation 
was, in fact, that of the Fire Brigades Union. 
The Fire Brigades Union's challenge to the Phase Three ten per 
cent wage limit in November, December and. January of 1977 and 1978 
illustrated both the reluctance of senior TUC leaders to be 
associated with any direct confrontation over the application of the 
ten per cent ceiling and the difficulties for the TUC in achieving 
any wider leadership consensus on this issue. It was argued above 
that the FBU had become committed to industrial action in order to 
rectify perceived anomalies in the relative wages of firefighters. 
Faced with both employer and Government intransigence on the 
observance of the ten per cent limit, the FBU leadership appealed for 
the assistance of the TUC in mounting a public campaign against the 
Phase Three limits. The TUC's internal cabinet, the Finance and 
General Purposes Committee, rejected this request. It suggested 
that the FBU was unlikely to sway the Government from its commitment 
to the ten per cent limit and should, therefore seek a negotiated 
settlement (TUC F&GPCM, 2 December 1977; t4S and The Times, 3 
December, 1977). FBU leaders were incensed at what they saw as a 
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contradiction between TUC policy and practice on incomes policy and 
they appealed this decision at a meeting of the entire General 
Council. Once again, their request was rejected though by the narrow 
margin of twenty to seventeen (TUC GCMG 21 December 1977; Guardian, 
22 December 1977). 
The obvious divisions on the General Council over the TUC's 
implicit acquiescence in Phase Three were more generally indicative- 
of the lack of consensus on this issue. Key TUC leaders cleary 
envisaged a relatively smooth transition over Phase Three to free 
collective bargaining as both a vindication of their previous 
representations to the Government and also an important bargaining 
chip in continued good relations with the Government. Ironically, it 
appeared that many in Government circles interIfeted the high degree 
of trade union acquiescence in Phase Three as an indication of the 
possibility of pursuing a further round of relatively tight wage 
restraint without full TUC cooperation. Their reading of Pnase Three 
suggested that trade union members would comply with a further 
policy, even if TUC leaders remained opposed to a percentage limit on 
earnings (Interview, 15 October 1980; also Williams, 1981; Bartlett, 
1982; Rodgers, 1984). TUC leaders emphasized their opposition to any 
form of Phase Four pay limit (TUC ECM 12 April and 12 July 1978)" 
However, in July 1978 a White Paper announced the Government's 
intention to enforce a five per cent pay limit over the coming pay 
round (Phase Four, 1978; on the TUC opposition, see TUC GCM, 26 July 
1978 and TUC GSC, 28 July 1978). 
Collapse of Phase Four 
The Government's ability to impose unilaterally a Phase Four 
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, wage policy proved 
to be much more limited than had been imagined. 
Policy-makers misread the degree of internal momentum building 
against wage restraint, particularly among public sector bargaining 
groups. The Government also overestimated its capacity to utilize 
contract sanctions on employers dealing with the Government to 
enforce the limits and, at the same. time, maintain the support. of 
Parliament for this approach (see Note 4 above). Perhaps. the policy 
had been designed only for electoral consumption? The Prime 
Minister's decision to delay the election and attempt to enforce the 
five per cent figure proved a serious miscalculation of bargaining 
sentiment and-provoked an almost immediate industrial response. 
Perhaps not unreasonably, the Treasury had estimated that a five per. 
cent limit would turn out to hold increases in earnings to roughly 
eight per cent in the same way that the ten per cent limit had held 
earnings increases to between thirteen and fourteen per cent. It was 
argued that the problem with Phase Three was not so much the upward 
drift as that the norm was initially set too high (Sunday Times, I 
October 1978). However, mathematical projections did not take, 
account of either the psychological impact or the highly 
differentiated resolution of differentials and relativities problems 
within. individual unions. The resolution of some of these problems 
simply increased the pressures in other bargaining groups and 
sometimes sparked yet further competitive claims. The Government 
later considered adopting its orginal target of eight per cent 
rather than the five per cent limit. By then, however, the momentum 
against the five per cent policy was seemingly inexorable and even 
small rise in the allowable limit was not sufficient to maintain 
union cohesion and authority (on the "institutional tightrope' 
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between 'economic growth requirements', 'the social claims and values 
of wage policy' and the authority of union leaderships, see Corina, 
1967: 310). 
There were, in fact, two attempts to rdconstruct the TUC's 
damaged relations with the Government and avert a series of 
politically damaging industrial confrontations: in the autumn of 
1978 and in the winter of 1979. The first failed because internal 
policy pressures on General Council members sharply circumscribed 
their ability and inclination to participate in TUC policy 
initiatives on pay bargaining. These internal policy constraints 
compromised the delicate chain of consensus-building which has been 
argued characterized TUC policy-making. The second attempt to 
reconstruct the relationship did not encounter such internal 
constraints because it came in the aftermath of of a series of 
private and public sector disputes in which the most significant 
internal industrial pressures had largely been spent. Thus, there 
was virtually no formal affiliate opposition to the signing of the 
Concordat in February 1979 (TUC, 1979a and b). By then, however, the 
damage to the relationship had been done and the credibility of the 
Social Contract had largely vanished. 
The problems with the Government's approach to Phase Four were 
readily apparent to senior TUC leaders. The 1978 Congress rejected 
the Phase Four norm the day after, the Prime Minister had reiterated 
his support for it (TUCR, 1978). The Government signalled that it 
would enforce the limit through contract and price sanctions 
(Guardian, 27 September 1978). The first major challenge to the 
policy came fron the private sector when Ford management offered its 
616 
unions no, more than the five per cent limit. This sparked an 
immediate walkout which the largest union involved, the TGWU, quickly 
made official (Guardian, 27 September 1978; The Times, 23 September 
1978). Moreover, the pressures on public sector wage claims- were 
building rapidly. However, much of the close understanding which had 
characterized the early period of the Social Contract had by then 
dissipated in a climate of mutual mistrust. 
The composition of the TUC's 'NEDC six!, hitherto the 
privileged vehicle of expression between senior Government ministers 
and the TUC, had altered substantially. The new leaders of the AUEW 
and TGWU, for instance, were only gradually easing their way into 
their new relationship with Government leaders (Interviews, 10 
September and 23 October 1979 and 8 July and 12 August 1980). David 
Basnett, in particular, wished to avoid what he perceived as the. 
imminent possibility of a disastrous breakdown in TUC-Government 
relations. Faced with the impasse between the TUC's opposition to 
Phase. Four and the Government's determination to enforce it, he 
proposed that the TUC throw a 'lifeline' and try to develop a new 
economic understanding (Guardian, 4 October 1978; The Times, 5,11 
and 12 October 1978). On the basis of discussions at an informal 
meeting between the TUC's NEDC representatives and senior Government 
ministers, the TUC Economic Committee endorsed the decision to 
explore the common ground between the TUC and the Government while 
maintaining Congress policy on opposition to Phase Four (TUC ECM, 11 
October 1978). There followed several weeks of intensive 
negotiations (TUC IM, 18 October"1978; GMWU IM, 10,11,19,23 and 24 
October; TUC ECM, 8 November 1978). The discussions centred on low 
pay, relativities and differentials problems, the impact of wage 
617 
increases on unit costs, the need for a regular mechanism to review 
prices and other economic developments, and the need to develop some 
kind of mechanism to investigate public sector wages on the basis of 
comparability principles. ' The Government was xnwilling to abandon 
Phase Four, but it was willing to drop its contract sanctions in 
return for TUC advice to negotiators on the need for stability in 
unit labour costs. The TUC representatives considered that they had 
made some progress on price controls. The comparability mechanism 
also offered some potential- for the resolution of the otherwise 
inevitable confrontations in the public sector (TUC ECM, 14 November 
1978; GMWUJ, December 1978). 
In what was an unusual episode by TUC standards, however, the 
tentative pact on 'Collective Bargaining, Costs and Prices' was 
endorsed by the TUC Economic Committee but failed to secure the 
endorsement of the General Council. It fell on a tied vote: 
fourteen for and fourteen against with two abstentions and a number 
of absences (TUC ECM and GCM) 14- November 1978; FT and The Times, 15 
November 1978). This unprecedented rebuff to the TUC leadership was 
symptomatic of the disparate analysis of key union leaders involved 
in the discussions as well as the very real pressures operating on 
them (Interviews, various dates). Already at the regular October 
meeting of the General Council, some members had argued that there 
was a need for a completely new approach to pay bargaining. In' 
contrast, others maintained that any discussion on pay guidelines 
was directly contrary to Congress policy' (TUC GCM, 25 October 
-1978). These different views were reflected in the actual vote. 
Three of the TGWU representatives, for instance, voted against the 
618 
statement even though their General Secretary, who was absent, was 
one of the negotiators. The fourth TGWU representative present at 
the meeting, Harry Urwin, abstained after attempting to delay any 
decision until-the support of the TGWU executive was assured. One of 
the Economic Committee members, Alan Fisher, actually voted against 
the statement after he had endorsed it on the Economic Committee. 
The strong industrial pressures in NUPE no doubt influenced this 
decision (NUPE IM, 20 November 1978). Indeed, Fisher's endorsement 
of the proposed TUC solution to the public sector dispute would later 
be repudiated by his own executive in an unusual assertion of 
lay 
control (Interviews, 15 August, 14 October and 14 November 1978). 
The opposition of the COHSE leader, Albert Spanswick, probably 
reflected similar pressures to those expressed within NUPE. The FBU 
General Secretary's opposition was undoubtedly an expression of the 
previous year's experience with the TUC and Phase Three. At least one 
General Council member, generally seen as a supporter of pay policy, 
reportedly voted against the document because he was unhappy with his 
exclusion from the Economic Committee in that year's General 'Council 
committee assignments (Interview, 23 October 1979; TUC GCM, 27 
September 1978). This was an equally important indication of the 
increasing difficulties of constructing a consensus at leadership 
level. Thereafter, TUC staff made a conscious effort to bring'as 
many General Council members as possible into discussions with the 
Government. On the other hand, as was argued above, union leaders 
such as Terry Duffy, David Basnett and Clive Jenkins, for a variety 
of internal political reasons, all enjoyed some degree of policy 
discretion on this issue at the time and supported the efforts to 
repair the TUC's relations with the Government. 
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Somewhat exasperated and dispirited, the TUC General Secretary, 
Len Murray, accurately predicted that this breakdown in communication 
between the Government and the TUC would lead to increased industrial 
troubles (Guardian, 16 November 1978). In facts the Government and 
the TUC continued to discuss the outlines of a possible agreement. 
Particularly after the defeat of its contract sanctions policy in 
Parliament and the settlement of the Ford dispute, the Government 
indicated that it was willing to contemplate increases above the five 
per cent limit. The Government and the TUC agreed to meet, monthly 
and continued to explore the various possibilities of a comparability 
exercise (Guardian, 14 and 18 December 1978; Observer, 17 December 
1978; DT, 20 December 1978; FT, 21 December 1978; TUC ECM, 13 
December 1978; TUC ECD, 10 January 1979; TUC GCM, 20 December 1978;. 
and GMWU IMF 22 December 1978)., However, these talks did not assume 
an urgent character until January. 1979 when industrial disputes in 
oil distribution, the hire and reward section of the road haulage 
industry, the water industry, the local authorities and the railway 
industry coincided with one of the most severe winter seasons on 
record. The public impression was of a Government and trade urn.. on 
movement out 'of control and the Government met repeatedly with the 
TUC to explore the alternatives to a declaration of a State. of 
Emergency. 
By this time, the TUC was engaged in an almost continuous series 
of meetings with senior ministers as, at various points, the Ecönomic 
Committee, the Employment Policy and Organization Committee, the 
Finance and General Purposes Committee and the entire General Council 
were meeting members of the Government (TUC GCM, 24 January 1979; TUC 
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ECM, 9 and 31 January 1979; TUC F&GPCM, 18 and 22 January 1979; TUC 
Circular, 
. 
30 January 1979). This exercise was certainly more 
elaborate in terms of constructing a consensus at leadership level 
than what had happened in October and November 1978. One senior TUC 
official acknowledged that this format at least guaranteed a General 
Council majority this time around (Interview, 7 October 1980). 
However, the internal political and industrial constraints were by- 
this time also much less onerous. The TUC was in essence 
surrendering no affiliate autonomy over wage bargaining. The 
Concordat was endorsed in the face of very little opposition, but any 
short- or medium-term prospect of an agreement between the TUC and a 
Labour government had been effectively removed from the political 
agenda (TUC GCM, 14 February 1978). 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has examined the mobilization of opposition to wage 
restraint within the sample unions and considered the implications of 
` these internal union developments for TUC policy-making. It has 
argued that; whereas union leaders were initially able to mobilize 
consent to the Phase One and Two policies, their scope for doing so 
in Phases Three and Four was increasingly limited as the industrial, 
impact of the policies was translated into internal union policy- 
making. In particular, this chapter has focused on union structure 
as a key variable in the determination of individual union experience 
of incomes policies and the relative scope for policy discretion on 
the part of national union leaders. It has also pointed to the 
importance of particular features of internal policy-making such as 
membership composition, approaches to bargaining and various 
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mechanisms for the downwards transmission of policy messages. 
Moreover, it has also been suggested that, irrespective of individual 
union variables, there are pronounced regional patterns of opposition 
and consent on incomes policies. The impact of union structure an 
the trade union experience of incomes policies will be further 
considered in Chapter 9. 
The implications of this incomes policy process within 
individual sample unions was profound. The scope for TUC-Government 
agreements was increasingly narrowed over this period as internal 
union pressures, first, limited the participation of their leaders in 
further episodes of TUC consenus-building on wage restraint and, 
later, precipitated the collapse of the pay policies and the 
Government itself. The next chapter concludes the analysis with a 
brief overview of the argument and some consideration of its 
implications for individual union and TUC policy-making and the 
limits and possibilities of future attempts by governments or the TUC 
to construct and implement such voluntary pay policies. 
r" 
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CHAPTER 9 
CONCLUSIONS 
This final chapter briefly reviews the argument and focuses on 
the implications of the findings for a number of areas of research. 
In particular, it considers the structure of individual union policy- 
making, trade union political strategies and the prospects for future 
voluntary incomes policy initiatives in Britain. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
This study has focused on trade union participation in the 
Social Contract incomes policies in Britain in the 1970s. It was 
argued that an'understanding of British trade union strategy and 
behaviour during this period must focus on the link between the 
internal and external dimensions of individual union organizations. 
More particularly, it has been suggested that, in the context of a 
voluntary incomes policy agreement between a central trade union 
organization such as the TUC and the state, it is necessary to look 
at the interaction between individual union policy-making and 
industrial practice, on the one hand, and TUC policy-making, on the 
other. The contention was that such an approach would inform both 
the nature of individual union policy-making, particularly the 
downwards mediation of policy initiatives from leadership level, and 
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the constraints placed on national trade union leaders in TUC 
policy-making through upwards policy mediations within individual 
union organizations. Moreover it was suggested that these processes 
have been poorly understood and. that this pointed to a significant 
gap in the literature on both trade union organizations and the 
incomes policy experience in Britain. 
The early chapters looked at the origins and formulation of the 
Social Contract. They attempted to locate the place of British trade 
union political and industrial practice in this new programmatic 
alliance between the TUC and the Labour Party and highlighted the 
critical ambiguities of the project as regards incomes policy and its 
place in a broader economic and political strategy. Chapter u 
reviewed the post-war patterns of opposition and support on incomes 
policies within and between the sample unions in this study and 
explored their variations in relation to certain key variables: 
their composition of membership and industrial location, their 
bargaining policies and their internal and external political 
practice. Chapter 5 focused on the evolution of TUC-Government 
relations during the 1974 Labour Government's first eighteen months 
in office. In particular, it examined the process of 'consensus- 
building' in the construction of a TUC bargaining policy response to 
the Government's requests for wage moderation, explored the range of 
factors affecting the participation of individual union leaders in 
this process, and considered the organizabional and industrial 
implications of the TUC's policy. Chapter 6 detailed the 
negotiations between the TUC and the Government on Phases One and Two 
of the Social Contract incomes policies, looked at the industrial 
624 
impact of these policies, and explored the rationale of TUC 
cooperation in this period of stringent wage restraint. Chapter 7 
focused on the mobilization of consent within individual unions for a 
policy of wage restraint. In particular, it identified the key 
levels within irjdividual unions at which consent for the policies 
was secured, explored the processes and organizational variables 
affecting this mobilization of consent, and looked at how a policy of 
consent or opposition to incomes policy was translated into 
industrial practice. Finally, Chapter 8 demonstrated how the 
industrial impact of wage restraint was articulated through different 
organizational structures into individual union policy-making 
processes. This upwards mediation of policy messages limited both , 
the capacity and inclination of individual union leaders to 
participate in the negotiation of further TUC-Government agreements 
on wage guidelines and led over two further phases of the Social 
Contract incomes policies, first, to the withdrawal of TUC 
cooperation and, ultimately, to the collapse of the policies. 
THE STRUCTURE OF UNION POLICY-MAKING 
0n3 of the major criterion for the selection of the sample 
unions was the structure of their policy-making. It was suggested 
that consent to incomes policies necessarily linked union bargaining 
policy and industrial practice with other forms 'of union policy- 
making. In this sense, the trade union experience of incomes policy 
provided a unique opportunity to scrutinize the articulation between 
industrial and political practice within trade unions. Moreover, it 
was hypothesized that union structure might play an important role in 
determining the nature of these types of articulations and the 
I. 
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consequent experience of incomes policies. Thus, both single- and 
dual-channel policy structures were investigated. 
It appears that there were some important variations between the 
experience of single- and dual-channel unions during the Social 
Contract incomes policies. First, in the single-channel unions, 
industrial pressures were transferred more directly into debates on 
other policy items such as political agreements on different phases 
of incomes policy because these issues were considered in the same 
policy forums and, sometimes, within the context of the same debate. 
Secondly, the dual-channel union leaderships experienced 
comparatively less difficulty in mobilizing policy messages and 
initiatives downwards because they did not have to contend with such 
direct industrial pressures in their policy-making bodies. 
These general observations, however, are subject to important 
qualifications. It must be emphasized, for instance, that the sample 
size was limited. There also appeared to be a complex range of other 
important factors affecting the incomes, policy experience of 
particular unions which clouds hardfast distinctions on incomes 
policy experience on the basis of union structure. The composition 
of union membership played an important role in determining incomes 
policy experience, particularly in relation to the design of the 
policy. The AUEW and NUPE, for instance, were both single-channel 
unions, but the AUEW's skilled membership was much more conscious of 
the impact of Phases' One and Two on differentials than was NUPE's 
lower-paid membership (though NUPE also experienced a range of 
differentials problems in the latter stages of the Social Contract 
pay policies). The struture of bargaining also exerted an important 
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effect. Indeed, it might be argued. that union policy-making struture 
was largely a product of bargaining structure (for a comparable 
approach, see Clegg, 1976b). Two of the single-channel unions, NUPE 
and the FBU, engaged in highly centralized bargaining. Many 
industrial pressures were, therefore, directed at national level and 
at national union bargaining policy. The other single-channel union, 
the AUEW, negotiated a master framework agreement, the National 
Engineering Agreement, but this determined only a small proportion of 
wage increases. Most bargaining was done at local level. Indeed, 
negotiations on a new national agreement were suspended during Phases 
One and Two. The structure of AUEW bargaining and the spread of its 
fairly heterogeneous membership meant that its industrial experience 
was much like the other large dual-channel unions. Previous 
bargaining policy and traditional approaches to pay policy also 
played an important role, regardless of union policy structure. 
ASTMS, for instance, had been consistently opposed to the concept of 
incomes policies, whereas 
other 
dual-channel unionshad consistently 
suppor. ed such an approach. Particular leadership dispositions also 
played a significant role in particular union approaches. This was, 
it has been argued, subject to the particular constraints on 
leadership discretion, but the ideological disposition of a union 
leader as well as his or her place within external policy-making 
bodies also affected a union's approach to or experience of incomes 
policy. 
There were also important differences between dual-channel 
unions in the articulations between industrial or bargaining policy- 
making and other policy-making. In the GMWU, for instance, the link 
was very indirect. This meant that it experienced less direct 
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industrial pressure than did a union like the TGWU where there were 
strong links at a number of different levels. In the case of the 
TGWU, these links did not initially contribute to much opposition to 
union consent for a pay policy, possibly because the policy had yet 
to be experienced industrially. However, the strong articulation 
between the two different channels of union policy-making meant that 
the industrial impact of the Social Contract pay policies was 
translated fairly directly into non-bargaining policy forums. This 
facilitated the organization of opposition to the policies. Thus, 
despite the existence of a variety of other mechanisms to effect the 
downwards mediation of policy, the organization and expression of 
industrial pressures in the union's policy-making body contributed to 
an unprecedented defeat of a leadership recommendation and, thus, 
critically altered the direction of external policy-making. 
There were also important differences between all of the unions, 
single- or dual-channel, which facilitated or discouraged the 
mobilization of both opposition to and consent for wage restraint. 
The factional system in the AUEW, for instance, largely determined 
the scope for leadership discretion. The different links between 
executive representatives and different regional and industrial 
structures of administration and representation also played an 
important role in determining relative leadership discretion. The 
link in the FBU and GMWU, for instance, was very direct though often 
with different results in terms of leadership discretion whereas the 
link in ASTMS and the TGWU was fairly indirect. In the AUEW and 
NUPE, the link appeared to be almost entirely independent of regional 
structures. A weaker. link tended to mean that the executive 
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possessed greater policy latitudo vis-a-vis regional structures. 
However, in both the GMWU and the FBU, the strong link between 
regions and executive also tended to ensure support for the platform 
in union policy-making. This was especially the case in the GMWU 
where the dominant regional representative was the regional secretary 
who sat on the executive, led the regional executive and also led the 
regional delegation to conference which frequently followed a system 
of regional mandating. 
Finally, the political and industrial strategies of the sample 
unions also demonstrated substantial variations. These were 
undoubtedly a reflection of prevailing organizational culture as well 
as its multiple determinants: membership composition, bargaining 
structure, particular trajectories of growth and decline, and 
patterns of internal and external political practice. These union 
strategies, often more implicit than explicit, and their 
manifestations in terms of approaches to incomes policy could not be 
predicted on the basis of a particular type of structure. The 
diversity of union approaches to incomes policy atests to the nature 
of union policy-making as a highly autonomous and particularistic 
process. It is possible to make certain generalizations about the 
impact of particular union structures on their experience of incomes 
policies, but there are a multitude of other variables. This again 
highlights the importance of internal union structure and the related 
processes of control for an understanding of, the internal dynamics of 
incomes policies and, in turn, their external dynamics. 
TRADE UNION POLITICAL STRATEGIES 
It must be emphasized that the success of the opposition to wage 
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restraint in the sample unions did not imply any new commitment to a 
radical political or economic strategy. Rather, the success of the 
incomes policy opponents was built quite pragmatically on the 
expression of grievances about the detailed industrial impact of the 
policies as well as an increasing disillusionment about the seeming 
lack of return in terms of overall economic performance. It was 
argued in Chapters 3 and 6 that the trade union leadership espousal 
of the Social Contract arose from a relatively pragmatic attachment 
to the values of the Labour Party and the political returns accruing 
from a Labour Government whatever its particular orientation. The 
Social Contract was a means of guaranteeing certain types of returns, 
but the trade union leadership attachment did not appear to be 
grounded in either of the social democratic or socialist conceptions 
of the Social Contract. This was the essential ambiguity of the 
Social Contract as a union bargaining strategy and why it was 
possible to support successive incomes policy phases despite 
considerable reservations about the merits of, government intervention 
in collective bargaining. Key trade union leaders were persuaded of 
the necessity of such a change in tact and they were able to 
generalize that conviction first at leadership level and then within 
individual affiliates. However, they were unable to prevent the 
disaffection of activists - those who maintain the levers of union 
bargaining practice and policy-making - as industrial grievances were 
articulated in opposition to the impact of the policies. 
The success of the internal opposition to the Social Contract 
incomes policies did not represent any large-scale movement from 
social democratic to oppositional political rationalities. The 
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'political' opponents of the Social Contract incomes policies 
generally espoused some variation of the socialist vision of a Social 
Contract; though they had by this time become disillusioned with the 
radical potential of such a project and espoused instead the 
articulation of an 'alternative economic strategy'. However, their 
success in limiting the possibility of leadership commitment to any 
" 
further rounds of pay restraint depended on a complex organizational 
alliance with those disillusioned with the detailed industrial impact 
of the policies. In this sense, the opposition was fundamentally 
instrumental in character. The industrial opponents of the policies 
rejected their continuation without necessarily formulating any 
0 detailed or systematic alternative. They simply wanted more 
flexibility to bargain and rectify anomalies that had created havoc 
in their pay structures. The mobilization of opposition was rarely 
linked to any transformative project. What might be labelled a 
'social democratic economism' remained' the predominant ethos in the 
bargaining strategies and political practice of British trade 
unionism. As Moss Evans, the TGWU General Secretary, phrased it in a 
report to the TGWU executive in the autumn of 1978: "Our approach is: 
carry on bargaining and backing Labour' (TGWU GSQR, 18 September 
1978). 
The period since the demise of the Social Contract has posed a 
number of challenges to such a formulation. Certainly, this 
traditional ethos on bargaining and political practice has remained 
predominant, but the TUC leadership has experienced increasing 
difficulties in containing the ideological divergence of its 
affiliates. Some union leaderships have opted for increasingly 
radical oppositional strategies challenging, rather unsuccessfully in 
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depressed economic circumstances, the power of the state on the 
political and industrial fronts. Other affiliates have eschewed all 
but the veneer of a social democratic political strategy and 
concentrated on a more cooperative form of instrumentalism - the 
kind of practice associated with moderate 'business unionism' (on 
'business unionism', see Banks, 1974)" These kinds of conflicts have 
erupted periodically and the TUC has appeared increasingly limited in 
its capacity to contain the ideological and industrial divergences 
between its autonomous affiliates (Murray, 1985). 
0 
TRADES UNIONS AND THE INCOMES POLICY CYCLE 
The experience of the Social Contract incomes policies was 
different from that of its predecessors in at least one respect. No 
period of reconstruction, usually under the auspices of another 
government, has yet followed. The defeat of the Callaghan Government 
in 1979 was clearly associated with the failure of the Phase Four 
policy and the breakdown of Government relations with the unions more 
generally. This electoral defeat conformed to the predominant 
political pattern which in Britain has elevated the question of 
incomes policies among the highest political priorities. However, 
the Thatcher Government has since lard gLy eschewed political 
mediations with representative organizations of employees and 
employers to affect labour market outcomes. Instead, it has pursued 
a more restrictive legal framework, implemented deflationary demand 
policies and been prepared to weather most political costs associated 
with relatively high levels of unemployment (see Urwin and Murray, 
1982 and 1983). This has had a profound impact on the industrial and 
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" political practice of many British trade unions affecting, in turn, 
TUC policy-making, especially in terms of the definition of an 
appropriate political strategy (see Murray, 1985). 
The important developments of this period lie outside the bounds 
1 of this study, though all of the research was conducted during the 
first term of the Thatcher Government, from 1979 to 1983. However, 
the emphasis on the operation of market forces to the exclusion of 
political mediations and the high cost on human resources of this 
economic strategy has meant that incomes policies have not yet 
disappeared from the political agenda as an instrument of economic 
policy. Indeed, they have featured prominently in many of the main 
alternative policies in which a reduction in the level of 
unemployment and government economic stimulus are identified as the 
principal political priorities. In conformity with the classic post- 
war argumentation on this subject (see Chapter 1), it is held that if 
a government was to pursue positive demand policies in order to bring 
down the levels of unemployment, then some form of restraint on the 
level of wage increases would be necessary if the increased demand 
was to be translated into new jobs rather than wage inflation. This 
has been argued mutedly among the 'wets' in the Conservative Party. 
The SDP/Liberal Alliance has advocated a tax-based and/or statutory 
policy which would not rely on the cooperation of wage bargainers 
with whom it has no organic link (IDS Focus, 1982; Jackman and 
Layard, 1982). Despite the many negative associations with the 
collapse of the Social Contract incomes policies, the Labour Party 
leadership has still aspired to convince TUC leaders of the merits of 
another wide-'ranging agreement on economic priorities. The 
resulting, often vague, formulations of national economic assessments 
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and fair wages and incomes distribution are strongly reminiscent of 
the initially ambiguous formulations of the Social Contract in 1973 
and 1974 (LC, 1982 and 1985; FT, 7 and 8 August, 1985). As in 1972 
and 1973, most trade union leaders appear to have placed the election 
of a Labour government as the central component of their political 
strategies. 
The seemingly inevitable reflex towards incomes policies and 
voluntary accords between the state and British trade unions on wage 
bargaining once again raises the question of their organizational 
implications, especially for trade unions. Neither the structure nor 
attitudes of individual union and TUC policy-making appear to have 
altered substantially in the interim. Yet the appeal of incomes 
policies appears undiminished. Assuming that this is the case, then, 
notwithstanding any insights to be gleaned from this or other studies 
on the subject, the next incomes policy experience promises to be as 
problematic as all of its predecessors. Trade union leaders are, of 
course, accustomed to making concessions. The question, as put by 
one former union leader, is whether or not they make concessions 
which go beyond their membership's readiness to accept them 
(Interview, 16 December 1980)? This study suggests that these 
external dynamics of incomes policy construction and implementation 
will remain contingent on their internal organizational implications. 
The highly differentiated internal organizational arrangements of 
British trade unions will continue to render TUC poliqy-making on 
this question and the maintenance of any voluntary incomes policy 
accord extremely problematic. 
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APPENDIX A 
TABLE A. 1 
CHRONOLOGY OF BRITISH INCOMES POLICIES DURING THE 1970s 
1972 November Stage I 
Heath Government's 
1973 April Stage II Statutory Policies 
November Stage III 
No TUC Agreement 
197k'February Election of a minority Labour Government 
(Re-elected in October 1974 with a majority) 
Tacit TUC Agreement To Abide By Stage III 
1974 August SOCIAL CONTRACT MARK I 
- no real wage increases, money wage 
increases pegged. to the cost-of-living 
- TUC AGREEMENT 
1975 August PHASE ONE 
- six pound flat-rate increases (non- 
consolidated) 
- 12-month rule 
- TUC AGREEMENT 
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1976 August PHASE TWO 
- 5% limit (2.50 pounds minimum & 4.00 
pounds maximum) 
- 12-month rule 
- TUC AGREEMENT 
1977 August PHASE THREE 
4 
10% limit plus optional productivity 
allowance 
- TUC AGREEMENT LIMITED TO 12-MONTH RULE' 
1978 August PHASE FOUR 
- 5% limit 
- TUC OPPOSITION 
November - Modifications to 5% policy; TUC STALEMATE (even split between support and 
opposition) 
1979February - Concordat: general statement of 
principles, but no earnings limits. 
TUC AGREEMENT 
May Election of a Majority Conservative 
Government' 
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APPENDIX B 
ECONOMIC INDICATORS: THE MATERIAL BASES OF CONSENT FOR AND 
OPPOSITION TO THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INCOMES POLICIES 
Figures B. 1 and B. 2 show. the pattern of change in prices, 
earnings, level of unemployment and real weekly take-home pay from 
1974 to 1979. They provide a clear indication of the material bases 
of consent for and opposition to the Social Contract incomes 
policies. 
Figure B. 1 charts the rate of change in the earnings-price 
relationship from the Heath Government's Stage Three to the Labour 
Government's Phase Four as well as the rate of male unemployment 
during the same period. As the official rate of female unemployement 
tends to understate the extent of women's unemployment, women often 
not registering as unemployed and thus becoming "invisible' members 
of the official labour force, their rate has been excluded. It 
should be emphasized that the prices and earnings trend lines express 
percentage change relative to the previous year, whereas the 
unemployment. trend line is an absolute percentage. 
In terms of the negotiation and renegotiation of voluntary 
incomes policies by the TUC and the Government, Figure B. 1 clearly 
illustrates the vicissitudes of the price-earnings relationship. As 
the TUC and the Labour Government attempted to lay the basis of a 
policy of voluntary wage moderation during the final months of Stage 
Three, the rate of change in both prices and earnings accelerated 
rapidly (see chapter 5). This acceleration continued through much of 
the Social Contract Mark One with the rate of change in earnings 
outstripping the rate of change in prices though the latter part of 
1974, but falling relative to the rate of prices increases in the 
final months of Mark One. Figure B. 2 shows that this fall was 
clearly reflected in real take-home pay. Real weekly take-home pay 
rose rapidly through the first months of Mark one and declined even 
more rapidly during the latter months. Moreover, the level of 
unemployment increased throughout Mark One. It is possible that 
these changes dramatized the depth of Britain's economic problems and 
favourably predisposed union members to a dramatic change in policy. 
The relative success of Phase One was measured by the 
precipitous decline in the rate of. change in both prices and 
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earnings, as is clear in Figure B. 1 Moreover, as indicated in 
Figure B. 2, real weekly take-home pay tended to stabilize during the 
period, albeit at a lower level than when the Labour Government took 
office. Even though the continuing rise in the rate of unemployment 
was a significant irritant in TUC-Government relatives, the relative 
success of Phase One facilitated the negotiation and implementation 
of Phase Two (see Chapter 6). 
Trade union consent for Phase Two was based on the assumption 
that the price and earnings trend lines could continue to decline as 
they had during Phase One (see chapter 6). However, Figure B. 1 
indicates that this was not the case. While the rate of change in 
earnings continued to decline as anticipated, the rate of price 
increases accelerated markedly as a result of the decline in the 
value of sterling. Figure B. 2 shows that real weekly take-home pay 
declined markedly. Moreover, as can be seen in Figure B. 1, the rate 
of unemployment stabilized at the high levels attained during Phase 
One. Quite apart from the multitude of specific anomalies in 
differentials and relativities arising form Phase One and Two, this 
combination of economic circumstances clearly eroded the material 
bases of consent for any future policies involving wage restraint 
(see Chapter 8). This change in the level of Consent is evident in 
the opinion poll data presented in Appendix C. 
Indeed, as is indicated in Figure B. 1, the earnings and price 
trend lines were reversed during Phase Three. While the rate of 
change in price increases experienced a secular decline, earnings 
rose consistently. Figure B. 2 shows that real weekly take-home pay 
recovered much of the loss experienced in Phase Two. The rate of 
unemployment continued at roughly the same level. If the economic 
trend lines were considered in isolation, which was no doubt what the 
Treasury mandarins did in their attempt to pursue a five per cent 
limit in Phase Four, it seemed that a material basis might have 
existed for a possible TUC-Government agreement on Phase Four. 
However, as was indicated in Chapter 8, the internal processes of 
opposition were by this time, already too far advanced for the TUC to 
reverse its policy. Even the TUC's November 1978 attempt to 
rekindle some form of agreement on Phase Four with the Government 
ended in stalemate at General Council level. The forces leading to 
the 'Winter of Discontent' disputes were seemingly irrevocable. The 
signing of the Concordat in February 1979 represented an attempt to 
repair the rift between the TUC and the Government in a pre-electoral 
period. By this time, the pay policy had collapsed and both earnings 
and prices-were in a re-entry phase from the period of restraint. 
Ironically, unemployment had, by then, begun to decline, albeit 
slightly. 
Real take-home pay also continued to recover through the 
collapse of Phase Four. The data provided by the Treasury which was 
used to calculate Figure B. 2 was only available to the latter part of 
Phase Three. However, a separate index constructed by Labour 
Research, from 1975 onwards, Table B. 1, extends beyond Phase Three. 
It follows a broadly similar pattern to that indicated in Figure B. 2, 
although at a slightly higher level. Table B. 1 charts a particularly 
strong resurgence in real take-home pay in the latter part of Phase 
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Four just prior to the election. 
TABLE B. 1 REAL TARE-HOME PAY 1975-1979 
MARK I PHASE I PHASE II PHASE III PHASE IV 
1975 1975-76 1976-77' 1977-78 1978-79 
August - 100 100 95 102 
November - 99 97 97 105 
February 103 98 94 97 105 
May 98 100 96 102 110, 
Source: Labour Research (1975-1980) 
Note: Average male earnings after tax at constant prices. 
January 1974 = 100 
Finally, in terms of general economic performance, Table B. 2 
charts the annual rate of growth or decline in Gross Domestic Product 
(GDP) and the change in the relative levels of company profits and 
company investment. In particular, it indicates, first, the 
phenomenal rate of economic growth during the 'Barber boom' in 1972- 
1973 (see Chapter 3); then, the depth of the recession in 1974-1975, 
particularly in terms of consecutive declines in GDP and in the level 
of company profitability; and, finally, the gradual recovery in 
economic indicators through Phases Two and Three in 1976,1977 and 
1978. 
640 
TABLE B. 2 CHANGES IN GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT, PROFITS AND INVESTMENT 
1970-1980 
YEAR GDP GROWTH COMPANY PROFITS COMPANY . (Annual % Change) (% of total Investment 
domestic income)' (% of GDP) 
1970 + 2.1 11.0 10.4 
1971 + 2.6 11.7 10.1 
1972 + 1.5 11.8 10.2 
1973 + 8.2 11.0 10.6 
1974 - 1.4 7.1 10.6 
1975 - 0.9 6.6 9.9 
1976 + 3.7 7.8 9.9 
1977 + 1.3 10.81 10.8 
1978 + 2.7 11.5 11.7 
1979 + 1.1 10.2 12.2 
1980 - 1.6 9.2 12.5 
Source: CSO (1981). 
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APPFNhTX r. 
PUBLIC OPINION AND INCOMES POLICY 1975-1979 
Figures C. 1 and C. 2 provide some measure of the changing pattern 
of public support for the Social Contract incomes policies. Between 
July 1975 and February 1979, Social Survey (Gallup Poll) Ltd. 
conducted thirty-one public opinion polls in which it asked the 
question: 'Do you think the Government's prices and incomes policy 
is: a good thing, a bad thing, qualified, or do not know'. These 
polls also included demographic data on the respondents. In 
particular, it was possible to ascertain the response to this 
question by trade unionist and non-trade unionist. This provides 
particularly interesting insights into the patterns of consent and 
opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies. This data was 
kindly supplied to the author by Social. Survey (Gallup Poll) Ltd. 
Figure C. 1 shows the changing pattern of respondents who believe that 
the Social Contract prices and incomes policy was a good thing. 
Figure C. 2 shows the pattern of those who believe that it was a bad 
thing. In each case, the pattern for trade unionists and non-trade 
unionists is separately indicated. The sample size for the poll was 
always more than five hundred with at least two hundred in each of 
the trade unionist and non-trade unionist category. It should, 
therefore, provide a fairly reliable indication of changes in public 
opinion over the course of the four phases of the Social Contract 
incomes policies. 
The response of trade unionists and non-trade unionists follows 
a very similar pattern in Figures C. 1 and C. 2. Thus, support for the 
policy was relatively high through Phase One, dipped dramatically 
shortly after the beginning of Phase Two, recovered to a relatively 
high level early in Phase Three, and, finally, plummeted once again, 
through Phase Four with the collapse of the policy. The pattern of 
opposition followed an inverse pattern with opposition rising very 
rapidly, especially among trade unionists, during Phase Two and, 
then, declining through Phase Three before mounting again with the 
collapse of the policy in Phase Four. There appears to be a. close 
association in the movement of public opinion through Phases One to, 
Three with the movement of prices, earnings and real earnings as 
depicted in Figures B. 1 and B. 2. As real earnings dipped markedly in 
Phase Two, so too did the level of public support. The turning point 
in public opinion would appear to be associated with the rapid rise 
in the rate of price inflation during Phase Two when the level of 
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increases in earnings continued to decline (see Figure 8.1; also, 
Chapter 8). 
It is especially noticeable that trade union support for the 
policies is generally at a higher level than for non-trade unionists, 
but this is not the case during much of Phase Two. As was discussed 
in Chapter 8, this was exactly the time when trade union policy- 
making bodies were meeting to consider their policy orientation to 
any prospective Phase Three. With the exception of the final poll in 
February 1979 when the Government's policy had already collapsed, 
support for the Government's policy was at its lowest level, 
particularly among trade unionists, mid-way through Phase Two. 
Conversely, opposition to the policy among trade unionists was 
strongest at this time. Moreover, thereafter, while a higher 
percentage of trade unionists than non-trade unionists continued to 
support the policies, a higher percentage of trade unionists than 
non-trade unionists also opposed the policies. This again highlights 
the important shift in trade union opinion during Phase Two. 
It must be emphasized that general questions about the 
desirability of an incomes policy rarely provide a satisfactory 
indication of actual industrial compliance with specific policies. 
Polling on this question frequently seems to tap a split 
consciousness whereby a majority of respondents will favour an 
incomes policy in general- though not for their specific bargaining 
unit. Figures C. 1 and C. 2, however, at least provide an assessment 
of relative levels of support and opposition for a given phase of 
incomes policy at a particular time and how these levels of support 
and opposition changed over time. 
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FIGURE C. 1: PATTERNS OF CONSENT FOR INCOMES POLICY 1975-1979 
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FIGURE C. 2: PATTERNS OF OPPOSITION TO INCOMES POLICY 1975-1979 
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APPENDIX D 
THE INDUSTAIIAL IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INCOMES POLICIES 
ON THE SAMPLE UNIONS 
Figures D. 1 to D. 6 provide some measure of the industrial impact 
of the Social Contract incomes policies on the sample unions. Each 
of the six figures charts the movement of real average weekly 
earnings for selected occupational and industrial categories covered 
by the sample unions between 1974 and 1979. They attempt to provide 
some indication of the material bases of consent for and opposition 
to the Social Contract incomes policies within the sample unions. Of 
course, the movement of real earnings is only one aspect of the 
industrial impact of the Social Contract incomes policies. As was 
argued in Chapter 6, the most salient form of wage comparison is 
often either in terms of differentials or relativities within the 
same place of work or the same local labour market. In other words, 
the differential movement of real earnings between comparator groups 
was as great a source of dissatisfaction as any absolute movement in 
real earnings. Figures D. 1 to D. 6 only hint at some of this 
differential movement. In many cases, however, the differential 
movement is hidden within the larger occupational or industrial 
aggregate. Even if Figures D. 1 to D. 6 do not fully document the 
industrial impact of the policies, as was argued in Appendix B (see 
Figures B. 1 and B. 2), the association between a marked decline in 
real average weekly earnings during Phase Two and the rising tide of 
opposition to the Social Contract incomes policies at this same time 
(see, i. e., Figures C. 1 and C. 2) was certainly more than 
coincidental. The interview evidence in this study corroborates such 
an hypothesis. 
The data in- each of the figures is drawn either from the annual 
New Earnings SurvqZ taken each April or the Department of 
Employment's annual June 'Survey of the Earnings of Manual Workers by 
Occupation in the Engineering, Shipbuilding, and Chemical Industries' 
(see NES; and DE Gazette, October of each year). The sample for each 
covers average gross weekly earnings not affected by absence. The 
earnings findings are expressed as a ratio of movement in the Retail 
Price Index based on either April or June 1974 = 100. An upwards 
movement in the graph, therefore, indicates that real earnings are 
increasing more rapidly than prices relative to the previous 
observation, and vice versa. The New Earnings Survey and the 
Department of Employment Survey both provide only one observation per 
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year. Given the variance of annual settlement dates, even for a 
single bargaining unit, the graphs risk over- or under-stating the 
movement of real wages in relation to the various pay policy phases. 
Thus, they can only be a very approximate barometer of the industrial 
impact of incomes policies. However, these surveys are still the 
standard source of earnings data in British industry. ' 
The occupational categories have been selected to reflect the 
most significant membership groups in the sample unions. This is 
particularly difficult in the general unions - ASTMS, GMWJ and TGWU 
- since they cover such a wide range of industries and occupations. 
This is also the case with the AUEW, though the skilled and semi- 
skilled occupational categories in the engineering industry 
approximate an important proportion of its membership. Since NUPE 
and the FBU are both industrial unions covering a limited number of 
readily identifiable bargaining groups, the movement of real earnings 
of their members can be very closely specified. 
In terms of the general movement of real earnings by 
occupational category and industry, considerable caution must be 
exercised when making any comparisons because of the possible 
variation in settlement dates. In all the figures, however, the 
Social Contract Mark I period would appear to be associated with a 
general upward trend in real earnings for public sector bargaining 
groups and women. Women, in particular, benefited from the 
implementation of equal pay provisions then taking place and such 
increases continued to be allowed over and above the Phase One and 
Two limits. Those working in the engineering, chemical and motor 
vehicle industries, however, appeared to suffer the effects of the 
recession during this period (see Figures D. 2, DA and D. 6). 
Phase One can be associated with a general levelling off of the 
movement in real earnings. Those groups that experienced a sharp 
decline during Mark I recovered some of the lost ground. The public 
sector bargaining groups did not maintain the level of the previous 
year's gains, particularly in the Fire Service (see Figure D. 3). 
Phase Two represented a uniform dramatic fall for All the 
occupational and industrial groupings covered,. This was, of course, 
the period when the level of price increases rose sharply while wage 
increases were constrained to a five per cent limit. It was also the 
period when support for the policies eroded dramatically. Groups 
such as the firemen (Figure D. 3) and skilled- and semi-skilled 
workers in the' motor vehicle industry (Figures D. 2 and D. 6) 
experienced particularly sharp declines in their level of real 
earnings. As was suggested in Chapter By it was precisely these 
groups which led significant industrial revolts against the pay 
policies in the latter stages of Phase Two and in Phase Three. 
Phases Three and Four represented, first, a general relaxation 
of the restraint policies and, then, their collapse. Earnings 
generally rose more quickly during Phase Three than did prices. Most 
of the occupational and industrial groups in Figures D. 1 to D. 6 
showed some recovery of real earnings during this period; though the 
differentiated pattern of opposition, particularly between public and 
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private sectors, was the source of some of the feelings of injustice 
which led to the breakdown of Phase Four. Public sector bargaining 
groups were particularly concerned that the Phase Four limit would be 
tightly enforced in the public sector whereas it was not so tightly 
enforced in the private sector. The April 1979 observation does not 
fully reflect the results of the Phase Four negotiations for some of 
the main public sector bargaining groups as they were awaiting the 
reccommendations of the Comparability Commission which had been set- 
up to resolve the public sector disputes in January and February 
1979. 
Finally, in terms of the movement of real earnings, it should be 
emphasized how few bargaining groups in this study actually appeared 
better off at the end of five years of different wage moderation 
policies than they were at the start. Indeed, many appeared 
marginally worse off. This certainly reflected continuing poor 
British economic performance. It cannot, however, have bolstered the 
Labour Government's chances of re-election. In mobilizing consent 
for the Social Contract incomes policies, _ 
it_. had been argued that 
short-term sacrifice would be translated into longer-term gain. In 
terms of the movement of real wages as depicted in Figures D. 1 to 
D. 6, at least, the evidence of such a return remained slim just prior 
to the 1979 election. 
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FIGURE D. 1: THE . INDUSTRIAL 
IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INCOMES 
POLICIES ON ASTMS. Real Average Weekly Earnings for Selected 
Occupational Categories Covered by ASTAS 
Sources: Calculated from NES (1974-1979) and British Labour 
Statistics Yearbook (1974-1979). 
Notes: Average gross weekly earnings for April of each year expressed 
as a ratio of the Retail Price Index based on April 1971=100. Note 
that downward movements in the graph indicate that the Retail Price 
Index is increasing more rapidly than earnings, and vice versa. 
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FIGURE D. 2: THE INDUSTRIAL. IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INCOMES 
POLICIES ON THE AUEWA(F). Real Average Weekly Earnings for Selected 
Occupational Categories Covered by the AUEW(E) 
Sources: Calculated from NES (1974-1979), DE Gazette (October, 197k-. 
1979), and British Labour Statistics Yearbook (11711979). 
Notes: Average gross, weekly earnings for either April or June'of each 
year expressed as a ratio of the Retail Price index based on either 
April or June 1974=100. Note that downward movements in the graph 
indicate that the Retail Price Index is increasing more rapidly than 
earnings, and vice versa. 
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FIGURE D. k: THE INDUSTRIAL IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INCOMES' 
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Sources: Calculated from NES (1974-1979) and British Labour 
Statistics Yearbook (1974-1979). 
Notes: Average gross weekly earning for April of each year expressed 
as a ratio of the Retail Price Index based on April 1974=104. Note, 
that downward movements in the graph indicate that the Retail Price 
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FIGURE D. 5: THE INDUSTRIAL IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INCOMES 
POLICIES ON NUPE. Real Average Weekly Earnings for Men and Women in 
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Sources: Calculated from NES (1974-1979) and British Labour 
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FIGURE D. 6: THE INDUSTRIAL IMPACT OF THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INCOMES. 
POLICIES ON THE TGWU. Real Average Weekly Earnings for Selected 
Occupational Categories Covered by the TGWU 
Sources: Calculated from NES (1974--1979), DE Gazette (October, 19714- 
1979), and British Labour Statistics Yearbook 7(-1-9-7-7--1979). 
Notes: Average gross weekly earnings for either April or June of each 
year expressed as a ratio of the Retail Price Index based on either 
April or June 1974=100. Note that downward movements in the graph 
indicate that the Retail Price Index is increasing more rapidly than 
earnings, and vice versa. 
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APPENDIX E 
INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT AND THE SOCIAL CONTRACT INCOMES POLICIES 
TABLE E. 1 
FREQUENCY AND VOLUME OF INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT 
1969 -. 1980 
Period I Number of Stoppages I Number of working days 
(1 Aug. - 31 July) I beginning in period lost in stoppages in 
I ' I progress in period 
---------- ---------! ----------------------- -I ------------------------- 
1969 - 1970 1 1 
3985 
I 
. 91851 I 
1970 - 1971 . 2726 I 16,113 
1971 - 1972 I 2262 19,009 
1972 - 1973 I 2722 11,646 
1973 - 1974 1 2781 12,117 (Stage three) I 
19711 - 1975 (Mark I) 
1975 - 1976 
(Phase One) 
2974 
1829 
9,931 
3,285 
1976 - 1977 2351 I 5,842 (Phase Two) 
1977 - 1978 1 2579 9,512 
(Phase Three) 
1978 - 1979 2397 ( 15,018 (Phase Four) I 
i 
I 
1979 - 1980 I I 1675 I 31,1121 I 
--------- 
One year 
--- ---------- 
period I 
--------------------- --r-------+------ 
i 
average 
--------- 
I 
-------------- 
2571 
--------------------- 
I 13,067 
----------------- 
Source: DE Gazette (1969 - 1979: Table 133) 
Note: Monthly figures are aggregated on an annual basis from 1 
August to 31 July in order to approximate the Social 
Contract incomes policy' periods. 
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NOTES 
Chapter 1 
1. The names of some of the sample unions have since been changed 
because of mergers, amalgamations and other organizational changes. 
For instance, the National Union of General and Municipal Workersis 
now known as the General, Municipal, Boilermakers and Allied Trades 
Union. The names which were operative during the 1970s have been 
used in this study. Details on these changes for the organizations 
referred to in this study are supplied in the Key to Abbreviations. 
2. Since the study draws on a wide variety of primary and secondary 
sources, a brief explanation of the system of referencing is 
required. Given the importance of the primary source materials and 
interviews in the analysis as well as the frequent reference to 
secondary literature, "a standard system of footnoting might have 
placed an extraordinary burden on the reader and rendered the text 
much less aceessable. Therefore, after some experimentation, a 
modified 'author-date' system was developed for the purposes of this 
text. References to secondary sources conform to the standard 
'author-date' entry. Primary sources have been referenced in the 
same way, but abbreviations are employed to refer to the generic 
title of primary documentary sources. The acronym of the relevant 
organization generally precedes the abbreviation. This system 
applies to sources such as trade union executive and committee 
minutes or background documents, conference proceedings, industrial 
conference and committee minutes, union journals and a variety of 
other document. The abbreviations are generally standardized across 
all unions for facility of reference and the abbreviations and full 
titles are cross-referenced in the bibliography. Material drawn from 
interview sources has been referenced by the date of the interview. 
Where appropriate, the organizational function or title of the 
interviewee is mentioned in the text. Otherwise, all interview 
material is referenced uniquely by date, even when, as was often the 
case, more than one interview took place on the same day. Such a 
system was adopted in order not to distinguish between the varying 
degrees of confidentiality requested by the interviewees while still 
conveying some impression of the role of the interview material in 
the construction of the overall analysis. 
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Chapter 2 
1. Seventy Labour MPs defied a 'three-line whip' and party policy 
when they voted with the Heath Government in the 28 October 
1971 Parliamentary vote which ratified Britain's terms of entry 
into the 'European Economic Community (EEC). Another twenty 
Labour MPs abstained. To the chagrin of many on the right of 
the Party, Tony Benn campaigned successfully to commit any 
future Labour Government to a referendum on the issue of 
British membership in the EEC. Roy Jenkins resigned as Party 
Deputy-Leader on this issue (New Statesman, 1971b: 637; 
Hatfield, 1978: 67-70; Stephenson, 1982: 19). 
2. Benn (1980: 66) has stressed the influence that a number of 
industrial struggles in the early 1970s exerted on his own thinking. 
The change in the party's industrial policy and the emphasis on 
cooperation with the trade unions, rather than the corporatist idea 
of public ownership planned from the top, `must be attributed 
entirely to what was being done on the shop floor during that 
period'. 
3. Hatfield (1978) documents the success of the left in promoting 
many of its policies on the sub-committees of the National 
Executive of the Labour Party from 1971 to 1973. 
Z. MacKintosh (1972a: -13) also emphasized the importance of the 
debate over Europe in determining political alliances within the 
party during this period. 'The novel feature of the Common 
Market issue is that for the first time in the modern history 
of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the apolitical centre has 
gone with the Left, thus weakening the position of any leader 
of the Centre-Right who remains pro-European. ' To counter. the 
influence of the left in the party a number of pro-European social 
democratic MPs later formed the right-wing Manifesto Group in 
December 1974. This group was the core of the breakaway Social 
Democratic Party founded in 1980 (see Stephenson, 1982: 33). 
5. On the politics and provisions of the Industrial Relations Act, 
various works are cited in the text. On the impact of the Act on 
industrial relations practices, see Weekes et al., 1975. 
6. Heffer (1973: 199-200) notes that the Government front bench 
attempted to exploit the possible divisions within the Labour Party 
on the question of repeal. It was in reponse to this that the 
chairperson of the PLP, Douglas Houghton, placed the PLP's commitment 
to repeal on the Parliamentary record. 
7. Hughes (1972: 8-13) drew the same conclusions and called on tra1e 
unionists to address themselves to the radical potential of the 
situation. Inasmuch as there could 'be no simple return to the 
status quo', he called for a radical extension of worker rights to 
'supplement a simply defensive wages struggle'. 
8. This package was finalized towards the end of January 1970 when 
the Shadow Cabinet met for an entire weekend to discuss 
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Conversative Party policies at the Seladon Park Hotel in 
Surrey. Thereafter, both Heath and this economic strategy were 
dubbed the 'Selsdon Man' (Butler and Pinto-Duschinsky, 1971: 
129-131)" 
9. The Conservative Party declared its opposition to statutory wage 
and price controls during the 1970 election campaign. From 
October 1970, however, the new Government vigorously promoted 
a voluntary pay restraint policy in the public sector in the 
hope that the private sector would follow the lead. While the 
Government managed to maintain its policy in the face of a 
lengthy postal dispute in early 1971, the policy was breached notably 
in the cases of local authority manual workers, electricity supply 
workers, and most spectacularly, the mineworkers in February 1972. 
There was also very little indication of success in holding down 
wages in the private sector. The CBI achieved greater success in 
its attempt to operate a voluntary limitation on price increases from 
the summer of 1971 to the summer of 1972. However, the CBI was not 
prepared to continue this policy unless there could be some guarantee 
that a comparable limitation on wage increases would reduce cost 
pressures. The Government then attempted to construct some kind of 
understanding on this basis. The subsequent breakdown of these 
tripartite negotiations in November 1972 led to the imposition of a 
statutory pay and prices policy. These negotiations and the trade 
union role therein are discussed in Chapter 3. See also Clegg, 1978: 
464-468; Barnes and Reid, 1980: 132-134 and 145-154; Workers' 
Educational Association, 1972; and Torode, 1971: 4-5. 
10. Balogh (1970b: 3) -noted that most countries since the war had 
attempted to achieve growth and stable prices: 'they failed time and 
again, either because the fight against rising prices caused such 
unemployment as was politically unacceptable, or because measures 
mitigating unemployment resulted in such a cost explosion as carried 
'prices with it'. Balogh concluded that the problem of 'how to 
reconcile a level of unemployment which is socially satisfactory with 
stability of prices and therefore with a balance in international 
payments' remained unsolved. He was critical of Crosland and others 
within the Party who felt that the Keynesian revolution had cured the 
basic economic ills; but was more critical again of 'the new lunatic 
fringe on the left which partly demands the maintenance of full 
employment, while raucously asserting their faith in unrestricted 
collective bargaining' (8-10). Indeed, Balogh charged the trade 
unions with incomprehension and resistance. In order for a future 
Labour Government to pursue the expansionary policies being advocated 
by Harold Lever and others, he argued that a 'social consensus' or 
'social contract' on economic policy must be achieved on a broad 
front. 'The unions and the Labour Party must therefore ... make it 
quite plain what clearly sensible alternative policies they are 
willing to pursue provided a consensus on general social and economic 
policy can be secured' (Balogh, , 1970x; see also Balogh, 1970e)" 
11. On the development of the TGWU-AUEW axis, see Barrat Brown (1972: 
180). It should be noted that this alliance was primarily based on 
the personalities of the respective leaders, Jack Jones and Hugh 
Scanlon. There continued to be considerable rivalry between the two 
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unions as they competed for the same membership amongst the semi- and 
unskilled grades of the engineering industry. It was fortuitous, 
albeit a reflection of the period, that both unions happened to 
elect left-wing general secretaries at roughly the same time. It was 
clear to both Jones and Scanlon that they would have to depend on the 
support of each other if they were to prevail over the traditional 
dominance of the 'moderate coalition' within the TUC General Council. 
On the policies of these two unions on collective bargaining and 
incomes policy, see Chs. 3 and 4. ' 
12. Composite 19 emphasized the need for an incomes policy and called 
for, inter a lia, the consideration of a legally-fixed minimum wage 
and the formation of a study group to suggest how a future Labour 
Government would tackle inflation. It was defeated by 3.139 to 2.851 
million votes (LPCR, 1970: 214-229). 
13. Hatfield (1978: 61-63) claims that it was the adoption of this 
approach that persuaded the TGWU and AUEW to vote for the policy 
document at the 1971 Conference. Note that its adoption was 
ultimately made easier by the move from pegged to flexible exchange 
rates. The -Bretton Woods international monetary system disintegrated 
in 1971; and the Government floated the pound in 1972 (see Gamble, 
1981: 128-129). This was seen as the removal of one of the major 
obstacles in the pursuit of expansionist economic policies. It was 
thought that the flexible exchange rate would diminish the pressure 
on the pound and, thereby, reduce the need for overly restrictive 
wage policies. 
141. The Institute for Workers' Control was founded in 1968 to further 
'the extension of democratic control over industry and the economy 
itself, by assisting the unification of Workers' Control groups into 
a national force in the socialist movement' (Coates, 1968: 104). The 
Institute attempted to bring a variety of workers as well as 
intellectuals together to pursue this common programme. As Topham 
and Coates (1969: 27) later wrote, 'The reason therefore, why 
workers' control is advanced as a slogan in present circumstances is 
that it provides both the essential bridge over which workers can 
pass from a defensive or corporate consciousness to full socialist 
understanding, and the strategy whereby that understanding can 
express itself in action which reaches out beyond the possibilities 
of a capitalist order'. Both the Bulletin of the Institute 
for Workers' Control and the annual Trade Union Register which began 
publication the following year were a regular forum for the 
discussion of such ideas. Undoubtedly, the two most significant 
books in giving this 'transformational strategy' specific expression 
were by Barrat Brown (1972) and Holland (1975). 
15. It was decided at a conference of affiliated executives in March 
1967 'that such conferences should be held annually to consider 
reports by the General Council on the economic situation and to 
develop a general economic strategy for the Movement, within which an 
active and progressive incomes policy can be formulated' (TUCR, 1967. - 
306). The conferences were later abandoned; but the publication of 
the annual economic review has continued. 
+} 
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16. Holland (1971: 10-12) advanced the need for a multi-seotoral 
state holding company. The 1960s Labour Government's Industrial 
Regeneration Corporation had fulfilled a useful function; but it was 
really little more than an investment loans agency. If effective 
economic planning was ever to take place, then the state would need 
to exert some control over 'the commanding heights' of the economy. 
Some degree of equity in major manufacturing concerns, held by such a 
state holding company, 'would give a greater degree of direct control 
over the rate, composition and location of investment than would have 
been provided by different macroeconomic policies and more State 
loans'. The TUC argued that a new Public Investment Agency was 
needed 'to channel public funds into the private sector by 
acquisition of a minority or a controlling share of equity, and to 
establish new public manufacturing and commercial operations' (TUCER, 
1972: 24). 
17. The 1972 Industry Act provided the mechanisms and finance for 
large- scale assistance to private industry, particularly on a 
regional basis. The extent of the Government's turn-around can 
be gauged by the eighty percent upward revision in planned 
public expenditure on aid to private industry in 1972-1973 (Young and 
Lowe, 1974: 137-138 and 163; On the collapse of Rolls Royce, see 
Lever, 1971a; On the impact of the work-in at Upper Clyde 
Shipbuilders, Interview with J. Airlie, Chairman of the 'UCS 
Coordinating Committee at the time of the work-in, 23 September 1980; 
also Thompson and Hart, 1972). 
18. Import and capital controls assumed an increasingly important 
place in the formation of an alternative economic strategy. 
Already in 1966, a group of Labour MPs and sympathetic 
university economists had argued that such controls might form part 
of an alternative package to the wage freeze that had been 
implemented by the Wilson Government to reverse the balance of 
payments deficit (Kerr, 1966). It was frequently argued, 
particularly by Cambridge University economists, that the 
balance of payments problem was 'the critical constraint on 
economic growth and the maintenance of full employment'. Therefore, 
if any British Government was to pursue a policy of expansion, then 
it would be necessary to stem the rush of imports through physical 
controls. Britain's Economic Crisis published by the Cambridge 
Political Economy Group (1974) was seen as one of the more cogent 
expositions of an early alternative economic strategy. It advocated 
, 
the necessity of immediate import controls with provisions for the 
planning of trade in the longer term (see also Ward, 1981). In 
addition to the role that import controls might play in protecting 
the balance of payments under conditions of expansion, later 
advocates of controls have tended to focus on the role that they 
might play in arresting the deteriorating trade position of a 
variety of manufacturing industries and acting as 'an essential 
adjunct to industrial planning' (see, e. g., CSE London Working Group 
1980: 87). Debates in the 1980s about the possibilities and 
limits of a potential alternative economic strategy can be traced 
very directly to this earlier period. Moreover, most of the issues 
in dispute have remained the same. 
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19. Hatfield (1978: 44-66) suggested that much 'of the energy and 
organisation of the social democrats in the party was absorbed by 
their campaigning in favour of EEC membership. It should also be 
noted that the head of the Home Policy Committee's research staff, 
Terry Pitt, was sympathetic to the strategy of the left, and played 
an important role in determining the research agenda. 
20. Benn first proposed this as a slogan in March 1973 (Hatfield, 
1978: 161). It then appeared in Labour's Programme 1973 (Labour 
Party, 1973) and was featured in the party's February 1974 
election manifesto (Labour Party, 1974). 
21 Jack Jones, the General Secretary of the TGWU, for instance, has 
suggested that Labour politicians do not necessarily bring forward 
pro-working class' policies of their own accord; nor would they 
necessarily remain bound to them. It was therefore better to commit 
them to a definite and immediate policy (Interview, 16 May 1980; also 
see Jones, 1981: 158). 
22. As Alan Bullock (1960: 205) wrote in his biography of Ernest 
Bevin, as the prime mover behind the amalgamation of a number of 
unions to form the TGWU, 'The General Secretary represented the unity 
of the Union. He was the man who held it together and resisted 
the particularist tendencies of the trade groups ... It was to 
the General Secretary that the Executive looked for guidance in 
formulating policy and under his supervision that the officers 
carried out the Executive's decisions. ' This tradition found its 
expression in subsequent TGWU general secretaries (on Arthur Deakin, 
see Allen, 1957; on Frank Cousins, see Goodman, 1979; the definitive 
biography of Jack Jones has yet to be written). 
23. Roger Undy (1978: 56), for instance, notes that from 1945 to 1977 
the platform at the TGWU's biennial policy conference had only 
been defeated on two comparatively minor issues. 'Apart from 
these defeats, successive general secretaries had carried the 
conference'. 
24. This view was reiterated in the great majority of interviews with 
TGWU members amd officials. 
25. Jones (1981: 158) later confirmed this view. 'For all its 
deficiencies, the idea of a Social Contract has alot to recommend 
it. It means committing Labour's leaders to a definite immediate 
policy, and if the policy is the right one it can enthuse the ranks 
and give cohesion to what is now a disunited army'. In other words, 
Labour's leaders must continually be committed and re-committed to 
definite immediate policies: 
CHAPTER 3 
1. The TUC set out a detailed list of what it considered to be the 
scope for future industrial relations legislation. This included a 
wide variety of both contentious and less controversial items: the 
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individual rights of workers vis-a-vis their employers ranging from 
the right to belong to a trade union to protection against unfair 
dismissal and the rights to notice; a trade union recognition 
procedure; the proposed conciliation and arbitration service; the 
non-legally binding character of collective agreements; the rights of 
trade union representatives including access to members, safety, 
disclosure, and advance notice of redundancies; the definition of and 
legal machinery affecting trade disputes including injunction 
procedures and picketing; and the definition and status of trade 
unions. These proposals were set out in a document, `Industrial 
Relations - The Scope of Future Legislation', prepared for the TUC 
General Council's the Finance and General Purposes Committee (see TUC 
F&GPC, 17 May 1972) and then forwarded for discussion by the Liaison 
Committee. This list formed the basis of the future legislation. It 
was not until the following summer that it was proposed and agreed 
that the Social Contract employment legislation should be implemented 
in three stages or Bills (LCR, 23 July 1973). The first stage would 
be a "Repeal Bill" of the Industrial Relations Act restoring 
protections for trade unions and improving provisions for unfair 
dismissal. A second Bill, would be introduced later and extend the 
rights of workers and unions. Finally, a third Bill would extend 
industrial democracy within companies. In fact, this three-stage 
plan was largely adhered to when the 1974 Labour Government was 
elected. However, because of the minority status of the Government 
in Parliament, some parts of the original Repeal Bill had to be 
incorporated in a later amending Act when the Labour Government 
enjoyed a majority. Equally, the industrial democracy issue was 
sufficiently controversial that a special inquiry was held (Bullock, 
1977). Ultimately, only a White Paper was produced. 
2. Callaghan had been reported to favour some form of compulsory 
arbitration under the rules of the proposed arbitration and 
conciliation service as apossible opening towards some form of 
counter-inflation policy. At the June Liaison Committee meeting, 
however, the TUC adamantly rejected such an approach (see LCR, 19 
June 1972). 
3. The CBI later extended its policy in this direction. The Future 
of Pay Determination (CßI, 1977), a discussion document' published in 
June 1977, was designed to start a public debate on the British 
system of pay bargaining. In particular, it suggested that, while 
maintaining a system that would allow freedom to negotiators, a 
'national forum' should be created to help foster a 'national 
consensus' on the country's economic reality. The important 
difference with the earlier Heath approach was that it did not depend 
on legal intervention. Rather, employers should seek to achieve 
voluntary reform of plant and company-level bargaining. This desire 
to create a 'national economic forum' was affirmed in the February 
1979 CBI policy document, Pay: the choice ahead (CBI, 1979). It was 
argued that the forum would shape expectations about the pay 
bargaining round in much the way that the West German model was 
designed to work. Such a 'corporatist" vision, however, was markedly 
out of step with the free market policies of the new Conservative 
Government in 1979 and was quietly abandoned. 
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4. Since prices policy, particularly as regards, foodstuffs, later 
became a source of contention between the TUC and the 1974-1979 
Labour Government, it is 'interesting to note the Labour Party 
representatives' initial caution. on this issue. "It had to be 
recognized however that an open-ended subsidy to keep food prices 
within the given figure even if this did not fall foul of Common 
Market considerations - might lead to a very high Exchequer 
commitment, to be financed by taxation' (LCR, 20 November 1972). The 
1974-1979 Labour Government initially did implement food subsidies 
and then abandoned them progressively in the face of pressures to 
reduce public expenditure. 
5" The original draft of Economic Policy and the Cost of Living in 
fact referred to a Labour Government producing 'the atmosphere, which 
would engender the confidence to make a wide-ranging agreement 
possible (LCR, 22 January 1973). 'Wide-ranging' certainly connoted, 
inter alia, pay policy. 
6. The "NEDC Six" are the six members of the TUC General Council who 
serve as the TUC representatives on the National Economic Development 
Council. They are nominated for a multi-year term by the TUC 
Economic Committee, one of the key sub-committees of the General 
Council. Their nomination is ratified by this latter body. The 
"NEDC Six" are viewed as the key actors in TUC economic policy- 
making, often representing the TUC in its dealings with the 
government on economic and incomes policies. The Six usually 
consists of the most influential members of the General Council since 
by custom it includes the leaders of the three largest unions - the 
TGWU, the AUEW and the GMWU - along with the TUC General Secretary 
and two other senior members of the economic committee. 
7. In a comparatively high turn-out (78.1 per cent), the 
Conservative Party gained 37.8 per cent of the popular vote to the 
Labour Party's 37.1 per cent. The major electoral surprise was the 
popular vote of the minor parties, particularly the Liberals who 
polled 19.3 per cent of the popular vote. In terms of parliamentary 
seats, however, the Labour Party gained four seats more than the 
Conservatives (301 to 297). For a full account of the election, see 
Butler and Kavanagh, 1974. 
8. Scargill (1975), then president of the Yorkshire region of the 
NUM, gave a markedly different account of the Government's 
intentions. "Heath had decided right after the " 72 strike that he 
would have to inflict a defeat on the miners. ' 
9. Rule 11 of the TUC Constitution outlines its role in industrial 
disputes. Except when the disputes of affiliates directly affect 
other affiliated workpeople, the General Council is only empowered to 
intervene at the request of an affiliated organization. Where the 
General Council does intervene, it is obliged either to tender advice 
to the affiliated organization or 'organize ... all such moral and 
material support as the circumstances of the dispute may appear to 
justify' (TUCR, 1973: 710-711). 
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° 10. The first volume of Barbara Castle's diaries to be published, 
The Castle Diaries 1974-1976 (Castle, 1980) is an invaluable 
supplement to much of the primary data on this period. Since Castle 
gives detailed accounts of particular meetings, based on the short- 
hand notes that she took as a participant in these meetings, her 
observations will frequently be used to corroborate information 
obtained from other primary sources. 
11. Scanlon was personally reluctant to use the term 'contract', 
preferring the term 'compact' because it had fewer legal 
connotations (Interviews, 30 April and 8 July 1980). He was also 
perhaps less fully integrated into the TUC-Labour Party policy-making 
process than some of the other TUC representatives, even though the 
industrial strength of the AUEW added considerable weight to his 
views when he was present to express them. Of the nineteen Liaison 
Committee meetings held between February 1972 and January 1974, 
observations on attendance are available for fifteen of them. On the 
trade union side, the institutional representation was most constant 
as the TUC General Secretary, either Victor Feather or Len Murray, 
was present for all fifteen meetings. Jack Jones attended thirteen 
of the fifteen meetings for which observations were available. Hugh 
Scanlon, in contrast, attended only seven of these fifteen meetings. 
This was marginally better than Sir Sidney Greene of the railway 
workers union who was present for six meetings only. The GMWU 
General Secretary attended nine of the fifteen - David Basnett, three 
of four; Lord Cooper, six of eleven. George Smith from the 
construction workers union also attended nine. As regards the PLP 
representatives, the Labour Party leader, Harold Wilson attended 
twelve of the fifteen meetings. James Callaghan was present for ten 
meetings and Denis Healey attended thirteen of fourteen meetings when 
he was Shadow Chancellor. If this data does not permit any firm 
conclusions on the degree of Scanlon's commitment to the 'Social 
Contract', it does indicate the importance that Jack Jones personally 
attached to the discussions and the high level of commitment 
forthcoming from the leadership of the PLP (The figures were obtained 
from LCR, 21 February 1972 through 4 January 1974). 
ti 
Chapter ý1 
1. For an understanding of TGWU bargaining policy, I owe a particular 
debt to the extensive discussions I have had with Harry Urwin. This 
section on the TGWU, however, does not necessarily reflect his views 
nor, of course, does he bear any responsibility for errors that might 
be found therein. 
Chapter 5 
1. The Con-Mech case was the final embarrassment of the Industrial 
Relations Act. With the new Government's commitment to repeal the 
contentious legislation, the Act was in a state of virtual 'suspended 
animation' from February 1974 (see Thomson and Engleman, 1975: 90- 
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92). The notable exception concerned a union recognition dispute 
dating from the previous year between a small engineering firm in 
Surrey, Con-Mech (Engineers) Ltd., and the Engineering section of the 
AUEW. An AUEW application to represent twenty-six employees at Con- 
Mech was not only refused, but resulted in the dismissal of their two 
shop stewards. The union at the firm took industrial action in their 
defence. The employer was granted an injunction by the National 
Industrial Relations Court (NIRC) to compel a return to work. The 
AUEW, following its policy of total non-cooperation with the 
Industrial Relations Act, ignored the injunction and was subsequently 
fined by the NIRC. Failure to pay the fine resulted in the 
sequestration of assets in November 1973. The AUEW responded with 
two one-day protest strikes in the engineering industry. The matter 
did not end there, however, as the employer successfully sought 
compensation for damages. At the end of March 1974, the NIRC ordered 
the AUEW to pay forty-seven thousand pounds in damages. When the 
union again refused to pay within the prescribed time limit, the NIRC 
ordered the sequestration of all AUEW assets. This prompted the AUEW 
executive, typically by a vote of four to three, to call, for an 
immediate national engineering strike on 7 May 1974. The strike was 
embarrassing for both the TUC and the Government who were attempting 
to highlight the new era of industrial peace under the Social 
Contract. Considerable efforts were made by the Secretary of State 
for Employment to persuade the AUEW that in the light of the imminent 
repeal of the Industrial Relations Act it should relax its policy of 
non-cooperation. However, neither the Government nor the TUC were 
willing to accede to the AUEW request for an immediate repeal of the 
Industrial Relations Act because they argued it was also necessary to 
enact replacement legislation. The AUEW called off the strike after 
twenty-four hours when the NIRC agreed to accept the offer of a group 
of anonymous donors to pay the fine and compensation owed by the 
union. The identity of the donor(s) remains unkown, but speculation 
pointed to companies affected by the dispute in the engineering 
industry. The NIRC was abolished with the repeal of the Industrial 
Relations Act two months later. On this series of events, see AUEWJ, 
November 1973 and April 1.974; The Times, 29 March and 9 May, 1974; 
Guardian, 24 April 1974; Scotsman, 8 May 1974; Clegg, 1976: 462; 
Moran, 1977: 146. 
2. Ironically, the Chancellor encountered more opposition to his 
budget from the Keynesians within the Cabinet than he did from the 
TUC. Harold Lever, Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, argued that 
the essence of the Social Contract was reducing unemployment and 
going for growth. The budget, he maintained, would inevitably 
increase unemployment and the Government would then 'be in trouble 
with the trade unions' (Castle, 1980: 51). In a post-budget meeting 
with the Government, the TUC representatives expressed the hope that 
remedial reflationary action would be taken if necessary (TUC ECD, 27 
March 1984). 
3. The consultations between the TUC and the CBI were the first 
national-level meetings between them since the CBI supported the 
principles of the Industrial Relations Act in 1974 (The Times, 21 May 
1974). 
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4. In the discussions within the Economic Committee, the overt 
reference to the acceptance of Stage Three was removed at the 
insistence of Laurence Daly of the NUM (MS, 13 June 1974). Press 
reports following the General Council meeting which endorsed 
Collective Bargaining and the Social Contract noted reservations on 
the part of at least three general secretaries: Ray Buckton of ASLEF, 
Frank Chapple of the EEPTU, and Geoffrey Drain of NALGO (Guardian and 
The Times, 27 June 1974). 
5. The Communist Party was equivocal on the Social Contract during 
the early months of the new Labour Government. There was little 
attempt to oppose the Social Contract within any of the sample 
unions. In the AUEW, for instance, in which the Party has 
" traditionally been well organized, there was little concerted attempt 
to promote opposition to the Social Contract at the National 
Conference in June (Labour Week), 21 June 1974; see also AUEWAC, 
1974; Guardian, 20 June 197k)" Given the success of the campaign 
against the Industrial Relations Act and in which Communist Party 
activists had played such a, prominent role, Party strategists were 
possibly wary of directly criticizing the new Labour Government which 
was committed to the repeal of the Act and, by extension, the union 
leaders such as Jones and Scanlon who had led the opposition to the 
Act but were also prominent supporters of the new Government. This 
equivocation was gradually resolved in favour of unambiguous 
opposition to the Social Contract. The Party newspaper, the Morning 
Star, expressed its opposition to the TUC General Council's voluntary 
wage guidelines in June and bitterly criticized ? arty member, Ken 
Gill, when he withdrew his motion critical of the Social Contract at 
the September TUC (11 June and 5 September 1974). In early 1975, the 
Party's industrial organizer, Bert Ramelson, published a pamphlet, 
The Social Contract - Cure-all or Con-trick?, which attacked the 
Social Contract and specifically targeted union leaders such as Jones 
and Scanlon who had won the movement against incomes policy and now 
were supporting the Social Contract (Ramelson, 1975: 8). Ramelson 
argued that voluntary restraint was only a prelude to compulsion and 
that the Social Contract must be defeated so as to force the 
Government in a new direction. To convey some flavour of later 
opposition to the Social Contract on the left in the AUEW, one of the 
more scathing, if iconoclastic, critics disparaged even the 
authenticity of the concept: 'The only Social Contract was by 
Rousseau and he was a bloody liar. It was even a plagiarism in its 
title. There was a need to be masked. ' (Interviews 15 October 1980). 
6. This was true, for instance, of both the Civil and Public 
Services Association (CPSA) and ASTMS. See Daily Ex presst 17 May 
1974; ASTMSJ, March-April, 1974; also below. 
7. On the February 1974 General Election, see note 79 Chapter 3. In 
the October 1974 election, the results were as follows: Labour 319, 
Conservatives 276, Liberals 13 and Others 27. Labour improved its 
percentage of the popular vote in the October election jumping by 2% 
to 39.2% as opposed to the 35.8% of the Conservatives. Labour's 
majority of three, however, was reduced to one with a by-election 
loss in June 1975. Following subsequent by-election losses, the 
Government's survival was increasingly tied to a complex series of 
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formal and informal arrangements with the smaller parties, most 
notably with the Liberals in, 1977-1978. 
8. Michael Stewart (1977: 205) quotes a spoof news item from Private 
Eye (21 March 1975) which nicely captures at least some of the 
absurdities of the Social Contract Mark I period. 
WAGES 
Wilson Warns 
By our Political Team 
In a shock warning last night the Prime Minister Mr. Harold Wilson 
gave his strongest warning yet. 
He warned: 'Make no mistake. If wages continue to riser people 
will take home more money. That is th8 consequence of continued wage 
rises. ' 
In what was clearly intended as a warning to the Unions, Mr. Wilson 
warned: 'You have been warned'. 
9. Monetarists have explained this decline in the rate of wage 
increases as a result of the levelling off of increases in the money 
supply. They have argued that the high rate of wage inflation in 
1975 was due to the rapid increase in the money supply in 1972-1973. 
Brittan and Lilley (1977: 175) suggest, therefore, that the Phase I 
six-pound policy was unnecessary as wage rates were declining in any 
case. Institutionalists, on the other hand, held that price and wage 
increases were the result of increases in world commodity prices. 
They were transferred into the British economy and sparked off a 
competitive wage and price spiral. Only an incomes policy, they 
argued, could break the vicious circle. The relative merits of this 
debate continue to nourish polemics between monetarists and their 
opponents. 
10. By the end of 1975 the rate of unemployment in Britain had 
risen higher than at any point since 1951. It continued to rise 
through 1976 (Sedgemore, 1978: 63). 
11. These proposals were presumably modelled on those of the 
Cambridge Political Economy Group. See note 18, Chapter 2. 
Chapter 6 
1.67.2 percent of those voting favoured Britain's continued 
membership in the EEC. The majority in the Cabinet, the other major 
political parties and the CBI favoured continued membership. The 
Labour Party NEC, half of the PLP, the Labour Party Conference and 
the majority of trade unions favoured Britain's withdrawal from the 
EEC. 
2. Public expenditure had risen from fifty-one percent of GDP (at 
current prices) in 1970-71 to sixty percent in 1975-76. This 
attracted considerable attention in economic circles, and led to 
charges that public spending was out of control. Whether the 
increases were due to conscious policy decisions or actual loss of 
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control, the Government was under increasing pressure to review its 
system for the planning of public spending. Thus, in July 1975 the 
Treasury announced that in 1976-77 seventy-five percent of central 
government expenditure would be controlled in cash rather than volume 
terms. This was the beginning of the system of cash limits which the 
Government found was also a convenient method to enforce a pay policy 
in the public sector (see Stewart, 1977: 221-224). 
3. Prior to 1983, most General Council members were elected from a 
. number of 
trade groups. All affiliated unions cast votes in each of 
the trade group elections. From the 1983 Congress, elections were 
held only for General council members representing the women's 
section and those unions with fewer than 100,000 members. Unions 
with more than 100,000 members were automatically entitled to a 
representative on the General Council with additional representatives 
alloted to the largest unions (see TUCR, 1983: 655). 
4. Even without accounting for inflation, the AUEW(E) and the GMWU 
paid out fewer dispute benefits in 1976 than any other year in the 
1970s. The attempt by GMWU officers to make an industrial response 
to the changed political and economic climate of the Social Contract 
wäs possibly reflected in the fact that its next lowest levels of 
dispute benefits in the 1970s were in 1975 and 1977, both years of 
voluntary restraint. Similarly, the AUEW paid out its next lowest 
level of dispute benefit in 1974 with 1975 and 1977 also at 
relatively low levels. The size of ASTMS changed so dramatically in 
the 1970s that it is difficult to compare levels of dispute benefit 
through the decade. However, 1976 was the lowest year in benefits 
paid out in the 1973-1979 period. Finally, the TGWU paid out its 
lowest levels of dispute benefits in 1974 and 1976 respectively. In 
terms of benefits paid out as a percentage of total membership 
contributions, TGWU dispute benefits were as follows: 1970 - 13.5%, 
1971 - 18.3%, 1972 - 13.5%, 1973 - 4.8%, 1974 - 2.6%, 1975 - 4. %, 
1976 - 2.1%, 1977 44,1978 14.9%, and 1979 - 8.2%. The 
comparatively low figures from 1974 through 1977 would seem to 
reflect an effort to minimize the number of official disputes. This 
was confirmed by a senior TGWU official who suggested that they tried 
to ensure that they were not involved in strikes which were too 
obvious or breached the policy. See ASTM R, 1974-1979; AUEW NCR, 
1972-1979; TGWUR, 1972-1979; and GMWU Accounts, 1972-1979. 
5. The Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, resigned on 16 March 1976. 
The election of his successor was held over the following three weeks 
with only Labour MPs eligible to vote. Michael Foot topped the first 
ballot with ninety votes to James Callaghan's eighty-four. The other 
aspirants, Roy Jenkins, Tony Benn, Denis Healey and Anthony Crosland, 
received fifty-six, thirty-seven, thirty and seventeen votes 
respectively. On the second ballot, Callaghan topped the poll with 
one hundred and forty-one votes to Foot's one hundred and thirty- 
three. Healey received thirty-eight votes. The result of the final 
ballot was announced on 5 April. Callaghan received one hundred and 
seventy-six votes to Foot's one hundred and thirty-nine. The result 
was, inter alia, a clear affirmation of the strength of the social 
democratic conception of the Social Contract within the PAP. 
Callaghan's victory did not, however, represent any significant shift 
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in the balance of political forces. Foot would continue to be the 
principal interlocutor of the left of the Party within the Government 
as well as a key intermediary between the Cabinet and the TUC General 
Council. Callaghan replaced Wilson as the principal interlocutor of 
the right within the PLP. 
6. The key item in the deal was cuts in public spending in order to 
achieve a rapid reduction in the Public Spending Borrowing 
Requirement (PSBR). However, it also involved a Government 
commitment to dispose of some of its holdings in British Petroleum, 
the national oil firm. This seemingly created the precedent of using 
privatization as a method of reducing the PSBR. This device was 
subsequently embraced with considerable enthusiasm by the 
Conservative Government elected in 1979. 
Chapter 7 
1. Perhaps the most notable exception was when two of the lay leaders 
of the moderate caucus in the AUEW National Committee, also Coventry 
töolmakers, successfully argued that the union should support the 
Government's Phase One policy but subsequently found themselves 
leading a toolmakers' dispute at the British Leyland Canley works in 
protest at their reduced differentials resulting from the six pound 
policy. They acceded to the AUkW executive's instruction that they 
return to work - an instruction in fact delivered by one of the more 
prominent opponents of the Social Contract incomes policies within 
the AUEW at the time (Interviews, 14 and 28 March 1980). 
2. In all of the sample unions except the AUEW, the general secretary 
played this key intermediary role. In terms of the internal and 
external political processes of the AUEW, the President was the 
approximate functional equivalent of the general secretary in the 
other sample unions. The elected AUEW general secretary played a 
somewhat unique administrative -role which often assumed more 
political overtones than was characteristic of appointed 
administrative officials in the other sample unions. Indeed, the 
formal relationship between general secretary and 'president or 
chairperson in the other unions varied considerably and was often an 
indicator of relative degrees of general secretary discretion in the 
internal policy process. In order to avoid unnecessary repetition of 
the difference between the AUEW and the other sample unions on this 
point, subsequent reference to the role of the general secretary in 
the sample unions will assume the functional equivalent, the 
president, in the case of the AUEW. 
3. The subsequent success of the moderate faction in consistently 
scouring a majority on the National Committee, particularly 
immediately prior to its restructuring in the early 1980x, was built 
on its efforts to move the 'floating' divisions away from a policy of 
independence and into the moderate organization "whip' (Interviews, 2 
June, 24 July and 29 September 1980). 
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Chapter 8 
1. Note that during Phase one support among trade unionists for the 
Government's prices and incomes policy ran higher among trade 
unionists than among non-trade unionists. However, as support for 
the policy dipped dramatically during Phase Two, the support of trade 
unionists temporarily fell below that of non-trade unionists (see 
Figure C. 1, Appendix C). Similarly, while opposition to the policies 
had run higher among non-trade unionists during Phase One, the level 
of opposition among trade unionists exceeded that among non-trade 
unionists during Phase Two. This represented a qualitative shift in 
the polling data as the level of opposition among trade unionists 
remained higher during Phases Three and Four (see Figure C. 2). 
2. In the May 1979 general election, the Conservative Party easily 
secured a parliamentary majority in one of the largest swings in 
popular vote in the postwar period. The Conservatives obtained 43.9 
per cent, Labour 36.9 per cent and the Liberals 13.8 per cent of the 
popular vote (Guardian, 5 May 1979). 
3.. The interview materials covered most the trade groups in the 
union. Minutes or conference records of four national trade group 
committees, one national section committee, and several London region 
trade groups were examined. Without being a completely comprehensive 
coverage, this material represents a relatively good cross-section of 
the different industrial groupings in the TGWU. 
4. The Government entered into a formal alliance with the Liberal 
Party in March 1977 in order to secure a Parliamentary majority (see 
Mitchie and Hoggart, 1978). In anticipation of an autumn election, 
the Liberal Party withdrew from the pact in 1978. This provided an 
additional element of instability in the Labour Government's attempt 
to enforce unilaterally a Phase Four policy. For instance, the use 
of contract sanctions for non-observance of the policy was defeated 
in Parliament. This defeat effectively undermined any further 
attempts to enforce the Phase Four guidelines in the private sector. 
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